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Increasing renewable electricity generation is a priority for the states surrounding the North 
Sea. These states rely on offshore wind energy to provide a large amount of renewable energy. 
The North Sea is a vast space, with good conditions for offshore wind: it is relatively shallow, 
and the wind blows harder, more often and more predictably than onshore.1 Recent reports 
predict a cumulative installed capacity of 40-59 gigawatts (GW) of offshore wind capacity by 
2030 and 86-127 GW by 2040.2 
Over the last few decades, the offshore wind farms (OWFs) constructed in the North Sea 
have increased in size and are located further from shore.3 The cost of the grid connection 
rises significantly when the distance to shore increases. This highlights the need for strategic 
investments in electricity transmission infrastructure to bring the electricity generated 
offshore to the onshore grid in a reliable and cost-effective way. This has motivated some 
North Sea coastal states to adopt a clustered approach for the connection of OWFs rather 
than a separate cable connection for each OWF.4  
At the same time, the EU aims to increase interconnection between the electricity markets of 
the Member States.5 The availability of interconnection capacity enables electricity to be 
traded and increases the reliability of the electricity system. However, this is only possible if 
physical links between the electricity systems of different Member States, named 
‘interconnectors’, are constructed. Most of the 82 interconnectors between EU states are 
located on land,6 but in some cases they are also located offshore, for instance to link 
electricity markets across the North Sea.7 Following the EU’s aim to increase interconnection, 
more subsea interconnections will also be built within the coming decades. 
As a result of these two factors, more cables will have to be constructed in the North Sea over 
the coming years. It is possible to combine different functions - interconnection and 
transmission of offshore-generated electricity - in so-called ‘hybrid assets’, which are cable 
 
1 E. Hau, Wind Turbines: Fundamentals, Technologies, Application, Economics (Springer, Heidelberg 2013, 3rd 
ed.), p. 677 
2 The numbers reflect the outcomes of different scenarios, and they are based on the combined predictions of 
the coastal states. ENTSO-E, ‘TYNDP 2018 Regional Insight Report – North Seas Offshore Grid, Final Version,’ 
(Brussels, 2019).  
3 WindEurope and its predecessor EWEA provide yearly offshore wind trends and statistics. In these yearly 
reports, the reported average distance to shore of all wind farms installed in a year has increased from 10,5 km 
in 2008 to 33 km in 2018. The maximum average distance was reached in 2016, with 43,5 km on average. 
4 See chapter 4.3 below. 
5 The EU has set a target of 5% interconnection in 2020 and 10% in 2030, in the Council Conclusions of 23 and 
24 October 2014: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/145397.pdf. See 
also below, chapter 3.4.1. 
6 Commission Expert Group on electricity interconnection targets, ‘Electricity interconnections with 
neighbouring countries’, p. 7. 
7 The ENTSO-E grid map gives an overview of all existing electricity infrastructure, including interconnectors: 
https://www.entsoe.eu/data/map/.  
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2 
connections that have a dual function. Eventually hybrid assets could be combined in a 
meshed offshore grid (MOG). A MOG is defined as all the electricity transmission assets that 
connect offshore generation from renewable energy sources to onshore connection points in 
two or more national electricity systems.8 In order to develop offshore electricity 
infrastructure more cost-effectively in the long term, North Sea coastal states are exploring 
the possibility of working together on offshore electricity infrastructure development and 
coordinating their regulatory efforts.9 The EU has named the ‘North Seas offshore grid’10 as a 
priority corridor in the trans-European energy network.11 
1.2 Aim and Research Question 
An important factor in the development of offshore electricity infrastructure in general, and a 
meshed offshore grid (MOG) in particular, is the legal and regulatory framework. At the 
moment, the multitude of rules in the national legal frameworks (on spatial planning, 
permitting procedures, grid connection, operational issues and decommissioning) makes it 
difficult to develop cross-border connections. At an EU law level, several rules in the current 
legal framework hold back the development of a MOG, as the legislation is not equipped to 
facilitate the combination of interconnection and transmission of offshore generated 
electricity. At an international law level, there is uncertainty about the jurisdiction over hybrid 
assets and MOG components. These legal barriers need to be addressed, as they currently 
hold back the development of offshore electricity infrastructure.12  
Without addressing these barriers, offshore electricity transmission will be developed in a less 
cost-effective way. There are multiple reasons for this. First, the costs are higher if more cables 
need to be constructed to separately cater for interconnection and connection of offshore 
wind farms, rather than integrating both functions in hybrid assets and eventually in a MOG. 
Secondly, if the legal framework differs between countries and thus makes the framework for 
cross-border assets unclear, the investments bear more risk, leading to higher capital costs. 
The administrative costs and risks associated with the development of offshore electricity 
infrastructure are also higher when permitting procedures are not streamlined. Finally, 
possible synergies from cooperation between coastal states, such as joint development of 
 
8 Author’s own definition.  
9 To this end, the states have signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 2010 and a Political Declaration in 
2016. North Seas Countries´ Offshore Grid Initiative Memorandum of Understanding, signed by Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and Sweden and the United Kingdom on 7 
December 2009 and by Norway on 2 February 2010; Political Declaration on energy cooperation between the 
North Seas Countries, agreed on 6 June 2016. 
10 The North Seas (plural), as used in the EU’s communication, comprises the North Sea as well as the Irish Sea. 
This dissertation has a more narrow focus, namely only the North Sea. This is why, except in citations and 
references, North Sea (singular) is used throughout the dissertation. 
11 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/540 of 23 November 2017 amending Regulation (EU) No 
347/2013 as regards the Union list of projects of common interest, OJ L 90, 6.4.2018, Annex VII, B(1). 
12 O. Woolley, ‘Overcoming Legal Challenges for Offshore Electricity Grid Development’, in M.M. Roggenkamp, 
O. Woolley (Eds), European Energy Law Report IX (Intersentia, 2012) p. 173. 
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OWF zones in the areas with the highest wind resources, are not delivered if cross-border 
cooperation is not facilitated by the legal framework.  
Therefore, the aim of this dissertation is to analyse how the legal framework should be 
adjusted to facilitate the cost-effective development of an offshore grid in the North Sea. The 
main research question to be answered in this dissertation is: what legal framework should 
be implemented in order to facilitate the cost-effective development of an offshore 
electricity grid in the North Sea? This main research question is answered through six sub-
questions, divided in three parts. The sub-questions and the overall structure of the 
dissertation will be covered in section 1.5.  
The word ‘should’ in the main research question indicates a normative approach, which 
requires a normative framework.13 From a legal perspective, the normative framework could 
be internal (testing the proposed solutions against the norms of the current legal framework) 
or external (testing the proposed solutions against external norms, such as cost-
effectiveness).14 In this dissertation, the normative framework is inspired by the work of O.E. 
Williamson, economist and Nobel prize winner. The specific aspect of his work that is relevant 
for this dissertation is his theory of ‘remediableness’. This theory entails, in short, that when 
different options are compared, not only the socio-economic benefits should be considered, 
but also the feasibility of the options and whether they can be implemented in practice.15 
Thus, he adds an extra criterion next to whether the option delivers net benefits. As he puts 
it, “[t]he remediableness criterion holds that an extant condition for which no feasible 
superior alternative can be described and implemented with expected net gains is presumed 
to be efficient.”16 In this dissertation, this is translated into an analysis which is based not 
purely on the economic perspective, but also on the legal, socio-political, financial and 
environmental perspective.17 Together, these perspectives give a good insight into whether 
the compared options are feasible and implementable. This is especially relevant for the legal 
framework for the MOG, as options that are not feasible or implementable in practice are not 
useful when trying to create a stable legal framework that facilitates the development of a 
MOG. 
1.3 Relevance in Relation to Previous Research Projects 
This dissertation is based on research performed in the context of EU-funded research project 
PROMOTioN (Progress on Meshed HVDC Offshore Transmission Networks).18 In this project, 
 
13 S. Taekema, ‘Theoretical and Normative Frameworks for Legal Research: Putting Theory into Practice’ Law 
and Method [2018, February]. 
14 Ibid. 
15 O.E. Williamson, ‘Strategy Research: Governance and Competence Perspectives’ Strategic Management 
Journal [1999 vol 20], p. 1092 
16 Ibid. 
17 These criteria are elaborated in section 7.2.2. 
18 The project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation 
programme under grant agreement No 691714. All information on PROMOTioN, including the research results, 
are available at www.promotion-offshore.net.  
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the technical and regulatory barriers to HVDC networks in the North Sea were addressed. The 
research on the regulatory framework consisted of three aspects, namely the legal, economic 
and financial frameworks. The University of Groningen worked together with the Florence 
School of Regulation (European University Institute) and Deutsche WindGuard, and delivered 
the research on the legal aspects of meshed offshore transmission networks.  
However, this dissertation also builds on other previous research projects which address 
either the technical characteristics and feasibility of different varieties of a MOG, 19 or the legal 
and regulatory framework needed for the development of such a grid.20 These studies on the 
legal and regulatory framework assess the legal barriers and provide several possible solutions 
to mitigate specific issues related to the current legal framework. This dissertation adds an 
extra layer compared to previous research projects by developing recommendations for 
policy-makers at international, EU and national levels, on the adoption of a concrete legal 
framework.  
The legal theoretical interest of this dissertation lies in two aspects. First, a strategy is 
developed to analyse multi-level legal frameworks, and specifically to compare and combine 
different possible legal instruments, i.e. an international law agreement in combination with 
EU law and amendments of national law. Secondly, an assessment framework is made in order 
to choose between different alternatives to address a certain issue, based on a qualitative 
informal Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA). In this dissertation, this type of assessment is used to 
address barriers in the legal framework of an offshore grid. However, it can be used more 
generally for other legislative questions where multiple alternative ways to address an issue 
exist. 
1.4 Scope 
The scope of this dissertation can be defined in different ways, namely geographically, 
temporally and based on subject matter. The aim of this dissertation is to analyse how the 
legal framework should be adjusted to facilitate the cost-effective development of an offshore 
grid in the North Sea. Therefore, the geographic scope of the legal research is the law 
applicable to the North Sea area and its coastal states: Belgium, Denmark, France (regarding 
the Channel), Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom.21 As 
 
19 An elaborate overview of all studies addressing the technical characteristics and economic feasibility of an 
offshore grid is given in P. Henneux, ‘Deliverable 1.3: Synthesis of available studies on offshore meshed HVDC 
grids’ (PROMOTioN, 2016). All PROMOTioN deliverables are available at https://www.promotion-
offshore.net/results/deliverables/. Specific studies that deserve attention in this context are the WindSpeed, 
OffshoreGrid, NorthSeaGrid, Twenties and E-Highway 2050 projects. 
20 H.K. Müller, A Legal Framework for a Transnational Offshore Grid in the North Seas (Intersentia, 2016); O. 
Woolley (2012); PwC, Tractebel Engineering, Ecofys, Study on regulatory matters concerning the development 
of the North Sea offshore energy potential, January 2016. 
21 Sometimes, Iceland is also mentioned in the context of North Sea offshore electricity infrastructure, see for 
example the IceLink project: https://www.landsvirkjun.com/researchdevelopment/submarinecabletoeurope. 
However, it is likely that this remains a point-to-point interconnector, rather than that Iceland is incorporated 
in a meshed offshore grid. This is because the distance to Iceland is much greater than between the other 
North Sea coastal states. 
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mentioned above, international law and EU law are also included in this research; they are 
treated as far as needed based on the subject matter, and where solutions are formulated 
with the North Sea area in mind. The recommendations of this dissertation could also be used 
to a certain extent for the legal framework of offshore electricity grid developments in the 
Baltic Sea, as this is also a relatively shallow sea with offshore wind developments and where 
the coastal states have an ambition to increase the interconnection capacity. Nevertheless, it 
obviously reaches beyond the scope of this dissertation to also examine the national legal 
systems of the Baltic Sea coastal states in detail.22 
From a temporal perspective, the starting point of this dissertation is the legal framework 
applicable as of 2019. However, this dissertation aims to make recommendations on the 
future legal framework that needs to develop in the long term in order to facilitate the 
development of a MOG. Therefore, the temporal scope of this dissertation reaches out to 
between 2040 and 2050. This is, on the one hand, quite a long timeframe, but on the other 
hand, not too far ahead either: developments in the offshore energy sector are planned with 
a long time horizon, which means that the more complicated grid connections, for which the 
legal framework needs to be amended, will be constructed from 2030 onwards with the full 
complexity of the MOG perhaps only reached by 2040-2050. However, at the same time, it is 
difficult to predict developments too far ahead, as there are too many variables and unknown 
developments. Therefore, recommendations for a legal framework beyond 2050 will not be 
made. Hybrid assets can be considered as an intermediate step in this regard: they are already 
developing,23 and will continue to do so during the coming decade. In the conclusion of this 
dissertation, the timeframe for implementing each recommendation (short term or long term) 
is indicated. 
Finally, in terms of subject matter, the scope of the dissertation is offshore electricity 
infrastructure, developing towards a MOG. Important features of the MOG are that it is 
located mainly offshore and that it connects offshore generated electricity to the onshore 
networks of at least two countries. Although the main focus is the electricity transmission 
infrastructure, the legislative framework for offshore wind farms is also included where 
relevant, as the grid and the wind farms connected to it depend on each other to a large 
extent. 
1.5 Structure of the Dissertation 
The dissertation consists of three parts. Part I analyses the status quo, the current legal 
frameworks at an international, EU and national level. The second part focuses on how the 
 
22 Instead, the Baltic InteGrid project provides an excellent overview of the legal framework and legal barriers 
for an offshore grid in the Baltic Sea: I. Bergmann et al., Establishing a meshed offshore grid: policy and 
regulatory aspects and barriers. July 2018. See also: C. Bergaentzlé, B. Egelund Olsen, A. Hoffrichter, P. Isojärvi, 
F. Marco, B. Martin, L.L. Pade and H. Veinla, Paving the way to a meshed offshore grid: Recommendations for 
an efficient policy and regulatory framework (Baltic Integrid 2019). 
23 The project ‘Kriegers Flak Combined Grid Solution’ is the first hybrid project. See section 3.5.2 for a 
description of this project. 
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new legal framework for offshore electricity infrastructure should be formed, i.e. which legal 
instruments can be used for this. The third part ‘fills in’ the legal instruments that are 
recommended in part II with proposals for concrete measures.  
The main research question (‘what legal framework should be implemented in order to 
facilitate the cost-effective development of an offshore electricity grid in the North Sea?’) is 
thus answered through several sub-questions, divided between the three parts. The chapter 
structure of the dissertation reflects these sub-questions: in each chapter, one sub-question 
is addressed. The different parts of the dissertation and the chapter structure with the sub-
questions are detailed below. 
Part I – The Current Legal Framework for Offshore Electricity Infrastructure in the North Sea 
A comparative overview of international, European and national law 
 
In the first part, the current legal frameworks on the international, EU and national levels are 
analysed. The aim of this part is to ‘set the scene’ for the rest of the dissertation, and to assess 
what parts of the current legal framework are currently holding back the development of an 
offshore grid. The sub-questions of this part are: 
 
Chapter 2 What is the legal basis for a legal framework for an offshore grid under 
international law and what legal barriers at international law level are holding 
back the development of an offshore grid? 
Chapter 3 What is the legal basis for legislation on the North Sea offshore grid under EU 
law and what legal barriers at EU law level are holding back the development 
of an offshore grid? 
Chapter 4 What are the current legal frameworks applicable in the different North Sea 
coastal states, namely Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom? 
 
 
Part II – A New Legal Framework for Offshore Electricity Infrastructure in the North Sea 
Proposals for a Multi-level Legal Framework under a Framework Treaty 
The second part assesses what legal instruments should be used to address the legal barriers 
identified in the first part. The choice of legal instruments is an important strategic choice in 
the legal framework, because each type of legal instrument has its advantages and 
disadvantages. The sub-questions of this part are: 
 
Chapter 5 How should we decide which level of law and legal instrument is most suitable 
(based on the principles mentioned below) to address a certain issue? Which 
instruments should be used for the legal framework for a MOG? 








The suitability of legal instruments for a certain topic is based on whether they fit within the 
legal-dogmatic framework, related to, for example, subsidiarity and proportionality, pre-
emption of EU law and practical considerations such as whether enforcement of the 
instrument is important and whether it is important that all North Sea states participate.  
 
In chapter 6, the mixed partial agreement, which is, on the basis of the assessment in chapter 
5, proposed as a backbone for the legal framework, is explored in more detail. Examples of 
how a mixed partial agreement can be used both in the environmental and economic sphere 
are elaborated upon, and different elements of these agreements are applied to the case of a 
North Sea MOG.  
 
Part III – Substantiating the Rules: Concrete Proposals for the Development of an Offshore 
Grid 
Analysis of the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Measures to be Adopted to Facilitate the 
Offshore Grid 
 
In the third part, the legal backbone structure proposed in Part II is ‘filled in’ with concrete 
measures. Different alternative concrete measures are weighed against each other and 
assessed on the basis of a qualitative informal CBA. The sub-questions in this part are: 
 
Chapter 7 Which concrete measures to address the barriers identified in Part I are 
feasible and lead to the cost-effective development of a MOG in the North 
Sea? 
Chapter 8 What legal framework should be implemented in order to facilitate the cost-
effective development of an offshore electricity grid in the North Sea? 
 
In chapter 8, the conclusion, the main research question of this dissertation is answered. This 
chapter lists the conclusions and recommendations based on the different parts of this 
dissertation and presents the full picture: the recommendations for a legal framework that 
facilitates the development of a MOG in the North Sea. Since Part II and III both deliver 
recommendations on the way in which a legal framework can be developed that facilitates 
the cost-effective development of an offshore grid, the approach in this concluding chapter is 
normative. The chapter concludes with a future outlook to possible new developments (such 
as offshore energy storage and conversion) and with recommendations for further research.  
 
1.6 Methodology 
As a preliminary remark, it is important to keep in mind that the legal framework does not 
stand alone: it is part of a more complex system that also involves other regulatory matters, 
such as the economic regulation and financing options for an offshore grid, as well as the 
technical feasibility of different grid options. This unavoidably gives the dissertation an 
interdisciplinary element, which is visible mostly in parts II and III.  
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In Part I, the international, EU and national legal frameworks are analysed. The methodology 
for chapters 2 and 3 is legal-dogmatic research. Legal-dogmatic research asks, “what the law 
is in a particular area”,24 which in the context of this dissertation is the currently applicable 
legal framework for offshore wind and offshore grid activities, at an international and EU law 
level. Chapter 2 and 3 are thus mainly descriptive, although chapter 2 includes a part where 
the existing law is applied to several elements of an offshore grid, and in both chapters, it is 
analysed where the current legal framework may cause barriers to the development of a 
MOG.  
 
Chapter 4 presents a comparative approach of the national legal frameworks. For this chapter, 
the ‘functional method’ of comparative law is used.25 In this case, the substantive law of the 
eight North Sea states is analysed in relation to the topics that are relevant for the 
development of the MOG: maritime spatial planning, permitting procedures, connection 
responsibilities, support schemes, offshore grid operation and decommissioning obligations. 
How these topics are dealt with in the different legal systems is assessed, and these are 
compared to each other so as to find out whether they facilitate the development towards a 
MOG.  
 
In chapter 5, first, several main theories of (political) decision-making are used to explain the 
development of a legal framework for the offshore grid. Then, on the basis of these decision-
making theories and the legal-dogmatic boundaries to certain instruments, a decision tree is 
developed in order to decide which level of legislation to use in order to address a certain 
issue in a multi-level context. This method is then applied to the issues identified in the Part I 
of this dissertation.  
Chapter 6 uses a legal-dogmatic approach to the legal instrument ‘mixed partial agreement’. 
This is based on how EU Member-States can engage in agreements with third states on topics 
for which they have transferred competence to the EU, which is an important topic in EU 
external relations law. Then, a comparison between different types of mixed partial 
agreements is made. Finally, an analysis is added of how such an instrument could be used as 
a framework treaty that serves as a backbone for the legal framework for a meshed offshore 
grid. 
In chapter 7, a qualitative law-and-economics approach is used to evaluate the different 
alternatives for measures to address the barriers in Part I of the dissertation, and to come to 
recommendations on which options should be recommended for the legal framework. The 
instrument used for this assessment is the ‘informal qualitative CBA’,26 in which the different 
alternatives for each policy issue are assessed based on different perspectives, namely the 
 
24 I .Dobinson, F. Johns, ‘Legal Research as Qualitative Research’ in M. McConville, WH. Chui (Eds) Research 
Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press 2017) 18-47, p. 21. 
25 M. Van Hoecke, 'Methodology of Comparative Legal Research', Law and Method [2015, December] para 4.1. 
26 A. Sinden, ‘Formality and Informality in Cost Benefit Analysis’, Utah Law Review [2015, 93], 95-171.   
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economic, legal, political, financial and environmental perspective. Through this normative 
approach, both the cost-effectiveness and the feasibility of the options are compared.27 The 
full methodology for this chapter is described in section 7.2 of this dissertation. 
 
As mentioned in section 1.3, a large part of the research in this dissertation is based on earlier 
research within the context of Horizon2020 research project PROMOTioN. Within the context 
of this project, the findings on the legal framework for the MOG have been regularly presented 
to a large group of stakeholders. The group of stakeholders included representatives from the 
relevant ministries of the North Sea coastal states, the transmission system operators and 
national regulatory authorities of these states and representatives of the offshore wind energy 
industry.28 In the presentations on the ongoing research, the reactions of the stakeholders, 
both in the form of questions and in the form of suggestions, were noted and used to improve 
the research. In order to make sure that the research was not influenced by one group of 
stakeholders in particular, the research was presented to a large group of stakeholders, at 
different locations and on different occasions, namely at closed meetings such as the meetings 
of the North Sea Energy Cooperation (NSEC), in which the European Commission, the relevant 
ministries, TSOs (Transmission System Operators) and NRAs (National Regulatory Authorities) 
of the coastal states are represented, and at open meetings such as side events to the 
WindEurope (Offshore) Wind summits and conferences (2017; 2018; 2019) and at conferences 
organised by neighbouring projects (Baltic InteGrid; NorthSee; Baltic Lines).29  
1.7 Introduction to Offshore Transmission Infrastructure 
This dissertation focuses on the legal framework for offshore electricity infrastructure. 
Nevertheless, without an understanding of the technical basis of offshore electricity grids, it 
is difficult to understand the legal framework. Therefore, in this section, the difference 
between onshore and offshore grids is explained, different components of offshore electricity 
transmission infrastructure are introduced, the difference between alternating current (AC) 
and direct current (DC) technology is explained and different possible scenarios for how the 
grid could develop are shown.  
1.7.1 Differences between Onshore and Offshore Grids 
An important first question in the context of this dissertation is whether there is a difference 
between onshore and offshore grids, and if so, whether this difference justifies a distinction 
in the legal framework between onshore and offshore grids.  
A first main difference is that the onshore electricity grids connect both electricity consumers 
and electricity producers. As the reliance of electricity consumers on the electricity network is 
large, high investments are made in the reliability of all elements of the onshore network. In 
 
27 O.E. Williamson, ‘Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost Economics Perspective’, Journal of 
Law, Economics, & Organization [1999, Vol. 15, No. 1], 306-342. 
28 S. Menze, A. Wagner, ‘Deliverable 7.10 on Stakeholder Interaction’, PROMOTioN (forthcoming). 
29 A full list of stakeholder interaction moments is available in Menze, Wagner (forthcoming).  
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other words, the ‘Loss of Load Probability’ should be as low as possible, as the ‘value of lost 
load’ (VoLL), a monetary indicator expressing the costs associated with an interruption of 
electricity supply,30 is very high onshore. For the offshore grid, this is different. The main 
purpose of a MOG is the connection of offshore wind farms to coastal states. With (almost) 
no load (electricity demand) connected to the offshore HVDC system, the requirements with 
regard to grid reliability can be lower than for an onshore system to which (household) 
consumers and critical systems for society, such as the railways and telecommunications 
system, are connected.  
The only two possibilities for offshore electricity consumption (load) that are currently being 
investigated, are offshore oil and gas platforms that could electrify their systems and 
compressors,31 and conversion of electricity to another energy carrier, such as hydrogen (H2) 
or methane (CH4).32 However, platforms will often keep generators as backup electricity 
supply, and short interruptions of these processes, in the case of an emergency, will not lead 
to large operational consequences for the platforms. It must be noted, however, that a sudden 
drop in offshore electricity production can still lead to severe consequences for society,33 if 
the onshore grid (including the fast response facilities such as thermal power plants, especially 
gas-fired power plants) does not have sufficient capacity to react to this drop of production 
offshore. This requires a high level of coordination between offshore (HVDC) and onshore (AC) 
electricity system on how outages are treated and on the maximum amount of lost infeed 
from the offshore grid that the onshore (AC) system is able to handle.  
Thus, due to the lower amount of connections and the different nature of the connections, 
the reliability standards for a MOG can be lower than for an onshore grid - but it must be 
noted that a MOG must still fulfil certain requirements with regard to grid reliability, as the 
onshore networks will experience a shortage when the infeed from the offshore grid is 
suddenly lost, and this may cause problems in the onshore grid. 
A second difference between the offshore and onshore grids is that for the onshore grid, there 
is a market presumption that the grid acts as a copper plate. This means that within a bidding 
zone, electricity can be transmitted freely from A to B, without any grid constraints.34 In an 
 
30 T. Schröder, W. Kuckshinrichs, ‘Value of Lost Load: An Efficient Economic Indicator for Power Supply 
Security? A Literature Review’, Frontiers in Energy Research [Dec 2015]. 
31 They currently mostly use fossil fuels for their systems and compressors. The possibility to connect offshore 
platforms to an offshore electricity grid is investigated in the research project North Sea Energy System 
Integration, https://www.north-sea-energy.eu/.  
32 See for example H. Blanco, A. Faaij, ‘A review at the role of storage in energy systems with a focus on Power 
to Gas and long-term storage’, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews [2018, Volume 81(1)] 1049-1086. 
33 See for an example of what happens when a large power loss occurs the technical report with regard to the 
outage of a gas fired power plant and an offshore wind farm, which led to a cumulation of different events and 
eventually to a black-out for more than 1 million people in the UK. National Grid, ‘Technical Report on the 
events of 9 August 2019’, 6 September 2019. 
34 In the EU Electricity Market Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2019/943, art. 2(65)), bidding zones are defined as 
‘the largest geographical area within which market participants are able to exchange energy without capacity 
allocation’. The delineation of bidding zones is important for the functioning of the electricity market: “An 
 
1




offshore grid, the capacity is more limited than onshore, which means that more grid 
constraints exist and that the offshore grid does not work like a copper plate. It must be noted 
that, in reality, the copper plate presumption does not always work for the onshore grid 
either, as there may also be grid constraints on the onshore grid. However, these constraints 
are not the responsibility of the market participants but of the TSO(s). When there are grid 
constraints in the onshore grid, these grid constraints are addressed by the relevant TSO by 
means of redispatch,35 which means that market participants do not have to take into account 
possible grid constraints, as this is the responsibility of the TSO. 
A third difference relates to the historical development of the network. Whereas the onshore 
electricity grid has developed gradually over the past century, the MOG can be considered as 
a greenfield network that is planned and developed in a much shorter timeframe.36 The time 
pressure for the development of a MOG is also high, since the coastal states’ ambitions on the 
development of offshore wind energy on the North Sea in the context of the energy transition 
are also high. 
Then, the question arises as to whether these differences justify the introduction of a different 
regulatory treatment for the offshore grid compared to the already existing rules for the 
onshore grid. There are various arguments for why the differences justify a different legislative 
and regulatory treatment. First, the risks and responsibilities are different for the offshore 
grid, due to the fact that there are no (or hardly any) electricity consumers connected to the 
offshore grid. This justifies different regulatory standards. Secondly, the absence of a ‘copper 
plate’ at sea justifies different market rules for the offshore grid. Thirdly, from a technical 
perspective, some of the operational rules, designed for onshore systems, do not work for 
subsea systems.37 Finally, the historical development of the onshore grid was first local, then 
national and finally cross-border, whereas the development of a MOG in the North Sea is 
inherently cross-border.38 This justifies a cross-border approach to the regulatory framework.  
A counter-argument against having separate legislative treatment for offshore grids compared 
to the onshore grid is that it complicates the legal framework for the electricity sector and 
that it decreases the unity and coherence of the current legal framework. However, this can 
 
optimal delineation of bidding zones should promote robust price signals for efficient short-term utilisation and 
long-term development of the power system, whilst at the same time limiting system costs, including balancing 
costs and redispatch actions undertaken by TSOs.” Ofgem, ‘Bidding Zones Literature Review, 2014, p. 2. 
35 See https://www.next-kraftwerke.com/knowledge/dispatch for an explanation and visualization of this 
process. 
36 M. Walser, F. Wagner (UCTE), ‘The 50 Year Success Story – Evolution of a European Interconnected Grid’, 
Secretariat of UCTE 2009. 
37 This relates to the technology choice, going from Alternating Current (AC) to High Voltage Direct Current 
(HVDC). See chapter 1.7.3, 3.4.6 and 7.3.6. 
38 The value added by a meshed offshore grid rather than in separate offshore wind connections lies in the 
ability to connect multiple countries. This is why an offshore grid in the North Sea is inherently cross-border. In 
the U.S.A., there are plans to construct an ‘offshore backbone’ along the East Coast, which connects OWFs and 
which fortifies the onshore grid. In that specific situation, there is no cross-border aspect as the entire grid 
would be located off the coast of the U.S.A. without connections to other states. However, in the North Sea, 
this is not the case and the MOG will be inherently cross-border. 
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be mitigated as most of the electricity sector’s legal framework, and the principles on which it 
is based, can be preserved and used for the offshore grid as well, except for the specific issues 
mentioned above. In the author’s opinion, this counter-argument is not strong enough to 
offset the arguments for why separate rules for the offshore grid are justified, which is why a 
separate legal framework for the offshore grid is investigated in this dissertation. 
1.7.2 Offshore Grid Components 
The different components of a typical offshore wind farm with connection to the onshore grid 
are as follows. An offshore wind farm consists of many individual wind turbines, which consist 
of a foundation and a turbine. The foundation can be a ‘monopile’, a jacket, tripod or a floating 
foundation – in the North Sea, the monopile is used most frequently.39   
 
Image 1: Wind Turbine Foundations. Source: Stiftung OFFSHORE-WINDENERGIE 
Different turbines inside an OWF are linked together by submarine cables. These cables are 
usually called ‘inter-array cables.’40 These cables collect the electricity and lead it to a 
converter station, a technical installation where the voltage is increased.41 This is necessary 
for transmission over longer distances, because the higher the voltage, the lower the losses 
of energy during transmission. Moreover, the electronic equipment of a converter station can 
filter out voltage fluctuations of the wind farm. In this way, it delivers a more constant output 
of electricity.  
From the converter station, long transmission cables lead to the nearest onshore connection 
point. Here, again, a converter station is placed, in order to convert the electricity to the right 
 
39 WindEurope, ‘Key Trends and Statistics 2018’, p. 29. 
40 In this context, the word ‘array’ refers to the ordered series/arrangement of wind turbines. ‘Array’ (noun) in 
Oxford Dictionary, second meaning ‘an ordered series or arrangement’. Examples of usage of ‘inter-array 
cable(s)’ in practice: http://www.nordseeone.com/engineering-construction/inter-array-cable.html, 
https://www.prysmiangroup.com/en/products-and-solutions/power-grids/offhsore-wind-farm/inter-array-
cable-systems.   
41 There is one exception to this, and that is small near-coast OWFs, such as the OWFs developed in the early 
development stages of offshore wind. Nearshore OWFs generally do not have an offshore converter station but 
rather have cables leading directly to the shore, with a converter station onshore. As the public opinion about 
OWFs close to shore is generally negative, this situation does not occur often any more. 
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quality to be connected to the onshore electricity grid. In a radial connection,42 as in the image 
below, the cable to the shore is called an ‘export cable’. Below, a schematic overview of the 
radial connection of an OWF is given, with wind turbines, an offshore converter station, inter-
array cables between the turbines and the converter station and an export cable between the 
offshore converter station and the onshore grid.  
 
Image 2: Radial Connection of Offshore Wind Farm. Source: TenneT  
For a meshed offshore grid, roughly the same components will be needed as for a radial 
connection: an offshore grid connects multiple offshore wind farms, via multiple converters, 
to at least two coastal states. Therefore, the electricity can flow in at least two directions (or 
more, if more states are connected). The cables in a meshed offshore grid are not considered 
‘export cables’ any more, as the cables are used for different electricity flows as well, and not 
solely for the ‘export’ of the electricity of the OWF.43 How they are named instead is still 
subject to discussion – it depends on the function and the complexity of the grid. In this 
dissertation, the cables in a connection between at least one OWF and at least two coastal 
states are called ‘hybrid assets’, as they serve the dual purpose of connecting OWFs and 
interconnection. This type of cable is also called a ‘Windconnector’,44 or a ‘Combined Grid 
Solution’.45 For more complicated grid connections,46 no specific names have been developed 
for specific cables. The general name ‘meshed offshore grid’ (MOG) can be used for all cables 
and other grid assets, such as converter stations, that together form such a grid. 
1.7.3 AC or DC Technology 
The goal of transmission grids is to transport electricity over long distances. Electricity 
transport can take place with two types of current, namely alternating and direct current. 
 
42 In a radial connection, an OWF is connected by a single connection directly to the onshore grid. The cable can 
only be used by the OWF as there no other entities connected to the cable.  
43 As an exception, it must be noted that in the Netherlands, the radial connections to the OWFs are considered 
part of the “offshore grid”. However, as there is only one direction of the electricity, from the OWFs towards 
the onshore grid, and no connections between different OWFs, this is different than a meshed offshore grid. 
The cables part of the Dutch “offshore grid” are thus still considered ‘export cables’. 
44 See for example: https://www.tennet.eu/news/detail/study-suggests-a-windconnector-linking-dutch-and-gb-
electricity-markets-and-offshore-wind-farms-coul/.  
45 By Energinet and 50Hertz, for the project Kriegers Flak Combined Grid Solution. See section 3.5.2 below. 
46 See section 1.7.4 below for an explanation of possible offshore grid development scenarios. 
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Alternating current (AC) has a continually changing voltage and direction of the current. The 
onshore electricity grids throughout Europe change the direction of the current 50 times per 
second; a stable frequency of 50 Hertz. If the frequency deviates substantially from 50 Hertz, 
this may lead to serious issues and eventually blackouts.47  
With direct current (DC), the electricity current keeps the same direction and the voltage also 
stays the same. DC is used in appliances with batteries and most electronic circuits (via an 
adapter). In addition, DC can also be used for long-distance bulk transmission of energy: over 
long distances, high voltage direct current (HVDC) have lower electricity losses than high 
voltage AC current.48 Therefore, for offshore cables from approx. 40-100 km onwards, it is 
more efficient to use HVDC.49 Another reason to use HVDC current for an offshore grid in the 
North Sea is that the various AC transmission grids around the North Sea are not synchronous 
with each other.50 With DC, asynchronous zones can be connected to each other. 
1.7.4 Grid Development Scenarios 
An offshore electricity grid in the North Sea can be designed in different ways, for example 
through a hub-based approach or a decentralised approach.51 These different ways are 
analysed in various studies in order to find the most cost-effective grid design.52 It is clear that 
such a grid will not be constructed overnight, but that this is a long process in which different 
connections are added at different moments.53 This makes it difficult to predict which scenario 
resembles most closely the way in which the grid is going to be developed. The legislative 
 
47 See for example National Grid, ‘Technical Report on the events of 9 August 2019’, 6 September 2019. 
48 M.M. Roggenkamp, R.L. Hendriks, B.C. Ummels, W.L. Kling, ‘Market and regulatory aspects of trans-national 
offshore electricity networks for wind power interconnection’ Wind Energy [2010 vol. 13], p. 484. 
49 D. van Hertem, ‘Drivers for the Development of HVDC Grids’, in D. van Hertem, O. Gomis-Bellmunt, J. Liang, 
HVDC Grids (Wiley/IEEE Press 2016) p. 19. 
50 There are three synchronous zones around the North Sea: Continental Europe; Nordic and United Kingdom. 
HVDC cables link these zones to each other. 
51 In a hub-based approach, several OWFs are connected to a ‘hub’. The second step is that different hubs are 
connected to each other and to several coastal states. A decentralised approach connects OWFs directly to 
each other and to several coastal chains. A decentralised approach is more logical in the case of a “chain” of 
OWFs between two coastal states, whereas the hub-based approach is more logical when OWFs are located in 
circles around central converter stations. See image 3. 
52 In the PROMOTioN project, these development scenarios are referred to as ‘topologies’. Topology is defined 
as ‘the way in which constituent parts are interrelated or arranged’ in the Oxford Dictionary. For the offshore 
grid, it refers to the way in which wind farms and converter stations are linked to each other and to the 
onshore grids of the coastal states. In earlier studies, the different ways in which the grid could develop have 
simply been called ‘scenarios’, but this term may lead to confusion as there are also other types of scenarios, 
such as ENTSO-E scenarios of the development of load and generation that are used as input for grid modelling. 
In this dissertation, the different ways an offshore grid could develop are referred to as ‘offshore grid 
development scenarios’. 
53 Müller 2016, p. 327. 
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framework for an offshore grid should be adaptable to different offshore grid development 
scenarios. This makes it robust for future grid developments.  
 
Image 3: Offshore grid development scenarios. Source: J. van Uden (TenneT) 
In image 3 above, different offshore grid development scenarios used in the PROMOTiON 
project are shown.54 The left image is the ‘business-as-usual’ scenario in which OWFs are 
connected radially and separate interconnectors exist to connect coastal states and to 
exchange electricity. The middle image is a decentralised approach in which meshes 
(additional connections) are created between OWFs that are close to each other within the 
same coastal state’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ),55 and with some additional cross-border 
links. The image on the right shows a hub-based approach (in which two artificial islands are 
visible), which involves OWFs that are connected to ‘hubs’ that are then connected to each 
other. Which of these scenarios resembles the actual development of the MOG depends on 
many factors, including technological and economic factors but also the legal and regulatory 
framework in which the grid is developed. It must be noted that these three scenarios should 
be considered as extremes; the actual development of the grid may also lie between different 
scenarios. 
1.8 Design Principles for a Legal Framework 
Section 1.7 makes clear that there are various technical aspects to take into account, even in 
a dissertation that is written from a legal and regulatory perspective. These technical aspects 
can be translated into an important design principle for the legal framework. As the exact 
technical characteristics of the offshore grid are not yet known, because the underlying 
technologies are still developing and as the grid could still develop towards different offshore 
grid development scenarios, it is important that the legal framework for offshore electricity 
infrastructure is able to cope with uncertainty around the abovementioned issues and around 
other, currently still unknown, future developments. By taking uncertainty into account, the 
proposed new legal framework will not be outdated by the time it is implemented. This 
 
54 Earlier research projects have similar scenarios (radial; meshed; hub-based). See for example S. Cole, P. 
Martinot, S. Rapoport (Tractebel Engineering), G. Papaefthymiou (ECOFYS) V. Gori (PwC), ‘Study of the Benefits 
of a Meshed Offshore Grid in Northern Seas Region’, July 2014, p. 52 and further; NSCOGI, Working Group 2 
Market and Regulatory Issues, ‘Integrated Offshore Networks and the Electricity Target Model, Final Report’ 
2014, p. 2. 
55 See chapter 2.2.1 for an explanation of the different maritime zones. 
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increases the value of the recommendations for the legal framework, as they will keep their 
relevance for a longer period.  
Another important design principle is that the legal framework needs to take into account the 
multi-level and multi-actor character of the topic of offshore electricity grids. As will be shown 
in the following chapters, the legal framework for offshore electricity infrastructure has 
several layers, as it is affected by international law, EU law and national law (which is 
sometimes even divided again between national and sub-national level). Moreover, what 
makes the legal framework for offshore electricity infrastructure very interesting, is the many 
different actors and interests that exist in this sector. This creates several tensions that are 
reflected in the current legal framework.  
For example, there is a tension between governments, regulated network operators and 
market-based OWF owners on the question of which entity should be responsible for which 
part of the grid, and how responsibilities should be rewarded via grid tariffs, taxes or electricity 
prices. This tension leads to a different balance and division of responsibilities in different 
North Sea coastal states. This is reflected in the currently divergent national legal frameworks 
on the connection responsibility for OWFs. Also, there is a tension between focusing on short 
term developments (reaching for the low-hanging fruits first) versus focusing on what will be 
needed in order to reach the targets set for 2050. Finally, there is a tension between the 
environmental interest of adhering to the greenhouse gas reductions laid down in the Paris 
Agreement,56 which requires large scale OWFs and a correspondingly large offshore electricity 
grid, and the protection of the maritime environment in general and certain species affected 
by the construction or operation of OWFs. This tension is reflected in (maritime) spatial 
planning law and the procedures for permitting and licensing. These tensions, the actors and 
interests behind the tensions, and the inevitable complexity of multi-level legislation, should 
be taken into account in the design of a future legal framework for the MOG. 
Throughout this dissertation, these design principles are reflected. The multiple layers come 
back in chapters 2, 3 and 4. The different actors and the decision-making needed for this are 
explained in chapter 5, and the uncertainty surrounding the future offshore grid development 
scenarios and technologies is reflected in the many choices presented in chapter 7. In chapter 
8, both design principles are reflected in the recommendations for a future legal framework 
for a MOG.  
 
56 Paris Agreement, Paris, 12 December 2015, U.N.T.S. I-54113, art. 2. 
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2 Offshore Electricity Infrastructure under International Law  
 
When discussing the legal aspects of the construction and operation of an electricity grid, one 
needs to distinguish between onshore and offshore grids. States’ competences to make rules 
and to enforce them onshore differ from offshore. Onshore, the competence to make rules 
and to enforce them derives from the territorial jurisdiction, which entails that states have the 
competence to rule over all activities that take place on their territory.57 However, for offshore 
activities, the competence to make rules and enforce them is based on the law of the sea and 
depends on the location and the nature of the activity that needs to be regulated. The 
question therefore arises, to what extent do the North Sea coastal states have the 
competence to regulate different components of an offshore grid? It is essential to investigate 
to what extent states have this competence, as it determines whether they can declare their 
laws applicable to an offshore grid. Moreover, as will be explained in more detail in the next 
chapter, the applicability of EU law on the grid also depends on whether states themselves 
have competence to regulate the grid. 
 
In this chapter, the question of legislative competence of coastal states will be answered on 
the basis of the applicable law of the sea. An important source of law of the sea is the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).58 The development of UNCLOS will be 
addressed below. This convention distinguishes between different maritime zones, which will 
be treated afterwards. Then, the provisions of UNCLOS regarding competence in the different 
maritime zones will be applied to the different components of an offshore grid. In this chapter, 
it becomes clear that legal uncertainty over the extent of competence persists, especially in 
the case of a more complex offshore grid. Therefore, different strategies to mitigate this legal 
uncertainty will be discussed. The chapter ends by answering the research question: What is 
the legal basis for a legal framework for an offshore grid under international law and what 
legal barriers at an international law level are holding back the development of an offshore 
grid? 
 
2.1 History of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
The rules on jurisdiction over different activities at sea can be found in the law of the sea. The 
history of the law of the sea goes back many centuries. It was most famously advanced by 
Hugo Grotius who elaborated the doctrine of mare liberum. Under this doctrine, the seas 
could not be claimed by one nation but instead were accessible to all nations.59 As 
international law of the sea developed, one clear exception to the freedom of the seas was a 
zone close to the shore which was treated as part of the coastal state’s territory, stretching as 
far as the coastal state could defend itself, which was, based on the military technology of a 
few hundred years ago, only a limited number of nautical miles.60  
 
57 M.N. Shaw, International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2008, sixth edition), p. 490. 
58 Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, 
Montego Bay, 1982, U.N.T.S I-31363 (hereinafter: UNCLOS).  
59 H. Grotius, Mare Liberum (Elzevier, 1609); Shaw 2008, p. 553-554. 
60 Shaw 2008, p. 554. 




In the 20th century, as nautical defence technologies developed and the interest in the natural 
resources in the sea and seabed rapidly increased,61 the legal regime applicable to activities in 
the sea has developed in parallel.62 In 1958, this led to a series of conventions which aimed at 
codifying the then applicable customary international law relating to the sea.63 Soon after, the 
concept of exclusive economic rights was developed when states unilaterally started claiming 
such rights.64 After several failed attempts to codify the concept of exclusive rights, the third 
Law of the Sea Conference, which held 11 sessions between 1973 and 1982, produced the 
‘United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’ (UNCLOS). This convention repeated many 
rules from earlier legal documents, but also included new provisions, for example with regard 
to the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).65 UNCLOS entered into force in 1994 and is signed and 
ratified by most states in the world, including the coastal states of the North Sea, as well as by 
the EU, via its predecessor, the European Economic Community (EEC).66  
 
2.2 Substantive Law under UNCLOS relevant to an Offshore Grid 
2.2.1 Competences of Coastal States in Different Maritime Zones 
UNCLOS defines several different maritime zones and stipulates which rights coastal States 
and other states have in these zones. These will be explained below, starting with the zone 
closest to the shore, the territorial zone. 
 
2.2.1.1  Territorial Zone 
The first zone as seen from the coast is the territorial zone. It extends to 12 nautical miles 
(22.2 kilometres) from the low water baseline.67 The seabed and the subsoil are also part of 
this zone.68 The territorial zone is considered an extension of the land territory. Thus, the full 
territorial sovereignty that states have on their land territory is extended to the territorial 
waters as well.69 Therefore, in principle, national laws can also apply to this zone. The coastal 




62 A. Oude Elferink, ‘Artificial Islands, Installations and Structures’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International 
Law (2013), para 8. 
63 First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous 
Zone, Convention on the High Seas, Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High 
Seas and the Convention on the Continental Shelf, Geneva, 1958. Except for the Convention on the High Seas, 
which was circumscribed as being ‘generally declaratory of established principles of international law’, these 
conventions contained both codification of existing rules and new rules. M.N. Shaw, International Law, p. 555. 
64 W.C. Extavour, The Exclusive Economic Zone (Institut universitaire de hautes études internationales, 1979), p. 
171. The concept was introduced, albeit indirectly, at the Second Law of the Sea Conference in 1960. 
65 UNCLOS Part V. 
66 United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea: 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm.  
67 UNCLOS, art. 3. For a definition, see: G. K. Walker (Ed.), Definitions for the Law of the Sea: Terms Not Defined 
by the 1982 Convention (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012), p. 239. 
68 UNCLOS, art. 2 (2). 
69 UNCLOS, art. 2 (1), although there is a limitation in art. 2(3): the sovereignty over this zone is exercised 
subject to this Convention and to other rules of international law.  
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One important limitation to the coastal state’s sovereignty is the right of innocent passage, 
which is part of the freedom of navigation. A coastal state cannot construct obstacles in such 
a way that it hampers the other states’ innocent passage. However, coastal states may 
regulate innocent passage of ships for (amongst others) the protection of cables and 
pipelines.70 This is done, for example, by having shipping lanes in place to guide the main 
shipping traffic. It is important to note that the laying of cables or pipelines by other states is 
not an activity of innocent passage. Therefore, as soon as any cable enters the territorial zone 
of a coastal state, it falls under the coastal state’s jurisdiction. 
 
2.2.1.2 Continental Shelf 
The next zone described in UNCLOS is the continental shelf. The continental shelf is defined 
as the seabed and subsoil beyond the territorial zone that can nonetheless be considered a 
‘natural prolongation of [the state’s] land territory’.71 The continental shelf is mostly relevant 
for the extraction of resources in the seabed or subsoil, such as oil and gas. Coastal states have 
‘sovereign rights’ over these resources,72 as far as that does not limit the rights of all other 
states, such as the freedom of navigation.73  
 
It is important to note that ‘sovereign rights’, as a concept, differs from ‘sovereignty’. 
Sovereignty in the law of the sea is related only to the territorial sea, it “implies that the 
territorial sea is the extension of the continental territory.”74 ‘Sovereign rights’ relate to both 
the continental shelf and to the Exclusive Economic Zone and entail a right to the exploration 
and exploitation of the natural resources and living resources, such as fish stocks, located 
there.75 The difference is that sovereign rights give states jurisdiction only over the activities 
related to the economic exploration and exploitation of the natural resources, and not to all 
other activities. States also enjoy jurisdiction in this area, although this jurisdiction is not full 
jurisdiction, as onshore, but jurisdiction limited to the exploration and exploitation of 
resources. Therefore, this type of jurisdiction is often called ‘functional jurisdiction’.76 
 
In the continental shelf, states enjoy both sovereign rights and functional jurisdiction.77 
However, it is important to understand the difference between these two concepts. In the 
literature, it is argued that sovereign rights, although less than full sovereignty, supersede 
jurisdictional claims of other states since they are considered to be exclusive rights, whereas 
claims of jurisdiction are on the basis of equality.78 Thus, claims of jurisdiction may be 
 
70 UNCLOS, art. 21 (1) c.  
71 UNCLOS, art. 76. 
72 UNCLOS, art. 77 (1). 
73 UNCLOS, art. 78 (2); Müller 2016, p. 30. 
74 Extavour 1979, pp. 22 and 221.  
75 Ibid. 
76 Müller 2016, p. 33. 
77 UNCLOS, art. 56(1)a and (1)b; Müller 2016, p. 33. 
78 Ibid., p. 33. M. Gavouneli, Functional Jurisdiction in the Law of the Sea (Brill 2007) p. 64.  
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concurrent with other states’ claims of jurisdiction to the same object or activity,79 whereas 
this is not possible with exclusive rights, as they are exclusive to one state.80  
 
The continental shelf zone is delimited either by the geographical end of the shelf or to 200 
nautical miles from the shore, if the outer edge of the continental shelf does not extend to 
that distance.81 However, the North Sea lies on one geographical continental shelf, which is 
why the area is divided according to delimitations based on bilateral treaties between the 
coastal states.82 
 
2.2.1.3 Exclusive Economic Zone 
The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is a development in the law of the sea that was officially 
introduced by UNCLOS in 1982.83 As codified in UNCLOS art. 55 and 57, coastal states may 
declare an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the maritime area stretching up to 200 nautical 
miles from their coastline. This zone does not exist automatically; it has to be actively claimed 
by the coastal state. The states within the North Sea area all claimed an EEZ.84 Claiming an 
Exclusive Economic Zone gives coastal states the right to exclusive economic exploration and 
exploitation of the natural resources in the waters, seabed and subsoil of that area.85  
 
As with the continental shelf, claiming an EEZ does not lead to full sovereignty over this area 
but only to functional jurisdiction over the activities related to economic exploration and 
exploitation of the natural resources. Thus, to mention an example from (EU) case law, a 
coastal state will be able to regulate fisheries in the EEZ but cannot impose Value Added Tax 
(VAT) on (telecommunication) cables that are not related to economic exploitation of that 
zone.86 In UNCLOS, the production of energy from the waves, currents and winds is explicitly 
mentioned as falling under economic exploration and exploitation.87 Moreover, states are 
allowed to construct artificial islands, installations and structures for the purpose of activities 
of economic exploration and exploitation and other economic purposes.88 This article is 
applicable to the continental shelf as well.89 It must be noted that the right to construct 
 
79 Müller (2016), p. 33-34. 
80 It must be noted that states may still have competing claims of jurisdiction over certain areas, especially 
where it concerns areas with natural resources in the sea bottom. In that case, states may still be convinced 
that they have exclusive rights to the resources in that area. 
81 UNCLOS, art. 76 (1). 
82 The delimitation of the continental shelf in the North Sea between the Netherlands, (Federal Republic of) 
Germany and Denmark gave rise to proceedings before the International Court of Justice, concerning the 
delimitation method to be used. International Court of Justice, North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 ICJ 
Reports 3.  
83 Although the idea of exclusive rights in a certain area was already developed earlier. See supra footnote 64. 
84 M. Lando, Maritime Delimitation as a Judicial Process (Cambridge University Press, 2019), Appendix I 
contains a list of all EEZ declarations and the national acts they are based on (as of 2019). 
85 UNCLOS, art. 56 (1) a, art. 57. 
86 CJEU, Case C-111/05 Aktiebolaget v. Skatteverket, [2007] ECR I-2697, para 43.  
87 UNCLOS, art. 56(1)a and (1)b. 
88 Ibid., art. 56(1)b(i) and 60. 
89 Ibid., art. 80 
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installations and structures in the EEZ and on the continental shelf comes with the obligation 
to remove these installations and structures after use.90 
 
2.2.1.4 The High Seas  
All waters beyond the territorial zone and, when a state has declared it, beyond the EEZ are 
part of the high seas.91 As the North Sea is divided into territorial waters and EEZs of the 
coastal states, there is no high seas area in the North Sea.92 However, it must be noted that 
the freedoms of the high seas, namely the freedoms of navigation, overflight, construction of 
cables, pipelines and artificial islands, fisheries and scientific research,93 are also (partially) 
applicable in other maritime zones. As this dissertation focuses on the construction of a MOG, 
the freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines is elaborated upon in more detail below. 
 
2.2.2 Freedom to Lay Submarine Cables and Pipelines 
Next to the rights of coastal states, based on the maritime zones explained above, there are 
also general rights applicable to all states. Although limited by the territorial waters and the 
sovereign rights states enjoy in the EEZ, the principle of mare liberum, literally translated as 
‘the free sea’, spans across different zones. This freedom of the sea includes the freedom of 
navigation and overflight, but also the freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines.94  
 
Under UNCLOS, all states are entitled to lay submarine cables and pipelines in the area beyond 
the territorial zones of coastal states, although this right is not unconditional but designed in 
such a way that other states’ rights are also preserved.95 Thus, the freedom to lay cables and 
pipelines is limited as follows: on the high seas, states only have to take into account that they 
should not damage already existing cables or pipelines.96 For the continental shelf, UNCLOS 
has dedicated a specific article to the laying of submarine cables and pipelines: the coastal 
state has to accept the laying of cables and pipelines, or, in other words: “the coastal State 
may not impede the laying or maintenance of such cables or pipelines”.97 However, the coastal 
state retains the right “to take reasonable measures for the exploration of the continental 
shelf, the exploitation of its natural resources and the prevention, reduction and control of 
pollution from pipelines.”98 What is meant by ‘reasonable measures’ in this context remains 
unclear from the text of UNCLOS, although some states are criticised in literature for taking 
measures that cannot be considered reasonable.99  
 
90 Ibid., art. 60(3). 
91 Ibid., art. 86. 
92 The closest areas of high seas to Europe are the Arctic Sea and the middle part of the Atlantic Ocean. 
Therefore, the provisions in UNCLOS regarding the high seas will not be elaborated upon further in this 
dissertation. 
93 UNCLOS art. 87. 
94 C. Redgwell, ‘International Regulation of Energy Activities’ in M. Roggenkamp, C. Redgwell, A. Ronne and I. 
del Guayo (Eds), Energy Law in Europe, Oxford University Press 2016, 3rd Edition, p. 67. 
95 UNCLOS, art. 79 (1), see also art. 87 (1) c.  
96 UNCLOS, art. 87(1)c and (2). 
97 UNCLOS, art. 79 (2). 
98 UNCLOS, art. 79(2). 
99 R. Beckman, T. Davenport, ‘The EEZ Regime: Reflections after 30 years’ LOSI Conference Papers 2012, p. 23. 




Interestingly, a difference between cables and pipelines exists with regard to consent for the 
delineation of the object.100 According to UNCLOS art. 79(3), the delineation of submarine 
pipelines is subject to consent from the coastal state, whereas submarine cables are not 
mentioned in this clause. This difference can be explained by cables being “relatively benign” 
to the maritime environment, whereas pipelines may carry substances that can cause severe 
pollution.101  
 
The freedom to lay cables and pipelines exists on the high seas and in the continental shelf 
area. For the territorial waters, there is no such freedom. Thus, coastal states have jurisdiction 
over cables constructed in their territorial waters. 
 
2.2.3 Environmental Protection 
UNCLOS does not only create rights for states, but also duties. Under UNCLOS, states have a 
duty to protect the environment.102 This is irrespective of the maritime zones and whether the 
state in question is a coastal state or a third state in the particular area. It entails duties for 
states to prevent and control pollution, to protect and preserve rare or fragile ecosystems and 
habitats, to prevent damage by pollution from other states.103 UNCLOS creates a legal 
framework for the monitoring, enforcement and safeguards of this duty as well.104 
Additionally, UNCLOS refers to other conventions for the protection and preservation of the 
maritime environment, concluded both before and after UNCLOS itself.105 
In this regard, the states around the North Sea are all parties to one of the most important 
conventions of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) in the context of environmental 
protection, the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(MARPOL).106 Moreover, the North Sea coastal states are also all part of the Convention for 
the Protection of the Marine Environment in the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR), 107 which is also 
applicable to the North Sea.108 The provisions of MARPOL and various guidelines of OSPAR are 
relevant for the construction and the operation of the offshore grid, and the IMO and OSPAR 
have created guidelines on the decommissioning or abandonment of installations and 
structures, which are also relevant for offshore grid converter stations.109 
 
100 Beckman, Davenport 2012, p. 22.  
101 Beckman, Davenport 2012, p. 22. 
102 UNCLOS, art. 192. 
103 Redgwell 2016, p. 68. 
104 UNCLOS, Part XII, sections 4, 6 and 7. 
105 UNCLOS, art. 237. 
106 Convention on the Prevention of Maritime Pollution, London, 2 November 1973. 
107 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment in the North-East Atlantic, Paris, 22 September 
1992 (hereinafter: OSPAR) 
108 OSPAR, art. 1(a). 
109 Redgwell 2016, p. 68-69 and 77; For example the non-binding IMO Resolution A.672 (16) ‘Guidelines and 
Standards for the Removal of Offshore Installations and Structures on the Continental Shelf and in the Exclusive 
Economic Zone’ (1989) and OSPAR Annex III art. 5. See section 2.3.1.5. 
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2.3 UNCLOS applied to an Offshore Grid 
The relevance and effects of the law of the sea to an offshore grid are best explained when 
applied to the future components of an offshore grid and to possible practical cable 
configurations. UNCLOS does not mention these different components. It only mentions 
‘cables and pipelines’, ‘artificial islands’ and ‘installations and structures’. However, UNCLOS 
does differentiate on the basis of the function of the asset, namely whether or not the asset 
is used for the exploitation of natural resources (in the EEZ).  
 
This section (2.3) is divided in three parts. The first part treats offshore electricity generation, 
with a focus on offshore wind farms, converter stations and ‘hubs’, groups of offshore wind 
farms connected to the same converter station. The second part focuses on the submarine 
cable, which can be subdivided into inter-array cables, export cables and interconnector 
cables.110 It is important to differentiate these cables on the basis of their function, as this 
changes the legal regime applicable under UNCLOS. The third part focuses on new 
developments. For example, with recent technological progress, it becomes possible to 
combine different cable functions to create so-called ‘hybrid cable infrastructure’.111 Hybrid 
assets give rise to various questions concerning the law of the sea, which will be examined 
extensively below. Hybrid assets are said to be the first building blocks of a meshed offshore 
electricity grid in the North Sea.112 A meshed offshore grid will entail connections with 
offshore windfarms as well as with several coastal states, although the exact configuration is 
not yet known. Therefore, the legal status of an offshore grid under UNCLOS is also explored. 
Finally, in some scenarios of development of the offshore grid, artificial islands are mentioned 
as a place to locate key components of the offshore grid, such as large converters or even 
power-to-gas facilities. Therefore, the rights and duties of coastal states towards artificial 
islands are also analysed. 
 
2.3.1 Offshore Electricity Generation 
2.3.1.1 Offshore Wind Farms 
A first component that should be treated in the context of the offshore grid is the offshore 
windfarm, as one of the main reasons to construct an offshore grid is to connect offshore 
windfarms. Other sources of offshore generated renewable energy, such as wave and tidal 
energy, are subject to the same regime, as they are also forms of exploitation of the energy 
generated by the ‘water, currents and winds’ and they could also be connected to a MOG. 
However, as offshore wind energy has the greatest potential in the North Sea,113 and offshore 
wind is currently used much more than tidal and wave energy in the North Sea, this 
dissertation will refer only to offshore wind farms.  
 
110 The legal differences between these different cables will be explained below, in 2.3.2. The technical 
differences are explained above, in chapter 1.7. 
111 3E, DWG, DNV GL, ECN, CEPS, ‘NorthSeaGrid, Final Report’ (2015), p. 59. NSCOGI, Working Group 2 Market 
and Regulatory Issues, ‘Integrated Offshore Networks and the Electricity Target Model, Final Report’ 2014, p. 3. 
112 O. Woolley, ‘Governing the North Sea Grid – the need for a regional framework treaty’, Competition and 
Regulation in Network Industries [2013, 14], p. 75. 
113 WindEurope, ‘Key Trends and Statistics 2016’, p. 24. Compare with: H. Sorensen, J. Fernandez Chozas, ‘The 
Potential for Wave Energy in the North Sea’, 3rd International Conference on Ocean Energy, p. 5.  




Under UNCLOS, producing renewable energy at sea is considered an activity of exploitation of 
the natural resources in the EEZ.114 Therefore, the coastal state has sovereign (exclusive) rights 
over this activity.115 In a coastal state’s exercise of these rights, it can be concluded that 
offshore windfarms fall under the regime of functional jurisdiction, allowing states to regulate 
the production of electricity from offshore windfarms.116  
 
In the exercise of their sovereign rights, states are limited by the boundaries of UNCLOS. They 
“shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other states” and “shall act in a manner 
compatible with the provisions of this convention”.117 Therefore, although states are allowed 
to construct offshore windfarms as they wish, there should still be sufficient room for other 
activities, such as the free navigation of ships or the laying of cables.118 
 
In art. 60(1)b, UNCLOS gives coastal states the right to construct, and to authorise and regulate 
the construction, operation and use of, amongst other things, “installations and structures for 
the purposes provided for in article 56 and other economic purposes”. Although the terms 
‘installation’ and ‘structure’ are not defined in UNCLOS,119 it is clear that a broad range of 
different edifices is targeted under this article. As wind turbines are used for the purposes 
provided for in article 56, it is consistent with the structure of UNCLOS that wind turbines 
therefore also fall under art. 60(1)b.  
 
Article 60 also sets out the rights and obligations of coastal states with regard to, amongst 
others, installations and structures. Coastal states have to ensure that the position of the 
installation is properly indicated, as “permanent means for giving warning of their presence 
must be maintained”.120 It is also necessary that other states and other users of the sea are 
aware of the construction of artificial islands, installations and structures. Therefore, UNCLOS 
requires that coastal states give due notice of the construction thereof.121 Coastal states are 
also obliged to remove the installations when they are not used any more.122 Coastal states 
may establish a ‘reasonable’ safety zone, which should generally not be more than 500 metres 
around the installation or structure.123 This is to ensure the safety of both vessels navigating 
 
114 In this case, the natural resource at stake could be the water, currents and winds. UNCLOS, art. 65(1)a. 
115 Müller 2016, p. 33. 
116 Ibid., p. 37.  
117 Müller 2016, p. 32, UNCLOS, art. 56(2). 
118 Müller 2016, p. 30. UNCLOS, art. 78(2). 
119 G. Walker Definitions for the Law of the Sea, Terms Not Defined by the 1982 Convention (Martinus Nijhoff, 
2012) gives some guidance on the definition of ‘installations’, placing them in the same category as artificial 
islands, as “(…) a human-made edifice (…) which is usually employed to explore or exploit marine resources.” p. 
104. Interestingly, “structures” are not even addressed in this book that aims to address terms not defined in 
UNCLOS.  It therefore remains a guess, what exactly is meant by ‘structures’. See also A. Oude Elferink 2013, 
para 1-7. 
120 UNCLOS, art. 60(3). 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid. 
123 UNCLOS, art. 60(4) and (5). The safety zone may only extend beyond 500 metres if authorized by generally 
accepted international standards or if recommended by the competent international organization, the IMO.  
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the area and of the installations and structures themselves. The addition of reasonable is to 
ensure that a balance is struck between the rights of the coastal state and the rights of other 
users of the sea, specifically with regards to the freedom of navigation. With regard to this 
balance, UNCLOS makes clear that the construction of artificial islands, installations and 
structures in internationally recognised sea lanes and areas where interference with 
international navigation may be expected, is not permitted.124 In these areas, the impact on 
the freedom of navigation is disproportionate, and sufficient sea space remains to construct 
converter stations in other areas. 
 
2.3.1.2 Fixed or Floating Wind Turbines 
Currently, offshore windfarms are mostly constructed as fixed structures, with foundations 
that are drilled deep into the seabed.125 However, in deeper waters, or waters with a rocky 
sea bottom, drilling foundations into the seabed is more difficult. Therefore, states are also 
experimenting with floating offshore windfarms.126 It may be questioned whether these 
floating installations or structures fall under the same regime as fixed installations or 
structures, or whether there are different rules applicable. A parallel can be drawn here with 
the legal situation of ships and floating oil or gas production platforms.127  
 
A main question in this regard is whether floating wind turbines should be categorised as 
‘ships’ or as ‘installations’. In international law, the definition of ‘ship’ depends on the 
instrument, and more specifically on the purpose of the instrument. For example, in the 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, the term ship is 
defined as any seagoing vessel, which is a very broad definition which would also include any 
floating device.128 This is in line with the goal of the Convention, namely to prevent pollution 
from any seagoing device. However, in the 1920 ILO Convention Concerning Unemployment 
Indemnity in Case of Loss or Foundering of the Ship,129 the term is limited to vessels used for 
maritime navigation, which would exclude floating wind turbines. This is because this 
Convention is specifically aimed at people employed on ships used for navigation. Thus, it 
depends on the context of the legal instrument, how the term ‘ship’ is defined. 
 
As there is no definition of ‘ship’ in UNCLOS nor a general understanding in various 
instruments that are part of the body of law of the sea, one could look at whether the general 
 
124 UNCLOS, art. 60(7). 
125 WindEurope, ‘Key Trends and Statistics 2016’, p. 7. Another form of foundation is the gravity-based 
foundation, which is placed on rather than in the seabed. This type of foundation is used in 7.5% of offshore 
wind turbines in Europe. See also chapter 1.7.2. 
126 For example, the Hywind Scotland Pilot Park is being developed 25km off the coast of Scotland: J.S. Hill, 
‘Hywind Scotland, World’s First Floating Wind Farm, Performing Better Than Expected’ CleanTechnica [16 
February 2018]. 
127 Although that does not clarify the legal situation of either floating wind or floating oil or gas installations or 
structures. See for example R.K. Richards, ‘Deepwater Mobile Oil Rigs in the Exclusive Economic Zone and the 
Uncertainty of Coastal State Jurisdiction’ Journal of International Business and Law [2011, 2]. 
128 H. Esmaeili, The Legal Regime of Offshore Oil Rigs in International Law, PhD thesis at the University of New 
South Wales, 1999, p. 46. 
129 ILO Convention Concerning Unemployment Indemnity in Case of Loss or Foundering of the Ship, Geneva, 24 
June 1926, 38 U.N.T.S. 295.  
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understanding or the definitions from various national jurisdictions of the word ‘ship’ would 
fit with the concept of a floating wind turbine. Through this method, one arrives at criteria 
such as: ships are ‘able to transport goods or persons’ and ‘can be used for navigation’.130 
Under some jurisdictions, it is not necessary for ships to have an independent propulsion 
system; a vessel can also be called a ship when it is designed to be towed.131 In the oil and gas 
sector, some platforms are designed to be able to navigate to the location where they will be 
used, either independently or towed by another vessel. This type of platform is classified as a 
ship, rather than as an installation, due to its design.132 Thus, similarly to the oil and gas sector, 
the legal classification of floating installations depends on their characteristics and on the 
national jurisdiction in which the floating installation is located. 
 
Floating wind turbines are also not designed to transport persons or goods. Moreover, their 
shape is unsuitable for navigation, and floating wind turbines spend most of their lifetime 
anchored in the same position, which means that they also do not navigate in practice. 
Therefore, unless there are specific limitations in national law, it is reasonable to classify 
floating wind turbines as ‘installations’ rather than as ‘ships’. This means, in practice, that 
coastal states will also have functional jurisdiction over floating wind farms in their EEZ. 
 
2.3.1.3 Converter Stations 
Essential to the production of electricity offshore is the converter station. It collects the 
electricity generated by the different individual installations and converts it to a higher voltage 
and to the appropriate quality, as well as, in some cases, changing the current from AC to 
DC.133 Converter stations are usually located close to the offshore windfarm(s) they connect. 
They are necessary to collect the electricity from the different turbines, and convert it to the 
appropriate voltage and quality. Therefore, although converter stations do not produce 
electricity themselves, they are essential for successful transport of electricity to the onshore 
grid. Therefore, it can be argued that they contribute to the economic exploitation of the 
natural resources in the EEZ, and that the coastal state’s competence to regulate an offshore 
windfarm also stretches to the converter station, which then falls under functional 
jurisdiction. Again, the limitation of coastal states’ rights in this regard is that the converter 
stations do not obstruct other states’ use of their right to free navigation,134 and that the 
installation is properly marked.135 
 
Different states’ practice concerning converter stations varies: in some states, the converter 
station (as well as the electricity cable between the converter station and the onshore grid) is 
considered a part of the offshore windfarm, owned by one entity, whereas in other countries, 
 
130 Esmaeili 1999, p. 29-31.  
131 Ibid. 
132 Ibid.  
133 See section 1.5.2 above. 
134 Müller 2016 concludes the same, p. 42/43. However, other states have to take into account the rights and 
duties of the coastal state as well, UNCLOS, art. 58(3). See also Beckman, Davenport 2012, p. 10. 
135 UNCLOS, art. 60(3), similarly as described for OWFs above in section 2.3.1.1. 
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the converter station is seen as a separate installation.136 Regardless of this difference, 
converter stations remain necessary to facilitate transport of the electricity over longer 
distances, without which the successful exploitation of wind energy is not possible. 
 
Even if the converter station is not part of the economic exploitation of the natural resources, 
UNCLOS allows the construction of installations and structures for the purposes of economic 
exploitation of the EEZ and other economic purposes.137 The latter part serves as a secondary 
basis of jurisdiction for the coastal state in case the converter station cannot fall under the 
legal regime applicable to the offshore windfarm. 
 
UNCLOS provides various rules with regard to artificial islands, installations and structures and 
the freedom of navigation and the safety thereof. The rules for converter stations are the 
same as the rules for wind turbines that are explained above. 
 
2.3.1.4 Offshore Wind Farm Hubs 
When offshore windfarms are located closely together, they can be connected to the same 
converter station and use the same export cable. Such a group of offshore wind farms is often 
referred to as a ‘hub’.138 It has yet to be seen whether hub-based connection leads to legal 
differences compared to radial connection, in which an offshore windfarm is connected 
directly with the onshore grid. Therefore, hubs are treated separately here. 
 
Currently, most offshore windfarms are connected through single radial connections, from 
one windfarm, mostly via a converter station, to the shore. However, several states now have 
adopted a hub-based approach for the connection of new windfarms. One example is 
Germany, where Dolwin, Helwin, Sylwin and Borwin are examples of hub-connected 
windfarms.139 The Netherlands also recently switched to a hub-based approach.140 A 
characteristic of a hub-based approach is that multiple windfarms are connected to the same 
converter station. The question arises as to whether such a shared converter station also falls 
under the functional jurisdiction regime that is applicable to the offshore windfarms 
themselves.  
 
As converter stations are necessary for the efficient connection of the offshore windfarms to 
the onshore electricity grid, regardless of whether one or multiple windfarms are connected 
 
136 This depends on the connection responsibilities for OWFs. See section 4.3. 
137 UNCLOS, art. 60 (1) b [emphasis added by author]. Judging from the travaux préparatoires, the reason why it 
was formulated in this way was to exclude military structures. However, other structures that serve some 
economic purpose should be allowed. M.H. Nordquist, S.N. Nandan, J. Kraska, UNCLOS 1982 Commentary, 
(Martinus Nijhof Publishers, 2012 part 2), p. 584. 
138 Müller 2016, p. 16. See also: J. DeDecker, P. Kreutzkamp, OffshoreGrid – Offshore Electricity Grid 
Infrastructure in Europe, Final Report (2011), p. 35. NSCOGI, Final Report – WG1 (2012), p. 6. 
139 TenneT, Grid Map Germany (July 2018). The map shows how the German converter stations connect 
different offshore wind farms. 
140 With the Dutch approach, four OWFs, tendered in pairs, are connected to two converter stations. These 
converter stations serve as hubs to collect the electricity from the different OWFs and to bring it to the right 
voltage to transport it to the onshore grid. 
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to it, it can be argued that hub-connected converter stations will fall under the functional 
jurisdiction of the coastal state as well.141 There are several arguments supporting this. First, 
the reduction in the number of converter stations and submarine cables by using a hub-based 
approach fits within the spirit of UNCLOS as it decreases the barriers to free navigation on the 
sea, as there are fewer converter stations and cables with safety zones. Secondly, as coastal 
states have jurisdiction over the exploitation of natural resources in the EEZ and for the 
construction and use of installations for this purpose, they should be able to connect their 
wind farms in the most efficient way, which may be with a hub-based approach.142 Based on 
these arguments, it can be concluded that the legal framework of hub-connected offshore 
wind farms does not differ significantly from that of single connection windfarms. 
 
Alternative approaches, such as one where the hub and the cables from the hub to the 
onshore grid fall under the general freedom to lay cables, are less in line with UNCLOS. As 
converter stations are needed for the exploitation of offshore wind energy, they already fall 
under the exclusive jurisdiction of coastal states.143 Moreover, substations are not essential 
to the freedom to lay submarine cables: the long-distance submarine cables in the North Sea 
do not have substations at sea.144 Therefore, the cable infrastructure for hub-based 
connections should also be considered as falling under the same legal regime as that of cable 
infrastructure for radial connections. 
 
In principle, hubs of offshore windfarms fall under the functional jurisdiction of the state in 
whose EEZ the construction is located. However, when a hub is located near a maritime border 
and connects offshore windfarms in multiple states, it is possible that multiple states claim 
jurisdiction over certain shared (intra-hub) cables, structures or installations. If this is the case, 
there is a situation of concurrent jurisdiction, giving rise to legal uncertainty for windfarm and 
offshore infrastructure developers, which should be avoided in the legal framework for a 
MOG. Concurrent jurisdiction can be avoided by concluding bilateral or multilateral 
agreements with the states concerned, as will be explained further in section 2.4.   
 
2.3.1.5 Decommissioning of Installations 
Both OWFs and converter stations are considered ‘installations and structures’ under 
UNCLOS, which means that the right of state to construct these assets comes with the 
obligation to remove them at the end of their lifetime, “taking into account any generally 
accepted international standards established in this regard by the competent international 
organization.”145 The competent international organisation in this regard is the IMO, and 
Guidelines adopted in Resolution A.672(16) of the IMO, adopted in 1989,146 is the 
 
141 Müller 2016, p. 42.  
142 Ibid.  
143 Ibid., p. 42. 
144 ENTSO-E, https://www.entsoe.eu/data/map/. Also Müller 2016, p. 43. See chapter 2.3.2 for a full 
explanation of the legal regime of offshore electricity cables. 
145 UNCLOS, art. 60(3). 
146 IMO Resolution A.672(16), adopted 19 October 1989 ‘IMO Guidelines and Standards for the Removal of 
Offshore Installations and Structures on the Continental Shelf and the Exclusive Economic Zone’. 
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international standard referred to. The IMO Guidelines were originally drafted with the 
offshore hydrocarbons sector in mind – offshore wind energy or converter stations did not 
play any relevant role in 1989 yet. The IMO Guidelines nuance the general removal obligation 
with exceptions for when partial removal or non-removal are allowed.147 After 1998, all 
installations in shallow waters (less than 100 meters) and all installations weighing less than 
4000 tonnes in air should be entirely removed.148 Individual offshore wind turbines will not 
weigh more than 4000 tonnes, so they should be removed in any case. Converter stations may 
weigh more than 4000 tonnes, but since the North Sea is a shallow sea (except the Norwegian 
trench), they will also have to be removed. Coastal states may determine that the installation 
may be left wholly or partially in place where they serve a new use, including the enhancement 
of a living resource.149 This can become very relevant as there are signs that the foundations 
of offshore wind turbines and converters serve as ‘artificial reefs’ for various types of marine 
species.150 In that case, removal of the foundations may actually cause more environmental 
damage than leaving the foundations in place – whether this is the case depends on the 
circumstances and is an ongoing discussion.151 If the foundations are left in place, it should be 
clear which entity is responsible for their maintenance.152 Moreover, no artificial reefs should 
be kept in place close to customary traffic lanes, in order to protect maritime safety.153 
Next to the IMO Guidelines, which have a global geographic scope, there are also specific 
Guidelines on the North-East Atlantic (including the North Sea), adopted in the context of 
OSPAR in 1998.154 This Decision followed the ‘Brent Spar Incident’155 in 1995 and shows a 
changing opinion of the OSPAR contracting parties compared to the IMO Guidelines of nine 
years earlier. Whereas the IMO Guidelines stay silent on what should happen after removal of 
the installation, the OSPAR Decision makes clear that dumping of the installation is not 
permitted.156 In the OSPAR Decision, leaving an installation wholly or partially in place is also 
not allowed unless there are “significant reasons” why alternative disposal than bringing the 
 
147 IMO Resolution, art. 1.1. 
148 Ibid., art. 3.2. 
149 Ibid., art. 3.4. 
150 Artificial reefs produce hard substrate for certain species to grow on. This attracts other species again and 
eventually, larger species may also use wind farms as hunting grounds. See D.J.F. Russell et al., ‘Marine 
mammals trace anthropogenic structures at sea’, Current Biology [2014 Vol 24 No 14]; O. Langhamer, ‘Artificial 
reef effect in relation to offshore renewable energy conversion: state of the art’ The Scientific World Journal 
[2012] p. 386713. 
151 K. Smyth, N. Christie, D. Burdon, J.P. Atkins, R. Barnes, M. Elliott, ‘Renewables-to-reefs? – Decommissioning 
options for the offshore wind’, Marine Pollution Bulletin [2015 90] pp. 247–258. See also A. Fowler, 
‘Renewables-to-reefs: Participatory multicriteria decision analysis is required to optimize wind farm 
decommissioning power industry’, Marine Pollution Bulletin [2015 98] pp. 368–371 and the following 
correspondence in the same issue.  
152 IMO Resolution, art. 3.11. 
153 Ibid., art. 3.12. 
154 OSPAR Decision 98/3 on the Disposal of Disused Offshore Installations.  
155 For the history of the Brent Spar Incident, on the decommissioning of the Brent Spar oil structure off the 
coast of the UK: V. Bakir, ‘Policy Agenda Setting and Risk Communication - Greenpeace, Shell, and Issues of 
Trust’, Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics [2006:3] pp. 67-88. 
156 OSPAR Decision 98/3, art. 2. 
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installation or structure to land should be allowed, in consultation with the other contracting 
parties.157 The OSPAR Decision also considers that installations and structures that serve 
another legitimate purpose are not ‘disused offshore installations’.158 This also makes it 
possible to keep foundations of OWFs and converter stations in place if they serve as artificial 
reefs.  
An interesting difference between the IMO Guidelines and the OSPAR Decision is that in the 
text of the IMO Guidelines, no differentiation is made between the part above the seabed and 
the part below the seabed. In the OSPAR Decision, the part below the seabed is explicitly 
excluded from being a disused offshore installation,159 which entails that the rule that 
installations and structures cannot be left wholly or partially in place does not hold for the 
parts below the seabed. As most offshore wind turbines in the North Sea are drilled deep into 
the seabed using a monopile foundation,160 this differentiation is relevant. 
Both the IMO Guidelines and the OSPAR Decision rely on the coastal states’ implementation 
of the rules; especially where it concerns exceptions to the general removal obligation, for 
example when there is a new, legitimate use of the installation. This may lead to a diversity of 
rules in the different North Sea coastal states on how the foundations of converter stations 
should be treated at the end of their lifetime.  
2.3.2 Submarine Cables 
Several types of submarine cables can be defined. First, a difference can be made between 
submarine electricity cables and submarine communication cables.161 Secondly, within the 
category of submarine electricity cables there are several different functions that are relevant 
for this dissertation, namely inter-array cables, export cables and interconnector cables. These 
will be treated in more detail below as the law applicable to them under UNCLOS can vary 
considerably.  
 
In general, it is important to know that in UNCLOS itself there is no definition of ‘submarine 
cable’.162 However, in the Consolidated Glossary 96 to the Manual on Technical Aspects of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, ‘submarine cable’ is defined as an 
“insulated, waterproof wire or bundle of wires or fibre optics for carrying electric current or a 
message under water”.163 It is evident that as the concept of a submarine cable is not even 
defined in UNCLOS, the differentiation between different submarine cables also cannot be 
found explicitly in the text of the convention. Nevertheless, differentiation on the basis of the 
function of the asset is necessary as it influences the legal regime applicable to the cable, 
 
157 Ibid., art. 2 to 4. 
158 Ibid., art. 1. 
159 Ibid., art. 1(c). 
160 See section 1.7.2. 
161 D. Burnett, R. Beckman, T. Davenport, ‘Why Submarine Cables?’ in D. Burnett, R. Beckman, T. Davenport, 
Submarine Cables, The Handbook of Law and Policy, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2014, p. 2-4.  
162 Walker 2012, p. 310-311. 
163 International Hydrographic Bureau, ‘A Manual on Technical Aspects of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea’, Special Publication No. 51, March 2006, 4th Edition, Appendix I - 26, No. 96.  
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which can be deduced from UNCLOS articles 56(1)a and 79(1), the exclusive right to exploit 
resources in the EEZ versus the freedom to lay cables and pipelines. 
 
As a general rule, the legal regime applicable to submarine cables depends first on their 
location and secondly on their function.164 In the territorial waters, submarine cables fall 
under the territorial jurisdiction of the coastal states.165 However, in the following zone 
(continental shelf/EEZ) it is dependent on the function of the cable, specifically whether the 
cable is used in the context of the exploitation of natural resources (including wind energy) or 
not – in the following sections it will be explained what legal regime is applicable for each type 
of cable.  
 
Regardless of the function and legal status of a specific cable, the coastal state retains certain 
rights, including the right to take reasonable measures for the exploration and exploitation of 
its resources.166 Moreover, the coastal state also retains certain duties, for example related to 
pollution prevention and environmental protection.167 Another general remark concerning all 
subsea cables is that whereas there is a removal obligation with regard to installations and 
structures,168 UNCLOS does not have such an obligation for cables.169 The reason for this may 
be that the removal obligation for installations and structures was originally linked to maritime 
safety and to the freedom of navigation,170 to which installations and structures (and the 
safety zone around them) form an impediment. Subsea cables generally do not form an 
impediment to the freedom of navigation, which is why there is less need for removal. 
However, UNCLOS was not drafted with a large offshore grid in mind. It might thus be a point 
of discussion in the future legal framework of a MOG whether removal guidelines for subsea 
cables should be introduced, for example because a large amount of subsea cables may lead 
to a ‘spaghetti scenario’ in the seabed,171 especially close to cable landing points, and because 
there may be hazardous materials such as lead inside subsea cables.172  
 
 
164 Burnett, Beckman, Davenport 2014, p. 75. 
165 UNCLOS, art. 79(4).  
166 Redgwell 2016, p. 66. 
167 UNCLOS, art. 192 and further. 
168 UNCLOS, art. 60(3). 
169 There is no mention in UNCLOS of a removal obligation in the relevant articles on subsea cables. D. R. 
Burnett, R. Beckman, T. M. Davenport, Submarine Cables: The Handbook of Law and Policy, Martinus Nijhoff, 
Leiden 2014, p. 217. Moreover, Müller (2016) argues that cables are not intended to fall under the provisions 
on installations and structures, as they are clearly regulated elsewhere, and therefore, the removal obligation 
for installations and structures does not hold for cables. Müller (2016), p. 37. 
170 Over time, next to navigation and safety concerns, environmental concerns were also voiced in the context 
of removal and abandonment of hydrocarbons production installations at sea.  
171 The “spaghetti scenario” is a term coined in several studies to depict a large uncoordinated amount of 
cables in the seabed. The term has been coined already in 2013 and possibly already before. See for example: 
http://www.elia.be/~/media/files/Elia/PressReleases/2013/EN/20131112_BOG-permits_ENG.pdf. 
172 Subsea electricity cables generally contain lead for insulation purposes. However, alternative materials are 
being investigated. See B. Sonerud, F. Eggertsen, S. Nilsson, K. M. Furuheim, G. Evenset, ‘Material 
considerations for submarine high voltage XLPE cables for dynamic applications’, Conference Paper 
(Conference on Electrical Insulation and Solid Dielectrics (CEIDP, 2012). 
PP-IDTK-PDF-TEMPLATE-24032020-1601471070490_NEW.indd   58 06-10-2020   09:41
 
36 
Next to these general considerations that are valid for all subsea cables, the legal status of 
different cables based on their function is as follows. 
 
2.3.2.1 Inter-Array Cables 
The cables between different turbines of an offshore wind farm, ‘inter-array cables’, collect 
the electricity from the individual turbines and transport it to the converter station. As these 
cables are part of the structure of an offshore windfarm, and as they are essential for the 
operation of the windfarm, they are deemed to be part of the offshore windfarm installation. 
In practice, the offshore wind turbines and inter-array cables cannot be separated from each 
other.173 Therefore, the functional jurisdiction regime applicable to OWFs and following from 
the right to exploit the natural resources, also applies to inter-array cables.  
 
2.3.2.2 Export Cables (Park-to-Shore Cables) 
The cables connecting the offshore windfarm to the onshore electricity grid, ‘export cables’,174  
or ‘park-to-shore cables’ bring the electricity from the edge of the windfarm to a larger 
electricity grid. Throughout this dissertation, the cables used exclusively to connect an OWF 
to the onshore electricity grid will be referred to as export cables.175 In future grid 
configurations, export cables can be replaced by hybrid assets or by connections to the 
offshore grid.176  
 
It is unclear whether export cables can be considered ‘structures’ for the economic 
exploitation of the EEZ.177 It is argued that cables were not intended to fall under the regime 
of ‘installations and structures’ in the functional jurisdiction created by UNCLOS art. 56(1)b jo. 
art. 60, as they are already regulated elsewhere in UNCLOS, namely in art. 79 (Submarine 
Cables and Pipelines on the Continental Shelf).178 An argument supporting this view is that art. 
79 mentions cables and pipelines specifically, whereas art. 60 only relates to ‘installations and 
structures’ in general. Nevertheless, following UNCLOS art. 55, it could also be argued that the 
functional jurisdiction regime created in the EEZ is the lex specialis to the general regime in 
which all states can lay cables, creating an extra right for coastal states to regulate installations 
and structures in their EEZ.  
 
 
173 This is visible for example in the ownership structure of offshore windfarms in all North Sea coastal states: 
whereas export cables and interconnectors may be owned by different parties, inter-array cables are always 
owned by the windfarm owner.  
174 Used in this sense, export does not refer to the sale of goods in another country, but to the activity to bring 
something away from one place to another place. From Latin ‘exportare’, to bring away (‘ex’ out and ‘portare’ 
to take/carry), cf. export of data in ICT applications. For usage of the term ‘export cable’, see for example: 
NorthSeaGrid, Final Report (2015), p. 8; http://www.offshorewind.biz/tag/export-cable/; Offshore Wind 
Project Board ORE, Overview of the offshore transmission cable installation process in the UK, September 2015, 
p. 6.  
175 As opposed to ‘hybrid cables’ and ‘Meshed Offshore Grid’ which hav 
176 See chapter 1.7.2 and 1.7.4. 
177 Müller 2016, p. 37 
178 Ibid. For example in UNCLOS, art. 79(4).  
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Nonetheless, there are other provisions in UNCLOS which can serve as the basis of coastal 
states’ jurisdiction over export cables. Müller (2016) concludes that, as they are essential for 
the exploitation of the offshore windfarms, the functional jurisdiction regime can be stretched 
to include export cables. They can be regulated under the provisions granting jurisdiction for 
the use of installations and structures and for other economic purposes.179 In practice, some 
states treat export cables as an inseparable part of the installations for the production of 




Interconnectors are electric cables or gas pipelines that facilitate transport of energy from one 
state to another. In this dissertation, the scope is limited to electricity infrastructure, and 
therefore, only electricity interconnectors are considered here. The term ‘interconnector’ 
comes from EU law,181 and also encompasses onshore connections between two states, 
although the onshore connections are not explored further here. Although the term comes 
from EU law, it is also used with regard to the law of the sea, where ‘interconnector’ can be 
described as a submarine electricity cable which is not used for the purposes of economic 
exploration or exploitation of the EEZ or continental shelf. For brevity’s sake, in this 
subchapter, the term interconnector will be used to refer to this type of cable.  
 
There are already several interconnectors in the North Sea.182 They are constructed for the 
sole purpose of connecting two states with each other in order to facilitate electricity trade. 
As such, they are not part of an activity that is associated with the economic exploration or 
exploitation of the natural resources in the EEZ or continental shelf.183 Thus, the regime of 
functional jurisdiction does not apply to this type of submarine cable. Instead, interconnectors 
are governed by the provisions that allow each state to lay cables on the continental shelf.184 
The jurisdiction of the coastal state is limited to the part of the cable in the territorial sea.185  
 
Although all states enjoy the freedom to lay submarine cables, coastal states still have some 
jurisdiction related to the protection of their sovereign rights in the EEZ: they can legislate 
over safety and environmental criteria. When the interconnector crosses the border between 
the continental shelves of two different states, the legal situation remains the same, limited, 
but with rights for the other coastal state to regulate environment and safety. Only at the 
point where the interconnector reaches the territorial zone of the other state, does it fall 
 
179 Müller 2016, p. 38-39. UNCLOS, art. 60(1)b. 
180 Ibid., this is the case for example in Sweden and Norway and used to be the case in the Netherlands and 
Belgium as well, see chapter 4.3.1. 
181 See chapter 3.5.1. 
182 For example: IFA (France-United Kingdom) (http://www2.nationalgrid.com/About-us/European-business-
development/Interconnectors/france/), BritNed (United Kingdom – Netherlands) (http://www.britned.com/), 
NorNed (Norway – Netherlands) (http://www.tennet.eu/our-grid/international-connections/norned/), 
Denmark-Sweden 
183 Müller 2016, p. 58. 
184 UNCLOS, art. 79(1). 
185 UNCLOS, art. 79(4). 
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under the full jurisdiction of the other state. As mentioned in section 2.2.2, whereas the 
delineation of a submarine pipeline is subject to approval of the coastal state, this is not the 
case for submarine cables. Therefore, in principle, states are free to choose the delineation of 
their cable, although they do have to respect existing cables, pipelines, installations and 
structures. 
 
2.3.3 New Developments 
2.3.3.1 Hybrid Infrastructure 
With technological progress, it becomes possible to connect energy generated offshore to 
several coastal states at the same time. This is relevant for example with a tee-in approach, in 
which an offshore windfarm is connected to an already existing interconnector,186 or with a 
hub-to-hub approach, in which two hubs of wind farms are connected with an extra cable 
between them. The latter is the case in the Kriegers Flak Combined Grid Solution between 
Denmark and Germany.187  
 
The cables in such a hybrid configuration are used to transport electricity to shore. However, 
when the electricity production is not at its maximum capacity, and consequentially, when 
there is spare capacity on the cables, these cables can function to transport electricity 
between two (or more) states, functioning as a regular interconnector cable. Therefore, such 
a construction is an ever-changing combination of transmission of offshore generated 
electricity with interconnection between states, depending on the amount of wind energy 
generated.  
 
The legal situation concerning jurisdiction over such infrastructure is much more complicated 
than the separate grid components mentioned before, the interconnector cable and export 
cable. It is a fact that the coastal state has jurisdiction over environmental and safety 
requirements of all cables. It is also clear that as soon as the cable enters the territorial waters 
and land territory of this state, the cable will fall under the jurisdiction of that state. However, 
alongside that, there is a clear difference in legal regimes for interconnectors and for 
connection of offshore windfarms. Combining these two functions of cables leads to 
uncertainty about the extent to which states have jurisdiction over the assets.188  
 
Temporal changes in the use of the cable also need to be taken into account. For example, 
when offshore windfarms are tee-ed in to an existing interconnector, the interesting legal 
situation is that a cable that at first did not fall under the functional jurisdiction of either state, 
may become subject to the functional jurisdiction of the state in whose EEZ the connected 
offshore windfarm is located. The consequences of such a change in jurisdiction will differ by 
coastal state, as in each state, different laws are applicable to different types of cables.  
 
186 Müller 2016, p. 59. This was originally planned for the ‘Cobra Cable’ between Denmark and the Netherlands. 
However, at the moment it does not seem likely that these plans will materialise. 
187 C.T. Nieuwenhout, ‘Offshore Hybrid Grid Developments: The Kriegers Flak Combined Grid Solution’, in 
Roggenkamp, M. & Banet, C. (eds.) European Energy Law Report 2018, Intersentia, Vol. XII, p. 95-112. 
188 Müller 2016, p. 59. 
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Another type of hybrid infrastructure is an OWF hub connected to two states instead of one. 
In this situation, one could argue that the cable from the hub in one state’s EEZ to the shore 
of another state is part of the functional jurisdiction of the first state, but one could also argue 
that the cable does not fall under the coastal state’s functional jurisdiction and instead falls 
under the freedom to lay cables, which is the same regime as for regular interconnectors. This 
needs to be clarified in the legal framework for an offshore grid in order to avoid a lack of 
jurisdiction or competing jurisdiction from different coastal states. 
 
It is also possible that a windfarm in one state’s EEZ is connected to a hub in another state. 
The cable that runs from that hub to the shore of the state in whose EEZ the windfarm is 
located, could then fall either under the freedom to lay cables, or under the functional 
jurisdiction of that state. This could lead to the perverse situation in which every state would 
require a hub to be constructed in their EEZ, even if this is less efficient from a technical or 
economic point of view, solely to gain jurisdiction over the cable.  
 
Another possible hybrid step is the connection of the offshore windfarm hubs of two different 
states.189 In such a situation, two countries have hubs with cables to their respective shores, 
and they connect the two hubs to each other by means of an extra cable. In that case, both 
states will be engaged in exploitation of their EEZ and will thus have functional jurisdiction 
over the cables reaching from hub to shore. However, the cable between the two hubs could 
be seen either as a variety of the hub-to-shore cable (over which the state would have 
functional jurisdiction), or as an interconnector, over which states normally have very limited 
jurisdiction. This situation would also require the states involved to agree on the extent and 
division of jurisdiction.  
 
Thus, there are various types of hybrid infrastructure leading to legal uncertainty. This legal 
uncertainty is a major impediment to the development of such hybrid infrastructure, even if 
it is more beneficial from an economic and technical point of view to combine different cable 
functions into one infrastructure.190 Therefore, it should be clarified whether the cables in a 
hybrid construction fall under the functional jurisdiction of the coastal state or under the 
freedom to lay cables of all states. As both options are possible under UNCLOS, a definitive 
solution cannot be deduced based on the current provisions. 
 
2.3.3.2  Meshed Offshore Grid 
A further possible future development is a meshed offshore grid.191 A meshed offshore grid 
combines hybrid infrastructure and connects it with several countries, thus creating a network 
of submarine cables in the North Sea.192 From a legal point of view, the difficulties that arise 
 
189 See for example the Kriegers Flak Combined Grid Solution, section 3.5.2. 
190 Müller 2016, p. 58; NorthSeaGrid, Final Report (2015), p. 61 ff. 
191 ‘Meshed’ in this sense means a network in which multiple countries and offshore windfarms are connected 
to each other.  
192 Müller 2016, p. 60. 
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with combined solutions persist with offshore grids. Again, different functions of the cables 
come together which makes answering the question of whether the cable falls under the 
jurisdiction of a state or whether multiple states could have concurrent jurisdiction, more 
difficult. The fact that the different offshore hubs are connected to each other, and to multiple 
states, does not make a difference to this question. However, the more states that are 
connected to the meshed offshore grid, the more impact the lack of clarity over the 
jurisdiction of states over certain cables starts to have.193  
 
2.3.3.3  Artificial Islands 
In some scenarios for the offshore grid, it is proposed that artificial islands are constructed.194 
In these scenarios, artificial islands are deemed necessary for the purpose of hosting the large 
converters needed for the operation of a MOG.195 The artificial islands themselves are not part 
of the MOG, but the converter stations and other infrastructure installed on them, is essential 
to the MOG. However, such large converter stations as needed for the MOG do need a large 
surface (such as an artificial island) to be installed, and thus, it can be argued that artificial 
islands will become necessary for the MOG once larger types of converters are needed. This 
is why it is still relevant to treat the legal status of artificial islands in the context of the MOG, 
even though the islands themselves do not form part of the MOG.  
The legal status of artificial islands under the law of the sea is similar to that of other 
installations, such as converter stations and wind turbines, although there are a few specific 
and significant differences.196 The legal regime for artificial islands is described in the same 
article as that of installations and structures, art. 60. In the first part of the article, a 
differentiation is made between artificial islands on the one hand and installations and 
structures on the other hand. Whereas for installations and structures, the purpose needs to 
be related to the exploration or exploitation of resources in the EEZ or other economic 
purposes, this is not the case for artificial islands.197 The rules on nautical safety (safety zone, 
 
193 Müller 2016, p. 58. 
194 See for example the ‘North Sea Wind Power Hub’, https://northseawindpowerhub.eu/; and E. Pernot, Legal 
assessment of the development of a sand-based offshore energy island, North Sea Energy III Deliverable 3.8 – 
Appendix (2020). See also J. Moore (TenneT), ‘Deliverable 12.3 – Draft Deployment Plan’ PROMOTioN (2020), 
p. 34 and further.  
195 It must be noted that next to hosting converters, artificial islands can fulfil other purposes as well, such as 
supporting the construction and maintenance of offshore wind farms, both for transferring crew to the wind 
farms, and as a hub for construction materials and spare parts. Cost savings can be achieved when construction 
vessels only have to go to the artificial island to obtain new materials or spare parts, rather than that they have 
to sail back to the coast to fetch new materials, which is the status quo. Lastly, artificial islands can also be used 
for energy storage and conversion – for example, to host power-to-gas installations. Power-to-gas is a process 
whereby electricity is used to produce certain gases, such as H2 (hydrogen) or NH3 (ammonia). These gases can 
then be used in the chemical industry, or mixed with CH4 (methane) to be injected in the natural gas networks, 
to be used again in other purposes, such as heating and electricity production in gas-fired power plants. See 
respectively: S. Krishna Swamy, N. Saraswati, P. Warnaar (TNO), ‘North Sea Wind Power Hub (NSWPH): Benefit 
study for (1+3) potential locations of an offshore hub-island’ TNO report, 2019; Blanco, Faaij 2018, pp. 1049-
1086. 
196 A. Oude Elferink 2013, para 5.   
197 UNCLOS, art. 60(1). 
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proper indication of the position of the object and due notice with regard to the construction 
are the same for artificial islands, installations and structures) as explained in paragraph 
2.3.1.3 (Converter Stations) are also applicable to artificial islands. Additionally, UNCLOS 
mentions that artificial islands, installations and structures do not possess the status of islands, 
and thus, that they do not enjoy the same rights as natural islands. As UNCLOS puts it, “they 
have no territorial sea of their own, and their presence does not affect the delimitation of the 
territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone or the continental shelf.”198  
A significant difference between artificial islands and installations and structures is that the 
provision on removal after abandonment or end of usage only mentions installations and 
structures– artificial islands are left out in the text. This omission is very relevant, as this would 
imply that removal of artificial islands after their usage is not intended in UNCLOS. There are 
several possible explanations of this. First, it might be that, at the time of drafting UNCLOS, 
states expected artificial islands to be of permanent usage. This line of thought is logical when 
the artificial island is used for the construction of an airport or for a new residential area or 
business centre.199 However, a relevant question in this regard is whether artificial islands 
always keep their purpose or not, and if not, whether a removal obligation for disused artificial 
islands should be adopted. This question lies beyond the scope of this dissertation, but might 
be an interesting topic of further research. 
As the legal regime for artificial islands differs from that of installations and structures, it is 
important to know where the difference between these objects lies.200 As mentioned above, 
there is no definition in UNCLOS of installations or structures. Neither is there a definition of 
‘artificial island’. An island is defined in UNCLOS as “a naturally formed area of land, 
surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide.”201 In line with this definition, using a 
systematic interpretation of UNCLOS, an artificial island should be defined as ‘a man-made 
area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide.’ Whereas being above 
water at high tide is also mentioned as a criterion for artificial islands in literature,202 this 
criterion alone cannot make the difference, as there are also many oil and gas platforms, 
maritime weather stations and offshore converter stations which are permanently above 
water, but which are not considered to be (artificial) islands. 
Using a grammatical interpretation of UNCLOS, the word ‘land’ in the definition of island and 
the derived definition of artificial island is crucial, as the question whether an object is 
considered land or not may be the difference between (artificial) islands on the one hand and 
installations and structures on the other hand. This can be based on the material the object is 
 
198 UNCLOS, art. 60(8). 
199 See for example E. Graham-Harrison, Hong Kong to build one of world’s largest artificial island projects, The 
Guardian 20-3-2019; Y. Arai , K. Oikawa , S. Suzuki , and K. Hayashi, Construction of an artificial island for Kansai 
International Airport, Coastal Systems and Breakwaters,  The Institution of Civil Engineers, 1992; The Pearl 
Man-made island in Qatar: https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/91941/the-pearl-qatar. 
200 E. Pernot 2020, paragraph 3.3. 
201 UNCLOS, art. 121(1). 
202 A. Oude Elferink 2013, paras 3 and 5.  
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made of: ‘land’ is commonly understood to be made of sand, rocks and/or other types of solid 
ground, or a combination thereof. Offshore platforms, whether used for the exploitation of 
offshore oil and gas resources, converter stations or any other purpose, are generally made of 
steel and/or concrete. Another difference, related to the use of materials, is that for islands, 
there is a more or less solid column of land from the sea bottom to the part above the water, 
or “man-made or natural materials that are piled on the seabed to form an area of land.”203 
The different types of materials and construction also have consequences for the ease of 
decommissioning and removal: an installation based on a foundation and a topside is easier 
to remove than an artificial island that consists of many cubic metres of sand, rocks and other 
types of solid ground. This could perhaps also explain the difference in legal approaches to 
removal obligations for artificial islands on the one hand and installations and structures on 
the other. 
As the scenarios, including artificial islands, have come up only recently, this part has been 
included in the research for this dissertation only at a later stage. Therefore, although the 
jurisdiction over artificial islands is relatively clear compared to other parts of a MOG, many 
legal questions with regard to artificial islands remain, for example with regard to 
environmental law aspects and applicability of laws and regulations of the coastal state to 
activities taking place on artificial islands. These questions may be considered in future 
research projects on this topic. 
2.4 Legal Certainty for an Offshore Grid 
In the previous section, it appears that, whereas the rules for certain grid components are 
clear, there is uncertainty about the legal status of hybrid cables and meshed offshore grids. 
These assets are between two categories of jurisdiction: functional jurisdiction as used for the 
connection of OWFs, and limited jurisdiction through the doctrine of the free seas for 
interconnector cables. It is important that states, project developers and investors know to 
what extent a coastal state has jurisdiction over a certain offshore electricity cable, as this 
influences which laws are applicable to the assets. Moreover, as will be explained in section 
3.1, it influences the applicability of EU law as well.  
In general international law, states exercise jurisdiction as far as there is a genuine link to the 
object.204 However, the meaning of the concept of ‘genuine link’ itself is still under 
discussion.205 In literature, the ‘genuine link’ doctrine is also applied to cable and pipeline 
infrastructure.206 In principle, this is based on the doctrine of ‘balance of interests’, whereby 
all possible interests are weighed and if the balance of interests turns out positive for the state 
 
203 Ibid., para 5. See also E. Pernot (2020), section 3.3. 
204 In the case of the link between a state and a person: ICJ, Nottebohm Case, ICJ Reports, 1955, p. 23. Shaw 
2008, p. 258. For the link between a state and a flag ship, see: UNCLOS, art. 91(1); Shaw 2008, pp. 611-613. For 
application of this doctrine to offshore pipelines: M.M. Roggenkamp, Petroleum Pipelines in the North Sea: 
Questions of Jurisdiction and Practical Solutions, Journal of Energy and National Resources Law [1998], p. 98.  
205 Walker 2012, p. 69 ff. See also Shaw 2008, p. 612. Currently, the only article in UNCLOS in which the term is 
used, is with regard to the nationality of ships (art. 91).  
206 Roggenkamp 1998, p. 98 
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involved, its jurisdiction is just and reasonable.207 However, this alone cannot solve the legal 
uncertainty around offshore electricity cables, as it leaves the possibility of multiple states 
having a claim to jurisdiction over the same object (concurrent jurisdiction). Therefore, the 
legal uncertainty cannot be solved on the basis of these doctrines of international law. 
2.4.1 Active or Passive Approach 
As the scope of the jurisdiction between states cannot be concluded decisively based on 
UNCLOS, solutions on another basis need to be sought. Both active and passive solutions to 
concurrent jurisdiction have been proposed in literature.208 The passive solution to concurrent 
jurisdiction is self-restraint of the states involved. In that case, states that could claim 
jurisdiction over a certain activity or asset refrain from doing so. A positive aspect of the 
passive approach is that it does not require much effort to implement. However, a negative 
aspect is that this approach avoids the problem rather than solving it definitively. As states’ 
governments and interests can change over time, this option still leaves legal uncertainty for 
future developments. It is important to provide sufficient legal certainty to developers, 
especially when the infrastructure becomes more advanced and investments become higher. 
Therefore, the passive approach is not advisable for the development of an offshore HVDC 
grid. Similarly, waiting until states’ practice regarding this issue develops into customary 
international law is a passive approach that is not advisable as it will not provide upfront legal 
certainty. Therefore, an active approach is required. The rest of this chapter explores different 
options under this approach. 
2.4.2 Amendment of Existing Treaties 
If the source of the uncertainty is the text of UNCLOS, the most direct way to remove 
uncertainty is to amend UNCLOS itself, in order to adopt specific rules on the new types of 
assets. Amendment of existing treaties is possible, and the rules on this are adopted in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.209 Treaty amendment processes vary. In general, 
treaty amendment is possible by agreement of the parties, unless the treaty provides for a 
specific procedure.210 After states reach agreement on the text, treaty amendments have to 
be accepted by government and parliament in the same way as new treaties do. Nevertheless, 
the drafting process may be easier when it builds on previous agreements. 
 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides for a simplified amendment procedure 
and a normal amendment procedure.211 The simplified procedure is used for small 
amendments to which no state sends objections within one year of communication of the 
proposed amendment.212 However, as provisions concerning jurisdiction are normally 
controversial, an amendment in this field would probably not be possible via the simplified 
procedure. For the normal procedure, at least half of the States Parties have to react positively 
 
207 Ibid.  
208 Müller 2016, p. 63 and the literature cited there. 
209 As described in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, 1969, U.N.T.S. I-18232, part IV. 
210 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 39 and 40. 
211 UNCLOS, art. 313 and 312 respectively. 
212 UNCLOS, art. 313. 
PP-IDTK-PDF-TEMPLATE-24032020-1601471070490_NEW.indd   66 06-10-2020   09:41
 
44 
to the proposed amendment within one year of the communication, before a new conference 
will be convened.213 Given the number of parties involved and the long process of drafting  
both UNCLOS and the preceding conventions, it is unlikely that states will have the appetite 
to enter into an amendment conference again. Moreover, such an amendment process will 
probably last for several years. During the negotiation process, legal certainty is decreased 
compared to maintaining the current status of the treaty, as the content and effect of the 
treaty provisions after amendment are unknown. This makes it an unsuitable option to solve 
the problem of legal uncertainty concerning jurisdiction over different cables.  
 
Naturally, the amendment process of a treaty with two parties is more straightforward than 
the amendment process of a multilateral treaty. Bilateral treaties that could address issues of 
competence related to installations and structures constructed at sea are the maritime 
delimitation treaties. In the North Sea, maritime delimitation treaties have been concluded 
between all states that share maritime borders. However, some of these treaties were 
concluded several decades ago, even with states that do not exist anymore.214 Therefore, re-
opening the negotiation process over such treaties may also lead to a long and burdensome 
discussion. Therefore, even the amendment of bilateral treaties might lead to a long period of 
legal uncertainty.  
 
2.4.3 Broad Interpretation of UNCLOS 
As described in paragraph 2.3, the position of hybrid assets and the MOG is difficult to decide 
on the basis of the text of UNCLOS itself. Therefore, a common interpretation of the rules laid 
down in UNCLOS may be needed.215 With a common interpretation, the states around the 
North Sea can adopt the same approach towards jurisdiction for hybrid assets and MOG 
components, and provide legal certainty at least for the North Sea basin. Based on UNCLOS, 
hybrid assets, and offshore grids alike, can be looked at from three different angles.216  
One angle is that the legal regime changes as the function of the asset changes: when the wind 
does not blow, the function of the asset is limited to interconnection, with very limited 
jurisdiction of the coastal state. When there is offshore electricity generation again, the asset 
falls under the functional jurisdiction regime again. This option creates a legally untenable 
situation in which the legal status of the asset and the jurisdiction over it can change almost 
per second. Therefore, this option cannot be used as a basis for the legal framework for a 
MOG. 
 
A second option is to divide the transmission infrastructure into three (or more) parts, namely, 
the part from country A to converter station A (part 1; see Image 4 below); secondly converter 
 
213 UNCLOS, art. 312. 
214 This is the case with the Federal Republic of Germany and the USSR. Germany and the Russian Federation 
respectively were successors in these treaties. 
215 Interpretation of international law is based on the rules of interpretation as laid down in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31.  
216 Nieuwenhout 2018, pp. 102-104. 
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station A to converter station B (part 2), which is the cross-border element, and finally from 
converter station B to the onshore grid of country B (part 3). If these parts are seen as separate 
elements, one can argue that only part 2 falls under the freedom to lay cables, as this part is 
not necessary to enjoy the exploitation of the natural resources in the EEZ, whereas parts 1 
and 3 do fall under the functional jurisdiction regime. However, this is also undesirable, as 
states and developers will want legal certainty and clear regulation over the middle part, 
between convertor stations A and B, as well. Moreover, in a MOG, regardless of the grid 
development scenario, there will be many cables that would fall in the same category as ‘Part 
2’, in which case jurisdiction is limited. 
 
  
A third option is to use a broad interpretation of UNCLOS’ terminology. There is some room in 
UNCLOS for this; according to article 60 sub 1, the coastal state has exclusive rights over the 
construction, operation and use of installations constructed for the purposes of article 56 (the 
exploration and exploitation of resources in the EEZ) ‘and for other economic purposes’. In 
this approach, the focal point is the (two or more) converter stations, installations which are 
essential for the successful transmission of electricity over long distances. One could argue 
that regulation of a cable between the two offshore converter stations is necessary for the 
use of these installations. With this reasoning, it does not matter that the cables are not solely 
used for the transmission of offshore-generated electricity, but also for interconnection 
between states. This is because interconnection, with the purpose of electricity exchange, falls 
under ‘other economic purposes’ as mentioned in UNCLOS art. 60. This is the reason why this 
approach focuses on the converter stations rather than on the wind turbines as installations: 
the use of wind farms as installations can already be served by single cables from the wind 
farm to shore, but for converter stations, interconnection as ‘other economic purpose’ can be 
included. With this interpretation based on article 60 UNCLOS, the cable between different 
converter stations can indeed be seen as falling under the functional jurisdiction of the coastal 
Image 4: Schematic Overview of Hybrid Electricity Cable. Source: author’s own production. 
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state. This does not change the legal status of existing interconnectors, as the interconnectors 
that have been constructed so far do not have offshore converter stations. 
 
One may wonder whether this broad interpretation of UNCLOS is sufficient in order to reach 
the desired amount of jurisdiction over the entire hybrid asset, or eventually of the MOG; 
some activities concerning the middle part of the hybrid asset will still not fall under the 
jurisdiction of the coastal state. An example of this is that it is difficult to conclude that the 
coastal state has jurisdiction over the construction process of the cable or even the delineation 
of the cable part between the two converter stations based on the regulation of the use of 
the converter stations. If states do regulate this, the coastal state’s jurisdiction goes further 
than what UNCLOS provides. Nevertheless, this interpretation does allow for more jurisdiction 
for hybrid assets and eventually for the MOG. In the interest of legal certainty, it is 
recommended that the North Sea coastal states adopt a common interpretation of the law of 
the sea regarding converter stations, hybrid assets and the MOG. This will allow for greater 
legal certainty concerning jurisdiction of hybrid assets, without having to amend UNCLOS.217 
 
In the interest of legal certainty, this common interpretation should be adopted in, or form an 
attachment to, a relevant instrument of international law. There are multiple options that 
could be used, which are described below. Adopting an extra instrument to interpret an earlier 
instrument is possible according to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Art. 31(3) 
of this Convention describes what the rights and duties of states are with regard to subsequent 
agreements.  
2.4.4 Conclusion of Bilateral Agreements 
One possible solution is to conclude bilateral agreements between the states involved that 
addresses the conflict of jurisdiction directly. This is similar to the approach used in the 
offshore oil and gas industry since the early 1970s. There, this approach is used for pipelines 
that connect the production facility in one state’s continental shelf to the shore of another 
state. In the North Sea area, Norway has concluded many treaties and Memoranda of 
Understanding (MoUs) with other states concerning pipelines that run from production 
facilities on the Norwegian continental shelf to onshore landing stations in other states. It is 
observed that the first of these agreements, the Ekofisk agreement, served as a model for 
later agreements.218 These agreements can be specific to one pipeline, which was a typical 
approach in earlier agreements, or apply to any existing or future pipeline between the 
countries involved. This latter approach is more common in recent agreements.219  
 
Such agreements could also be useful for electricity cables in the North Sea. However, one 
should be aware of the differences between the situations. In the (early) Norwegian pipeline 
agreements, there is a clear ‘sending’ state, namely Norway, and a ‘receiving’ state. The gas 
 
217 Amendment of UNCLOS is possible but difficult. This is elaborated in chapter 2.4.2. 
218 Roggenkamp 1998, p. 100. 
219 Ibid. 
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that is produced in the EEZ will only be transported to the shore, and not vice versa. This had 
a clear impact on the pipeline agreements, which gave much more power to the sending 
state.220 The sending/receiving dichotomy is in some way similar to an offshore windfarm that 
is connected only to one state, which is another state than the state in whose EEZ the 
windfarm is located. However, in offshore grid scenarios, windfarms are connected to multiple 
states’ shores, or to multiple offshore hubs. In such cases, there is no longer one clear 
‘sending’ and ‘receiving’ state. 
 
Therefore, with a grid that encompasses offshore windfarm hubs in multiple states’ EEZs, all 
states involved can have a genuine link and interests in jurisdiction. This makes it is more 
difficult to see a natural division of jurisdiction for one state on the basis of a balance-of-
interests approach. However, if multiple states have concurrent jurisdiction, they also have 
the power to negotiate together and make agreements on how legal issues, such as the choice 
of forum for disputes, or the nationality for tax purposes, should be solved. This is a grey area 
between public international law (law between states) and private international law (the 
complete body of conventions, national law, case law, customary law related to legal conflicts 
between individuals in international context) because often, the activities in states’ EEZ are 
heavily regulated. Moreover, the network operators (TSOs or other parties) responsible for 
offshore connections are sometimes also (partially) owned by the state. In any case, having a 
treaty that makes clear which states’ laws are applicable to which part of the grid will greatly 
improve the legal certainty of these cables under international law. 
2.4.5 Adoption of a Multilateral Treaty 
A third option is to adopt one multilateral treaty for all states bordering the North Sea. The 
drafting process for multilateral treaties is often more difficult than for bilateral treaties, as 
multiple parties are involved and might have different, contradicting opinions. However, it 
prevents a scenario in which there is a different legal situation in every different combination 
of states, according to the specific treaty that was signed between these states. Concluding a 
multilateral treaty would increase the coherence of the legal system.  
 
An approach that goes a step further than an international agreement, but in the same 
direction of ‘active’ solutions under an already multilateral treaty, is to harmonise substantive 
national law applicable to electricity cables via European law. This solution will help to avoid 
possible legal conflicts because the legal framework of one state would no longer differ from 
the other state. However, it is highly questionable whether full harmonisation of national laws 
 
220 Norway is the ‘sending’ state, the state on whose initiative the gas field is exploited. In the Pipeline 
Agreements, it is stated that the pipelines shall be owned by a Norwegian pipeline company, under Norwegian 
law, with its central place of business in Norway, being Norwegian resident for tax purposes. This suggests that, 
as the legal person owning the pipeline has Norwegian nationality, the pipeline itself also has Norwegian 
nationality. This fortifies the genuine link Norway has with the pipeline. Moreover, as it is Norway’s EEZ that is 
economically exploited and Norway has a larger interest in how this is done as sending state, the balance of 
interests approach would be in favour of Norway having jurisdiction over the pipeline. This balance of interests 
is typically more clear in the case of a ‘sending’ and ‘receiving’ state. Roggenkamp 1998, p. 103; See also 1973 
Ekofisk Pipeline Agreement, U.N.T.S. I-12678, art. 3.  
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regarding offshore wind energy generation is allowed when taking into consideration the 
principles of proportionality and subsidiarity under European law.221  
 
Nevertheless, some topics are already harmonised or are relatively easy to harmonise, in the 
interest of all states involved. Examples are technical requirements and safety standards. 
Other substantive law is much harder to harmonise, especially where it concerns fundamental 
differences between countries and their legal systems. One example is the rules on who can 
own such cables and substations or how they are financed in the different countries. And even 
if all rules are harmonised, there can still be complicated issues, such as which state can 
impose taxes on which activity. Moreover, this would also require harmonisation of all 
possible future laws relating to these cables. In any case, the harmonisation of substantive 
national law is a very ambitious approach to the problem of jurisdiction, which will take many 
years to complete. 
 
2.4.6 Weighing up the Different Options 
Legal certainty is necessary in order to attract the large investments needed for the 
development of hybrid and meshed offshore electricity infrastructure. Therefore, solutions 
need to be sought to increase legal certainty related to jurisdiction. Although both passive and 
active solutions to the problem are proposed above, the passive solutions do not do enough 
to diminish the legal uncertainty. Therefore, only the active solutions were researched further. 
Active options are the adoption of international treaties that specifically address the question 
of jurisdiction or the harmonisation of substantive laws. The latter option will take a very long 
time to implement, and is dependent on strong political will, which is often difficult to reach 
in all countries involved.  
 
That leaves the option of concluding (an) international treaty(ies) to clarify the legal situation 
under international law and to avoid the situation of concurrent jurisdiction. This practice is 
used in the offshore oil and gas sector for pipelines running from a production facility in one 
state’s EEZ to the onshore system of another state, which has similar legal complications as 
offshore electricity cables. The experience states have with this practice in the offshore oil and 
gas sector can serve as an additional benefit to reduce legal uncertainty. International treaties 
could come in the form of multiple bi- or trilateral treaties or one multilateral treaty. One 
multilateral treaty will have a longer and more complex negotiation process, but the overall 
end result will be more uniform. On the other hand, different bilateral treaties will be easier 
to negotiate, but the end result will be more complex, with a different legal regime between 
each combination of states. However, having one model agreement that will be re-used for 
the next agreements could mitigate that. Alternatively, states can also choose to amend 
existing treaties, such as the maritime delimitation treaties or even UNCLOS. However, this 
 
221 TEU, art. 5. This will be explained in more detail in chapter 3.2 and 5.1.2.2. It must be noted as well that 
after the transition period, the UK will no longer be required to harmonise its legislation based on EU law. If the 
largest market for offshore wind would no longer be required to participate, harmonization efforts in the North 
Sea area based on EU law would be much less effective. 
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could open up discussions on other aspects of these treaties as well, which might in fact take 
longer than concluding separate treaties.  
 
Table 1: Amendment of Existing Treaties vs. Conclusion of New Treaties 




Experience from the offshore oil 
and gas sector should reduce 
negotiation time required.222 
Lack of coherence between different 
bilateral treaties could impede further 
development from hybrid 







Coherent solution for 
uncertainties around jurisdiction. 
Treaty can also be used to 
regulate other topics and to 
create institutional structure. 
The more parties, the longer and more 







Structure is already given. 
Potentially less politically 
sensitive than a new treaty. 
The amendment process may open 
political sensitivities about other topics, 
such as fisheries, border delineation 





Direct solution to jurisdiction 
problem. 
Institutional structure is already 
given. 
Could also be used in fields other 
than offshore wind. 
Difficult amendment processes, 
requiring agreement of majority of 
parties (including those not bordering 
the North Sea) – example: the drafting 
process of UNCLOS itself. 
 
2.5 Interim Conclusion 
On the basis of UNCLOS, the competences of coastal states differ per maritime zone and per 
activity. Until 12 nautical miles from the shore a coastal state has full territorial jurisdiction, 
irrespective of the type of cable. Beyond that distance, there is only functional jurisdiction, 
meaning that a coastal state has the right to legislate over activities that are related to the 
economic exploitation of that zone but not over other activities. Cables used for the 
production of electricity fall under functional jurisdiction. Regarding other cables, states can 
only legislate as far as safety and environmental requirements are concerned. This also 
includes interconnection cables, as they do not serve the economic exploitation of the EEZ.  
 
 
222 A good example in this regard is the Norwegian-UK framework agreements for gas pipelines (1998, 2005). 
See H. Musaeus, ‘Introduction to the Framework Agreement entered into between Norway and the United 
Kingdom Concerning Cross-Boundary Cooperation’ in U. Hammer, M.M. Roggenkamp (Eds) European Energy 
Law Report III (Intersentia 2006). 
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Based on the differentiation between assets that fall under the functional jurisdiction of 
coastal states and assets that fall under the freedom to lay submarine cables, different 
components of a future offshore grid can each have a different legal regime under the law of 
the sea, depending on whether their function is related to the production of electricity from 
offshore wind energy or not. When the functions of ‘electricity production with transport to 
shore’ and ‘electricity transport between countries’ are separated, the legal situation under 
the law of the sea seems clear. However, when functions are mixed, for example when hybrid 
electricity transmission infrastructure or eventually an offshore electricity grid is created, 
uncertainty over the legal status of various grid components persists. This increases with the 
complexity of the grid, and forms a major impediment to the development of a meshed 
offshore electricity grid, as regulatory uncertainty reduces the willingness to invest in hybrid 
or meshed offshore grid infrastructure,223 even though for the high planned capacity of 
offshore wind in the North Sea, it is economically more sensible to invest in hybrid or meshed 
infrastructure rather than in radial connections of windfarms.224 Therefore, a solution to the 
problem of concurrent jurisdiction and other problems related to jurisdiction over the cables 
at sea should be considered in the legal framework for the meshed offshore grid. 
 
As the scope of the jurisdiction between states cannot be concluded decisively based on 
UNCLOS, another basis for a solution needs to be sought. Both active and passive solutions to 
concurrent jurisdiction have been proposed in literature.225 The passive solution to concurrent 
jurisdiction is self-restraint of the states involved. In that case, states that could claim 
jurisdiction over a certain activity or asset refrain from doing this. However, this option avoids 
the problem rather than solving it definitively. A positive aspect is that it does not require 
much effort to implement. Nevertheless, as states’ governments and interests can change 
over time, this option still leaves legal uncertainty for future developments. It is important to 
provide sufficient legal certainty to developers, especially when the infrastructure becomes 
more advanced and investments become higher. Therefore, this option is not advisable for 
the development of an offshore HVDC grid. Similarly, waiting until states’ practice regarding 
this issue develops into customary international law is a passive approach that is not advisable 
from the perspective of upfront legal certainty.  
 
Therefore, active solutions that address the conflict of jurisdictions directly should be 
developed. There are several options, including the conclusion of bilateral treaties, the 
amendment of existing treaties (such as bilateral treaties on border delineation) or the 
conclusion of a multilateral treaty. Which option should be recommended for the legal 
framework of the MOG is explored further in Part II of this dissertation.  
 
223 The regulatory treatment of a cable is based on whether the coastal state has jurisdiction over it, which is 
uncertain. Willingness to invest depends amongst others on the question whether there is a stable regulatory 
framework for the entire lifetime of a project. PwC, Tractebel Engineering, Ecofys, Study on regulatory matters 
concerning the development of the North Sea offshore energy potential, January 2016, p. 86. See also A. 
Armeni, Intermediate Report: Financing Framework for meshed offshore grid investments, June 2017, p. 13. 
224 See for example calculations in A. Flament, P. Joseph, G. Gerdes, L. Rehfeldt, A. Behrens, A. Dimitrova, F. 
Genoese, I. Gajic, M. Jafar, N. Tidemand, Y. Yang, J. Jansen, F.D.J. Nieuwenhout, K. Veum, I. Konstantelos, D. 
Pudjianto, G. Strbac, NorthSeaGrid Study Final Report, p. 27. 
225 Müller 2016, p. 63 and the literature cited there. 
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3 Offshore Electricity Infrastructure under European Union Law 
 
Many States surrounding the North Sea are Member States of the European Union or of the 
European Economic Area (EEA). In their legal frameworks, EU law plays an important role. A 
large part of the legislation they have in place originates from EU law, either directly via 
Regulations or indirectly via transposition of Directives into national law.226 This is also the 
case for the electricity sector, where legislative efforts to create a single energy market date 
back to the 1990s and where a detailed system of EU legislation determines how the sector is 
organised and regulated. Therefore, it is important to dedicate attention to the role of EU law 
in the regulation of offshore electricity infrastructure. 
The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, this chapter aims to analyse the legal basis for the 
development of a legal framework for offshore electricity infrastructure as far as EU law is 
concerned. Secondly, the chapter aims to expose which current EU legislation, or lack thereof, 
influences the development of offshore electricity infrastructure, which forms a basis for later 
chapters proposing a new regulatory framework for offshore electricity infrastructure.  
Before analysing substantive EU law, it is first of all important to see to what extent the body 
of EU law is applicable at sea. As shown in the previous chapter, coastal states’ jurisdiction 
beyond the territorial waters is limited to certain activities. This chapter first analyses the 
consequences of this limited jurisdiction for the applicability of EU law at sea (section 3.1). 
Thereafter, another limitation of EU law will be discussed: that the EU can only act if the 
Member States have conferred upon it the competence to act, by means of the founding 
treaties (section 3.2).227 The rights and competences of North Sea coastal states that are not 
part of the EU, namely Norway and the United Kingdom, will also be scrutinised (section 3.3). 
The last part of this chapter describes the substantive law that is currently applicable to 
offshore electricity infrastructure (section 3.4), and the gaps in this legislation with regard to 
the development of such offshore electricity infrastructure (section 3.5).  
3.1  Applicability of EU law at Sea228 
States’ jurisdiction over activities at sea is codified in UNCLOS and depends on the location 
and nature of the activity concerned, as explained in chapter 2. However, UNCLOS is directed 
mostly at states and the EU is not a state. Therefore, the extent to which the EU has jurisdiction 
at sea cannot be derived solely on the basis of the substantive rules of UNCLOS; alternative 
reasoning must be found.  
 
226 These acts and their legal force are based on Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), as amended by the 
Treaty of Lisbon, U.N.T.S. I-47938, art. 288. 
227 Treaty on European Union (TEU), as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, U.N.T.S. I-47938, art. 5(2). 
228 This subchapter is based on research in the context of the article J.J.A. Waverijn, C.T. Nieuwenhout, 
'Swimming in ECJ case law: The rocky journey to EU law applicability in the continental shelf and Exclusive 
Economic Zone' Common Market Law Review [2019) 56 6], pp. 1623–1648. 
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A logical place to start is the EU’s founding treaties.229 The Treaty on European Union (TEU) 
and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) lay down the EU’s 
competences and the scope of its jurisdiction. According to the Treaty on European Union, EU 
law is applicable to the Member States of the European Union.230 This provision does not 
specify further whether this provision only includes the states’ territories,231 or whether the 
states’ entire spectre of jurisdiction is covered.232 Therefore, these provisions from the 
founding treaties do not provide a sufficient legal basis to establish general EU jurisdiction at 
sea.  
An alternative reasoning, based on the founding treaties of the EU, is linked to the conferral 
of competences. According to the principle of the conferral of competences, the EU shall only 
act in so far as the Member States have conferred competences in the Treaties.233 When this 
is the case, the EU may act, adopt measures and assert a form of jurisdiction.234 One may 
conclude that the EU gains jurisdiction over activities at sea as well, to the extent that the 
Member States conferred this competence to the EU. How far this works in practice depends 
on the activity, as explained further below in section 3.2.  
The view that EU competence over activities at sea depends on the conferral of competences 
is supported by the declaration made by the European Communities, predecessor of the 
European Union, at the time of ratification of UNCLOS, 1 April 1998:  
(…) By depositing [this instrument], the Community has the honour of declaring its 
acceptance, in respect of matters for which competence has been transferred to it by 
those of its Member States which are parties to the Convention, of the rights and 
obligations laid down for States in the Convention and the Agreement. The declaration 
concerning competence provided for in Article 5(1) of Annex IX to the Convention 
[follows]. (…)235 
 
229 Ibid., pp. 1630-1631. 
230 TEU art. 52. 
231 TFEU art. 355 specifies the territorial applicability further with a list of territories, indicating whether or not 
EU law is applicable there. Nevertheless, the territories mentioned are only overseas islands and territories. 
Therefore, this article is of no further assistance for determining the applicability of EU law at sea. 
232 Jurisdiction can also be based on the nationality of persons, the place of registration of companies, the flag 
state of ships and airplanes, and, as explained in the previous chapter, on sovereign rights state enjoy in their 
EEZ and on their continental shelf. 
233 TEU art. 5(2). 
234 The conferral of competences in concrete legislative areas (i.e. internal market, environment, energy) is 
based on art. 5(2) TEU jo. art. 2-4 TFEU.  
235 Declaration of the European Communities upon formal confirmation (1 April 1998) of ratification of 
UNCLOS: Declaration concerning the competence of the European Community with regard to matters 
governed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 and the Agreement of 
28 July 1994 relating to the implementation of Part XI of the Convention.  
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In this declaration, the link between the transferral of competences and the rights and 
obligations Member States have according to UNCLOS is made clear. However, even with this 
declaration, several questions remain with regard to the application of EU law at sea.  
These questions related to the extent to which EU primary and secondary law is applicable at 
sea have given rise to a number of cases before the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU).236 The line of case law stretches back several decades and has resulted in the 
development of a general rule. In principle, when a coastal State has (functional) jurisdiction 
over a certain area or certain activity, EU law also applies to this area or activity, even when 
the legislation in question refers specifically to ‘territory’.237 The term ‘territory’ is thus 
interpreted extensively in order to include offshore activities even beyond the territorial 
waters.  
In a case that is very relevant to the development of the MOG,238 the CJEU passed judgement 
on whether the Habitats Directive would be applicable to the activities of the UK in the EEZ.239 
Article 2(1) of this Directive states that, “the aim of the directive is to contribute towards 
ensuring biodiversity (…) in the European territory of the Member States to which the EC 
Treaty applies”. According to the European Commission, the UK had unlawfully limited the 
scope of the Habitats Directive to the territorial zone. The Commission argued that as the UK 
exercises its sovereign powers beyond the territorial zone, the Habitats Directive should also 
apply there. The Court agreed with this reasoning and thus confirmed its earlier stance that 
EU law ‘follows’ national sovereignty. Thus, the Habitats Directive was applicable to the 
maritime zones of the UK in so far as the UK exercised its jurisdiction there.240 
With the extensive interpretation of ‘territory’ in the cases above, the question arises as to 
what extent the application of EU law can be stretched with regard to activities taking place 
at sea. The Court answered this question in the Aktiebolaget NN case.241 This case concerned 
the question whether the Sixth VAT Directive was applicable to the construction of an offshore 
fibre-optics telecommunications cable between Sweden and another Member State.242 The 
Court considered that this activity was not covered by art. 56 and 60 UNCLOS (sovereign rights) 
but rather by art. 79 (the freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines).243 However, art. 79 
 
236 Joined Cases 3/76, 4/76 and 6/76 Cornelis Kramer and others, ECLI:EU:C:1976:114; Case 61/77 Commission v. 
Ireland ECLI:EU:C:1978:29; C-37/00 Weber ECLI:EU:C:2002:122; C-6/04 Commission of the European 
Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Habitats Directive) ECLI:EU:C:2005:626; C-
111/05 Aktiebolaget NN v Skatteverket, ECLI:EU:C:2007:195; C-347/10 Salemink v. Raad van bestuur van het 
Uitvoeringsinstituut werknemersverzekeringen ECLI:EU:C:2012:17; C-266/13 L. Kik v. Staatssecretaris van 
Financiën, ECLI:EU:C:2015:188. 
237 C-37/00 Weber, para 32 and 34; C-6/04 Commission v. United Kingdom (Habitats), para 115, 117. See also C-
347/10 Salemink v. Raad van bestuur van het Uitvoeringsinstituut werknemersverzekeringen. 
238 CJEU, Case C-6/04 Commission v. United Kingdom (Habitats). 
239 Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and 
flora (Habitats Directive). The Habitats Directive is explained in more detail in section 3.4.4.3. 
240 C-6/04 Commission v. United Kingdom (Habitats), para 115, 117.  
241 C-111/05 Aktiebolaget NN v Skatteverket; Waverijn, Nieuwenhout 2019, pp. 1634-1635. 
242 C-111/05 Aktiebolaget NN v Skatteverket, para 12.  
243 Iibd., para 59. 
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does not grant coastal states jurisdiction, which is why EU law also does not apply.244 This 
reasoning has been confirmed in subsequent CJEU case Kik v Staatssecretaris van Financiën.245 
With Aktiebolaget and Kik, the focus on sovereign rights to establish jurisdiction for the EU 
resulted in reverse reasoning: when there is no exclusive sovereign right for the coastal state, 
such as in the case of the laying of transport pipelines and interconnector cables, the EU also 
does not have jurisdiction. 
The difference between this case and the earliest case on offshore jurisdiction for the EU, 
Kramer and others,246 is striking. In this combination of cases, which concerned fishermen who 
breached provisions in EEC law at the high seas, the question was whether the EEC had the 
competence to regulate fishing on the high seas. In the reasoning of the Court at that time 
(before UNCLOS was adopted) it became clear that jurisdiction of the EEC is dependent on the 
fact that states have similar authority under public international law – to fishing on the high 
seas. Fishing on the high seas, like the construction of cables and pipelines, does not fall under 
coastal states’ exclusive rights, it is a right for all states. However, as the Kramer cases were 
judged in very different legal and factual circumstances, before the adoption of UNCLOS and 
thus before legal recognition of ‘Exclusive Economic Zones’, the author pleads that these cases 
should be treated as ‘outliers’, with the much more recent Aktiebolaget case as new standard, 
which has been confirmed in subsequent cases. 
Following from the judgments of the CJEU in favour of establishing EU jurisdiction for activities 
that fall within national jurisdiction, as well as judgments against establishing EU jurisdiction 
for activities that fall outside national jurisdiction, the general rule that can be derived from 
current case law is that the applicability of EU law follows the extent of national jurisdiction. 
As explained in the previous chapter, this may give rise to difficulties with regard to hybrid 
assets for which the extent of jurisdiction of coastal states is unclear at the moment. 
3.2 EU Competences to Regulate Offshore Electricity Infrastructure 
As mentioned above, the EU can only act when and as far as the Member States conferred 
competences upon it in the founding treaties.247 This is important as the competences, as laid 
down in the founding treaties, form the basis for the current EU legal framework as well as for 
the future legal framework for offshore electricity infrastructure. First, the TFEU provides a 
general enumeration of competences conferred upon the EU, either exclusively for the EU or 
shared, meaning that Member States have competence as long and far as the EU has not made 
use of the competence.248 Then, there are specific competences for specific policy fields, 
 
244 Ibid., para 59-61.  
245 C-266/13, L. Kik v. Staatssecretaris van Financiën;. See also Waverijn, Nieuwenhout 2019, p. 1635. 
246 Joined cases 3, 4 and 6-76, Cornelis Kramer and others. 
247 TEU art. 5(2) and TFEU art. 2-4. For a general history on the development of the founding Treaties and the 
historical development of the place of the energy sector in these treaties, see H. Vedder, A. Ronne, M. 
Roggenkamp, I. del Guayo, ‘EU Energy Law’ in M. Roggenkamp, C. Redgwell, A. Ronne and I. del Guayo (Eds), 
Energy Law in Europe, Oxford University Press 2016, 3rd Edition, p. 193 and further. 
248 TFEU, art. 2-4. 
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elaborated in dedicated Treaty articles in which the exact aims and limitations of the 
competences are mentioned. 
With the introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon, there is a specific article dedicated to energy.249 
It provides that EU energy policy shall aim to ensure the functioning of the energy market; 
ensure security of energy supply in the Union; promote energy efficiency and energy saving 
and the development of new and renewable forms of energy; and promote the 
interconnection of energy networks.250 The EU, using the Ordinary Legislative Procedure 
(OLP),251 shall take the necessary measures to achieve these objectives.252 Nevertheless, the 
Member States retain the right to determine the conditions for exploiting their energy 
resources, the choice between different sources as well as the general structure of their 
energy supply.253 It must be noted that this right may be limited somewhat again by 
obligations of the Member States towards renewable energy,254 and climate law, for example 
through the measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. However, within the targets set 
by the EU (and the Member States combined), the choice of which type of low-carbon energy 
sources are used lies with the Member States.  
Apart from the energy competence in Article 194 TFEU, there are several other competences 
that are also relevant for offshore electricity infrastructure. For example, the competence for 
environmental issues, laid down in Articles 191-193 TFEU, enables the adoption of legislation 
with the goal to preserve, protect and improve the quality of the environment.255 There is a 
link with the promotion of renewable energy, such as offshore wind energy, to achieve climate 
targets by reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Moreover, there is a link with (offshore) spatial 
planning due to environmental protection of the areas in which offshore electricity 
infrastructure is constructed.  
Another relevant competence is the competence on trans-European networks, enshrined in 
art. 171 TFEU. It provides a basis for the EU to adopt legislation with the aim of promoting the 
interconnection and interoperability of national networks as well as access to these networks. 
Cross-border electricity infrastructure and essential parts of national grid infrastructure also 
fall under trans-European networks, although art. 194(1)d gives competence for the 
interconnection of energy networks specifically and may thus be considered a lex specialis to 
the trans-European networks competence. Finally, there is a competence on harmonisation 
of the internal market.256 This competence is used for measures with the aim of establishing 
 
249 The Treaty of Lisbon entered into force in December 2009. The specific article is art. 194 TFEU 
250 TFEU art. 194. 
251 The ‘Ordinary Legislative Procedure’, previously referred to as ‘co-decision procedure’, is described in detail 
in art. 294 TFEU. This procedure is used for most legislative processes in the EU. 
252 TFEU art. 194(2). 
253 Ibid. 
254 This is elaborated further in section 3.4.2. 
255 TFEU art. 191-193. 
256 TFEU art. 114. 
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or ensuring the functioning of the internal market.257 The competence on the internal market 
is used as a general competence, a safety net for if no specific competences are available. The 
integration of the EU energy market fell under this competence until 2009, when the specific 
competence on energy was introduced in the Treaties. As the competence on the internal 
market is no longer used for energy-related policy, it will not be elaborated upon further in 
this chapter. 
Overlap between competences may exist where the exact borders of the competences are 
not clear. In general, the main reason why choosing the right competence in case of 
overlapping policy fields is important, is procedural. For each competence, it is stated in the 
founding treaties which legislative procedure has to be used. Basing legislative action on the 
wrong competence may lead to a wrong procedure, which may result in nullity of the 
legislative act.258 As the competences that are relevant for the offshore electricity grid are all 
based on the Ordinary Legislative Procedure,259 there is no risk that the wrong procedure is 
used.  
Some competences are ‘exclusive competences’ for the EU, and some are ‘shared 
competences’ between the EU and the Member-States. For the latter, “the Union and the 
Member States may legislate and adopt legally binding acts in that area. The Member States 
shall exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised its competence. 
The Member States shall again exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has 
decided to cease exercising its competence.”260 This means that Member States can only 
legislate as far as the EU has not already exercised its competence in that area. The 
competences of energy, trans-European networks and the internal market are all shared 
competences.261 
3.3 Connection to EEA and Third States 
Although most North Sea coastal states are Member States of the EU, this paragraph explains 
the rights and competences of the North Sea coastal states that are not Member States of the 
EU, namely Norway and the UK. 
3.3.1 EEA Agreement 
Although Norway is not a member of the EU, it does form part of the internal market via the 
European Economic Area-Agreement (EEA-Agreement).262 The EEA Agreement forms the 
bridge for the adoption of EU legislation in the EU. Legal instruments adopted by the EU which 
are relevant to the EEA, mostly related to the internal market, will have to be transposed into 
 
257 As laid down in TFEU art. 26(1) and 114 TFEU. 
258 Müller 2016, p. 88. See for example C-300/89 Commission v. Council (Titanium Dioxide) ECLI:EU:C:1991:244. 
259 See footnote 251 above for an explanation of the OLP. 
260 TFEU, art. 2(2). 
261 TFEU, art. 4. 
262 Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA Agreement), OJ No L 1, 3.1.1994, U.N.T.S. I-31121, p. 3; 
and EFTA States’ official gazettes). The Member States to this agreement are Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein 
and all EU Member States. 
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Norwegian law once adopted by the EEA.263 Whereas EU instruments are automatically 
binding to EU states, they are only applicable to EEA states after their adoption in the Annexes 
to the EEA Agreement. The procedure is that for legal instruments marked ‘with relevance to 
the EEA’, the Joint Committee, which consists of the ambassadors of Iceland, Norway and 
Liechtenstein as well as representatives from the European External Action Service, have to 
make a decision on whether to officially incorporate it into the EEA Agreement, either 
integrally or with adaptations.264 This procedure is time-consuming, which results in a 
legislative ‘lag’, sometime of several years. Nevertheless, EEA States are involved in the 
legislative process at an early stage: the EEA Agreement requires that the European 
Commission seeks advice from the EEA Members when it drafts new legislative proposals.265 
Energy as a general topic is incorporated in the EEA Agreement.266 In a separate annex (Annex 
IV), all relevant energy-related acts adopted by the Joint Committee are listed. The legislative 
lag is also clearly visible here: the legal instruments of the Third Energy Package, adopted by 
the EU in 2009, were finally adopted in the EEA Agreement in 2017,267 after which 
implementation in the national legislative systems of the EEA states took place. This created 
an interesting situation in that, until recently, the EEA states still worked with the previous 
relevant Directive and Regulations, from 2003.268 The EEA did adopt other instruments such 
as the Renewable Energy Directive and the Regulation on the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) 
in this period,269 but the legislative instruments of the Third Energy Package proved more 
difficult to accept.270 Although the aim behind adoption of EU legislation in the EEA Agreement 
is legislative uniformity, the legislative lag in certain instruments may distort this. 
3.3.2 Status of the UK 
The status of the UK in the future offshore grid is difficult to predict at the moment, due to 
the fast-changing developments of Brexit. However, after the election result of 12 December 
2019, in which the pro-Brexit Conservative party was returned to power with a significantly 
 
263 EEA Agreement, art. 7. 
264 EEA Agreement, art. 102. 
265 EEA Agreement, art. 99. 
266 EEA Agreement, art. 24 jo. Annex IV. For a detailed account of Energy Law within the EEA, see: D. Busschle, 
B. Jourdan-Andersen, ‘Energy Law’ in C. Baudenbacher (ed), The Handbook of EEA Law (Springer 2016) p. 773ff. 
267 Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No 93/2017 of 5 May 2017 amending Annex IV (Energy) to the EEA 
Agreement [2019/205], OJ L 36/44. 
268 Directive 2003/54/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity, OJ L 176, 15/07/2003; 
Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity, 
OJ L-176/1, 15/07/2003. 
269 An interesting detail in this regard is that, whereas Regulation (EU) No 1316/2013 establishing the 
Connecting Europe Facility, amending Regulation (EU) No 913/2010,OJ L-348/129 20-12-2013 (CEF Regulation) 
is adopted by the EEA, the Regulation on which it is based, Regulation 347/2013 on guidelines for trans-
European energy infrastructure (TEN-E Regulation), is not adopted by the EEA. It was deemed to be of 
relevance to the EEA by the EU legislator, but the EEA states considered it not relevant to implement into the 
EEA Agreement.  
270 Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No 162/2011 of 19 December 2011 amending Annex IV (Energy) to the 
EEA Agreement (Renewable Energy Directive); Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No 157/2014 of 9 July 2014 
amending Protocol 31 to the EEA Agreement, on cooperation in specific fields outside the four freedoms. 
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increased majority, the political mandate for the UK Government to leave the EU was 
reconfirmed. As the UK has now officially left the EU, and the transitional period is not 
expected to be extended, a period of legislative uncertainty will begin, which will have an 
effect the energy market. As will be shown in more detail below, cross-border electricity flows 
between EU Member States are highly influenced by EU law. Cross-border flows between EU 
Member States and third states inside the EEA or with (potential) candidate Member States 
are also often based on EU law.271 Cross-border flows with Switzerland are based the complex 
bilateral relations between Switzerland and the EU.272 However, with Brexit, it is not yet clear 
what the legal status of cross-border electricity trade will be between the UK and any other 
European country, nor how this legal status will be developed.  
One possible way to address the situation is by excluding the UK from the MOG, as exclusion 
of the UK would make it much simpler to adopt a legal framework on the basis of EU law. 
However, this greatly reduces the societal benefits of the MOG, for two reasons. First, the UK 
is a major player in the offshore wind industry, with 44% of the installed capacity of offshore 
wind energy in the North Sea and many projects in the pipeline.273 Therefore, there are large 
societal benefits from the cost-effective connections of OWFs in the UK EEZ. Second, the MOG 
will deliver more interconnection capacity to the UK. Calculations have proven that 
interconnectors to the UK deliver a particularly large societal benefit,274 as the price 
differences between the continental electricity markets and the UK electricity market often 
diverge, and because extra interconnection increases the robustness of the system. 
For these reasons, it is important to design the legal framework for the MOG in such a way 
that the UK can also participate in it, even though this means that the legal framework 
becomes more complicated. This means that the legal framework cannot be based exclusively 
on EU law. 
3.4 Substantive EU Law applicable to offshore electricity infrastructure 
A broad range of EU law is applicable to offshore electricity infrastructure. EU legislation and 
policy plays a large role in the general organisation of the electricity sector of its Member 
States. In addition, there is EU legislation regarding different topics that are relevant for the 
planning and construction of OWFs and the MOG itself: promotion of renewable energy, 
compatibility with state aid provisions, environmental law, maritime spatial planning, trans-
 
271 This is based on the Treaty establishing the Energy Community, Athens, 25-10-2005. In article 10 of this 
Treaty, it is stipulated that “Each Contracting Party shall implement the acquis communautaire on energy (…)”.  
272 P.A. van Baal, M. Finger, ‘The Effect of European Integration on Swiss Energy Policy and Governance’, Politics 
and Governance [2019 Vol 7(1)] pp 6–16. 
273 WindEurope, ‘Offshore Wind Key Trends and Statistics 2018’, p. 18. 
274 The societal benefits are derived from the differences in electricity prices, which are higher between 
continental coastal states and the UK than between continental coastal states amongst each other. Moreover, 
the peaks in electricity consumption lie differently than in the continental states, due to the time difference. 
Finally, differences in market structures (i.e. reliance on certain sources of energy) make interconnection more 
beneficial. These arguments also explain why so many interconnector projects to the UK are planned: A. 
Vaughan, ‘With Brexit looming, energy sector builds new links to Europe’ the Guardian, 18 Aug 2018 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/aug/18/brexit-looming-energy-sector-builds-new-links-europe.  
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European energy networks and (offshore) grid operation. These topics are addressed in this 
section. 
In order to understand which parts of the current legal framework form barriers to the 
development of a MOG, a two-step approach is used. First, an overview of the applicable EU 
law is given in this section. In section 3.5, the legal barriers resulting from these legal 
instruments are elaborated upon. 
3.4.1 General Organisation of the Electricity Sector 
A short history of EU regulation of the electricity sector shows various key developments. As 
the electricity sector used to be characterised by large nationally-oriented, vertically-
integrated companies, legislative efforts to achieve a common European energy market were 
difficult.275 One key effort to advance the internal energy market was to liberalise the 
electricity sector with a separation of the commercial part of the supply chain, namely the 
generation and supply of electricity, from the transmission and distribution of electricity.276 
This process is called ‘unbundling’. The process of unbundling and liberalisation started in the 
mid-1990s with administrative separation of the network elements from the commercial 
elements.277 It was furthered with the 2003 Directive concerning common rules for the 
internal market in electricity, in which transmission and distribution activities had to be 
unbundled in legal, organisational and decision-making terms from other activities.278 This 
entailed that, in as far as transmission systems were still owned by vertically integrated 
companies, they had to be separated at least in legal form from the rest of the company, as 
well as that the organisation and decision-making structure of the companies had to be 
separate. In 2009, with the ‘Third Energy Package’, unbundling was taken even further with 
extra criteria in order to further eliminate influence between commercial activities and 
transmission activities.279  
Currently, there are three forms of unbundling.280 The first form is ownership unbundling, in 
which the transmission system is completely separated from generation and supply activities, 
as the owner of a transmission system is not allowed to directly or indirectly exercise control 
 
275 The Commission dedicated a working paper to it: European Commission, ‘The Internal Energy Market’ COM 
(88) 238 Final. It identified several obstacles to achieving an internal market in electricity, p. 70 and further. 
276 Directive 96/92/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity, OJ L 027, 30/01/1997, 
art. 7 (for transmission). This separation entails that at least on management terms, the transmission system 
operator is independent from other activities. 
277 For the history and development of the concept ‘unbundling’ in EU energy law, see T.M. Dralle, ‘The 
Unbundling and Unbundling-Related Measures in the EU Energy Sector’ European Yearbook of International 
Economic Law [2018 5], p. 21. 
278 Directive 2003/54/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity, art. 10 and 15. 
279 Directive 2009/72/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity, OJ L 211, 14.8.2009, 
art. 9, 13, 14, 17-23. 
280 For a general overview of the current unbundling rules, see H. Vedder, A. Ronne, M. Roggenkamp, I. del 
Guayo, ‘EU Energy Law’ in M. Roggenkamp, C. Redgwell, A. Ronne and I. del Guayo (Eds), Energy Law in Europe, 
Oxford University Press 2016, 3rd Edition, p. 269 and further. 
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over the functions of generation and supply.281 The second form is designed for transmission 
systems that belong to vertically integrated companies. For these systems, an ‘independent 
system operator’ needs to be designated, which manages the non-discriminatory access to 
the networks (third party access), the collection of network charges and which operates, 
maintains and develops the transmission network.282 This form is in a phase-out process, only 
networks that used to be part of a vertically integrated company in 2009 can use this form; 
this is not possible for newer transmission networks.283 The third form is the ‘independent 
transmission owner’. If this model is used, the owner of the transmission system needs to fulfil 
a long list of requirements with regard to personnel, funding and information sharing.284 The 
different forms of unbundling show that it is possible to separate the ownership of a 
transmission network from its daily operation and management. This may be useful for the 
offshore grid as well, depending on the preferences of the Member-States in this regard. 
Another key development was the establishment of regulatory authorities. Already by 1996, 
national regulatory authorities were established to settle disputes over contracts and 
negotiations in the newly liberalised energy market.285 They gradually obtained more powers 
with the 2003 and 2009 Directives.286 In 2000, the regulatory authorities of 10 countries 
voluntarily founded the Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER), to cooperate and 
address cross-border issues.287 In addition to CEER, an official EU Agency on the Cooperation 
of Energy Regulators (ACER) was established in 2009.288 ACER has many roles with regard to 
the supervision of the electricity and gas sectors. The roles that are relevant for the 
construction of a MOG are ACER’s participation in the development and implementation of 
network codes,289 and making decisions regarding the regulation of cross-border electricity 
transmission projects, in cases where either the National Regulatory Authorities cannot reach 
a decision together or have conferred the competence to make decisions on an issue to 
ACER.290 
 
281 Directive (EU) 2019/944 on common rules for the internal market for electricity, art. 43 and recitals (68) to 
(77).  
282 Ibid., art. 44. 
283 Ibid., art. 44. 
284 Ibid., art. 46. 
285 Directive 96/92/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity, art. 20. 
286 Directive 2003/54/EC, art. 23, Directive 2009/72/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in 
electricity, art. 7(3), 10(2), 11(8). 
287 https://www.ceer.eu/eer_about. 
288 ACER was created by means of Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of 
Energy Regulators, OJ L 211, 14.8.2009. 
289 The role of EU network codes is explained further in chapter 3.4.6. ACER has a role in submitting framework 
guidelines, reasoned opinions on draft network codes and reasoned opinions where ENTSO-E has failed to 
implement a Network Code. Regulation 2019/942 establishing a European Union Agency for the Cooperation of 
Energy Regulators (ACER), OJ L 158/22, 14.6.2019., art. 5. 
290 Ibid., art. 6(10). 
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A third important development is the facilitation of cross-border electricity exchanges. This is 
facilitated by increased (physical) interconnection,291 standardisation and market integration. 
There is a European aim for 10% interconnectivity in 2020,292 based on the European Council 
conclusions of March 2002.293 In 2014, the 10% electricity interconnection target was 
extended to 15% by 2030 “while taking into account the cost aspects and the potential of 
commercial exchanges in the relevant regions.”294 The increase in interconnectivity projected 
by the Commission and Council is facilitated by the Trans-European Energy Networks for 
Electricity (TEN-E) Regulation, which identifies so-called Projects of Common Interest (PCIs) 
for the electricity network and facilitates the timely construction thereof,295 for example by 
streamlining the permitting process.296 Market integration is also facilitated through the 
adoption of common rules in the European Network Codes, which are legal instruments that 
contain the technical specifications for a safe and reliable operation of the electricity 
system.297  
In the context of cross-border cooperation, another development is the establishment of 
ENTSO-E, the European association for TSOs in electricity. ENTSO-E was founded in 2009,298 
and its primary roles are supporting the implementation of EU energy policy, facilitating 
cooperation between TSOs, and providing information on the electricity markets and cross-
border flows. Whereas ENTSO-E is founded through an EU legal instrument, the organisation 
also has TSOs from non-EU countries among its members. Examples are the Balkan states 
which are part of the synchronous continental electricity grid, and the Norwegian and 
Icelandic TSOs, which are part of the EEA.299 However, participation of the UK after Brexit is 
not certain. 
3.4.2 Promotion of Renewable Energy 
Since 2009, the promotion of renewable energy has been one of the goals of EU energy policy. 
This is visible from the Directive on the Promotion of Renewable Energy, adopted in April 2009. 
 
291 Commission Expert Group on electricity interconnection targets, ‘Towards a sustainable and integrated 
Europe’, 11-2017, p. 10-11. 
292 Interconnectivity is defined as import capacity over installed generation capacity in a Member State.  
293 The European Council of March 2002 encouraged Member-States to work towards an interconnection 
target of at least 10%. The October 2014 European Council called on States again with the same message, but 
with a deadline of 2020. See, for the Council conclusions: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/145397.pdf 
294 Commission Proposal: COM(2014) 330 final; Council Conclusions of 23 and 24 October 2014: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/145397.pdf 
295 Regulation (EU) 347/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2013 on Guidelines for 
Trans-European Energy Infrastructure (TEN-E Regulation), art. 1 and Annex 1(1)1.  
296 National authorities should give ‘the most rapid treatment legally possible’ to these projects, create a one-
stop-shop and adhere to maximum terms for responding to the. TEN-E Regulation, art. 7(2)  
297 Regulation (EU) 714/2009, art. 6. Network Codes exist for connection (Requirements for Generators, HVDC 
Connections), Operations (System Operations, Emergency and Restoration) and Market (Capacity Allocation & 
Congestion Management, Forward Capacity Allocation and Electricity Balancing). The relevant network codes 
are elaborated in more detail in chapter 3.4.6. 
298 Regulation 714/2009 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity, art. 4 
and 5. 
299 https://www.entsoe.eu/about/inside-entsoe/members/.  
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This directive sets national targets for renewable energy and provides for other rules to 
promote the use of renewable energy, for example through changing the market rules for 
renewable energy.300 A few months later, the Lisbon Treaty was adopted, which introduced a 
special ‘energy competence’ in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.301 This 
competence, adopted in art. 194 TFEU, includes energy efficiency and the promotion of 
renewable energy.302  
Since then, the Juncker Commission (2014-2019) has introduced the ‘Energy Union’. One of 
the goals of the Energy Union, which now forms the umbrella for most EU energy policy, is to 
stimulate ‘sustainable’ energy.303 In the documents in which this term is used, it becomes clear 
that sustainable means low-carbon and climate-friendly.304 This increases the importance of 
the promotion of renewable energy within the energy policy of the European Union. 
With the adoption of the Clean Energy Package in 2018-2019, the introduction of large 
amounts of renewable energy became central to EU energy policy. As part of the Clean Energy 
Package, the Directive on the Promotion of Renewable Energy was also recast. Instead of the 
earlier national renewable energy targets,305 the recast Directive focuses on a European-wide, 
collective target of 32% renewable energy in the gross final energy consumption by 2030.306 
Collective rather than individual targets are introduced, to increase cooperation between the 
states, and to reflect the collective responsibility states have towards climate change.  
The (recast) Directive provides common rules and objectives for support schemes for 
renewable energy,307 which can be considered as a lex specialis to the general rules on state 
aid, which are explained below. The (recast) Directive also facilitates EU Member-States to 
open their support schemes for renewable energy to participants from other Member-States, 
which is an extra measure on top of the cooperation mechanisms that already existed under 
the 2009 Directive and that are also adopted in the (recast) Directive.308 These mechanisms 
could provide a legal basis for cooperation between coastal states on the support for 
 
300 With priority access and priority dispatch, adopted in art. 16 of the Directive, the principle of non-
discrimination in the energy sector is set aside in order to stimulate energy from renewable sources rather than 
energy from other sources. 
301 Earlier legislation on energy policy was based on the internal market competence or, in the case of the 
promotion of renewable energy, on the environmental competence. 
302 TFEU, art. 194(1)c. 
303 In full, the goals of the Energy Union are “to give EU consumers - households and businesses - secure, 
sustainable, competitive and affordable energy”: European Commission, Energy Union Package, COM(2015) 80 
final, 25.2.2015. 
304 Ibid., p. 2 
305 Directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (Renewable Energy 
Directive, RED), OJ L 140/16, Annex I, the individual targets per Member-State differ, according to the base 
scenario and the RES potential of that Member State. However, the combination of all national targets should 
lead to at least 20% share of renewable energy in the total energy consumption. 
306 Directive (EU) 2018/2001 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (recast), OJ L 
328/82, 21-12-2018, art. 3. 
307 Ibid., art. 4. 
308 Ibid., art. 5, art. 8-14. H. Klinge Jacobsen, L-L Pade, S.T. Schröder, L. Kitzing, ‘Cooperation Mechanisms To 
Achieve EU Renewable Targets’, Renewable Energy [2014 63] 345-352. 
3




renewable energy, notably offshore wind, connected to a meshed offshore grid.309 Examples 
of cooperation mechanisms are ‘joint projects’, which are limited to a specific project or group 
of projects, and ‘joint support schemes’ which offer a general support scheme between two 
(or more) Member-States. Both joint projects and joint support schemes could be envisaged 
as a way to bridge national incompatibilities between support schemes. 
A heavily debated issue for renewable energy in general is the provision of priority access and 
priority and/or guaranteed dispatch for renewable energy.310 An important change to the 
2009 Directive is that priority access and dispatch of renewable electricity are removed from 
the Directive with the legislative changes of 2019. Currently, only access for renewable gases 
to the gas transmission and distribution networks is still in the Renewable Energy Directive.311  
Priority access and dispatch for renewable electricity are not deleted completely, rather they 
are moved to the Regulation on the Internal Market for Electricity and limited significantly. 
Only small installations (less than 400 kW) and demonstration projects for innovative 
technologies are eligible.312 Therefore, priority dispatch will generally not be applicable to the 
offshore wind sector, except for demonstration projects. Priority access is not as relevant for 
offshore wind farms as for onshore renewable electricity projects, as in most countries, access 
to the grid is already diligently planned and adjusted to the commissioning date of the OWF.313 
It must be noted that, even though diligently planned and adjusted, onshore integration of 
the offshore generated electricity may become problematic in the future, as the volumes of 
offshore generated electricity increase significantly. Therefore, adjustment of the (onshore) 
market rules will become necessary again in the future (see section 3.5.6). 
Another new element added by the (recast) Directive of 2018 is that the European Union 
expects Member States to gradually open their renewable energy support systems to 
renewable energy projects in other Member States. This is an interesting development 
regarding earlier case law of the CJEU in the ‘Ålands Vindkraft’ case.314 This case was about a 
wind farm located on the Åland islands, which are Finnish territory but connected to the 
Swedish electricity grid with a much stronger link than to the Finnish electricity grid. Although 
in this case, the wind farm was located on an island, the situation is comparable to an offshore 
wind farm that is connected to two coastal states in a MOG. In the Åland case, the wind farm 
operator objected to refusal from the Swedish authorities to grant green energy certificates 
to the energy produced by his wind farm on Åland. The Swedish authorities limited the 
certificate system (the Swedish renewable energy support system) to energy produced on the 
 
309 S.T. Schröder, L. Kitzing, H.K. Jacobsen, L.L. Pade, ‘Joint Support and Efficient Offshore Investment: Market 
and Transmission Connection Barriers and Solutions’, Renewable Energy Law and Policy Review [2012 2] pp. 
112-120. 
310 Directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable energy, art. 16. 
311 Directive 2018/2001 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (recast), art. 20. 
312 Regulation 2019/943 on the internal market for electricity, OJ L 158, 14.6.2019, art. 11. 
313 For example, in Germany and in the Netherlands, the commissioning date of the OWF and the grid 
connection are stipulated in the tender conditions. There are penalty payments for delays, both on the side of 
the OWF developer and on the side of the TSO regarding the grid connection. 
314 Case C‑573/12, Ålands Vindkraft AB vs Energimyndigheten, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2037. 
PP-IDTK-PDF-TEMPLATE-24032020-1601471070490_NEW.indd   88 06-10-2020   09:41
 
66 
territory of Sweden, but the wind farm operator on Åland deemed this to be discriminatory in 
light of art. 34 TFEU (free movement of goods).315 The Court decided that the restriction of 
the Swedish renewable energy support system to electricity generated in Sweden was indeed 
a barrier to cross-border trade in goods, or, in the words of the Court, “constitutes a measure 
having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions on imports, in principle incompatible with 
the obligations under EU law resulting from Article 34 TFEU, unless that legislation can be 
objectively justified (…).”316 As a next step, the Court judged that in this case, the refusal to 
grant green energy certificates to this wind farm was objectively justified in light of the 
promotion of renewable energy in Sweden and specifically the discretion of the Member-State 
to organise the scheme in such a way that it could justify the costs of the scheme.317 Having 
to open up its support scheme to electricity produced elsewhere would increase the costs 
significantly, and this could not be forced upon a Member-State.  
This case dates from 2014, and the factual circumstances of the case even date back to 2009. 
At that time, Member-States were not ready to open their support schemes to renewable 
energy from other Member-States, except in specific cooperation agreements.318 However, 
since then, Member-States have significantly developed their support schemes for renewable 
energy. One could wonder whether territorial limitations of support schemes should still be 
justified in the current factual circumstances. The recast Directive of the Clean Energy Package 
presented an opportunity for the EU legislature to make this clear. However, it appears that 
forced opening of territorially limited support schemes was still a bridge too far: with the new 
rules introduced by the Clean Energy Package, Member States “have the right” to open their 
support schemes: indicative targets ranging from 5% in 2023-2026 to 10% in 2027-2030 are 
mentioned.319 However, in the future this may be less voluntary; an evaluation of the 
implementation of this article is planned in 2023, and if this evaluation shows that the national 
support schemes are not opened for at least 5% in 2025 and 10% in 2030 to bids from other 
EU Member States, an obligation to open up support schemes to these percentages may be 
introduced.320 Offshore wind energy in the North Sea, connected to a MOG, may be an 
interesting opportunity to open up specific support schemes of the North Sea coastal states, 
especially when OWFs are physically connected to multiple coastal states. However, this 
depends on political willingness and on the degree of cooperation between the North Sea 
states. 
Finally, the (recast) Directive on the promotion of renewable energy provides for various other 
topics, such as a framework for the administrative accounting of renewable energy, for local 
 
315 Electricity is considered a good according to case law of the CJEU: C-393/92, Gemeente Almelo and Others v 
Energiebedrijf IJsselmij, ECLI:EU:C:1994:171, para 28. 
316 Case C‑573/12, Ålands Vindkraft AB vs Energimyndigheten, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2037, para 75. 
317 Ibid., para 103 ff. 
318 For example, via the cooperation mechamisms mentioned above. It must be noted that since 2012, so three 
years after the Alands Vindkraft case, Norway and Sweden have had a joint support scheme. However, there 
was no such agreement with Finland.  
319 Directive 2018/2001 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (recast), art. 5. 
320 Ibid., art. 5(5). 
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energy communities, renewable heating and cooling and for self-consumption of renewable 
energy. These topics are not relevant for the construction or operation of an offshore 
electricity grid and will therefore not be elaborated upon further. 
3.4.3 Compatibility of State Aid with the Internal Market 
Next to dedicated energy law, the energy sector also has to abide by the general rules of EU 
law, enshrined in the founding treaties, complemented with secondary EU law and case law 
by the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). These general rules of EU law are for example the 
rules on free movement of goods and services, as well as the rules on competition law and 
state aid.321 It reaches beyond the scope of this chapter to treat all the general rules of free 
movement, competition law and state aid in detail,322 but some attention must be paid to the 
rules on state aid because it (still) plays a large role in the renewable energy sector and in 
energy infrastructure investments, and will also impact the construction of a MOG and the 
OWFs connected to it. 
In general, the founding Treaties of the EU prohibit Member States to give certain 
undertakings or activities an economic advantage (aid) over others if this distorts the internal 
market.323 Nevertheless, there may be exemptions for certain products or activities,324 
including some forms of electricity generation and transmission activities. In order to inform 
the sector about which activities are allowed to receive state aid and which are not, the 
European Commission issued a guidance document specifically for energy and environmental 
protection.325 These Guidelines, albeit non-binding, indicate the Commission’s position on the 
conditions under which the aid is deemed compatible with the internal market. When the 
Commission finds aid to be incompatible with the internal market, it decides that the State is 
to abolish the aid or to alter it in order to make it compatible again.326 Therefore, the 
Guidelines form an important source of information on how state aid legislation should be 
interpreted in the context of the energy sector. It must be noted that it is still necessary to 
notify the Commission of an intention to give state aid and to wait for approval (notification 
obligation).327 During this period, states are not yet allowed to put the proposed measures to 
effect (standstill procedure).328 
 
321 TFEU Title II (Free Movement of Goods, TFEU artt. 101,102,106, 107 and 108 (Competition law and state aid 
regulation). 
322 One can refer to the following literature instead: H. Vedder, A. Ronne, M. Roggenkamp, I. del Guayo, ‘EU 
Energy Law’ in M. Roggenkamp, C. Redgwell, A. Ronne and I. del Guayo (Eds), Energy Law in Europe, Oxford 
University Press 2016, 3rd Edition, chapter 4; Chr. Jones (Ed.), EU Energy Law Vol. II: EU Competition Law and 
Energy Markets [Claeys&Casteels 2016]; L. Hancher, A. de Hauteclocque , F. Salerno, State Aid and the Energy 
Sector [Hart Publishing 2018]. 
323 TFEU art. 107(1). 
324 TFEU art. 107(3). 
325 Communication from the Commission, Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy 
2014-2020 (2014/C 200/01). 
326 TFEU art. 108. 
327 TFEU art. 108(3). 
328 Ibid. 
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For renewable energy, including offshore wind energy, financial support should be based on 
a market premium rather than a fixed amount.329 In addition, the entity receiving the aid 
should participate in the balancing market,330 and there should be measures in place to 
prevent negative pricing.331 Moreover, aid should be granted following a competitive bidding 
process.332 Regarding energy infrastructure aid, the Commission performs a case-by-case 
analysis, which takes into account whether there are any market failures; whether the project 
adheres to the principles of Third Party Access and tariff regulation and to what extent the 
project contributes to the security of supply.333 
3.4.4 Environmental Law and Maritime Spatial Planning 
Offshore electricity generation and transmission infrastructure has an impact on the area 
around it, both in terms of the use of public space in general, and in terms of environmental 
impact. Therefore, it is important for coastal states to determine which areas are the most 
suitable for offshore wind energy (maritime spatial planning). This depends, amongst other 
things, on environmental law. In this chapter, environmental law and maritime spatial 
planning are combined as there is a large overlap between the two areas of law where it 
concerns offshore wind and offshore grid developments. Offshore wind and offshore grid 
projects may be located in or near protected nature areas, such as Natura 2000 areas, and are 
likely to have an environmental impact. By choosing locations strategically, the environmental 
impact of offshore wind and offshore grid projects can be reduced. 
Environmental policy has been addressed at European level since the 1970s, with various 
measures related to the internal market.334  From 1987 onwards, the objective of 
environmental protection was also adopted in the founding Treaties.335 In terms of 
substantive law, the relevant instruments for offshore electricity infrastructure are the 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Directive,336 the Strategic Environmental Assessment 
 
329 Communication from the Commission, Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy 
2014-2020 (2014/C 200/01), para 124a 
330 Ibid., para 124b 
331 Ibid., para 124c. 
332 Ibid., para 126. 
333 Ibid., para 207. 
334 J. Jans, H. Vedder, European Environmental Law [Europa Law Publishing 2012, 4th ed] pp. 3-4. 
335 With the entry into force of the Single European Act on 1 July 1987. 
336 Directive 2014/52/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the 
environment, OJ L-124/1 25-4-2014 (hereinafter EIA Directive). 
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(SEA) Directive,337 the Habitats Directive,338 the Birds Directive,339 the Marine Strategy 
Framework Directive340 and the Maritime Spatial Planning Directive.341  
3.4.4.1 Environmental Impact Assessment Directive 
The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Directive states that for activities which are 
expected to have an impact on the environment, an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
has to be provided.342 The scope of the Directive is relatively wide, as it also covers cumulative 
effects of different projects. Moreover, positive environmental effects, such as the increase 
of biodiversity, also fall within the scope.343 Projects for which an EIA is required are listed in 
its Annexes I and II; Annex I for the activities for which an EIA is compulsory and Annex II for 
activities for which the national authorities decide whether an EIA is necessary.344   
The construction of offshore windfarms is mentioned in Annex II: ‘installations for the 
harnessing of wind power for energy production (wind farms)’. There is no differentiation 
between onshore and offshore, but as explained in paragraph [3.2], the EIA Directive is 
presumed to be applicable to offshore wind farms as well. Concerning electricity transmission 
infrastructure, however, Annex I mentions overhead electrical lines with a voltage of 220 kV 
or higher and a length of 15 km or more. This can be relevant for the onshore grid 
reinforcements necessary to facilitate the connection to an offshore grid. However, offshore 
electricity cables are buried into the seabed. The EIA Directive makes no mention of 
underground cables.345 Interestingly, underground cables are mentioned in a Commission 
working document on the application and effectiveness of the EIA Directive as a possible point 
that needs to be amended.346 However, in the latest revision of the EIA Directive, this has not 
been addressed, although the construction and operation of subsea cables may also impact 
the environment.347 Therefore, it is interesting that the question whether or not an EIA 
obligation exists for the offshore electricity cables is not addressed in the last revision of the 
EIA Directive. A comment in this regard is that Member States have a margin of discretion to 
 
337 Directive 2001/42/EC on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the 
environment, OJ L197/30 21-7-2001. 
338 Council Directive 92/43/EEC on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, OJ L206/7 
22-7-1992 (Habitats Directive). 
339 Directive 2009/147/EC on the conservation of wild birds, OJ L20/7 26-1-2010. 
340 Directive 2008/56/EC establishing a framework for community action in the field of marine environmental 
policy (Marine Strategy Framework Directive), OJ L-164/19 25-6-2008. 
341 Directive 2014/89/EU establishing a framework for maritime spatial planning, OJ L-257/135 28-8-2014. 
342 Directive 2014/52/EU (EIA Directive), art. 4. 
343 Jans, Vedder 2012, p. 346/347. CJEU C-142/07, Ecologistas en Accion-CODA ECLI:EU:C:2008:445, para 41. 
344 Jans, Vedder 2012, 349. 
345 Neither onshore nor offshore underground cables. It must be noted in this regard that onshore underground 
high voltage cables are also subject of discussion. See for example, H. Kamp, Kamerbrief 380 kV 
hoogspanningsverbinding Eemshaven-Vierverlaten, DGETM-EO / 16188366 (in Dutch). 
346 Report from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions  on the application and effectiveness of the EIA Directive 
(Directive 85/337/EEC, as amended by Directives 97/11/EC and 2003/35/EC), COM(2009) 378 final, 23.07.2009, 
p. 3. 
347 NIRAS, ‘Subsea Cable Interactions with the Marine Environment, Expert Review and Recommendations 
Report’, 12-2015. 
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require an EIA to be performed for activities that have a significant impact on the environment 
based on art. 2(1) of the EIA Directive,348 which means that states could also demand an EIA 
based on their national law rather than on EU law. As the MOG requires the construction of a 
large amount of submarine cables, the obligations with regard to submarine electricity cables 
could be clarified in the next revision of the Directive. 
Some projects have cross-border environmental impact, either in the construction phase or in 
the operational phase. This can also be the case for offshore wind energy and transmission 
infrastructure. If this is to be expected, neighbouring countries have to be informed about the 
project and about its possible transboundary impact. Moreover, within reasonable time, they 
should be able to indicate whether they wish to participate in the EIA procedure.349 This is 
based on the Espoo Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in Transboundary 
Context, and the implementation thereof in the EIA Directive.350   
3.4.4.2 Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive 
In the context of a MOG, it is relevant to assess not only the impact of a single extra OWF or 
offshore electricity transmission project but also the cumulative environmental impact of the 
many wind farms and electricity infrastructure projects planned in the North Sea. Whereas 
the EIA Directive targets individual projects, the Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) 
Directive targets plans and programmes. Thus, in this instrument, the cumulative impact of a 
range of projects in the same area can be taken into account.  
The Directive obliges policy-makers to develop an SEA for public plans and programmes at a 
national, regional and local level. Public plans for all activities covered under the EIA Directive 
or under the Habitats Directive fall under the scope of this Directive.351 Thus, as OWFs and 
offshore grid developments are likely to have an impact on the environment, the policies and 
plans on these topics are also under the scope of the Directive. The SEA Directive bears several 
similarities to the EIA Directive: the SEA should also be performed before the adoption of the 
plan or programme, in order for it to be taken into account in the decision-making 
procedure.352 Moreover, there is also a special provision for transboundary consultations with 
a view to give neighbouring Member States influence over the drafting of the SEA and the 
ability to participate in the consultation process.353 
3.4.4.3 Habitats and Birds Directive 
The Habitats Directive, which aims to protect wild flora and fauna in general, and the Birds 
Directive, which is specifically aimed at the protection of wild birds have a large influence on 
 
348 In combination with their national laws, based on EIA Directive art. 2(2). 
349 Jans, Vedder 2012, p. 353. 
350 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in Transboundary Context, Espoo, 1991, U.N.T.S. I-34028; 
Directive 2014/52/EU (EIA Directive), art. 7. 
351 Directive 2001/42/EC on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment 
(SEA Directive), OJ L197, 21-7-2001, art. 3(1) and (2). 
352 Ibid., art. 4(1). 
353 Ibid., art. 7. 
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nature conservation, also offshore. Both Directives are relevant for offshore wind energy as 
well as offshore electricity infrastructure, as they designate specific protected areas, such as 
Natura2000 areas,354 which may overlap with strategic areas for offshore wind energy or 
electricity transmission infrastructure. For example, many coastal areas are Natura2000 areas 
and there are some protected areas further offshore as well, such as the Dogger Bank.355 The 
CJEU judged explicitly that the Habitats Directive also applies at sea as far as states exercise 
sovereign rights there.356 
The main risks regarding offshore wind and grid developments in or near protected areas are 
the danger of collisions between birds and bats and offshore wind farms and the underwater 
construction and maintenance of the foundations of wind turbines and converter stations.357 
Nevertheless, whether these risks materialise depends to a large extent on the project siting 
and design.358 With regard to the project design, EIAs for OWF projects often include 
mitigation measures to lower the impact on certain species.359 
Member States have to take the appropriate measures to minimise pollution, deterioration of 
habitats and disturbance of animals in the protected areas.360 Concerning offshore electricity 
infrastructure, this depends very much on strategic siting of OWFs. Nevertheless, it is not 
prohibited per se to construct offshore electricity infrastructure in Natura2000 areas: in the 
specific situation that there is an overriding public interest,361 and if the procedural safeguards 
have been followed, it is possible to place an OWF or converter station in a Natura2000 area 
or in an area affecting the Natura2000 area.362 These interests and safeguards, including the 
assessment of alternative solutions and compensatory measures to mitigate the adverse 
effects to the affected area, are described in a guidance document on art. 6(4) of the Habitats 
Directive.363  
 
354 An overview of Natura 2000 areas can be found on http://natura2000.eea.europa.eu/#. 
355 The United Kingdom has provided licenses and support for the construction of three offshore wind farms at 
the Dogger Bank, they are supposed to be completed by 2024-2025. UK Government, Department of Business, 
Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), Contracts for Difference Allocation Round 3 Results, published 20 
September 2019, Revised on 11 October 2019. In the meantime, the Netherlands and Denmark are considering 
the construction of an artificial island on the Dogger Bank: https://northseawindpowerhub.eu/.  
356 See above, chapter 3.2. 
357 European Commission, Guidance Document ‘Wind energy developments and Natura 2000’, 2011, p. 33, 37 
and 39. 
358 Ibid., p. 5. 
359 M. Dähne, J. Tougaard, J. Carstensen, A. Rose, J. Nabe-Nielsen, ‘Bubble curtains attenuate noise from 
offshore wind farm construction and reduce temporary habitat loss for harbour porpoises’, Marine Ecology 
Progress Series [2017 vol 580]; R.C. Fijn, K.C. Krijgsveld, M.J.M. Poot, S. Dirksen, ‘Bird movements at rotor 
heights measured continuously with vertical radar at a Dutch offshore wind farm’, International Journal of 
Avian Science [2015]. 
360 Council Directive 92/43/EEC on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, OJ L206/7 
22-7-1992 (Habitats Directive), art. 6; Directive 2009/147/EC on the conservation of wild birds, art. 4. 
361 What is an ‘overriding public interest’ is elaborated by the European Commission: European Commission, 
‘Guidance document on Article 6(4) of the ‘Habitats Directive’ 92/43/EEC’ (January 2007). 
362 European Commission, Guidance Document ‘Wind energy developments and Natura 2000’, 2011, p. 5, 63ff. 
363 Guidance document on Article 6(4) of the 'Habitats Directive' 92/43/EEC, January 2007 
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3.4.4.4 Marine Strategy Framework Directive 
The Marine Strategy Framework Directive forms the link between environmental law, spatial 
planning and offshore activities. It aims for the adoption of effective environmental policy for 
the marine areas of the European Union, including the North Sea.364 There is a strong link 
between the requirements of this Directive and the obligations coastal States have under 
international law following OSPAR.365 The responsible Directorate-General of the European 
Commission mentions that the OSPAR secretariat is willing to facilitate the implementation of 
the Marine Strategy Framework Directive by the relevant Member States.366  
3.4.4.5 Maritime Spatial Planning Directive 
Another relevant directive is the Maritime Spatial Planning Directive. This Directive requires 
all Member States with a coastline to install a Maritime Authority and to implement Maritime 
Spatial Planning, via a Maritime Spatial Plan.367 The Directive had to be transposed by 2016, 
and the first maritime plans have to be ready by 2021, in order to give the Maritime Spatial 
Planning Authorities sufficient time to draft the plans.368 Nevertheless, many Member States 
installed such an authority before the deadline and have even drafted such plans already.369  
Maritime Spatial Planning is important for efficient planning of the limited space available at 
sea. The maritime spatial plans should therefore take into account ‘economic, social and 
environmental aspects to support sustainable development and growth in the maritime 
sector’. Especially for offshore wind and offshore electricity infrastructure, structures and 
installations that will remain in the sea for several decades before being decommissioned and 
that have a large impact on the area, it is important that they are planned in such a way that, 
depending on the policy objectives of the coastal state, other interests are considered as 
well.370 One could think of navigation, nature protection, extraction of natural resources such 
as oil, gas and minerals, defence areas and fisheries. As these activities may have cross-border 
impact, it is important that coastal states communicate with each other already in the 
planning phase. The Directive provides for this cross-border cooperation and data sharing, 
which should ensure coherence and coordination of the plans, especially where it concerns 
transnational issues.371 Nevertheless, cross-border maritime spatial planning appears to be a 
 
364 The ‘North East Atlantic Ocean’ includes the Greater North Sea, the Channel, the Kattegat and the Celtic 
Seas. Marine Strategy Framework Directive, art. 4(1)b and 4(2)a. 
365 OSPAR: Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment in the North-East Atlantic, Paris 1992, 
U.N.T.S. I-42279. All North Sea coastal states have signed and ratified OSPAR. 
366 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/marine/international-cooperation/regional-sea-
conventions/ospar/index_en.htm. 
367 Directive 2014/89/EU establishing a framework for maritime spatial planning, art. 4, 8 and 13. 
368 Ibid., art. 15. 
369 Netherlands: Noordzeeloket, Nationaal Waterplan (in Dutch); Belgium: Minister van Noordzee, Marien 
Ruimtelijk Plan voor de Noordzee (in Dutch); Germany: Bundesamt für Seeschiffahrt und hydrographie, 
Raumordnungsplan Nordsee (Textteil) (in German). 
370 In practice, however, it appears that the Maritime Spatial Planning process is often designed around a 
specific sectoral objective, such as energy. P. Jones, L. Lieberknecht, W. Qiu, ‘Marine spatial planning in reality: 
Introduction to case studies and discussion of findings’ in Marine Policy [2016 71] 256–264, p. 259. 
371 Directive 2014/89/EU establishing a framework for maritime spatial planning, art. 11. 
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process with several practical difficulties, such as that monitoring and evaluation take place in 
different cycles in different countries, making it more difficult to take into account monitoring 
results in maritime spatial planning.372    
3.4.5 Trans-European Electricity Infrastructure 
There are several Regulations related to the investment in, and the construction of, trans-
European electricity infrastructure. First and foremost, the Regulation on Guidelines for Trans-
European Energy Infrastructure (TEN-E) has as its main aim to identify projects that 
significantly contribute to the interconnectivity of the trans-European Energy 
Infrastructure.373  These projects are called Projects of Common Interest (PCIs). The Regulation 
streamlines the planning and permitting phase for these projects and provides rules for cross-
border cost allocation when states cannot agree on this by themselves.374  Moreover, a 
financial instrument (the Connecting Europe Facility; CEF) was created to provide financial 
assistance to these PCIs under certain conditions.375 Financial assistance is only possible when 
a cost-benefit analysis and a cross-border cost allocation procedure have been performed and 
when, after these procedures, the project would still not be commercially viable without an 
extra financial incentive.376  
In practice, every two years, a list of PCIs is drawn up. Project developers (TSOs or other 
parties) can ask for a certain project to be added to the PCI list. Individual projects should fall 
within the ‘priority corridors’ defined by the Regulation. The North Sea Offshore Grid is one of 
these priority corridors.377 The fourth PCI list (2019) includes several interconnectors in the 
North Sea area, as well as the following: “One or more hubs in the North Sea with 
interconnectors to bordering North Sea countries (Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands), 
currently known as the “North Sea Wind Power Hub”.”378   
Projects which are adopted in the list of PCIs profit from priority status in the treatment of the 
permit applications by national authorities, which means that these files should get ‘the most 
rapid treatment legally possible’.379 There are also deadlines for the lengthy process of 
planning and permitting. The pre-application procedure may not last longer than two years, 
and the time between the application and permit granting may not exceed 18 months.380 
Combined, the procedures should not take longer than 3.5 years, which may be prolonged 
once by nine months.381 However, administrative appeals and judicial remedies are not 
 
372 S. Hommes et al., ‘Deliverable 1.2: Report on cross-border Maritime Spatial Planning in two case studies’, 
(MASPNOSE project, 2012) p. 61. 
373 Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure (hereinafter: TEN-E 
Regulation). 
374 Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 (TEN-E Regulation), art. 12. 
375 Regulation (EU) No 1316/2013 establishing the Connecting Europe Facility, OJ L-348/129 20-12-2013, art. 7. 
376 Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 (TEN-E Regulation), art. 14(2). 
377 Ibid., Annex VII B1. 
378 European Commission, C(2019) 7772 final, 31 October 2019 (forthcoming). 
379 Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 (TEN-E Regulation), art. 7(2). 
380 Ibid., art. 10(1). 
381 Ibid., art. 10(2). 
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counted as part of these time limits, whereas these procedures may significantly lengthen the 
permitting process. Therefore, PCIs may still have lengthy permitting processes even though 
the TEN-E Regulation aims to shorten this procedure. 
Next to the TEN-E Regulation and CEF Regulation, there is also a Council Regulation on 
Notification of Investment Projects in Energy Infrastructure.382 The aim of this regulation is 
data collection on investment in the development of new energy sources, the transformation 
of existing infrastructure and decommissioning of energy infrastructure. Member States have 
to send this information bi-annually. The data are used to monitor the development of the 
production capacity as well as the security of supply in different Member States. Relevant for 
offshore electricity infrastructure is that the notification obligation is also applicable to wind 
farms of 20MW and more, submarine transmission cables with a capacity of 150 kV or more 
and to PCI projects.383 This makes it likely that the notification obligation is applicable to all 
offshore grid developments in the North Sea. 
3.4.6 Offshore Grid Operation – the Role of EU Network Codes 
The electricity grid is operated by the TSOs of different countries. In order to maintain the 
grid’s safety and reliability, network codes are drafted.384 Both the hardware (the physical 
connections) and the software need to be operated with great precision, and the EU Network 
Codes that lay down how the network should be operated, are therefore invaluable. Without 
network codes, it is not possible to safely operate such a complex network. The same goes for 
a future MOG, without detailed rules on how the MOG is to be operated, the MOG will not 
function. 
These network codes have been developed over a long time, via cooperation between 
national entities.385 However, the formal start of the EU Network Codes was Regulation 
714/2009,386 which asked TSOs to draft Grid Codes that lay down the rules and parameters 
that every connected party should adhere to. The grid codes codify existing rules and technical 
standards, and add extra rules on how the grid should be operated. In addition, the Grid Codes 
codify arrangements about grid costs and access to the network. EU Network Codes are 
drafted by the TSOs, working together as ENTSO-E. Following advice from ACER, these codes 
are adopted by the European Commission via comitology.387  
 
382 Regulation (EU) No 256/2014 concerning the notification to the Commission of investment projects in 
energy infrastructure within the European Union, OJ L-84/61 20-3-2014. 
383 Ibid., Annex 3.1; 3.2. 
384 For an overview of the drafting process of EU network codes, see L. Hancher, A.M. Kehoe, J. Rumpf, ‘The EU 
Electricity Network Codes and Guidelines: A Legal Perspective’, FSR Research Report, March 2020, p. 16 ff. 
385 M. Walser, F. Wagner, ‘The 50 Year Success Story – Evolution of a European Interconnected Grid’, 
Secretariat of UCTE 2009. 
386 Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in 
electricity, art. 6. In its successor, Regulation (EU) 2019/943, chapter VII is entirely dedicated to network codes. 
387 Regulation 714/2009, art. 6(6)-(11), 8(1) and 23(1) provide the legal basis for this procedure. Currently, all 
European Network Codes are adopted and are in the implementation phase. Hancher, Kehoe, Rumpf (2020) 
provide a detailed overview of this procedure. 
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The network codes are highly complex and often technical documents, but they provide 
essential information on grid connections,388 system operation389 and market rules. These 
rules are applicable to the current AC networks in Europe as well as to DC networks. Next to 
the general network codes, there is a network code specifically for HVDC grid connections, 
which is also highly relevant for offshore grids.390 The HVDC Network Code refers to the rules 
of the general Network Codes on Requirements for Generators and adds some specific 
provisions on HVDC connections.391  
There are several Network Codes on market rules concerning capacity allocation on cross-
border electricity transmission networks, on the day-ahead and intraday electricity markets, 
as well as concerning long-term transmission rights.392 The main market principles laid down 
in the Electricity Market Regulation, non-discriminatory market access and market-based 
allocation of capacity, are also reflected in these Network Codes. Furthermore, the network 
codes facilitate the cross-border exchange of energy by providing ‘the minimum degree of 
harmonisation required to achieve the aims of [the] Regulation [on the internal market for 
electricity]’.393 
There is also a specific network code for the balancing of the electricity networks.394 Electricity 
networks must be balanced to maintain a stable frequency. Fluctuations in frequency may 
disturb or damage the entities connected to the electricity grid, both on the generation and 
on the consumption side. Excessive deviations in frequency may even lead to blackouts. An 
HVDC network does not have a frequency, but in an HVDC network, the voltage can fluctuate 
when the generation and load (electricity consumption) are not balanced. Moreover, the 
HVDC network can support the frequency of the onshore AC system at its converter stations. 
Therefore, the Electricity Balancing grid code is also relevant for an offshore HVDC grid in the 
North Sea, at least when the network code adopts specific rules about the balancing of the 
HVDC grid as well.   
 
388 Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/631 of 14 April 2016 establishing a network code on requirements for 
grid connection of generators, OJ L-112/1 27-4-2016. 
389 Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/1485 of 2 August 2017 establishing a guideline on electricity transmission 
system operation, OJ L 220, 25.8.2017. 
390 Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/1447 of 26 August 2016 establishing a network code on requirements for 
grid connection of high voltage direct current systems and direct current-connected power park modules, OJ L-
241/1 8-9-2016. 
391 Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/631 (Requirements for Generators) refers to ‘offshore power park 
modules’ in articles 13-22. Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/1447 (HVDC Connections) refers to these 
requirements for HVDC connections, art. 38. 
392 Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/1222 of 24 July 2015 establishing a guideline on capacity allocation and 
congestion management, OJ L-197/24 25-7-2015; Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/1719 of 26 September 
2016 establishing a guideline on forward capacity allocation, OJ L-259/42 27-9-2016; Commission Regulation 
(EU) 2017/2195 of 23 November 2017 establishing a guideline on electricity balancing, OJ L-312/6 28-11-2017. 
393 Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on the internal 
market for electricity, art. 58(2)a. 
394 Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/2195 of 23 November 2017 establishing a guideline on electricity 
balancing, L-312/6 28-11-2017. 
PP-IDTK-PDF-TEMPLATE-24032020-1601471070490_NEW.indd   98 06-10-2020   09:42
 
76 
Examining the Network Codes is not an integral part of this dissertation, as they include many 
technical details which are not relevant for a dissertation on the legal framework. 
Nevertheless, it is important to state the function of the Network Codes in the legal framework 
for an offshore grid. The Network Codes aim to standardise technical rules across Europe, 
which is particularly useful for cross-border electricity flows and for companies that have grid 
connections in several countries, both of which are relevant for an offshore grid.  
It must be noted however, that the Network Codes do not aim for complete harmonisation. 
Several issues are not standardised but left to the Member States to decide. On these issues, 
named ‘non-exhaustive requirements’, Member States are free to decide on these 
requirements within certain boundaries.395 This leads to a different implementation of the 
Network Codes in the national electricity systems, which may still hamper cross-border 
electricity trade, which is why the European Network Codes were created in the first place.  
Next to the relatively new European Network Codes, another relevant instrument for offshore 
grid operation is the Regulation on the Inter-TSO Compensation Mechanism.396 The 
mechanism aims to compensate TSOs for the losses (the decrease of transmission capacity) 
they incur as a result of cross-border flows through their networks and the extra costs incurred 
by infrastructure reinforcement in order to accommodate these flows.397 It started as a 
voluntary scheme for TSOs but was codified officially with the 2003 Package.398 The inter-TSO 
compensation mechanism may be relevant for the offshore meshed grid as there will be cross-
border flows over this grid. Nevertheless, it depends on the physical characteristics of the grid 
as well as on the governance structure as to whether such a mechanism is needed or whether 
another solution can be found.399 It appears that this compensation mechanism is only a small 
part of the total costs of electricity infrastructure,400 and that this compensation mechanism 
is not able to correct the currently existing issues of congestion at borders between bidding 
zones. 
 
395 ENTSO-E, ‘Parameters of Non-Exhaustive Requirements: ENTSO-E Guidance document for national 
implementation for network codes on grid connection’, p. 7-29.  
396 Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on the internal 
market for electricity, art. 49 currently sets the legal basis for this mechanism. The details are elaborated in a 
separate regulation: Commission Regulation (EU) No 838/2010 on laying down guidelines relating to the inter-
transmission system operator compensation mechanism and a common regulatory approach to transmission 
charging, OJ L-250/5 24-9-2010. 
397 Commission Regulation (EU) No 838/2010 on laying down guidelines relating to the inter-transmission 
system operator compensation mechanism and a common regulatory approach to transmission charging. 
398 Regulation 1228/2003, art. 3 and 8. 
399 A different bidding zone configuration could change the flows through the network. 
400 S. Hadush, C. de Jonge, R. Belmans, ‘The Implication of the European inter-TSO compensation mechanism 
for cross-border transmission investments’, International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems [2015 
vol. 73] p. 682. 
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3.5 An Offshore Grid in the Current EU Legal Framework? 
The paragraphs above give an overview of the EU legislation applicable to offshore electricity 
cables. The next step is to investigate whether the current legislative framework also works 
for new developments, such as hybrid assets and a meshed offshore grid. 
The categorisation of hybrid and MOG assets under EU law influences how the assets are 
regulated in terms of conditions for access, income (tariffs) and ownership. Categorisation of 
‘new’ assets such as hybrid cables and cables that are part of the MOG according to current 
EU law is the least invasive option as it maintains the status quo. However, this may lead to 
undesirable consequences, for example to a hybrid asset not being constructed, or being 
constructed only as a radial connection,401 or only as an interconnector.402 
 
The difficulty with the current legal framework is that various characteristics of hybrid cables 
are not well reflected in the current regulatory regime. The current EU legal framework only 
differentiates between ‘transmission networks’ and ‘interconnectors’, whereas hybrid assets 
and cables that form part of the MOG have characteristics from both ‘categories’. In section 
3.5.1., it is explained which rules are problematic for hybrid assets and for the MOG. The newly 
developed project ‘Kriegers Flak Combined Grid Solution’ is an example of how this is 
approached in practice. The approach for Kriegers Flak Combined Grid Solution is elaborated 
in section 3.5.2. This approach, however, cannot be copied to other hybrid or MOG projects. 
As such, a solution with another approach might be needed. This other solution could be 
designed in several ways, developed in the following sections. In section 3.5.3, the 
fundamental question of whether it is necessary to regulate the offshore grid in the way the 
onshore grid is regulated, is asked. Then, in section 3.5.4, the potential of recital 66 of the 
recast Electricity Market Regulation in addressing regulatory difficulties for hybrid assets and 
the MOG under EU law is discussed. Finally, in section 3.5.5, an alternative solution, based on 
a different market model, that could circumvent the legal issues described in this subchapter 
is presented.  
3.5.1 Hybrid Asset Regulation in the Current EU Legal Framework 
In this section, the different problematic aspects of EU law with regard to hybrid assets (and, 
in the future, also with regard to the MOG) are elaborated: the specific rules on 
interconnectors (which are, in principle, also applicable to hybrid assets), the principle of non-
discrimination and the existing market rules. 
3.5.1.1 Interconnectors 
Interconnectors are defined in the Electricity Market Directive as ‘equipment used to link 
electricity systems’ and in the Electricity Market Regulation as ‘a transmission line which 
 
401 This has become clear from stakeholder interaction in the context of the PROMOTioN project, see Menze, 
Wagner (forthcoming). 
402 The ‘COBRAcable’ interconnector between Denmark and the Netherlands was designed to be able to 
connect OWFs in Germany. However, due to regulatory difficulties, it remained only an interconnector. 
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crosses or spans a border between Member States and which connects the national 
transmission systems of the Member States’.403 With the current definition for 
‘interconnector’, hybrid connections or cross-border cables that are part of the MOG 
automatically fall under both definitions, which means that these cables also have to adhere 
to the rules applicable to interconnectors as described in EU law.  
First of all, this means that the requirement for Member States to have at least 70% of the 
interconnector transmission capacity available to the market, respecting operational security 
limits of internal and cross-zonal critical network elements, is also applicable to hybrid assets 
and the MOG.404 This rule, called the 70% rule, was added to the Clean Energy Package in 
order to make clear which capacity TSOs should keep available at the borders of their bidding 
zones. This was done in order to promote unrestricted cross-border trade in electricity, and 
to prevent the phenomenon of ‘exporting congestion to the border of the bidding zone’ or 
‘congestion displacement’, in which TSOs limit the amount of cross-border capacity in order 
to address internal congestion issues.405 Congestion is a natural phenomenon in electricity 
grids: if no congestion ever occurs, this could be a sign that the electricity grid is 
overdimensioned compared to the electricity flows it is used for. However, structural 
congestion limits the possibilities for electricity trade and should thus be addressed by the 
grid owner. EU energy law provides several options for TSOs to combat congestion, both on 
the long term (grid reinforcement; bidding zone reconfiguration) and on the short term 
(redispatch).406 On borders between bidding zones, TSOs should coordinate actions to 
alleviate (internal) congestion, in order to prevent adverse effects on each other’s networks. 
However, it seems that in practice, TSOs avoid congestion within their networks by limiting 
the capacity of interconnectors at their borders, thereby limiting electricity flows within their 
system. This is the ‘congestion displacement’ mentioned earlier in this paragraph, which has 
a negative impact on the integration of the internal market for electricity. The 70% rule, and 
its predecessor in the 2009 Regulation, aim to limit this phenomenon, although not always 
successfully, leading to several cases in which the European Commission intervened in the 
operational practice of TSOs.407 
The question is whether the tools and rules for congestion management will also work for 
offshore electricity infrastructure and eventually for a MOG. There are two important 
differences between congestion management in neighbouring onshore networks and offshore 
 
403 Directive 2019/944 on common rules for the internal market for electricity, OJ L 158, 14.6.2019, art. 2(39), 
Regulation (EU) 2019/943 on the internal market for electricity, art. 2(1). 
404 Regulation (EU) 2019/943 on the internal market for electricity, art. 16(8). 
405 J. Rumpf, ‘Congestion displacement in European electricity transmission systems – finally getting a grip on 
it? Revised safeguards in the Clean Energy Package and the European network codes’ Journal of Energy and 
Natural Resources Law [2020], p. 3.  
406 Rumpf (2020), p. 6.  
407 Ibid., p. 11 ff. Notable cases are the ‘Swedish Interconnectors Case’ (Case COMP/39.351; Commission 
Decision 2010/C 142/08 [2010] OJ C142/28), the ‘DE/DK border Case’ (Case AT.40461; Commission Decision 
2019/C 58/09 [2019] OJ C58/7) and the ‘Baltic Cable Case’ (Case C- 454/18 Baltic Cable AB v 
Energimarknadsinspektionen, ECLI:EU:C:2020:189). 
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electricity cables such as envisaged for the MOG: first of all, it is much more difficult to control 
electricity flows in a cross-border AC network, such as the onshore electricity networks, than 
in a DC network – where electricity needs to pass through a converter station first. This makes 
it possible to steer electricity flows in much more detail. Secondly, as the circumstances for 
constructing offshore transmission infrastructure are often more difficult than for onshore 
transmission infrastructure, the total interconnection capacity between two bidding zones is 
often more limited than for onshore neighbouring bidding zones, which means that price 
differences and (structural) congestion persist. 
For regular subsea interconnectors (without any OWFs connected to them), the 70% rule can 
be fulfilled without major hurdles, as the purpose of these interconnectors is to offer 
interconnection capacity to the market. However, the story is different for hybrid assets and 
for the meshed offshore grid, in which the capacity has to be shared between OWFs and other 
market parties that wish to use the capacity on the cables. The 70% rule is difficult to apply to 
hybrid assets and for the MOG, as this means that OWFs connected to cross-border lines 
cannot always get full access to the offshore grid, for example when other market parties, 
such as other renewable energy sources, take the available capacity. For these OWFs, the 
alternative, a radial connection, would guarantee that they could transmit the full output of 
the OWF to the onshore network. For windfarms and other parties connected onshore, the 
situation is also different as the capacity of their connection is also more or less guaranteed 
due to the copper plate presumption.408 Thus, the playing field between OWFs connected to 
a hybrid asset or a MOG is not levelled with other (radially connected) OWFs and with other 
types of electricity generators, connected to the onshore grid. As a level playing field and fair 
competition is another goal of the EU’s work towards an internal electricity market, this issue 
requires attention: the current rules hold back investments in hybrid assets. 
A second rule applicable to interconnectors is that congestion income409 is ring-fenced for 
specific purposes, namely guaranteeing the actual availability of cross-border connections and 
maintaining or increasing the cross-zonal capacity.410 This means that, according to the 
Regulation, in principle, unless these goals have been adequately fulfilled, interconnector 
owners cannot use the revenues for another purpose. This rule is adopted in order to avoid 
creating perverse incentives for the network operator: without such a rule, the network 
operator would have a financial incentive to keep the transmission capacity small, as this 
increases congestion revenues.411 With this rule, the network operator cannot profit from 
 
408 See section 1.7.1 for a detailed explanation on the copper plate presumption. 
409 Congestion income is the revenue that an interconnector owner receives when the capacity on an 
interconnector is auctioned (implictly or explicitly). These auction revenues are thus based on the price 
differential between the two electricity markets that are connected by the interconnector. For a theoretical 
explanation of congestion management and auctioning processes, see H.P.A. Knops, L.J. de Vries, R.A. 
Hakvoort, ‘Congestion Management in the European Electricity System: An Evaluation of the Alternatives’, 
Journal of Network Industries [2001 2].  
410 Regulation (EU) 2019/943 on the internal market for electricity, art. 19(3). The predecessor of this article is 
art. 16(6) of Regulation (EU) 714/2009. 
411 Knops, de Vries, Hakvoort (2001), p. 332, 343. 
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these revenues, which takes away the incentive to keep transmission capacity low. However, 
it must be noted that compared to the earlier requirement (2009 Regulation) that congestion 
income had to be used for the construction of new interconnectors,412 the rule is softened in 
the 2019 Regulation.  
Interestingly, the requirement regarding the ring-fencing of congestion income from the 2009 
Regulation, has been nuanced by a recent judgment of the CJEU.413 In this case, the CJEU had 
to judge how art. 16(6) of Regulation 714/2009 should apply to an exempted 
interconnector,414 i.e. an interconnector owned by a company specifically for that purpose 
(without any other grid activities than owning and operating that specific interconnector). 
Correct application of art. 16(6) would entail that the interconnector owner would be 
practically deprived of its income, as congestion income is the sole source of income of an 
exempted interconnector and as it would only be allowed to spend the congestion income on 
the construction of new interconnectors or on the improvement of existing infrastructure. The 
Court concluded that even if a company only operates one interconnector, it is still considered 
a TSO in the context of the Regulation, which means that art. 16(6) also applies to such 
companies.415 However, the Court was forced to conclude that the NRA was allowed to 
authorise the company in question to use part of the congestion income to cover expenses 
with regard to the interconnector, including making an appropriate profit.416 This derogation 
from art. 16(6) was necessary in order to make sure that ‘TSOs merely operating one 
interconnector’ were not discriminated against compared to other TSOs. The repercussions of 
this recent case, for example with regard to the appetite of market parties to own and operate 
merely one interconnector, remains to be seen.  
3.5.1.2 Non-Discriminatory Access for all Market Participants 
One way to address the issue addressed above, the division of capacity of an interconnector 
between OWFs and other market participants, is by giving OWFs precedence over other 
market flows.417 An important norm in EU energy law is non-discriminatory access for all 
market participants.418 A main question to be asked in this context is whether it is necessary 
to give a special status to OWFs connected to a hybrid asset, especially regarding the 
conditions for access.419 This implies a deviation of the general EU rules on non-discriminatory 
 
412 Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in 
electricity, article 16(6). 
413 Case C-454/18 Baltic Cable AB v Energimarknadsinspektionen, 11 March 2020, ECLI:EU:C:2020:189. 
414 An interconnector can receive an exemption from several rules regarding ownership, third party access and 
income, based on Regulation (EU) 2019/943, art. 63 or on its predecessor Regulation 714/2009, art. 17 (New 
Interconnectors), if it fulfils the conditions of this article.  
415 Case C-454/18 (Baltic Cable), para 51/52. 
416 Ibid., para 79. 
417 See section 3.5.2 for an example of where this has happened. 
418 H.T. Kruimer, ‘Non-discriminatory Energy System Operation: What Does it Mean?’ Competition and 
Regulation in Network Industries [2011 Vol 12 No. 3] 268-269. 
419 Kruimer (2011) elaborates under what conditions different treatment of certain network users can be 
justified. This is based on case law of the CJEU, mainly C-439/06 Citiworks, ECLI:EU:C:2008:298 and C-213/96 
Outokompu ECLI:EU:C:1998:155. 
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access and a level playing field, as other parties will also be interested in reserving the capacity 
of the cable. Non-discriminatory access is a useful principle for the onshore grid under the 
assumption of a copper plate, but for an offshore situation in which the OWFs are of the same 
capacity as the cable connecting them, the situation is different than for onshore connected 
parties.420  
 
A possible argument in favour of a special regulatory treatment of hybrid assets is of a political 
and economic nature: why would the state, through general public funds from taxes or 
through levies on the electricity bill, finance the development of offshore wind energy, while 
limiting the access of the OWF to the electricity network? If the goal of the support schemes 
is to stimulate the production of renewable energy, it will be counterintuitive to limit the 
access of this electricity to the grid.  
 
Nevertheless, there are alternative ways for ensuring sufficient access of OWFs to the grid, 
such as by over-dimensioning the capacity on the hybrid asset, in order to make sure there is 
always sufficient capacity. However, this is not beneficial from a societal point of view, as this 
will make the connection of OWFs much more expensive, while the length of time when the 
capacity is really necessary is limited. In other words, by over-dimensioning the grid, the costs 
are increased much more than the benefits are.  
 
Considering the level playing field, which ensures fair competition between different market 
players, it is important to consider between whom the playing field should be levelled: 
between offshore wind and onshore wind, or between radially connected offshore wind and 
hybrid connected offshore wind. This makes a big difference, because for the former case, one 
should not provide special access and dispatch conditions to OWFs, whereas in the second, 
special access and dispatch conditions for the OWFs connected to a hybrid asset levels the 
playing field with radially connected OWFs. The rules on access and dispatch cannot be seen 
in isolation from the general market rules, i.e. whether an OWF, located in the EEZ of country 
A but connected to a hybrid asset between country A and country B is only allowed to bid into 
the electricity market of country A, or whether it can also participate directly in the electricity 
market of country B.421 The exact formulation and scope of such rules is a topic of economic 
optimisation. It falls outside the scope of this research to develop these rules, but it is clear 
that the rules need to be adapted to the specific situation of hybrid assets, which means that 
a separate legislative category of hybrid assets is necessary to apply these rules to. 
 
420 The onshore grid is over-dimensioned for the purposes of grid safety and reliability, and this is less relevant 
for the offshore grid, to which generally no load (electricity users) is connected. See chapter 1.7.1. 
421 The status quo with a radial connection is that an OWF in the EEZ of country A is only allowed and physically 
able to bid into the electricity market of country A. However, when an OWF is connected to an offshore grid 
with connections to both country A and B, different arrangements are possible. See NSCOGI, Working Group 2 
Market and Regulatory Issues, ‘Integrated Offshore Networks and the Electricity Target Model, Final Report’ 
2014. 
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3.5.1.3 Forward Capacity Allocation 
With the current rules on Forward Capacity Allocation (FCA), it is possible to reserve capacity 
on a certain cross-border connection a month or even a year in advance. In the EU Network 
Code on FCA, “promoting effective long-term cross-zonal trade with long-term cross-zonal 
hedging opportunities for market participants;” is mentioned as a first objective.422 However, 
a main function of the MOG is to connect OWFs, and the output of OWFs is difficult to predict 
more than a few days in advance, when reliable weather models become available.423 
Therefore, the rules on forward capacity allocation, enshrined in the EU Network Code on 
Forward Capacity Allocation, need to be amended where it concerns offshore grid assets. The 
market rules on the other time scales, i.e. day-ahead and intraday, are not problematic for the 
MOG, as it is possible to predict OWF output relatively reliably on these time scales. Therefore, 
the market rules on these time scales do not have to be amended. 
In conclusion, there are several parts of the current regulation of cross-border electricity 
networks that are problematic in the light of hybrid assets and the MOG and the connection 
of OWFs thereto. In the first hybrid project, Kriegers Flak Combined Grid Solutions, these 
issues were addressed in practice. 
3.5.2 Current EU Law in Practice: Kriegers Flak Combined Grid Solution 
The offshore wind farm Kriegers Flak, under Danish jurisdiction, is connected both to the 
Danish onshore grid and to two German offshore wind farms, Baltic 1 and Baltic 2, which have 
already been connected to the German coast for several years.  Thus, an electrical connection 
with the name Kriegers Flak Combined Grid Solution is constructed between Denmark and 
Germany with three offshore wind farms in the middle. 
Kriegers Flak Combined Grid Solution is a hybrid project which also falls under the definition 
of interconnector as described above. However, the OWFs in this project also benefit from the 
rules on priority dispatch which existed under the 2009 Renewable Energy Directive.424 The 
rules on interconnectors were difficult to reconcile with the rules on priority dispatch for 
electricity from renewable sources, which meant that a special exemption had to be made for 
this project: the available capacity (which is required to be offered to the market) is only the 
capacity of the interconnector after the capacity used by the OWFs is deducted: the market 
model of the project entails that, in principle, transport of electricity from the offshore wind 
farms to shore has priority on the cable.425  
 
422 Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/1719 of 26 September 2016 establishing a guideline on forward capacity 
allocation, art. 3(a). 
423 In wind forecasting for OWFs, a few days ahead is already called ‘long-term’ forecasting. See X. Wang, P. 
Guo, X. Huang, ‘A Review of Wind Power Forecasting Models’, Energy Procedia [2011 12] pp. 770 – 778. 
424 Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of 
the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC 
and 2003/30/EC (Renewable Energy Directive), article 16(2)b. 
425 Energitilsynet, ‘Metodegodkendelse af markedsmodel for Kriegers Flak havvindmøllepark – 
elforsyningslovens § 73 a’, 15-01-2014, § 30. 
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The OWF in the Danish EEZ sells its electricity on the East-Danish spot market, and the OWFs 
in the German EEZ sell their electricity on the German side.426 The TSOs forecast the available 
capacity on the cable by deducting the electricity production on an hourly basis in the day-
ahead time spectre.427 This determines which capacity will be reserved for the OWFs. The 
remainder of capacity will be made available to the market. Kriegers Flak offshore wind farm 
thus has the same conditions as other offshore wind farms in East-Denmark.428 The German 
offshore wind farms (Baltic 1 and 2), already constructed several years ago, will keep operating 
according to the same conditions as before the construction of the hybrid connection. The 
interconnection capacity is then calculated on the basis of what capacity is left after the 
transport to the shores of Denmark (for Kriegers Flak) and Germany (for Baltic 1 and 2) and 
based on ‘netting’ of the electricity flows in the two directions.429 
 
Image 5: Schematic Overview of the Kriegers Flak Project. Source: Energinet.dk 
A particular difficulty for hybrid assets, and thus for Kriegers Flak Combined Grid Solution, is 
the requirement for interconnectors to make all capacity available to the market (which is 
now replaced by the 70% requirement, see section 3.5.1.1.). It is not possible to make the 
capacity of the interconnector available to all market participants, as required by EU law, while 
also ensuring the level playing field of the OWFs connected to it. The OWFs connected to a 
hybrid asset would then need to compete with other market participants for capacity on their 
grid connection (the interconnector), whereas other (onshore) connected parties and radially 
connected OWFs do not have to compete in such a way: the grid connection they have is 
 
426 Ibid., § 29 and 31. 
427 Ibid., § 30. 
428 Ibid., § 31. 
429 Ibid., ‘Figure 2’ on p. 7 and § 37. ‘Netting’ in this context means that the available export capacity of a 
country is calculated by adding the cable capacity between that country and the offshore wind farm(s) to the 
current production at the offshore wind farm(s).  
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guaranteed and they are presumed to be part of a copper plate. This is a fundamentally 
different market situation. 
 
For Kriegers Flak Combined Grid Solution, deviation from the general rule (which, at the time 
of regulatory approval was not yet specified to 70% but rather “the maximum capacity” of the 
interconnector should be available to market participants)430 was logical due to the historical 
development of the project, as the German OWFs already existed for several years when the 
extra connection was made and their situation needed to be preserved. However, this will not 
be the case for future hybrid assets or for the MOG as a whole, and therefore, this solution 
cannot be copied to other hybrid assets. In addition, this solution, which is based on 
agreement between the involved TSOs, NRAs and the European Commission, could be 
challenged at the CJEU as it is not clear whether it is compatible with current EU law, 
specifically with the rule that the available capacity on interconnectors should be offered to 
all market participants, which is based on the principle of non-discriminatory access to 
electricity networks. This leads to legal uncertainty for hybrid assets with regard to the 
application of EU law, specifically with the rule on the available capacity. This needs to be 
addressed in the legal framework for future hybrid assets and for the MOG. 
3.5.3 To Regulate or Not To Regulate 
Before going into detail on how future hybrid assets, or the offshore grid as a whole, should 
be regulated, a fundamental choice is to what extent the offshore grid needs to be regulated 
in the first place.431  Following from economic theory, transmission of electricity is deemed to 
be a natural monopoly.432  The construction of electricity cables in general and in particular at 
sea entails large upfront investments. These investments are ‘sunk costs’, costs that have to 
be made before the first electron is transported. However, once the cable is there, there is 
only a low marginal cost to transport electricity over it, which gives the first supplier a large 
economic advantage.433 It is not economically opportune to have multiple cables next to each 
other in the same area, as the costs of constructing a second cable are just as high, while the 
returns will be lower for both cables. This is an extra barrier to entry. The high investment 
costs and the impossibility of creating two parallel electricity networks mean that electricity 
transmission qualifies as a natural monopoly. 
 
A risk of natural monopolies is that, without the competitive pressure of other market 
participants, they may demand prices which are too high or unfair conditions for access, or 
otherwise deliver insufficient service to the grid users. In order to prevent this, regulation 
simulates competitive pressure through income regulation of the grid owner, and rules on 
 
430 Under the legislation applicable at the time when Kriegers Flak CGS gained regulatory approval, this was 
Regulation 714/2009, art. 16(3). 
431 Regulation exists to overcome market failures. However, over-regulation may lead to inefficiencies in the 
market, creating so-called regulatory failure or government failure. See B. Orbach, ‘What is government 
failure?’ Yale Journal on Regulation Online [2013 44] p. 45. 
432 J. Perloff, Microeconomics (Pearson, 2009 5th ed.) p. 369/370. 
433 W. Kip Viscusi, Economics of Regulation and Antitrust (MIT Press, 2005, 4th Ed.) p. 402. 
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access and quality norms ensure that those connected to the system will get fair treatment. 
Therefore, in many countries, electricity transmission (and distribution) is a regulated 
economic activity. 
 
In some situations, a lower level of regulation is possible: some interconnector projects can 
be (partially) exempted from the regulatory framework applicable to interconnectors.434 
These projects, the so-called exempted or merchant interconnectors, can, under specific 
circumstances, be exempted from the rules on their income, unbundling or third-party 
access.435 However, this is only done in a limited number of cases and only when it is not 
possible to develop the project under the general regulatory framework.436 As mentioned in 
section 3.5.1.1, the CJEU has recently judged that the current regulatory framework does not 
always take into account the specific conditions of such exempted interconnectors, which 
justifies specific derogations from the general EU energy law rules applicable to 
interconnectors.437 
 
Several OWF developers also state that they are able to own and operate an offshore grid,438 
and that this does not have to be a regulated activity. A parallel can be drawn to the offshore 
gas sector in the North Sea, where an extensive (upstream) pipeline system exists between 
different gas fields. The parallel with the upstream offshore gas system is that in both cases, 
different locations of generation (of electricity) or production (of gas) are connected to each 
other. In both cases, this is done in order to prevent the situation in which each gas field (or 
wind farm) has a separate pipeline (or cable) to the onshore network, especially when there 
are multiple gas fields (or OWFs) close to each other. However, a difference is that shared 
 
434 The general legal framework applicable to interconnectors is explained in section 3.5.1.1. An exemption 
from this framework is possible in certain cases, when it is not possible to develop an interconnector under the 
general regulatory framework, for example because the investment is too risky. 
435 Regulation (EU) 2019/943 on the internal market for electricity, art. 63. 
436 This is only possible if the following six criteria (from Regulation 2019/943, art. 63, are met: the investment 
enhances competition in electricity supply; the level of risk attached to the investment is such that the 
investment would not take place unless an exemption is granted; the interconnector is owned by a natural or 
legal person which is separate, at least in terms of its legal form, from the system operators in whose systems 
that interconnector is to be built; charges are levied on users of that interconnector; since the partial market 
opening referred to in Article 19 of Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (24), no 
part of the capital or operating costs of the interconnector has been recovered from any component of charges 
made for the use of transmission or distribution systems linked by the interconnector; and an exemption would 
not be to the detriment of competition or the effective functioning of the internal market for electricity, or the 
efficient functioning of the regulated system to which the interconnector is linked. 
437 This is based on the ‘Baltic Cable Case’, see footnote 407 above.  
438 A distinction must be made here between owning a single radial connection from the OWF to the onshore 
grid, which is common in several countries (see section 4.3), and owning an electricity grid. The difference is 
that for the former, there is only one user, namely the OWF, and only one type of usage, namely from the OWF 
to the shore. For an electricity grid, multiple users and multiple directions are possible. This distinction is 
relevant in the light of the access rights of different market participants, which is not relevant for a radial 
connection but which is relevant for a meshed grid with several competing users. 
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upstream infrastructure is a common practice in the gas sector, whereas it is not common to 
the electricity sector, at least in Europe. 
An advantage of having OWF developers in charge of a shared cable system (in parallel to the 
upstream pipeline system that exists in the gas sector), is that this will limit the interface risk 
between windfarm and cable connection. This is especially valuable during the construction 
phase. The advantage of this system, according to major European OWF owners, is that OWF 
owners can make the connection in a more reliable, technologically consistent, and less costly 
way.439 However, a downside is that OWF developers may have an interest in limiting the 
availability of the transmission capacity to electricity generated by their OWFs, which means 
that third party access will be more difficult,440 which is a barrier to entry for potential new 
competitors in the electricity generation sector. This may reduce competition in electricity 
generation. This was one of the reasons for introduction of the unbundling regime for the 
electricity and gas grid.441  
In a way, making OWF developers responsible for the construction of the assets, or, taking 
things a step further, categorisation of the grid as an upstream grid, such as done in the 
offshore gas sector, entails a decision to reduce the amount of regulation applicable to the 
assets. If countries decide that, contrary to the normal unbundling rules,442 OWF developers 
should be able to own and operate the offshore grid, regulation is necessary to ensure the 
level playing field between different OWF developers and other market players (competing 
for interconnection capacity) as the grid owners in this situation will have a competitive 
advantage over OWF developers that do not own a grid and over other market players. 
Therefore, regardless of whether the grid is owned by a TSO, by various third parties or by 
OWF developers, regulation of the transmission activities is necessary. 
3.5.4 The Role of Recital 66 of the Electricity Market Regulation 
In the Electricity Market Regulation, recital 66 on facilitating investments in major new 
electricity infrastructure, is amended to include a special provision about hybrid assets:443  
 
 
439 This is a finding of stakeholder dialogue in the context of research for the PROMOTioN project. See Menze, 
Wagner (forthcoming). 
440 There is a link with the ‘essential facilities doctrine’ in EU competition law. This doctrine entails that when 
companies have certain ‘essential facilities’, bottlenecks such as distribution networks, they should grant access 
to these facilities to other market parties (competitors) at a reasonable price. Transmission grids can be 
regarded as essential facilities to which competitors will want to have access in order to be able to reach their 
market. There have not been cases in which the essential facilities doctrine is explicitly mentioned, but there 
are many legislative acts in the energy sector which are inspired by this doctrine. A. de Hautecloque, ‘Article 
102 TFEU Abuse of a dominant position’ in C. Jones (Ed.) EU Competition Law and Energy Markets (Claeys & 
Casteels 2016) p. 303. 
441 The Commission dedicated a working paper to it: COM (88) 238 Final, ‘The Internal Energy Market’. It 
identified several obstacles to achieving an internal market in electricity, p. 70 and further. 
442 See section 3.4.1 for an explanation of the separation of transmission and distribution activities from 
generation and supply activities. 
443 Regulation (EU) 2019/943 on the internal market for electricity, recital (66). 
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(…) Offshore electricity infrastructure with dual functionality (so-called ‘offshore 
hybrid assets’) combining transport of offshore wind energy to shore and 
interconnectors, should also be eligible for exemption such as under the rules 
applicable to new direct current interconnectors. Where necessary, the regulatory 
framework should duly consider the specific situation of these assets to overcome 
barriers to the realisation of societally cost-efficient offshore hybrid assets. 
 
In other words, developers of hybrid assets are able to apply for an ‘exemption for new 
interconnectors’. Such an exemption allows developers to deviate, in specific situations, from 
the common rules on unbundling, financial regulation and third party access.444 Such 
exemptions are used more often in the case of interconnectors that could not otherwise be 
developed,445 but with this new recital, the road to exemptions is opened to hybrid assets as 
well. This is not ideal, as the wording does not yet provide sufficient certainty to developers 
of hybrid projects as to whether an exemption would be possible for their projects specifically, 
and more generally, what the conditions for exemptions for hybrid assets are.  
 
Moreover, as owners of hybrid assets will often find themselves in the same situation, i.e. with 
conflicting interests between the connected OWFs and those who wish to make use of the 
interconnector capacity, many hybrid projects will apply for an exemption. This is suboptimal 
from a legal doctrinal perspective, as it means that the exception becomes the norm when it 
comes to hybrid assets, which makes one wonder about the value of the norm. The norms, at 
least with regard to interconnectors, are created with specific interests in mind as well. The 
exemption regime is created for the purpose of weighing the interest of protection of the 
internal electricity market (third party access, unbundling, increased interconnection through 
reinvestment of congestion rents) with the interest of constructing the asset in the first place, 
for example when the project risk is too high, meaning that the asset would otherwise not be 
constructed at all.  
 
In the development of hybrid assets, there is a cycle of waiting: the project developers bring 
projects forward only when they are positive about the Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) and about 
whether they are allowed to construct the assets. However, the CBA is based on the regulatory 
framework for hybrid assets, which needs to be clarified by the NRA. The NRA is bound by the 
 
444 Ibid., recital 66 and Exemption for new interconnectors, art. 63. 
445 An exemption can only be granted under the following conditions: (a) the investment must enhance 
competition in electricity supply; (b) the level of risk attached to the investment is such that the investment 
would not take place unless an exemption is granted; (c) the interconnector must be owned by a natural or 
legal person which is separate at least in terms of its legal form from the system operators in whose systems 
that interconnector will be built; (d) charges are levied on users of that interconnector; (e) since the partial 
market opening referred to in Article 19 of Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 1, 
no part of the capital or operating costs of the interconnector has been recovered from any component of 
charges made for the use of transmission or distribution systems linked by the interconnector; and (f) the 
exemption must not be to the detriment of competition or the effective functioning of the internal market in 
electricity, or the efficient functioning of the regulated system to which the interconnector is linked. Regulation 
2019/943 on the internal market for electricity, art. 63. 
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law, in which currently no clear rules are stated. This means that the NRA cannot give sufficient 
clarity to the TSO, which, in turn, will not be able to develop the project further. Without 
hybrid assets being built, there is no urgency for the legislature to amend the law regarding 
hybrid assets. Kriegers Flak Combined Grid Solution is an interesting project, as it breaks this 
cycle and goes ahead with a pragmatic interpretation of the law. However, the regulatory 
situation for Kriegers Flak is very specific, especially because the OWFs were there first. This 
put the NRAs and project developers in the position to interpret EU energy law in a very 
specific way. However, with the legislative amendments of the Clean Energy Package, an 
interpretation based on the variable maximum capacity of the interconnector would probably 
not be possible.  
 
Recital 66 could be of use here, as it provides for the possibility of an exemption. The 
exemption regime is often used to deviate from the rules on how congestion income can be 
used.446 However, for hybrid assets, it could be that the exemption is not (only) about 
congestion income, but rather about the provisions on third party access or the full availability 
to the market of the interconnection capacity,447 in order to allow for a special status for the 
OWFs connected to hybrid assets. 
 
In order to provide more legal certainty and to create a level playing field between different 
hybrid assets, it is advised to adopt a clear definition as well as substantive provisions on this 
matter in the operative part of the Regulation. However, even though adoption in the 
operative part of the Regulation would have provided more legal certainty, adoption of the 
recital is a first step to help approach hybrid assets. A next step would be to adopt a definition 
and substantive provisions on hybrid assets in the Regulation. 
3.5.5 Alternative Solution: Bidding Zone Configuration 
Alongside the possibility of amending EU law in order to regulate hybrid and MOG assets as 
presented above, it is also possible to construct hybrid or MOG assets while keeping the 
current EU law on interconnectors by using an alternative solution, which circumvents legal 
issues on the definitions of interconnectors and hybrid assets by changing the market model. 
In essence, this alternative solution comes down to introducing small offshore bidding zones 
(or ‘nodes’) rather than having the OWFs in the EEZ of one coastal state bid into the electricity 
market of that same coastal state. With this system, OWFs bid in to small bidding zones, which 
could consist of one OWF or a cluster of OWFs (in a ‘hub’). Whereas the electricity price in a 
normal electricity market is based on the combination of supply and demand, there is no, or 
 
446 The general rule is described in paragraph 3.5.1.1. However, for certain project developers, specifically for 
the ones that do not own and operate an onshore grid as well, these rules are not relevant as they are only 
interested in owning and operating one interconnector. For these parties, an exemption to the rules on how 
the congestion income can be used, is necessary. 
447 Regulation 2019/943 on the internal market for electricity, art. 63(1) specifies the articles from which an 
exemption is possible: Article 19(2) and (3) of this Regulation and Articles 6 and 43, Article 59(7) and Article 
60(1) of Directive (EU) 2019/944. 
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hardly any, demand in an offshore bidding zone (as no (or hardly any, in exceptional cases) 
electricity consumers are connected to the offshore bidding zone.448 Therefore, the electricity 
price in the small bidding zone is determined by the electricity price in the highest priced 
neighbouring market to which interconnection capacity is still available.449 If no capacity 
remains, the price of the small bidding zone will be zero.450 This is a market risk for OWF 
owners, who need to receive a price for their electricity in order to recoup their investment. 
This can be mitigated by introducing a different support system for OWFs in a small bidding 
zone, which includes a contract for difference to the nearest price zone(s) and a financial 
transmission right for a predetermined capacity, which could be awarded on the basis of the 
principle ‘use it or lose it’. Remaining capacity can then still be marketed to other parties. With 
this support scheme, OWF owners will not have an incentive to produce more than the 
capacity for which they have a financial transmission right, as this will cause the price to drop 
to zero.451 This gives OWFs an incentive to optimise their electricity output and to stop 
production when there is no capacity left to transmit the electricity to consumers. Moreover, 
this provides a locational price signal which could also stimulate the development of electricity 
storage and conversion.452 
The introduction of a ‘small bidding zones’ model does not require changes to the main 
Directives and Regulations of EU energy law, as it is currently already possible to define 
bidding zones that do not adhere to country borders.453 Even more so, according to the 
current formulation  in the Electricity Market Regulation, bidding zones should reflect areas in 
which there is no structural, long-term congestion.454 Offshore, between different OWFs or 
OWF hubs, transmission capacity is limited by the line capacity of the cables, which means 
that (structural) congestion is likely to occur in some places.455 In this sense, it fits ‘naturally’ 
to use a small bidding zones model for OWFs. It must be noted that the introduction of this 
model, although it does not require major amendments to EU law, does require a different 
support system for OWFs, which requires time to implement into the national jurisdictions of 
the participating coastal states. Moreover, another important presumption is that there is a 
level playing field between the OWFs connected to the same network. This is the case in 
 
448 See section 1.7.1. 




453 This is the case for example in Norway and Italy, which have respectively five and six bidding zones within 
their country borders. The split in multiple bidding zones can be justified by a lack of internal transmission 
capacity in the electricity grid of the country. If there is not sufficient internal transmission capacity, the 
country can no longer be considered as one large ‘copper plate’ (see section 1.7.1). The smaller bidding zones 
reflect the structural congestion between the different areas: inside one bidding zone, there should be no 
structural internal congestion. The reverse (bidding zones crossing a country border) is also possible: the 
Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland share one bidding zone on the island of Ireland, the so-called ‘Single 
Electricity Market’  
454 Regulation (EU) 2019/943 on the internal market for electricity, art. 14. 
455 The offshore grid cannot be considered a copper plate like the onshore grid. See section 1.7.1. 
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theory, following EU law, but in practice, the differences in network charges for generators456 
may cause onshore wind energy of a state without these charges to have priority over OWFs 
connected directly to the offshore grid and thus disturb this market model in practice. 
Moreover, some amendments to the EU Network Codes may have to be made in order to 
make the new market model run smoothly. 
3.5.6 Remaining Issue: Onshore Integration of Offshore Generated Electricity 
This chapter analysed the EU law applicable to offshore electricity infrastructure. However, 
there is a large interdependency between offshore electricity infrastructure and the onshore 
electricity grids it connects. As the generation capacity offshore is projected to grow 
significantly, an important issue is the integration of the offshore generated electricity in the 
onshore electricity networks. The enormous influx of electricity in the onshore networks will 
pose new challenges with regard to congestion management and market rules in the onshore 
networks. For example, maximum infeed limits may have to be adjusted, the security of the 
system needs to be reassessed, and the possibilities of energy storage and conversion may 
need to be stimulated through regulatory adjustments.  
In this regard, it must be noted that introducing small bidding zones for the offshore grid will 
optimise the electricity flows offshore, and influences the conditions for bringing the 
electricity to shore (i.e. bringing the price to zero when the output from the OWFs in a bidding 
zone exceeds the line capacity on the connections from that bidding zone to the different 
onshore grids). However, the small bidding zones model should not be considered a panacea 
that solves onshore congestion issues.  
It lies beyond the scope of this dissertation to discuss the necessary changes regarding the 
onshore electricity network rules needed to incorporate the large influx of offshore generated 
electricity in detail. However, this topic should be covered in future research projects, covering 
both the technical perspective and the regulatory perspective.  
3.6 Interim Conclusion 
The European electricity sector is to a large extent regulated by EU law. The substantive EU 
law described in this chapter forms the regulatory foundation for the electricity sector. On this 
foundation, more specific regulation on Member State level is added. As a consequence, the 
regulatory structure of EU law also forms the basis for the regulation of offshore electricity 
transmission infrastructure. Nevertheless, there are several provisions in current EU energy 
law that hinder the development of offshore electricity infrastructure.  
Considering the fact that offshore electricity infrastructure is located to a large extent outside 
the territory (and territorial waters) of coastal States, an important question is to what extent 
EU law is applicable beyond the territory of the Member States. In doctrine, the competence 
that the EU has to legislate activities at sea and to enforce these rules is derived from the 
 
456 See below, chapter 4.3.3 for an elaboration on what these charges are and how they differ per state. 
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(functional) jurisdiction its Member States have, in combination with the conferral of 
competences to the EU. This is also confirmed by the CJEU in case law stretching several 
decades. The conferral of competences itself takes place via the founding treaties. At the 
moment, the EU has competences in the areas of energy, trans-European networks, 
environmental policy and the internal market. The construction and operation of offshore 
electricity infrastructure is covered by the competences on energy and trans-European 
networks. 
Although this chapter is dedicated to EU law, special attention needs to be paid to the rights 
and competences of neighbouring states which are outside the EU, such as Norway and the 
UK. Norway is part of the internal market via the EEA. With a special procedure, all legislative 
documents deemed applicable to the EEA will be adopted in the EEA Agreement and 
transposed into national law in the EEA countries. However, there is a legislative lag of several 
years. For the UK, the situation is more difficult, as a legal framework entirely based on EU law 
is probably not acceptable to the UK in the current political climate. This is important to take 
into account when drafting the legal framework for a MOG. 
Then, when it comes to substantive EU law, many definitions and categories in the Electricity 
Market Regulation currently applicable to offshore electricity infrastructure do not do justice 
to the characteristics of hybrid assets and MOG infrastructure. One can argue that it is against 
the idea of the level playing field to adopt a new category of assets and to make special access 
rules for these assets, but there are economic arguments against this as well.  Eventually, 
adopting a new category of assets and making clear what the rules and obligations with regard 
to this new category are will provide the required legal certainty to grid developers. An 
alternative solution is to change the bidding zones model offshore, which does not require 
direct changes of EU law but which requires an overhaul of the market system and support 
scheme for OWFs. In practice, both options can be pursued in parallel in the legal framework 
for a MOG. 
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4 Comparative Analysis of National Legal Frameworks for 
Offshore Electricity Infrastructure 
 
The coastal states around the North Sea all have their own approach to regulating offshore 
wind energy and the related grid infrastructure. Although many choices in the national legal 
frameworks of the coastal states are based on European and international law, there is still a 
large diversity of approaches in national law. As coastal states develop their own legal 
approach towards offshore activities based on what they see as a successful approach in other 
North Sea coastal states, a dynamic system of best practices and legal innovation emerges.  
The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, it is to provide an overview of the variety of different 
legal approaches with regard to offshore wind and offshore electricity infrastructure. Second, 
the chapter aims to highlight which options are available to regulate the development of 
offshore wind and offshore electricity transmission infrastructure. The identification of these 
options forms an important step in deciding which legal arrangements should be 
recommended for the development of an offshore grid. The information of this chapter will 
therefore feed directly into chapter 7 as possible options for concrete proposals to stimulate 
the development of offshore infrastructure in light of a future offshore grid.  
The chapter provides a comparative analysis of the national legal frameworks relevant for 
offshore wind and offshore electricity transmission infrastructure, based on a functional 
approach. The analysis includes eight countries around the North Sea (including the Channel): 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom.457 The topics analysed in this chapter follow the lifetime of the assets in an offshore 
grid in a chronological fashion, with respectively: maritime spatial planning; licensing and 
permitting procedures; connection responsibilities; (operational) support for offshore wind 
energy; offshore grid operation; and finally, decommissioning obligations. For each of these 
topics, the eight countries’ policies are discussed and compared. Where possible barriers for 
the development of an offshore grid exist, they are marked as elements to be addressed in 
the future legal framework of the MOG. 
The comparative approach used in this chapter is based on the ‘functional method’ of 
comparative law.458 In this case, the substantive law of the eight North Sea states is analysed 
in relation to the topics that are relevant for the development of the MOG. How these topics 
are dealt with in the different legal systems is assessed, and these are compared to each other 
so as to find out whether they facilitate the development towards a MOG. The ‘functional 
method’ is chosen above other methods of comparative legal research, because the 
 
457 For an overview of the legislative framework for offshore wind and offshore cable infrastructure organized 
per country rather than per subject, see C.T. Nieuwenhout (2017), PROMOTioN Deliverable 7.1: Legal 
Framework and Legal Barriers to an Offshore HVDC Electricity Grid in the North Sea: Intermediate Report for 
Stakeholder Review, July 2017, chapter 5. 
458 M. Van Hoecke, 'Methodology of Comparative Legal Research', Law and Method [2015, December] para 4.1. 
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methodology for comparative research should follow the research aim.459 In this case, 
historical comparison is not relevant as the legal framework on this matter has only developed 
in the last decade. Structural comparison of the legal systems is not helpful to answer the 
research question either, as structural comparison focuses more on the legal systems as such 
(for example in a comparison between common law and civil law), and for this dissertation, 
the content rather than the structure of the legal frameworks of the different coastal states is 
relevant.  
4.1 Maritime Spatial Planning 
4.1.1 History of Maritime Spatial Planning 
For a long time, the North Sea has only been used for marine transport and for fishing, which 
did not conflict with each other very much.460 However, over the last century, the North Sea 
has been used for many different activities, such as shipping, defence purposes, fishing, 
recreation, mineral extraction, nature conservation and transmission of gas via submarine 
pipelines. These activities all require an amount of space, either temporarily, in the case of 
ships that pass by, or (semi-)permanently in the case of installations for aquaculture461 or 
extraction of oil or gas. Over the last few decades, renewable energy production and 
transmission of the generated electrical energy via cables have been added to the activities at 
sea which require a large amount of space on a (semi-)permanent basis. Coastal states have 
been struggling to find sufficient space for the different activities that sometimes exclude 
other activities in the same areas. For example, fishing in areas that are heavily used for 
navigation, or the construction of OWFs in defence practice areas, is not accepted.   
The struggle that coastal states experience with regard to the combination of different 
activities at sea builds on the underlying power of states to regulate certain activities at sea: 
to decide, whether, where and when they can take place.462 The regulation of offshore 
activities can be decided on an ad-hoc basis, but as the amount and (spatial) impact of 
activities at sea increases, ad-hoc decision-making might lead to sub-optimal results with 
regard to the use of space at sea. This in turn may limit the amount of activities that can take 
place in a state’s EEZ and continental shelf or increase the environmental impact of certain 
activities more than necessary. Maritime spatial planning is a process which leads coastal 
states to weigh the interests and impacts of different activities and possible synergies between 
activities to come to an optimal use of the (sometimes scarce) space available at sea. Maritime 
Spatial Planning (MSP) is a neutral instrument that can be used to improve decision-making 
on the spatial planning of nautical areas, with attention to different human activities at sea, 
 
459 Ibid. 
460 C.N. Ehler, ‘Marine Spatial Planning, an Idea Whose Time Has Come’ in K.L. Yates, C.J.A. Bradshaw (Eds), 
Offshore Energy and Marine Spatial Planning (Routledge 2018) p. 6. 
461 Aquaculture is described as “the rearing of aquatic animals or the cultivation of aquatic plants for food” in 
the Oxford Dictionary. In the future, algae cultivation for the purpose of bioplastics or biofuels may be added to 
this. 
462 This is based on jurisdiction at sea, elaborated further in chapter 2.3. 
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as well as the impact of these activities on the maritime environment.463 It can also facilitate 
cross-border cooperation as it makes the impacts of different activities visible, although this 
only works if the states on both sides of a border have a similar or comparable approach to 
maritime spatial planning.464 
Some coastal states started maritime spatial planning several decades ago. Belgium and 
Denmark were the first to do so. Denmark, in the context of the search for optimal offshore 
wind energy locations, started maritime spatial planning specifically aimed at offshore wind 
farms as early as 1997.465 Belgium already had a practice of maritime spatial planning dating 
back to 2003.466 There, the need for a maritime spatial plan originated from the demand for 
suitable locations for offshore wind energy.467 However, the first plan drafted only applied for 
two years, without a clear vision for the future. Moreover, both in Denmark and in Belgium, 
the drafting process was much less organised than contemporary maritime spatial plans.468  
4.1.2 Contemporary Maritime Spatial Planning 
Since the introduction of the EU Maritime Spatial Planning Directive in 2014,469 maritime 
spatial planning has become compulsory for all coastal states investigated in this chapter, 
except for Norway. The Directive was declared ‘not relevant for the EEA’ and was therefore 
not adopted in the EEA agreement. Therefore, in practice, Norway does not have maritime 
spatial planning to the same extent as the other coastal states. Nevertheless, Norway did 
make a strategic assessment of offshore wind energy locations in 2012.470 This document can 
be seen as a first step towards a Maritime Spatial Plan (MSP). However, it is not binding and it 
only takes into account one activity, offshore wind energy. 
The introduction of the EU Maritime Spatial Planning Directive, and its development and 
drafting process already,471 has led to a formalisation of maritime spatial planning law in the 
countries it applies to, although it focuses on minimum harmonisation and thus only 
prescribes the minimum standards.472 In the implementation of the Directive, the states had 
 
463 N. Schaefer, V. Barale, ‘Marine Spatial Planning: Opportunities & Challenges in the Framework of the EU 
Integrated Maritime Policy’, Journal of Coastal Conservation [2011 15] 237-245, p. 238. 
464 F.M. Platjouw, ‘Marine Spatial Planning in the North Sea – Are National Policies and Legal Structures 
Compatible Enough? The Case of Norway and the Netherlands’, the International Journal of Marine and Coastal 
Law [2018 33] pp. 34-78, p. 77/78.  
465 Danish Energy Agency, ‘Danish Experiences from Offshore Wind Development’, 2015, p. 16/17. 
466 F. Maes, A. Vanhulle, A.K. Lescrauwaet, ‘Mariene Ruimtelijke Planning’ in A.K. Lescrauwaet, H. Pirlet, T. 
Verleye, J. Mees, R. Herman, (Eds.), Compendium voor Kust en Zee 2013: Een geïntegreerd kennisdocument 
over de socioeconomische, ecologische en institutionele aspecten van de kust en zee in Vlaanderen en België 
(VLIZ 2013), p. 274. 
467 Ibid. 
468 Ibid. 
469 Directive 2014/89/EU establishing a framework for maritime spatial planning, OJ L 257, 28.8.2014. 
470 Norges Vassdrags- og Energidirektorat, Havvind - Strategisk konsekvensutredning (2012), available at 
http://publikasjoner.nve.no/rapport/2012/rapport2012_47.pdf.  
471 E. van Doorn, S.F. Gahlen, ‘Legal Aspects of Marine Spatial Planning’, in K.L. Yates, C.J.A. Bradshaw (Eds), 
Offshore Energy and Marine Spatial Planning (Routledge 2018) p. 80-82. 
472 Ibid., p. 83. 
PP-IDTK-PDF-TEMPLATE-24032020-1601471070490_NEW.indd   120 06-10-2020   09:42
 
98 
to make clear which authorities are to draft maritime spatial plans, what timespan they cover 
and what their legal status is. Moreover, the adoption of procedures for cooperation with 
neighbouring states is also required by the Directive.473 
The Directive was implemented in different Acts across the analysed countries. For example, 
in Belgium, the Act on the Marine Environment was amended in 2012 to allow for official 
spatial planning.474 Denmark has implemented the Directive with the adoption of a new 
Maritime Spatial Planning Act.475 The Act codifies the practice that already existed before and 
adds more specific information on the procedure and on which interests are taken into 
account.476 In France, (onshore) spatial planning is codified in the Urban Planning Code (Code 
de l’Urbanisme), but offshore wind energy and offshore electricity cables, as well as all other 
constructions at sea, are explicitly excluded from this Act.477 Instead, the French 
Environmental Code (Code de l’Environnement) requires ‘integral management of the sea and 
coastal areas’, and a ‘strategic document’.478 This forms the basis of maritime spatial planning 
in France.  In Germany, from 2009 onwards, maritime spatial planning is based on the general 
Spatial Planning Act (Raumordnungsgesetz), which designates ‘Vorrangsgebiete’. In these 
areas, certain activities, such as offshore wind energy, have priority over all other activities, 
within certain margins set by the same Act.479 In the Netherlands, maritime spatial planning is 
part of the Water Act (Waterwet), in which it is provided that the government drafts a National 
Water Plan.480 This Water Plan encompasses both internal waters and the sea – the part on 
the North Sea is to be considered a Maritime Spatial Plan in the sense of the Directive. As 
mentioned before, Norway does not have any maritime spatial planning law in place, although 
a strategic assessment of the siting of offshore wind areas was published in 2012.481 In 
Sweden, maritime spatial planning has its basis in the Environmental Act.482 It is elaborated 
upon further in an Ordinance dedicated to maritime spatial planning.483 Lastly, the United 
Kingdom implemented the Directive in the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009.484  
 
473 Directive 2014/89/EU establishing a framework for maritime spatial planning, art. 11. 
474 Act on the Maritime Environment (Wet Marien Milieu), art. 7, changing art. 5(bis) of the original act. The 
first Maritime Spatial Plan was adopted with a Royal Decree: Koninklijk Besluit van 20 maart 2014 tot 
vaststelling van het marien ruimtelijk plan, Nr. 2014-03-20/03. 
475 Act on Maritime Spatial Planning (Lov om maritim fysisk planlægning) LBK 615, 8-6-2016. 
476 Ibid., kap. 5.  
477 Urban Planning Code (Code de l’urbanisme) R-421-8-1, L421-5(e).  
478 Environmental Code (Code de l’environnement) art. L-219-1 and L-219-3.  
479 Spatial Planning Act (Raumordnungsgesetz vom 22. Dezember 2008 (BGBl. I S. 2986), das zuletzt durch 
Artikel 124 der Verordnung vom 31. August 2015 (BGBl. I S. 1474) geändert worden ist), art. 17. 
480 Water Act (Wet van 29 januari 2009, houdende regels met betrekking tot het beheer en gebruik van 
watersystemen (Waterwet 2009)), art. 4.1. The most recent version (2016-2021) can be found here: 
https://www.noordzeeloket.nl/images/Nationaal-waterplan-2016-2021%20H_4776.pdf. See also L. de Vrees, 
‘Adaptive marine spatial planning in the Netherlands sector of the North Sea’, Marine Policy [corrected/in press 
14 February 2019] p. 103418. 
481 NVE (Norwegian Water and Energy Directorate), Havvind – Strategisk konsekvens utvredning, december 
2012. 
482 Environmental Act (Miljöbalk), 1998:808, kap. 4 para 10. 
483 Maritime Spatial Planning Ordinance (Havsplaneringsförordning) (2015:400). 
484 Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009 (c 23). 
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4.1.3 Preparation and Adoption of Maritime Spatial Plans 
Maritime spatial planning documents are often prepared by the national or regional maritime 
authorities,485 and officially adopted by the relevant Minister in the form of an official 
government decision or decree. In all investigated countries except for Norway, the maritime 
plan is binding through its legal form as decree or government decision. Additionally, Denmark 
and the United Kingdom state explicitly that spatial planning decisions have to be taken in 
accordance with the maritime plan, with Denmark making an exception for urgent cases in 
which the Minister cannot wait until the maritime spatial plan is changed, or when it is 
necessary in order to comply with international or European law, or when it is necessary for 
maritime safety.486 In Danish law, this is made explicit, but in other countries, this might also 
be the case in practice.  
The authorities responsible for the Maritime Spatial Plans can take different shapes and 
functions. For example, France, Sweden and the United Kingdom have different maritime 
authorities for different regions,487 whereas the Belgium, Denmark, Germany and the 
Netherlands only have one maritime authority.488 Sometimes, even if there is only one 
authority, multiple plans can be drafted. This is the case in Germany, where the Bundesamt 
für Seeschiffahrt und Hydrographie (BSH) develops plans for both the North Sea and the Baltic 
Sea.489  
 
485 In the Directive, only the term ‘the relevant authorities’ is used. See for example MSP Directive, art. 3(2). 
Which authority is the relevant authority differs per coastal state, but most states have specialized authorities 
for maritime affairs. An example is the German Bundesamt für Seeschifffahrt und Hydrographie (BSH). Another 
possibility is that the state has several ‘relevant authorities’. For example, in the UK, the relevant authorities 
are the Secretary of State for the English inshore and offshore regions, Scottish Ministers for the Scottish 
inshore and offshore regions, Welsh Ministers for the Welsh inshore and offshore regions and the Department 
of the Environment in Northern Ireland for the Northern Ireland inshore and offshore regions.  
486 Denmark: Act on Maritime Spatial Planning, kapitel 5. United Kingdom: Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009, 
sec. 58(1) and (2). 
487 For France, four regions are used: the Channel (East)/North Sea; North Atlantic/Channel (West); South 
Atlantic; the Mediterranean sea. Environmental Code (Code de l’Environnement), art. R-219-1-7 (I). For Sweden, 
the regions are the Baltic Sea, Skagerrak/Kattegat and the Gulf of Bothnia, Environment Act (Miliöbalk), kap. 4 
para 10, Maritime Planning Regulation (Havsplaneringsförordning), para 2. For the United Kingdom, there are 
separate maritime planning authorities for England, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales (Marine and Coastal 
Access Act 2009, sec. 50). Officially, there are eight marine planning areas according to sec. 49 Marine and 
Coastal Access Act 2009, but England has subdivided its maritime area in 11 different subareas, which will all 
have separate plans: https://www.gov.uk/government 
/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/325688/marine_plan_areas.pdf. 
488 Respectively Federal DG Environment, Federal Public Service Public Health, Food Chain Safety and 
Environment - Marine Environment Unit (BE), the Danish Maritime Authority (Soefartsstyrelsen, DK), 
Bundesamt für Seeschiffahrt und Hydrographie (BSH, DE), Interdepartmental Directors North Sea Consultative 
Body (IDON, NL) represented to the public by a separate entity ‘Noordzeeloket’ which provides information to 
the public. 
489 Spatial Planning Act (Raumordnungsgesetz des Bundes), art. 17 jo. Verordnung über die Raumordnung in der 
deutschen ausschließlichen Wirtschaftszone in der Nordsee (2009) including Raumordnungsplan Nordsee 2009 
and Verordnung über die Raumordnung in der deutschen ausschließlichen Wirtschaftszone in der Ostsee (2009) 
including Raumordnungsplan Ostsee 2009. 
http://www.bsh.de/de/Meeresnutzung/Raumordnung_in_der_AWZ/index.jsp 
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4.1.4 Scope of Maritime Spatial Plans 
Legal and political differences also become visible when comparing the substantive scope of 
maritime spatial plans. This reveals how diverse the plans are in terms of the scope of interests 
taken into account. These interests include offshore wind energy, minerals extraction, sand 
extraction, fisheries and aquaculture, military purposes, nature protection and recreation. The 
interests that are taken into account in different North Sea coastal states depend on the 
specific available resources, and on political choices on which activities have priority over 
other activities. A sensitive topic in this regard is military purposes. A comparison between the 
North Sea coastal states on this point reveals interesting differences: in France, a clear division 
is made between economic and ecological development of the sea on the one hand and 
military usage of the sea on the other hand. Military usage of the sea is explicitly excluded in 
maritime spatial planning documents.490 Contrary to this, the Netherlands explicitly includes 
military areas in the maritime spatial planning document. It is mentioned specifically that 
military areas can also be used for other purposes when the military is not using the area, 
although (semi-)permanent constructions such as wind farms and gas or oil exploitation 
platforms are not allowed.491 
4.1.5 Flexibility of Maritime Spatial Plans 
On the one hand, with the rapid emergence of new activities at sea, such as wave and tidal 
power, energy islands, floating wind energy,492 and currently unforeseen technologies that 
will be developed in the future, it is important that there is some flexibility in the maritime 
spatial planning of coastal states, in order to take new technological or market developments 
into account. On the other hand, for many activities, such as ecological improvement and 
(semi-)permanent installations, long-term stability of maritime spatial planning is also 
important. This tension between flexibility and stability has to be addressed in how maritime 
plans are made. There are two variables which influence the flexibility and stability of 
maritime spatial planning: the renewal time for maritime spatial plans and the possibility to 
amend an already adopted plan. Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom 
renew their maritime spatial plans every six years, 493 Sweden updates its plans at least once 
every eight years,494 and Denmark and Germany every ten years.495 Concerning the possibility 
 
490 Environmental Code (Code de l’Environnement), art. L219-5-1.  
491 Policy Document for the North Sea 2016-2021, connected to the National Water Plan (Beleidsnota Noordzee 
2016-2021), p. 54. 
492 Cf. D.S.Coles, L.S.Blunden, A.S.Bahaj, ‘Assessment of the energy extraction potential at tidal sites around the 
Channel Islands’ in Energy [2017 Vol 124], pp. 171-186; H.C. Sørensen, J. Fernández Chozas, ‘The Potential for 
Wave Energy in the North Sea’ conference paper for the 3rd International Conference on Ocean Energy, 6 
October 2010, Bilbao; O.C. Spro, R.E. Torres-Olguin, M. Korpås, ‘North Sea offshore network and energy storage 
for large scale integration of renewables’, Sustainable Energy Technologies and Assessments 
[2015 Vol 11] pp. 142-147. 
493 Belgium: Marine Environment Act (Wet Marien Milieu), art. 5bis para 2; France: Environmental Act (Code de 
l’Environnement), art. L-219-2; Netherlands: Water Act (Waterwet), art. 4.8(1), the United Kingdom: Marine 
and Coastal Access Act, sec. 61(12). 
494 Sweden: Maritime Spatial Planning Regulation (Havsplaneringsförordning), para 21. 
495 Denmark: Maritime Spatial Planning Act (Lov om maritim fysisk planlægning), kap. 4 para 10; Germany: 
Spatial Planning Act (Raumordnungsgesetz des Bundes), art. 7(8). 
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to amend the maritime plan once it is adopted, all countries have provisions in place for 
periodic review and amendment of the maritime plans. When neighbouring countries renew 
their spatial plan around the same time, they can take into account developments at the other 
side of the border and seek synergies. However, the North Sea coastal states have adopted 
their first spatial plans at different moments and they currently have different intervals for 
when they review and renew their maritime spatial plan. This means that in practice, the 
maritime spatial planning processes of the coastal states are not synchronous.  
4.2 Permitting Procedures 
Permitting procedures are often considered as a legal risk or a barrier in the development of 
large and complex projects, including large electricity infrastructure projects.496 These 
procedures may take several years, depending on the extent to which the procedure is 
streamlined between different permitting authorities, the maximum reaction time for 
authorities and whether there are any appeals or legal challenges of permit granting decisions. 
The delay itself may already be costly due to missed benefits or extra expenses. Moreover, 
the possibility of delays entails an extra risk for project developers, namely the risk that there 
are legislative changes or changing market circumstances influencing the business case for the 
wind farm or the electricity transmission infrastructure during the (often already long-lasting) 
permitting phase. In that case, the project developer may want to adjust the project taking 
into account the latest legislative or technological changes, whereas, if the project would be 
changed, the permitting process needs to start over again. Although legislative changes are 
often foreseeable in the short term, they are hardly foreseeable over the time scale that is 
normally needed for electricity infrastructure projects, which generally need several years 
from the planning and business case development phase until the phase where the final 
permits and investment decisions are obtained. Therefore, project developers have an 
interest in a permitting phase that is organised as smoothly as possible. This partially lies in 
the hands of project developers, who have to deliver the right information at the right time, 
but it is mainly influenced by the permitting authorities and the way the permitting process is 
organised according to national law. 
For electricity infrastructure projects situated within one state, the permitting process is 
already a barrier. For cross-border infrastructure projects, this is even more the case. The 
authorities in both countries need to agree to the proposals, preferably within the same time 
period. When all permits in one country are ready but there is a delay in the other country, 
the infrastructure still cannot be constructed in time. Whereas wind farms themselves are 
normally located in only one state, many cross-border electricity cables will be needed in a 
meshed grid. Nevertheless, the connections and the installations they connect depend on 
each other to such an extent, that the permitting processes for the OWF and for the cable 
 
496 PwC, Tractebel, Ecofys, ‘Study on regulatory matters concerning the development of the North Sea offshore 
energy potential’, Report for the European Commission, Jan. 2016, p. 84/85. 
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connection often run in parallel. Therefore, the permitting procedures of both OWFs and of 
submarine electricity cables will be considered here. 
Before elaborating on the legislative practice of the North Sea coastal states, some attention 
needs to be paid to terminology. There are several different terms used for the permission 
with which a coastal state gives a certain entity the right to construct and exploit an OWF at a 
certain location. This can be called a ‘concession’, ‘license’ or ‘permit’ depending on the exact 
legal situation. It has to be borne in mind that this chapter translates the specific terms of 
Belgian, Danish, French, German, Dutch, Norwegian and Swedish national law in English, 
which undeniably changes the specific wording.497 Words sounding similar, i.e. Belgian 
‘domeinconcessie’ and Norwegian ‘konsesjon’ may have slightly different legal meanings in 
different countries: in Norway, a konsesjon is needed for the construction of an offshore wind 
farm and for cables between offshore wind farms and the onshore grid, whereas in Belgium, 
domeinconcessies are related to the use of a specific good in the public domain (such as an 
area for the production of wind energy).498 Both words refer to the usage of public space, but 
as explained above, the scope of the term is slightly different in both countries. Therefore, in 
this chapter, the words ‘concession’, ‘license’ and ‘permit’ are used in a broad sense, to 
encompass the variety of different formulations in different legislations. 
The investigated countries require several permits for the construction of offshore wind farms 
and for offshore electricity transmission infrastructure. The structure and amount of permits 
needed per country differs significantly. Although the topic of this dissertation is electricity 
transmission infrastructure, the procedures for OWFs are also relevant. This is because the 
construction of transmission infrastructure normally follows the construction of OWFs. 
Therefore, both topics are covered in the following two subchapters. The last subchapter is 
dedicated to innovation in the permitting procedures over the last years. 
4.2.1 Permitting Procedures for Offshore Wind Farms 
For offshore wind farms, the two most commonly required licenses are construction licenses 
and concessions for the exploitation of the wind energy over the lifetime of the OWF. The 
construction license is often linked to environmental law considerations and regularly includes 
 
497 The various words that are used in this context are: domeinconcessie and vergunning (BE), tilladelse (DK), 
concession and autorisation (FR), Zuschlag, Planfeststellung and Genehmigung (DE), vergunning (NL), konsesjon 
(NO), tillstånd (SE). 
498 Even within one jurisdiction, there might be difficulties with regard to the interpretation of the word 
concession. In Belgium, the Court of Ghent discussed the legal difference between ‘concessie van openbare 
dienst’ and ‘domeinconcessie’. It found that the former relates to the government giving an individual (private 
or company) the right to perform a certain public service, whereas ‘domeinconcessie’ relates to the 
government granting an individual the exclusive right to exploit resources in a certain domain, without 
performing a public service. D. Dekeuster, ‘Het onderscheid tussen een concessie van openbare dienst en een 
domeinconcessie’, 30-9-2016, available at https://www.dkc-law.be/Actualiteit/ArtMID/549/ArticleID/96/ 
Het-onderscheid-tussen-een-concessie-van-openbare-dienst-en-een-domeinconcessie. 
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a requirement for an EIA to be performed.499 This is due to the fact that the development of 
wind farms normally has a significant impact on the environment. In Denmark, next to the 
construction license, another license is needed for preliminary investigations as a separate 
activity.500 Sweden also requires two environmentally-oriented permits both connected to the 
construction of wind farms in the territorial waters: a permit for performing environmentally 
hazardous activities and a permit for water operations;501 in the EEZ, only one permit, based 
on the Act on the Swedish EEZ, is needed.502  
The other commonly required license is the exploitation permit or concession for the 
exploitation of wind energy. This license, permit or concession is required in Belgium,503 
Denmark,504 France as far as the wind farm is located in territorial waters,505 Germany,506 the 
Netherlands,507 Norway,508 Sweden beyond the territorial waters,509 and the United 
Kingdom.510 This exploitation permit is often granted for a certain time. In Belgium, it is 
specified in the royal decree that forms the basis of the concession, that the concession is valid 
for 20 years, with the possibility of extension to, at most, 30 years.511 In other countries, the 
maximum duration of the concession is not specified in the legal basis, but it is specified in the 
permit itself. In the Netherlands, the permit duration depends on the wind farm itself and on 
 
499 In Belgium, an Environmental Permit is needed for the construction of OWFs as well as for other activities at 
sea, Protection of the Maritime Environment (Wet Bescherming Marien Milieu), art. 25(1). In Denmark, this is 
necessary when the OWF is deemed to have a significant impact on the environment (which was the case for 
all OWFs so far). This obligation is based on the Promotion of Renewable Energy Act, art. 26(1). France has 
incorporated an EIA obligation in the Code de L’Environnement, L-122-1(II); Norway in the Offshore Wind 
Energy Act, kapittel 4; Sweden in the Miljobalk, kap. 9 para 6. In the United Kingdom, a ‘Marine License’ is 
required for the construction of offshore wind farms, based on Marine and Coastal Access Act, sec. 66. Through 
the Marine Works (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2007 no. 1518, amended by the Marine 
Works (Environmental Impact Assessment) (Amendment) Regulations 2017 no. 588, sec. 2 combined with sec. 
8 and schedule A2.  
500 Denmark, Promotion of Renewable Energy Act (Lov om fremme af vedvarende energy), LBK nr 356 af 
04/04/2019, art. 22. 
501 P. Söderholm, M. Pettersson, ‘Offshore Wind Power Policy and Planning in Sweden’, Energy Policy [2011 
39(2)] p. 523. 
502 Act on the Swedish EEZ (Lag (1992:114) om Sveriges ekonomiska zon), art. 5. With this Act, several of the 
principles and criteria from the Environmental Code are also applied to activities beyond the Swedish territorial 
waters, art. 2. The Act also requires an EIA for the permit application, art. 6. 
503 Act on the Organisation of the Electricity Market (Wet betreffende de Organisatie van de Elektriciteitsmarkt) 
1999-04-29/42, art. 6, with details provided in Koninklijk besluit betreffende de voorwaarden en de procedure 
voor de toekenning van domeinconcessies voor de bouw en de exploitatie van installaties voor de productie van 
elektriciteit uit water, stromen of winden, in de zeegebieden waarin België rechtsmacht kan uitoefenen 
overeenkomstig het internationaal zeerecht, BS 30.12.2000, p. 43557. 
504 Danish Promotion of renewable energy act, art. 29.  
505 According to French law, the State can only give out concessions for the use of the public property that it 
owns. A. Monaco, P. Prouzet, Governance of Seas and Oceans (Wiley, 2015) p. 191. 
506 This is the “Zuschlag” for a certain area, based on Act on offshore wind energy, art. 46(1). 
507 The Wind License (Windvergunning) is based on the Offshore Wind Energy Act (Wet Windenergie op Zee), 
art. 12.  
508 Konsesjon, Offshore Wind Energy Act (Lov om fornybar energiproduksjon til havs (Havenergiloven)), art. 3-1. 
509 Act on the Swedish EEZ  (Lag om Sveriges Ekonomiska Zon), para 5. 
510 For the United Kingdom, the concession is a lease from the Crown Estate. This organisation manages the 
assets owned by the Sovereign, including the seabed.  
511 Royal Decree 30.12.2000, art. 13. 
PP-IDTK-PDF-TEMPLATE-24032020-1601471070490_NEW.indd   126 06-10-2020   09:42
 
104 
the local circumstances, but is limited by law to at most 30 years.512 In the United Kingdom, 
applicants first receive a 5-year lease from the Crown Estate; a final lease is granted after all 
other consents and permits are obtained.513 The Crown Estate is the entity responsible for 
these licenses, as it holds the exclusive rights to exploit the ‘Renewable Energy Zone’.514 This 
REZ is similar to an EEZ.515 
In the Netherlands, since the legislative changes of 2016, the construction- and exploitation 
permits are combined into one license (Windvergunning).516 This license to produce wind 
energy (Windvergunning) replaces the ‘Water Licence’ (Watervergunning) which is usually 
required for operations that take place in the water or at sea.517 At the same time, the Wind 
Licence gives the selected project developer the right to construct and operate a wind farm 
within the designated area, which makes the Wind Licence a construction licence and an 
operation licence, similar to a concession, at the same time. 
The Dutch procedure provides that the EIA is prepared by the government institution, RVO, 
which organises the entire license process. The EIA is prepared in the context of the Wind 
Farm Zone Decision (Kavelbesluit), and it serves as an EIA for the entire project, including the 
construction.518 As the EIA takes place before it is clear which party is going to construct the 
wind farm and what the project design is going to be, a ‘bandwidth approach’ is used in the 
Dutch offshore wind farm EIAs. With this approach, different alternatives concerning for 
example the minimum capacity per turbine and the total number of turbines are investigated 
within a certain range, i.e. environmental impact is measured for 50 large turbines and for 100 
smaller turbines.519 The project developer of the wind farm is allowed to plan and construct 
the wind farm within the bandwidth indicated in the EIA. 
The procedure for obtaining an exploitation permit can be ‘open-door’520 or coupled to a 
certain area. Norway and Sweden have an open-door procedure. Belgium has an open-door 
 
512 Offshore Wind Energy Act (Wet Windenergie op Zee), art. 15. 
513 Müller 2016, p. 179. 
514 Energy Act 2004, sec. 84(1). 
515 The Renewable Energy Zone was originally designated by Renewable Energy Zone (designation of area) 
order 2004, no. 2668. However, this order has been revoked by Exclusive Economic Zone Order 2013/3161 
art.1(2) (March 31, 2014). Nevertheless, the Renewable Energy Zone is also described in the Energy Act 2004, 
art. 84. For Scotland, there is a separate Renewable Energy Zone Order, based on Energy Act 2004 art 84(5), 
which is not revoked and thus still applicable: Renewable Energy Zone (Designation of Area) (Scottish 
Ministers) Order 2005/3153. 
516 E.M.N. Noordover, A. Drahmann, ‘Tailormade Regelgeving voor windturbineparken op de Noordzee’, 
Tijdschrift voor Omgevingsrecht [2014 3/4] p. 111. 
517 Water Act (Waterwet), art. 6.5a.  
518 Noordover, Drahmann 2014, p. 114. 
519 For example, the complete EIA for Borssele 1 (in Dutch, English summary available): Grontmij, Pondera, 
‘Milieueffectrapport kavelbesluit I windenergiegebied Borssele, Addendum bij het MER, Passende Beoordeling, 
GM-0165241, revisie D01. 
520 An ‘open-door’ procedure allows any interested party to apply for a permit to construct and operate an 
offshore wind farm at a certain location. Often, this application is followed by a procedure in which the 
application is published and other potentially interested parties are invited to react and to place a counter-
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procedure within the confines of the planned offshore wind areas.521 Whereas Germany and 
the Netherlands have a centrally planned procedure now, they both had open-door systems 
before legislative revisions in 2015 and 2016 respectively. A compromise between open-door 
procedures and permitting per specific area is a zonal approach. With this approach, OWF 
developers can make their own OWF plans within predetermined OWF zones. This provides 
liberty to the developers to choose their location whilst also enabling the coastal state to 
organise the usage of the sea efficiently. A zonal approach is used in the United Kingdom, 
where the Crown Estate makes development zones available in different ‘leasing rounds’.522 
It is also possible to combine approaches: Denmark has a hybrid system. Open-door 
applications are allowed next to the centrally-planned system in which the TSO performs 
preliminary investigations and constructs and operates the export cable. It must be noted that 
in practice, the Danish open-door procedure is rarely used. Factors potentially contributing to 
this are the favourable conditions for the centralised tender, namely the preliminary 
investigations and export cable provided by the TSO, and the fact that financial support for 
open-door projects is the same as for onshore wind projects, which is generally lower than for 
centrally-planned offshore wind projects.523  
Next to the permits specific to the offshore wind farms, Denmark and France require 
companies producing electricity to obtain a general license to produce electricity and to feed 
it into the electricity grid. In France, the license, provided by the national regulatory authority 
CRE, is a permit for the exploitation of an installation for the production of electricity.524 CRE 
has to take into account the balance between demand and supply of electricity; the nature 
and source of the primary energy source; the energy efficiency of the installation compared 
to the best available technology; the technical and financial capacities of the applicant and the 
impact of the installation on the climate targets.525 The installation has to be compatible with 
the multiannual programme for energy,526 which gives the long term directions for 
development of the energy sector. For Denmark, the license is bound to the company as a 
 
proposal. Eventually, the relevant authority takes the decision whether or not an offshore wind farm as applied 
for may be constructed. The difference with centrally planned procedures is that an open-door procedure 
leaves the initiative to project developers to decide if, and where, they want to construct an offshore wind 
farm. 
521 Koninklijk besluit betreffende de voorwaarden en de procedure voor de toekenning van domeinconcessies 
voor de bouw en de exploitatie van installaties voor de productie van elektriciteit uit water, stromen of winden, 
in de zeegebieden waarin België rechtsmacht kan uitoefenen overeenkomstig het internationaal zeerecht, BS 
30.12.2000, p. 43557, art. 5(2) and 7. 
522 See for example The Crown Estate, Information Memorandum: Introducing Offshore Wind Leasing Round 4, 
September 2019, p. 17. 
523 Danish Renewable Energy Act, art. 36(2). 
524 Energy Code (Code de l’énergie), art. L311-5. 
525 Ibid. 
526 French Ministry of the Environment, ‘French Strategy for Energy and Climate – Multi-annual Energy Plan, 
2019-2023, 2024-2028’, English translation of the ‘Programmations pluriannuelles de l’énergie (PPE)’. 
PP-IDTK-PDF-TEMPLATE-24032020-1601471070490_NEW.indd   128 06-10-2020   09:42
 
106 
whole and not to a specific plant.527 Therefore, if the company that operates the offshore wind 
farm already has the permit, it does not need to obtain this permit for the next installation. In 
the other countries, there are no such licenses for the production of electricity although 
licenses are sometimes required for the supply of electricity. As this chapter focuses on 
production and (offshore) transmission, licenses for the supply of electricity fall outside the 
scope of this chapter. 
4.2.2 Permitting Procedures for Offshore Electricity Transmission Infrastructure 
For offshore electricity transmission, different permits are needed. Again, some countries 
require separate permits (and EIAs) for the construction of the export cables of wind farms, 
whereas in other countries, this is covered already in the permit for the offshore wind farm, 
as it is considered to be one installation. This also depends on whether the export cable is 
regulated as part of the offshore wind farm or whether it is regulated as a separate asset.528 
For interconnectors, the situation is interesting considering the limits of jurisdiction under 
international law: Denmark and France explicitly differentiate between transit cables and 
cables that reach the coastline.529 The other countries have not adopted specific provisions on 
transit interconnectors, but the UK does differentiate between different parts of the 
interconnector, namely the “inshore stretch” and the “offshore stretch”.530 Both strategies 
(differentiation between different kinds of interconnectors or one regime for all) are in line 
with international law. In the context of the development of a MOG, it is important that the 
permitting procedures for offshore electricity transmission infrastructure are streamlined as 
much as possible, in order to decrease the administrative burden and costs of developing 
numerous cable projects, and that it is clear under which permitting regime hub-to-hub cables 
in a MOG fall. 
 
527 Denmark: Electricity Supply Act (Lov om elforsyning) LBK nr. 418, art. 10. See also: A. Ronne, ‘Energy Law in 
Denmark’ in M. Roggenkamp, C. Redgwell, A. Ronne and I. del Guayo (Eds), Energy Law in Europe, Oxford 
University Press 2016, 3rd Edition, p. 446.  
528 See chapter 4.3 below. 
529 Denmark: Electricity Supply Act, art. 21(5). France, Décret no. 2013-611 du 10 juillet 2013 relatif à la 
réglementation applicable aux îles artificielles, aux installations, aux ouvrages et à leurs installations connexes 
sur le plateau continental et dans la zone économique et la zone de protection écologique ainsi qu'au tracé des 
câbles et pipelines sous-marins, JORF no 0160 du 12 juillet 2013 page 11622, art. 19 “qui atterrisent sur le 
territoire français.  
530 The requirements of the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009 relating to a Marine License (necessary for, 
amongst others, the construction of offshore cables) are not applicable to the ‘offshore stretch’ of exempt 
submarine cables.  ‘Exempt’ in this context means a cable that is not used for the exploration or exploitation of 
natural resources or the operation of artificial islands or installations under the jurisdiction of the United 
Kingdom. This exemption thus relates to interconnectors and not to OFTO-cables. With regard to the ‘inshore 
stretch’ of exempt cables, a Marine License is needed, but the relevant authority must grant the license for any 
application. With regard to both parts of the cable (inshore and offshore), the authority can impose conditions, 
related for example to safety or environmental considerations. Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009, sec. 81(4) 
and (5). 
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In practice, in Belgium, a permit is needed for the construction of offshore electricity or 
telecommunications cables, as well as for offshore pipelines.531  In Denmark, a permit awarded 
by the Energy and Climate Minister is necessary for the construction of all offshore electricity 
cables except for inter-array cables and for transit-interconnectors.532 Thus, a differentiation 
is made in the function of the cables. 
In France, concerning the area beyond the territorial waters, there is one decree applicable to 
artificial islands, structures, installations as well as offshore cables and pipelines.533 According 
to this decree, a notification procedure exists for the construction of offshore cables.534 For 
the electricity transmission infrastructure located in the territorial waters, the Environmental 
Code requires an authorisation or declaration, the same as with the offshore wind farms.535  
In Germany, for all offshore cables, a planning approval awarded by the BSH is needed. Next 
to this, for the construction of interconnectors, a specific permit is needed for underwater 
cables and pipelines, based on the Mining Act,536 and awarded by the Landesamt für Bergbau, 
Energie und Geologie.537  
The Netherlands has a complicated permission system for the construction of electricity cables 
with five different permits, whereas other North Sea coastal states have one or two permits. 
However, the Netherlands has made a considerable effort to streamline the permission 
process, not only for offshore electricity transmission infrastructure but also for other large 
projects. Considering offshore infrastructure, first of all, for the onshore leg of the cable, the 
spatial plans (bestemmingsplan) of certain areas and municipalities have to be amended, until 
one kilometre into the sea: this is the border of the area of Dutch municipalities and 
provinces.538 For this area (until 1 km into the sea) the Minister of Economic Affairs and the 
 
531 Belgian Royal Decision on the laying of cables (…), Koninklijk besluit betreffende de nadere regels voor het 
leggen van kabels die in de territoriale zee of het nationaal grondgebied binnenkomen of die geplaatst of 
gebruikt worden in het kader van de exploratie van het continentaal plat, de exploitatie van de minerale 
rijkdommen en andere niet-levende rijkdommen daarvan of van de werkzaamheden van kunstmatige eilanden, 
installaties of inrichtingen die onder Belgische rechtsmacht vallen, BS 09-05-2002, p. 19339, art. 5-6. 
532 Danish Electricity Supply Act, art. 22a. 
533 Décret no. 2013-611 du 10 juillet 2013 relatif à la réglementation applicable aux îles artificielles, aux 
installations, aux ouvrages et à leurs installations connexes sur le plateau continental et dans la zone 
économique et la zone de protection écologique ainsi qu'au tracé des câbles et pipelines sous-marins, JORF no 
0160 du 12 juillet 2013 page 11622. 
534 Ibid., art. 19. 
535 Environmental Code (Code de l’environnement), art. L-214-3(I) and (II). 
536 Federal Mining Act (Bundesberggesetz (BBergG)), art. 133(1). The article refers only to pipelines, but in the 
last clause, it declares the article also applicable to submarine cables. BBergG, art. 133(4). 
537 Müller 2016, p. 206. 
538 Act on the Coastal Boundaries (Wet van 2 november 1990, houdende regeling provincie- en 
gemeentegrenzen langs de Noordzeekust van de gemeente Den Helder tot en met de gemeente Sluis en 
wijziging van de Financiële-Verhoudingswet 1984 (Stb. 1990, 553), Act on the Provincial Division of the Wadden 
Sea (Wet van 8 december 1980, tot provinciale indeling van de Waddenzee (Stb. 1980, 670)), Act on the 
Municipal Division of the Wadden Sea (Wet van 12 december 1985, tot gemeentelijke indeling van de 
Waddenzee (Stb. 1985, 648)). Electricity Act (Electriciteitswet), art. 20ca also mentions that several of the 
articles in that Act relating to grid extension (20a-20c) are also applicable to the offshore grid, except that there 
is no Rijksinpassingsplan for the area at sea beyond the municipality/provincial boundaries of 1 km. 
PP-IDTK-PDF-TEMPLATE-24032020-1601471070490_NEW.indd   130 06-10-2020   09:42
 
108 
Minister of Infrastructure and the Environment can amend all spatial plans at once with a 
Rijksinpassingsplan.539  Next to this, administrative decisions are needed for at least five 
different permits, namely a permit on the basis of the Water Act, one on the basis of the 
Nature Protection Act, one on the basis of the Environmental Act, one on the basis of the Flora 
and Fauna Act, and one permit for discharging materials in the sea, on the basis of the Water 
Act.540 Moreover, a provincial permit may also be necessary, depending on the project. In 
order to prevent a burdensome and long process, all permits are prepared in one coordinated 
procedure, the Rijkscoordinatieregeling, under the responsibility of the Minister of Economic 
Affairs.541 For the part of the cable located in the EEZ, only a Water Permit is needed.542 
In Norway, next to the concession for the OWF, a separate concession is necessary for the 
construction of a submarine electricity cable.543 Moreover, for the onshore part of offshore 
cables, an EIA is necessary.544 This should be sent together with the concession application, 
subject to the approval of the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE).545  
In Sweden, the Act on the Continental Shelf provides that permission is needed for all activities 
of exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf,546 including the laying of cables and 
pipelines.547 This rule is interesting as not all cables and pipelines are used for the exploitation 
of the continental shelf, i.e. cables to connect OWFs are for the exploitation of the EEZ rather 
than the continental shelf. Moreover, it is written in the Swedish Act on the Continental Shelf 
that when the cables continue into Swedish territory, which is the case for cables connecting 
OWFs to the onshore grid, the article that requires a permit for submarine cables and pipelines 
is not applicable,548 as the cable will already be covered by the abovementioned permits. Next 
to this rule, the general rules from the Environmental Code are applicable, which entails that 
 
539 See K.J. de Graaf, D.A. Lubach, ‘Offshore Windenergie: Optimaal Omgevingsrecht op Zee?’ in K.J. de Graaf, 
Regulering van offshore windenergie (preadvies Nederlandse Vereniging voor Energierecht) (Intersentia, 2008), 
p. 71. As an example, the plan for the cables to connect the Borssele OWFs can be found here: 
https://www.rvo.nl/sites/default/files/2016/03/Inpassingsplan%20noz%20Borssele_ontwerp_def.pdf.  
540 In Dutch the respective permits and licenses are the Watervergunning, Vergunning op basis van de 
Natuurbeschermingswet, Omgevingsvergunning, Ontheffing Flora- en faunawet and Watervergunning – lozen. 
541 This coordinated procedure, used for projects of ‘national interest’ is based on the Dutch Spatial Planning 
Act (Wet Ruimtelijke Ordening), article 3.28. See for example: Decision on the application of the 
rijkscoordinatieregeling to the cables for the Borssele OWFs: 
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/besluiten/2014/12/04/besluit-tot-toepassing-van-
rijkscoordinatieregeling-voor-project-transmissiesysteem-op-zee-borssele. Similar decision for Hollandse Kust 
Zuid: https://www.rvo.nl/sites/default/files/2016/01/Besluit%20toepassing%20RCR%20vjyzomw2m48z.pdf.  
542 Under the Water Act (Waterwet), a permit is needed for placing substances in any water body, including the 
sea and the sea bottom: art. 6.2 combined with art. 1.1(3). 
543 Offshore Wind Energy Act (Lov om fornybar energiproduksjon til havs (Havenergiloven)), art. 3-2. 
544 F. Arnesen, U. Hammer, P. Hakon Hoisveen, K. Kaasen, D. Nygaard, ‘Energy Law in Norway’ in M. 
Roggenkamp, C. Redgwell, A. Ronne and I. del Guayo (Eds), Energy Law in Europe, Oxford University Press 2016, 
3rd Edition, p. 871. 
545 Ibid. 
546 Swedish Act on the Continental Shelf (Lag (1966:314) om kontinentalsockeln), para 2b and 3. 
547 Ibid., art. 15a. 
548 Ibid., art. 15b. 
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an EIA is needed as well.549 For the onshore leg of cables in Sweden, developers also need a 
concession from the Energy Markets Inspectorate.550 The application should include the 
required voltage, the environmental impact and proof that the cable construction can be 
economically motivated.551 This seems more logical for regular extensions of the electricity 
grid than for the onshore leg of export cables. However, the connection of offshore wind farms 
takes place onshore, as will be explained in section 4.3 below. Therefore, the cable between 
the landing point at the shore and the grid connection point would still require a separate 
concession under the Electricity Act.  
In the United Kingdom, a distinction is made between export cables and interconnectors. For 
export cables, offshore transmission licenses are required.552 Moreover, the Crown Estate may 
require another lease for the transmission infrastructure if the cables are not yet covered by 
the offshore wind farm lease itself.553 Then, considering all submarine cables (i.e. export cables 
and interconnectors), Marine Licenses might be needed, dependent on the function and the 
location of the cable. Different regimes are in place for the ‘inshore stretch’ and the ‘offshore 
stretch’ of submarine cables. The ‘inshore stretch’ is the part of the cable that is located in the 
territorial waters, the ‘offshore stretch’ is the part beyond the territorial waters.554 Moreover, 
a differentiation exists between exempt cables and other submarine cables. In this context, 
‘exempt’ relates to cables that are not used for the exploration or exploitation of natural 
resources or the operation of artificial islands or installations under the jurisdiction of the 
United Kingdom, i.e. regular interconnectors. A Marine License is not required for the offshore 
stretch of exempt interconnectors.555 For the inshore stretch, a Marine License is needed but 
must be granted for any application.556 Lastly, for all interconnector cables, an 
‘interconnection license’ under the Electricity Act 1989 is required.557 
4.2.3 Innovation in the Permitting Process 
Over the last few years, several countries have updated their legal framework for offshore 
wind.558 It is clear that countries redesigning their legal framework have looked at 
developments in neighbouring states. This has led to some legislative convergence and 
adoption of systems which proved to work well in neighbouring states, such as the centralised 
 
549 Ibid., para 2a and 3a. 
550 Swedish Electricity Act (Ellag), 1997:857, kap. 2 para 1 and 1a. 
551 Ibid., kap. 2 para 2. 
552 Electricity Act 1989, sec. 6C(5) and (6). The reasons for this will be elaborated further in paragraph 4.4. 
553 https://www.thecrownestate.co.uk/media/5518/guideline_for_leasing_of_export_cable_routes.pdf, p. 7. 
554 Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009, sec. 81(4).  
555 Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009, sec. 81(1). 
556 Ibid., sec. 81(2)a. 
557 Electricity Act 1989, sec. 6(1)e. 
558 Germany in 2016/2017 with large amendments of the Renewable Energy Act (EEG) and the introduction of 
the Offshore Wind Energy Act (Windenergie auf See Gesetz) in October 2016; the Netherlands with the 
Offshore Wind Energy Act (Wet Windenergie op Zee) adopted in June 2015; Belgium with the introduction of 
the Modular Offshore Grid in 2017: Wet tot wijziging van de wet van 29 april 1999 betreffende de organisatie 
van de elektriciteitsmarkt, met het oog op het instellen van een wettelijk kader voor het Modular Offshore Grid, 
No. 2017-07-13/07. 
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tender approach first used in Denmark and later in the Netherlands and Germany. At the same 
time, while developing their own legal system, countries could also learn from legislative 
mistakes and inefficiencies in the permitting process of neighbouring countries, which led 
them to adopt improved or innovative regulatory approaches. This is an enhanced form of 
‘legal transplant’,559 in which a legal solution is not only ‘transplanted’ from one legal system 
to another, but also improved compared to the ‘donor’ legal system. An example of this is that 
tender procedures in the Netherlands have clear provisions on the connection obligations of 
the TSO, and the timing thereof, based on realistic expectations about the amount of 
connections that the TSO has to produce in a certain timeframe. This is because earlier, in 
Germany, there were large delays in the connection of offshore wind farms by the TSO.560  The 
legislative development and innovation is visible in the permitting process as well as in other 
topics, such as connection responsibilities (chapter 4.3) and support schemes for offshore 
wind (chapter 4.4). This finding is interesting, as it is generally considered that regulatory 
‘competition’ leads to a race to the bottom,561 whereas in this case, the regulatory 
competition leads to efficiency improvements. 
In permitting procedures, a first clearly visible development is the appointment of one 
organisation as a ‘one-stop-shop’ for potential OWF developers. This organisation prepares a 
central tender for specific offshore wind sites and also provides information on, for example, 
seabed conditions and wind resources. The one-stop-shop approach is used in Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Germany. The idea behind this approach is to smoothen the permitting 
process for the entity interested in constructing an offshore wind farm and to de-risk the 
tender application beforehand. Through the TEN-E Regulation, the electricity transmission 
projects which are awarded a PCI-status have to benefit from a one-stop-shop approach.562 
Next to this, countries may introduce the same one-stop-shop system for other activities, such 
as the development of offshore wind farms. This is the case in Denmark, Germany and the 
Netherlands.563 
 
559 A. Watson introduced this term to indicate the transfer of a rule from one legal system to another. He 
claimed that “borrowing is the most fruitful source of legal change” A. Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach 
to Comparative Law (Scottish Academic Press, 1974) p. 335.  
560 Nieuwenhout 2017, p. 86. 
561 This can be observed for example in corporate law and taxes. See for example A. Berle, G. Means, The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property (Transaction Publishers 1932).  
562 Regulation (EU) 347/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2013 on Guidelines for 
Trans-European Energy Infrastructure, art. 8(1). 
563 In Denmark, DEA (Danish Energy Agency) is the one-stop-shop. M. Cramer Buch, E. Kjaer (DEA), ‘Report: 
Danish Experiences from Offshore Wind Development’, May 2015, p. 21. In Germany, the Bundesamt für 
Seeschifffahrt und Hydrographie (BSH) functions as one-stop-shop for all wind farms beyond the territorial 
waters (in territorial waters, wind farms are regulated by the Bundesländer). In the Netherlands, the Rijksdienst 
voor Ondernemend Nederland (RVO) serves as a one-stop-shop for offshore wind developers in the 
Netherlands: it provides preliminary information such as seabed surveys, organises workshops, prepares the 
EIA and organises the tender process. For example, the website for the first offshore wind farm after the 
legislative changes of 2016 shows all information provided by RVO: 
https://offshorewind.rvo.nl/generalborssele.  
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A second development is the amount of preparation of OWF tenders carried out by the 
authorities. The more preparation that is done already by the relevant authorities, the less 
need for repeating the same examinations multiple times, for each tender participant. Thus, 
in some coastal states, all necessary information, for example data on wind resources, sea-
bed surveys and even EIAs, are provided to all (potential) tender participants. This lowers the 
costs of participating in the tender for the participants, as they do not have to gather the 
information themselves. The Netherlands has the most extensive preparation for OWF 
developers, as even the EIA is already prepared by the tendering agency: the EIA is already 
incorporated in the Wind Farm Zone Decision (Kavelbesluit), which also lays down the 
conditions under which the OWF may be constructed. As it is important that tender 
participants have some room to develop their own plans with the OWF, the EIA is performed 
following a bandwidth-approach, where multiple different alternatives, such as the minimum 
and maximum capacity per turbine, the minimum and maximum height of the rotor blades 
etc. are investigated.564 It must be noted that a separate EIA is made for export cables.565 
Another legislative development is the coupling of the wind farm site permit or concession 
with offshore wind support schemes. In the Netherlands for example, before 2016, there were 
many parties with a license to construct an offshore wind farm at certain sites, but as these 
parties did not manage to acquire support for the construction of the wind farms, they did not 
use their license to construct a wind farm.566 Now, applicants participate in one tender 
procedure for the construction and exploitation permit as well as for access to the support 
scheme, with the required level of financial support as central tender criterion. This system is 
used in Denmark and Germany as well as in the Netherlands. 
Other innovations worth mentioning but not adopted by other countries (yet) are the 
standardisation of wind farm capacities. In the Netherlands, this is done to achieve a cost 
reduction in the connection costs, as cable and converter station design can be optimised for 
the predetermined capacity and then used several times. This is only possible when it is 
already clear in the planning phase that sufficient wind farms are going to have the same 
capacity. This requires a centralised planning approach and sufficient wind farms in the 
planning phase, which is not the case in all countries. Another innovation in the permitting 
process which is not (yet) followed by other countries is the Rijkscoordinatieregeling used by 
the Dutch to coordinate the permit application and granting process for large and complex 
projects including the construction of cables for the connection of OWFs, which requires at 
least five different permits. Another interesting innovation is that Belgium adopted the 
possibility to apply for a concession for offshore (hydro) electricity storage, next to the regular 
 
564 For example, the complete EIA for Borssele 1 (in Dutch, English summary available) can be found here: 
https://www.rvo.nl/sites/default/files/2015/07/MER%20kavel%20I%20Borssele%20compleet%203.pdf. For an 
example of the bandwidth approach, see chapter 13. 
565 http://offshorewind.rvo.nl/file/download/44029202 , p. 29. 
566 Noordover, Drahmann 2014, p. 111. 
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concessions for offshore wind.567 Given the rapid developments in energy storage, it is 
interesting that Belgium provides in the regulatory framework for offshore energy storage 
before the technology is available for large-scale installations offshore. 
With the introduction of hybrid projects and offshore grid developments, more legislative 
innovation can be expected. This is because the current legislative frameworks are not always 
well adapted to the transition to an offshore grid, especially regarding the permits and 
connection responsibilities for offshore electricity transmission infrastructure. Streamlining 
and simplification of the permitting procedures in the coastal states will contribute to cost-
effective development of a MOG. 
4.3 Connection Responsibilities and Ownership of Transmission 
Infrastructure 
For the development of a MOG, it is important to understand which actors are involved in the 
(economic) ownership and operation of offshore electricity transmission infrastructure. This 
is determined by how the assets are categorised in national law, which translates into which 
actor(s) bear(s) the responsibility to connect offshore wind farms to the onshore electricity 
grid, and which actor(s) may construct interconnectors.  
This subchapter addresses which entity has the responsibility to connect offshore wind farms 
and which entity may own and operate offshore electricity transmission infrastructure in the 
different coastal states. Concerning terminology, it is important to bear in mind that the term 
‘ownership’, when used in the context of ownership of offshore assets, refers to economic 
ownership rather than to the notion of ownership in national civil (or common) law of the 
analysed countries. This is because property law of the countries involved does not always 
apply to the area beyond the territorial waters.568  
4.3.1 Connection of OWFs – Status Quo 
In the current legal frameworks of the coastal states, three options are available for the 
connection of offshore wind farms to the onshore electricity grid. The first option is that the 
developer of the wind farm is responsible for the connection to the onshore grid. This is the 
case in Sweden,569 in Denmark for new OWFs constructed after 2020,570 and used to be the 
 
567 Royal Decision on the conditions and procedures for the construction and exploitation of installations for 
hydro-electric energy storage in Belgian sea areas (…), Koninklijk besluit betreffende de voorwaarden en de 
procedure voor de toekenning van domeinconcessies voor de bouw en de exploitatie van installaties voor hydro-
elektrische energie-opslag in de zeegebieden waarin België rechtsmacht kan uitoefenen overeenkomstig het 
internationaal zeerecht, BS 06-06-2014, p. 43599. 
568 See for an example of Dutch legislation J.J.A. Waverijn, 'Navigating Legal Barriers to Mortgaging Energy 
Installations at Sea – the Case of the North Sea and the Netherlands', in C. Banet (ed) The Law of the Seabed 
(Brill 2020). It reaches beyond the scope of this dissertation to treat the applicability of civil law/property law of 
the North Sea coastal states in the EEZ in detail.  
569 See for example Energimyndighet, ‘Havsbaserad Vindkraft – potential och kostnader’, p. 56. 
570 Danish Energy Agency, New Danish calls for offshore wind farm tenders - Information on the Thor offshore 
wind farm tendering procedure, October 2019, p. 14/15. This policy change requires changes to the Danish 
Renewable Energy Act, which are currently in progress. 
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case in the Netherlands and Belgium.571 In the Netherlands, the export cable was considered 
part of the offshore wind farm installation in the Dutch Electricity Act.572 However, with the 
introduction of art. 24Aa of the Dutch Electricity Act in combination with art. 15a, art. 1(1)b, 
1(1)ba and 1(4), the responsibility has been shifted to the TSO. In Norway, the legal system 
does not specify which party is supposed to connect the offshore wind farms.573 Therefore, it 
is assumed that the developer of the wind farm will also develop the export cable. An 
advantage of this approach is that there is no interface risk offshore (between the OWF and 
the export cable), as the same company is responsible for the cable connection and the wind 
farm itself.574 However, hybrid connections and offshore grid developments are more difficult 
with this connection option: the infrastructure which first connects only one wind farm might 
in the future be used to connect several wind farms and an interconnector. Then, the usage 
of the infrastructure changes from exclusively for the original wind farm owner to a situation 
in which other wind farms, potential competitors to the transmission owner also require 
access (third party access). Sharing essential infrastructure with your competitors brings 
competition law concerns, which have in the past led to several cases at the European 
Commission and the CJEU,575 and to the unbundling process to prevent direct influence from 
the electricity producer over assets which are used by competing grid users.576  
The second option for the connection of OWFs is to make the (onshore) TSO responsible for 
connecting offshore wind farms to the onshore grid. In that case, the OWF developer makes 
the connection from the OWF to the converter station, which is located close to the OWF. 
Then, from the converter station to the onshore grid, the assets are developed and owned by 
the TSO. This option is currently used in Germany and the Netherlands,577 and used to be the 
case in Denmark.578 In this case, the offshore converter station and export cables are also 
considered to be regulated assets, for which the TSO receives an income via the tariffs for 
electricity users, just as for the onshore electricity grid. France has a similar system, but 
 
571 The Netherlands has changed its system in 2016 with the Offshore Wind Energy Act (Wet Windenergie op 
Zee). However, the OWFs Prinses Amalia, Luchterduinen, OWEZ and Gemini were connected according to the 
previous system. For these wind farms, the export cable is constructed and owned by the wind farm developer. 
In Belgium, the system is changed for offshore wind farms that had their financial close after 31 December 
2016: these wind farms are connected to the ‘Modular Offshore Grid’. Wind farms with a financial close before 
this date have their own connection to the shore. 
572 Müller 2016, p. 153. 
573 This is not specified in the Offshore Renewable Energy Act, nor in the Energy Act, the two relevant legal 
instruments for this topic. 
574 Instead, the interface risk is moved to the connection between the export cable and the onshore grid. 
575 A. de Hautecloque, ‘Article 102 TFEU – Abuse of a dominant position’ in C. Jones (Ed). EU Energy Law 
Volume II: EU Competition Law and Energy Markets (Claeys&Casteels 2016, 4th Ed.), pp. 299-302, pp. 330-332. 
576 This topic is elaborated further in chapter 3.4.1 above. 
577 With regard to the Netherlands, it must be noted that, although the same company as onshore is 
responsible for offshore connections, the company (TenneT) operates under a different license for the offshore 
grid. This license is limited to 10 years, after which it is still open which party will own and operate the grid. 
578 Müller 2016, p. 172. The legal framework is currently being changed, for the announcement thereof, see 
Danish Energy Agency, New Danish calls for offshore wind farm tenders - Information on the Thor offshore 
wind farm tendering procedure, October 2019, p. 14/15. This policy change requires changes to the Danish 
Renewable Energy Act, which are currently in progress. 
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contrary to the aforementioned countries, in France the wind farm developer is still 
responsible for the offshore converter station, whereas the TSO is responsible for the export 
cable from the offshore converter station to the onshore grid.579 
An extra development in TSO-based connections is the hub-based-approach used in Germany, 
in which multiple wind farms are connected to one converter station.580 The clustering regime 
started with a publication of the German NRA.581 According to this publication, clustering 
decreases the environmental impact of cable construction in sensitive areas such as the 
Wadden Sea, while also decreasing the costs of (HVDC) grid connection of offshore wind farms 
when they are increasingly far off the coast. 
The third connection and ownership option is that a third party is responsible for the 
connection to the onshore grid. This is the case in the United Kingdom, where, between 2005 
and 2009, a system was developed in which offshore transmission lines have to be 
tendered.582 With this system, a third party, mostly a private party that is interested in long-
term stable investments, owns and operates the link between the wind farm and the onshore 
electricity grid. This party is called the ‘Offshore Transmission Owner’ (OFTO). Every cable 
connecting a wind farm to the onshore electricity grid is classified as an offshore transmission 
system, which requires an ‘Offshore Transmission License’.583 Each operator of such a link is a 
TSO in legal terms. With regard to the construction of the cable, there are two possibilities.584 
The first possibility is that the wind farm owner constructs the cable when it also constructs 
the wind farm, transferring the property when the wind farm becomes operational (generator 
build).585 The second option is that a third party constructs the cable directly and operates it 
afterwards (OFTO build).586 Due to the unbundling obligations that exist under European law, 
the OFTO cannot be the same entity as the entity that owns and operates the wind farm, nor 
can an OFTO own other generation activities.587  
It is important to note that (economic) ownership and operation do not necessarily have to 
belong to the same entity, especially when the transmission assets become more complex and 
more expensive.588 Another option is to have several owners, for example in a joint venture, 
 
579 http://www.rte-france.com/sites/default/files/rte2015-raccordementemr-web.pdf?profil=32, p. 4. 
580 Examples of hub-based converter stations include BorWin, DolWin, HelWin and SylWin.  
581 BNetzA, ‘Positionspapier zur Netzanbindungsverpfllichtung’ (2009). 
582 Müller 2016, p. 182-183. J.C.W. Gazendam, ‘Het Britse regime voor elektriciteitsnetten op zee: veilen voor 
efficiency’ in NTE [2018 3] pp. 64-72. 
583 Electricity Act 1989, Sec. 6C-6D. 
584 For projects that qualified for tenders before March 2012, a transitional regime existed. In that regime, 
there was only one choice: export cables were constructed by the generator and then transferred to an OFTO, 
Müller 2016, p. 185. 
585 The Electricity (Competitive Tenders for Offshore Transmission Licences) Regulations 2015, no. 1555 2015, 
sec. 3 and Part 2. 
586 Ibid., sec. 3 and Part 3. 
587 Müller 2016, p. 184. 
588 This is generally the case with longer distances, change from AC to DC networks and the connection of 
several wind farms to one asset, for example in the case of offshore grid developments. 
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and to appoint one entity as operating partner,589 in which case the operating partner could 
act as an independent system operator (ISO).590 Moreover, it is also possible to have several 
owners of specific cable connections, such as OFTOs in the United Kingdom, but to place 
system operation in the hands of the entity responsible for onshore electricity system 
operation, the TSO or, in the case of the UK, the ESO.591 
The question of connection responsibility is connected to the economic approach of ‘deep’, 
‘shallow’ and ‘super-shallow’ connection costs.592 In the economic approach, the spectrum of 
deep to super-shallow refers to the extent to which the OWF developer has to finance the 
connection to the grid. ‘Deep connection costs’ means that the OWF developer has to finance 
the export cable as well as any onshore grid reinforcements necessary to connect the OWF, 
‘shallow connection costs’ entails the costs from the OWF to the onshore converter station 
and ‘super-shallow connection costs’ means that the OWF developer only has to finance the 
connection from the OWF to the offshore converter station.593 Thus, the first option, in which 
the OWF owner is responsible for connection to the onshore grid, leads to deep or shallow 
connection costs, whereas the second option, where the TSO is responsible for grid 
connection, leads to (super)shallow connection costs for the OWF, unless the costs are 
redistributed again after construction. In order to reach a level playing field for OWFs in the 
North Sea, it would be advisable that the coastal states strive to adopt a connection regime 
that is compatible with long term grid developments in the North Sea area, and that they strive 
for convergence of the costs related to the connection of OWFs (corrected for the distance to 
shore, depth and complexity of the connection). This levels the playing field between OWFs 
located in different jurisdictions. It must be noted though, that full convergence or 
harmonisation of the connection responsibility is not necessary for the future development of 
a MOG, as long as the connection responsibilities do not exclude offshore grid developments. 
The next section elaborates the possibilities for ownership for offshore grid developments. 
4.3.2 Ownership of the MOG 
It is a large step from the connection obligations and ownership specifications of specific OWF 
export cables to the ownership of future components of a MOG. However, two intermediate 
steps are the clustering of offshore wind farms in hubs with a joint converter station,594 and 
 
589 This type of cooperation is also used in the oil and gas production industry, where risks are shared by several 
owners in a joint operating agreement (JOA). For more information, see E.G. Pereira, Joint Operating 
Agreements – Risk Control for the Non-operator (Globe Publishing Business 2013) p. 30 ff. 
590 Following Directive (EU) 2019/944 on common rules for the internal market for electricity, art. 44. 
591 Müller 2016, p. 187. 
592 P. Bhagwat, Deliverable 7.4, Economic framework for a meshed offshore grid, 2019, PROMOTioN, p. 63 ff. 
593 Ibid. 
594 Müller (2016), p. 214 ff. This approach is currently followed in Germany and the Netherlands. In Germany, 
this strategy is developed since 2009, starting with the publication of a position paper on the matter: BNetzA, 
‘Positionspapier zur Netzanbindungsverpfllichtung’ (2009). BorWin, DolWin, HelWin and SylWin are examples 
of converter stations that serve clusters of OWFs. In the Netherlands, the clustering approach takes place since 
the legislative changes of 2016. The Development Framework for OWFs shows that they are tendered in 
clusters of two, that are connected together. Development Framework: Dutch Ministry of the Economy and 
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hybrid electricity links such as the Kriegers Flak Combined Grid Solution.595 There, 
infrastructure is shared by several actors and the question of ownership and responsibility 
becomes more important. These types of projects make clear what legal framework is 
necessary when it comes to the ownership of a MOG. 
As the MOG is made up of connections that are used for multiple purposes, the owner of the 
grid must also be able to facilitate this. For the systems in which the OWF developer is also 
responsible for the export cable, it is difficult if this cable is also used as an electricity grid to 
which third parties have the right to access. There is a possible conflict with the rules on 
unbundling, if the OWF developer is also in charge of part of the MOG.596  For the third option, 
the OFTO based connection responsibility, the OWF developer, who constructs the export 
cable, will not have a direct interest in incorporating the long term perspective in their 
projects, for example in the form of heavier or more complex converter stations in a current 
project in order to allow for a more cost-effective connection in future grid enlargements 
(anticipatory investments). Neither will the third-party owner, to which the grid asset is 
transferred before the operational phase, have an interest in this, unless there is a clear 
requirement from the regulator that the connection must be developed in a certain way, and 
compensation for the extra costs incurred by the anticipatory investment.  Therefore, the 
coastal states in which the TSO is responsible for the connection of OWFs will have fewer legal 
barriers in the shift from single (radial) OWF connections to a MOG than coastal states that 
have an OWF developer-based system or an OFTO-based system.   
Next to the more fundamental concerns mentioned above, there may also be more practical 
barriers. For example, in the UK OFTO system, if the same asset is used for interconnection as 
well as for the export of offshore generated electricity, there is uncertainty on the licensing 
obligations of OFTO owners and interconnector owners. Interconnector owners are not 
allowed to own a transmission license at the same time,597 whereas offshore transmission 
licenses (required for every OFTO) are defined as ‘a transmission licence authorising anything 
that forms part of a transmission system to be used for purposes connected with offshore 
transmission’.598 However, this type of concern can be addressed by relatively small 
amendments of the relevant Acts. 
4.3.3 Network Charges 
The entity that constructs the connection of an OWF to the electricity grid will incur the costs 
of doing so. However, these costs may be transferred to other entities or even to consumers. 
For example, when the TSO is responsible for the export cables, these costs may be added to 
 
Climate, ‘Ontwikkelkader Wind op Zee’ (in Dutch), 
https://www.rvo.nl/sites/default/files/2016/10/Ontwikkelkader%20windenergie%20op%20zee.pdf. 
595 See section 3.5.2 for an elaboration on Kriegers Flak Combined Grid Solution. See also Nieuwenhout 2018. 
596 See section 3.5.3. 
597 Electricity Act 1989, sec. 6(2A). 
598 Sec. 6C(5) Electricity Act 1989. See also G. Gordon, A. McHarg, J. Paterson, ‘Energy Law in the United 
Kingdom’ in M. Roggenkamp, C. Redgwell, A. Ronne and I. del Guayo (Eds), Energy Law in Europe, Oxford 
University Press 2016, 3rd Edition, p. 1101. Nieuwenhout 2017, p.118.  
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the general network costs, which are calculated in the electricity tariffs consumers bear (which 
can be subdivided in connection tariffs and transport tariffs). In each coastal state, different 
rules exist on the division of network charges between consumers and producers. In some 
states, the network charges (subdivided in connection tariffs and transport tariffs) are borne 
entirely by the consumers. In other states, these charges are borne partially by consumers and 
partially by generators, as generators also benefit from the existence of the grid. Concerning 
the latter, electricity generators are most likely to pass these charges on to consumers via the 
electricity price. Therefore, it could be questioned whether charges for electricity generators 
(also called ‘Generator charges’ or ‘G-charges’) are necessary, or whether they only 
complicate the already difficult tariff system.599 Some plead for maintaining these ‘G-charges’ 
as they can send a locational signal for siting new capacity close to where it is used.600 
However, this argument does not work for OWFs, as their location is often already determined 
by the government via the tender specifications or via the predetermined ‘Wind Farm 
Zones’.601 
Regardless of whether G-charges should be maintained or not, differences in G-charges 
between different coastal states distort the electricity flows and dispatch in the MOG. As 
explained in 3.5.5, when OWFs of different states are in direct competition with each other 
and with onshore sources of renewable energy, these charges may distort the market for 
generators with otherwise very similar cost structures (which is the case for OWFs). The table 
below shows the large differences between coastal states in the division between network 
charges for consumers and for generators. A convergence of the division of charges between 
consumers and generators is necessary for the MOG. 
Table 2: Division of Network Charges between Consumers and Generators602 
Coastal State Consumers Generators 
Belgium 93% 7% 
Denmark 97% 3% 
France 98% 2% 
Germany 100% 0% 
Great Britain 77% 23% 
Netherlands 100% 0% 
Norway 62% 38% 
Sweden 59% 41% 
 
4.4 Support Schemes 
For several decades, offshore wind energy was an ‘emerging technology’, which used to be 
more expensive than conventional energy sources and other renewable energy sources such 
 
599 Bhagwat 2019, p. 130. 
600 Ibid. 
601 See chapter 4.2 and 4.4. 
602 Bhagwat 2019, pp. 133-138. 
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as onshore wind energy and solar energy. In order to allow for the development of this sector, 
state support was needed to cover the difference between the costs for the developer (the 
OPEX and CAPEX) and the revenues from the sale of the renewable electricity. In recent years, 
however, the amount of financial support needed to develop offshore wind farms has fallen 
significantly.603 Therefore, the relevance of support schemes, and the discussion thereof in a 
dissertation on the future legal framework for offshore electricity infrastructure, may have 
decreased in importance, especially when wind farms are constructed without financial 
support altogether.604 Nevertheless, support schemes are not abolished yet – on the contrary, 
some say that the current low bids on support scheme tenders for offshore wind are due to 
temporary factors such as low interest rates and a low steel price, which could rise again in 
the future.605 The differences between coastal states regarding support schemes between the 
North Sea coastal states are related to the scope of the support scheme, how the aid is 
awarded, the duration of the aid, the procedure for awarding the aid and the flexibility to 
adjust the aid scheme to respond to market developments. In this paragraph, the differences 
are elaborated upon and the relation to the development of the MOG is explained. 
4.4.1 Types of Support Schemes 
Two major types of support are tradable certificates schemes and schemes based on a 
compensation per MWh of renewable energy fed into the electricity grid. The latter type, 
which includes feed-in premiums, feed-in tariffs and Contracts for Difference (CfDs), are a 
direct compensation per MWh from a budget that is usually funded through a supplement on 
consumers’ electricity bills. The amount of the compensation per MWh can be fixed or flexible, 
based for example on the (long-term or actual) electricity price or on a combination of factors 
(such as the market price and the value of Guarantees of Origin).606 The formulas used for the 
calculation of the compensation per MWh can be quite complicated.607 Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have a system in place which is 
based on a compensation per MWh.608  
 
603 TenneT, ‘Market Review 2017 - Electricity market insights’ (2018), p. 33. 
604 Official statement by the Dutch government upon announcing the first Dutch offshore wind farm which is 
going to be constructed without financial support: https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2018/03/19/nuon-
wins-permit-for-dutch-offshore-wind-farm-without-subsidy. A year earlier, in Germany, subsidy-free tender 
results were announced for DONG: Pilita Clark for the Financial Times, ‘Dong Energy breaks subsidy link with 
new offshore wind farms’, 14 April 2017. 
605 This is based on stakeholder conversations in the context of PROMOTiON; Menze, Wagner (forthcoming). 
606 Guarantees of origin are electronic evidence that a certain amount of electricity was produced from 
renewable sources. These guarantees can be traded, and they represent a market value. Directive 2018/2001, 
art. 2(12) and art. 19. 
607 For example, in Belgium, the height of the financial support is based on the formula: The compensation = 
Levelised cost of electricity (LCOE) – ((electricity reference price x (1 – correction factor) + value of the 
Guarantee of Origin) x (1 – grid loss factor). This is laid down in Koninklijk besluit betreffende de instelling van 
mechanismen voor de bevordering van elektriciteit opgewekt uit hernieuwbare energiebronnen 16-7-2002, art. 
14(1). 
608 Belgium: see infra footnote 593. Denmark has a centralized tender system. The bidding price in the tender 
determines the height of the financial support: Danish Renewable Energy Act ((Lov om fremme af vedvarende 
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The tradable certificates system provides indirect compensation: a market for certificates per 
MWh of renewable energy is created by obliging electricity supply companies to buy 
certificates for a certain percentage of the electricity they sell. The height of the percentage 
and the total quantity of supplied electricity determine the demand for the certificates. Then, 
as with any market, the balance between demand and supply of the certificates determines 
the price at a given moment. The supply of the certificates comes from the production of 
renewable energy by installations that are eligible for the certificates. This is often counted 
per MWh fed into the electricity grid. The United Kingdom, albeit in a phase-out process, 609 
as well as Norway and Sweden, have a tradable certificates system.610 
4.4.2 Scope and Duration 
The scope of support could either be specifically for offshore wind energy (technology-
specific) or for all types of renewable energy (technology neutral). Tradable certificate 
schemes are technology-neutral, whereas feed-in premiums and feed-in tariffs are usually 
technology-specific, but not always. For example, the Dutch feed-in scheme is in principle 
technology-neutral (applications from all types of renewable energy are allowed) but there is 
an important exception for offshore wind, for which separate tenders are organised, outside 
the general tender round for renewable energy that is organised biannually.611 The advantage 
of technology-neutrality is that renewable energy installations that cost the least per MWh 
will be constructed first, either until the market is satisfied (with a tradable certificates 
market), or until the support budget is exhausted (in the Netherlands). A disadvantage is that 
an emerging technology will not be able to develop as it will always be more expensive than 
 
energy), art. 22(7). France has a system in which the supply company (EDF) has an obligation to buy renewable 
energy at a certain contract price. The height of this price is determined by a competitive dialogue. Germany 
and the Netherlands have a tender-based system in which the height of the feed-in premium is determined by 
the tender bidding outcome. The United Kingdom recently introduced a Contracts for Difference based support 
scheme. Contracts for Difference (CfDs) are contracts under private law between the project developer and the 
‘Low Carbon Contracts Company’ (LCCC). Project developers get a refund for the difference between an 
estimate of the market price and an estimate of the long-term price needed to bring forward investment in a 
given technology (the strike price). The legal basis is provided in Energy Act 2013, part 2 chapter 2, and The 
Contracts for Difference (Allocation) Regulations 2014, 2014 No. 2011, amended by The Contracts for 
Difference (Allocation) (Amendment) Regulations 2015, 2015 No. 981, and by The Contracts for Difference 
(Allocation) (Amendment) Regulations 2016, 2016 No. 1053. 
609 The tradable certificates system will run until 2037 for projects that were accredited under the old system 
before March 2017. Renewables Obligation Order 2015 (England and Wales), 2015 No. 0000, Renewables 
Obligation (Scotland) Order 2009, 2009 No. 140, Renewables Obligation Order (Northern Ireland) 2009, 2009 
No. 154. Cf. Department of Energy and Climate Change, RO Transition Consultation Document, 17 July 2013, p. 
8. See also: Ofgem, ‘Final guidance on the transition period and closure of the RO’, 16 Oct. 2014. 
610 This scheme is based on an international agreement, namely the ‘Agreement between the Government of 
the Kingdom of Norway and the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden on a Common Market for Electricity 
Certificates’, Stockholm 29-6-2011. The Agreement has been implemented by national implementation acts in 
the two countries: the Norwegian Electricity Certificate Act 2011 (Lov om elsertifikater, Elsertifikatloven), LOV-
2011-06-24-39; and the Swedish Electricity Certificate Act (Lag (2003:113) om elcertificat). 
611 Decision on the Stimulation of Renewable Energy Production (Besluit stimulering duurzame 
energieproductie) BWBR0022735, 21-10-2017, art. 2(6) 
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the established technologies, even though it might be cost-effective in the long term due to 
technological innovation, learning effects in the industry and economies of scale.  
Concerning the duration, there is a difference between tradable certificates-based systems 
and direct compensation schemes. For the latter, most countries provide support for a certain 
number of years from the moment an installation is producing electricity. This is usually 15-20 
years.612 In Denmark, the term ‘full-load hours’ is used, which reflects the production over a 
certain amount of years, but which is dependent on weather conditions and technical 
availability of the installation.613 On the other hand, for tradable certificates systems, an 
absolute term of the scheme is mentioned. The scheme in the United Kingdom is in a phase-
out process until 2037,614 and the Norwegian-Swedish system is currently planned to last until 
2035, but this could be extended.615 
4.4.3 Flexibility of Support Schemes 
As the market circumstances in the electricity market often change, it is important that some 
flexibility is incorporated in the support scheme in order to adjust the level or conditions of 
support to changing market circumstances. There are two options: in some states, there are 
specific formulas, which also include a long-term average market price and the value of 
guarantees of origin (which is deducted from the support).  Belgium has the most elaborate 
formula,616 but this did not prove to lead to competitive prices.617 In other countries, the 
support is fixed for the entire period. This is the case in France for example. Tradable 
certificates are flexible in the sense that the value depends on the number of certificates 
available in the market and to what extent the government creates demand for these 
certificates by obliging companies to buy these certificates. 
Next to this, some flexibility in the design of the support scheme itself may lead to more 
competitive tender outcomes. Tender outcomes depend on many factors, but the design of 
the support scheme itself and the type of tender in which the support per MWh is determined 
 
612 In the Netherlands, the support lasts for 15 years: Ordinance Wind Energy at Sea (Regeling windenergie op 
zee 2016) art. 10. In Belgium, it is 19 or 20 years, based on the date of the financial close: a financial close 
before May 2016 led to support for 20 years; after this moment, only 19 years of support are granted: 
Koninklijk besluit betreffende de instelling van mechanismen voor de bevordering van elektriciteit opgewekt uit 
hernieuwbare energiebronnen, 16-7-2002, art. 14 para 3(1) and (2). Denmark, France and Germany all have a 
maximum duration of support of 20 years, Danish Renewable Energy Act (Lov om fremme ad vedvarende 
energy), art. 37(4); in France, this is indicated in the Cahier des Charges in which the details of the tender are 
specified: ‘Cahier des charges de l’appel d’offres portant sur des installations éoliennes de production 
d’électricité en mer en France métropolitaine’, p. 12. In Germany, this is regulated by the Renewable Energy Act 
(Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz) art. 25.  
613 Renewable Energy Act (Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz), art. 37(2) jo. (4). This was 10 TWh for the earlier wind 
farms and 20 TWh for Horns Rev 3 and Anholt. 
614 See supra footnote 595. 
615 Norwegian Act on elcertificates, art. 4. Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Norway and 
the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden on a Common Market for Electricity Certificates’, Stockholm 29-6-
2011, art. 2(2) and art. 3(2). 
616 Royal Decree 16-7-2002, art. 14. 
617 CREG, ‘Studie over de analyse van ondersteuning van offshore windenergie met inbegrip van het jaarlijks 
verslag over de doeltreffendheid van de minimumprijs voor offshore windenergie’, (F)1568, 19 december 2016.  
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plays a role. It is possible to discern best practices in the context of (operational) support. A 
successful approach is shown by the Danish, German and Dutch support schemes in which 
competitive tenders are organised. Compared to the Belgian fixed formula and the French 
competitive dialogue, the cost reductions are much larger, leading the Belgian and French 
authorities to reconsider their support scheme.618 Another important factor is stability and 
predictability, which leads to reduced costs of capital and insurance costs.619 Furthermore, 
providing seabed surveys and wind resource reports for the specific sites which are tendered 
reduces the upfront investment developers have to make before applying for a license to 
exploit an offshore wind farm. All potential competitors need the same information, and in 
this way, the information can be provided once instead of all competitors having to perform 
their own site investigations. 
4.4.4 Cross-border Aspects 
The support for offshore wind energy (and sometimes for the connection infrastructure) falls 
under the European rules on state aid. Therefore, the Guidelines on State Aid for Energy and 
Environmental Protection are applicable.620 In these Guidelines, it is specified that the aid has 
to be competitively determined, and that operational aid for generation at times when prices 
are below zero should be prevented.621 This is implemented in the Member States with a feed-
in scheme in the respective laws and tender conditions. In North Sea coastal states with a 
tradable certificates system, this is not necessary, as the tradable certificates compensation is 
based on a market price, not on an extra compensation on top of the spot electricity price. 
Most of the support schemes for offshore wind are nationally-oriented. Nevertheless, the EU 
Renewable Energy Directive provides for so-called cooperation mechanisms with which 
Member-States can cooperate in their support for renewable energy.622 The Directive offers 
three possibilities: statistical transfers, joint projects and joint support schemes.623 Although 
the Directive is in place for years already, the cooperation mechanisms have not often been 
made use of: some statistical transfers have occurred;624 there was a joint tender for solar 
 
618 This has led the Belgian and French authorities to reconsider their support systems. The Belgian NRA CREG 
has published a report about this: CREG, ‘Studie over de analyse van ondersteuning van offshore windenergie 
met inbegrip van het jaarlijks verslag over de doeltreffendheid van de minimumprijs voor offshore 
windenergie’, (F)1568, 19-12-2016. The French Court of Audit (Cour des Comptes) has also produced a heavy 
report criticising the inefficiencies of the support scheme for offshore wind: Cour des Comptes, ‘Le Soutien aux 
Énergies Renouvelables’, Mars 2018.  
619 TKI Wind op Zee, ‘Offshore wind cost reduction progress assessment’, 20-2-2017, p. 12-13. 
620 Communication from the Commission, ‘Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy 
2014-2020’, 28.6.2014, OJ C 200/01. 
621 Ibid., para 124 and 126. 
622 The Directive is discussed in more detail in chapter 3.4.2. 
623 Directive (EU) 2018/2001 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (recast), articles 5, 
8-14. 
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photovoltaic renewable energy projects between Denmark and Germany;625 and Norway and 
Sweden have a joint support scheme for the tradable green certificates.626  
Cooperation mechanisms could be used for offshore wind in hybrid or meshed electricity grids 
as well,627 when the electricity generated at OWFs does not flow only to one state (which is 
the case with radial connections) but to any state connected to the MOG. In this case, it might 
be considered politically difficult if a state supports the OWFs in its EEZ financially, while the 
electricity flows predominantly to other states. With cooperation mechanisms, a ‘fairer’ 
support scheme could be designed.628 
4.4.5 Link between Support Schemes and the MOG 
There are two important links between the topic of support schemes and the development of 
the MOG. First, as shown above, the differences in the support schemes between coastal 
states lead to a large diversity in the conditions for, and level of support, that OWF developers 
receive. It would be advisable for the coastal states to strive for more convergence, as this 
levels the playing field between the different states. Otherwise, when an OWF is developed, 
it might be that OWFs are developed mostly in the locations with the most favourable 
regulatory conditions, relating for example to support schemes and the costs of the 
connection, as explained in chapter 4.3, and not in the areas that are most logical from the 
point of view of wind resources or stability of the grid. This happened already on a small scale 
in the solar photovoltaic experiment between Denmark and Germany, where, surprisingly, 
most installations were placed in Denmark - whereas the solar resources were larger in 
Germany.629 
Another link between the nationally organised support schemes and the development of a 
MOG is whether there is a condition in the rules of the support scheme that support is limited 
to OWFs that are connected exclusively to the onshore grid of the state in which the OWF is 
located. This is problematic as it limits the OWF developer’s willingness to connect to a hybrid 
connection or to the MOG, as it will lose its entitlement to support in that case. However, this 
type of problem can be amended relatively easily by changing the formulation of the rules. 
For example, in the Netherlands, this used to be problematic when the legislation limited 
 
625 This is based on the Danish Act on a pilot tender for solar PV construction (Lov om pilotudbud af pristillaeg 
for elektricitet fremstillet pa solcelleanlaeg), lov nr. 261 of 16 March 2016; and on the German Renewable 
Energy Act (Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz), para 5 jo 88a. See also P. Crossley, Renewable Energy Law, An 
International Assessment (Cambridge University Press 2019) p. 239. 
626 This support scheme is based on an international agreement: the Agreement between the Government of 
Norway and the government of the Kingdom of Sweden on a Common Market for Electricity Certificates, 
Stockholm 29-6-2011. See also O. Boge, ‘The Norwegian-Swedisch Electricity Certificates Market’ in M.M. 
Roggenkamp, H. Bjornebye (Eds) European Energy Law Report X (Intersentia 2014). 
627 S.T. Schröder, L. Kitzing, H.K. Jacobsen, L.L. Pade, ‘Joint Support and Efficient Offshore Investment: Market 
and Transmission Connection Barriers and Solutions’, Renewable Energy Law and Policy Review [2012 2] pp. 
112-120. 
628 This is elaborated further in chapter 7.3.4. 
629 See for an elaborated overview: D. Dmitruk, ‘Danish – German Cooperation on the First Cross-Border 
Tenders for Renewable Energy: A Blueprint for Future Cross-Border RES Projects?’ in M.M. Roggenkamp, C. 
Banet (Eds) European Energy Law Report XII (Intersentia 2019), p. 113-132. 
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support to installations connected to the Dutch onshore electricity grid, but the current rules 
state that the electricity fed into an electricity grid is entitled to support.630 It is specified in 
the same document that an electricity grid means the onshore electricity grid or an offshore 
grid in the Dutch EEZ.631 Thus, this also includes cable connections to an offshore grid that is 
not exclusively linked to the Netherlands but also to neighbouring countries. In Belgium, the 
formulation is that support is available for “electricity supplied to the transmission or 
distribution network or to a direct line”.632 When it turns out that the offshore grid is not 
included in this formulation, it can be amended in the Royal Decree itself – which is a lower 
threshold than changing the Electricity Act itself.  
4.5 Offshore Grid Operation 
The safe and secure operation of offshore electricity infrastructure is an emerging issue, which 
will become very important when a MOG is developed. First, it is important to consider 
whether specific rules for offshore grid operation are needed, compared to the rules that 
already exist for onshore grid operation. Next to the European network codes, there are 
(technical) rules on the operation of the grid in national network codes. The non-exhaustive 
requirements of the European network codes are also filled in further in the national network 
codes. Thus, (offshore) grid operation is also partially regulated at national level. As with the 
discussion of the network codes at EU level,633 most rules can also be applied to the offshore 
grid, although some specific amendments need to be made for the adaptation of the rules to 
HVDC technology. It goes beyond the scope of this research to analyse the (often very 
technical) network codes integrally. Nevertheless, some issues that are relevant for the 
development of a MOG are elaborated. 
First, the responsibility for offshore grid operation needs to be clear. Currently, for the 
onshore electricity networks, the responsibility for safe and reliable operation of the grid lies 
with the TSOs. They are supervised by the NRA, which may start an investigation when 
incidents happen, and may also apply financial penalties when the TSO has not adequately 
fulfilled its role. For the MOG, this may be more difficult, especially when the ownership of 
the grid lies in the hands of different entities. It needs to be made clear in the legal framework, 
either in the EU Network Codes or in the national implementation thereof, which entity bears 
final responsibility for the operation of the MOG. 
A second issue is the diversity in rules on balancing. Electricity networks needs to be in balance 
at all times.634 Therefore, states have different systems in place to describe how TSOs and 
 
630 Emphasis added by the author. Decision on the Stimulation of Renewable Energy Production (Besluit 
stimulering duurzame energieproductie), art. 15(1)a. 
631 Ibid., art. 1(1)j. 
632 Royal Decree, 16-7-2002, art. 7. 
633 See chapter 3.4.6. 
634 In AC networks, the balance is reflected in a stable frequency of AC networks within the agreed bandwidth 
around 50 Hz. Balance is maintained by feeding as much energy to the grid as what is taken from it by 
consumption and conversion and transmission losses. In DC networks, the balance is reflected in the voltage 
level, and maintained in the same way, by balancing consumption, grid losses and infeed. 
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connected parties are required to act when an imbalance occurs and to prevent imbalances 
in the first place. Often, the system is that all connected parties above a certain capacity are 
balancing responsible parties. They have to indicate what they expect to provide to the grid 
or take from the grid. If they consume or produce more or less than what they stated 
beforehand, they will have to reimburse the TSO for the costs the latter makes to correct the 
imbalance caused by the balancing responsible party. Previously, depending on the coastal 
state, renewable energy generators were sometimes exempted from balancing requirements. 
However, with the European Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Protection and Energy 
2014-2020, this exemption has to be phased out and is no longer allowed for new generators 
that receive financial support.635 Therefore, legal differences between the countries on 
whether or not a balancing requirement exists for renewables is diminishing. Nevertheless, 
practical differences between countries still exist,636 as balancing rules and costs vary greatly 
between countries, which may lead to different strategies and different volumes on the 
imbalance market.637 These practical differences in the balancing rules may become a barrier 
to the operation of a MOG, as it is difficult to operate a grid in which connected parties adhere 
to different rules according to the EEZ they are located in. As the balancing rules have to be 
adjusted in light of the MOG anyway to accommodate for HVDC technology, this is an 
opportunity to strive for a more coherent system between the North Sea coastal states.  
Third, there are some practical issues concerning grid operation, for example the planning of 
outages for maintenance on cables or other grid components. For TSO-based connections of 
OWFs, it is logical that the TSO plans outages related to maintenance in a way that it is most 
convenient for the electrical system. However, this may be more challenging for systems in 
which many different grid operators exist, such as in the United Kingdom. However, the United 
Kingdom presents an interesting approach: although the many different third parties are 
responsible for the connections they own and the maintenance of these connections, the 
practical operation of offshore transmission cables is performed by National Grid, the 
(onshore) TSO in its capacity of system operator.638 In this way, coherence of the system can 
be ensured whilst the numerous owners retain responsibility for asset maintenance. In a 
simple example, the OFTO determines whether maintenance has to take place, whereas the 
system operator National Grid ESO agrees when maintenance can take place. 
4.6 Decommissioning Obligations 
Under international law, coastal states have an obligation to remove installations which are 
no longer used.639 This is a relevant requirement for the legal framework for offshore 
 
635 Communication from the Commission, ‘Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy 
2014-2020’, C 200/1, para 108 and 124(b). 
636 Bhagwat 2019, p. 197. 
637 R. A. C. van der Veen, A. Abbasy, and R. A. Hakvoort, ‘A comparison of imbalance settlement designs and 
results of Germany and the Netherlands’, project paper for the project, ‘Balance Management in Multinational 
Power Markets’ (2010). 
638 Müller 2016, p. 184, p. 187. 
639 UNCLOS, art. 60(3). See section 2.3.1.5. 
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electricity grids, as this means converter stations and other installations necessary for the grid 
will have to be removed after the end of their lifetime. What exactly needs to happen at the 
end of the lifetime of converter stations changes the total lifetime costs of the installations, 
and thus changes the CBA of (parts of) the grid. Next to this, there is also a link between the 
removal obligation of OWFs and the offshore grid: rules on what happens at the end of the 
lifetime of OWFs may change the grid configuration. For example, if the area has to be 
restored in its original state, the grid connection becomes redundant, whereas if the same 
area can be used again for new OWFs, the same grid connection can be used again. 
Although originating from the same source (UNCLOS, IMO and OSPAR guidelines), the 
decommissioning obligation for installations and structures is implemented differently among 
the analysed countries. The IMO Guidelines and OSPAR Decision also leave a margin of 
discretion to the coastal states to decide under which conditions installations can be left in 
place, for example when they serve a legitimate purpose (which can also be an ecological 
purpose).640 Moreover, although there is no obligation to remove subsea cables based on 
international law,641 coastal states may include a removal obligation for subsea cables based 
on their national legal framework.642 
Looking at decommissioning from the perspective of the MOG, an important topic is the 
approach towards the varying lifetimes of the assets. OWFs typically have a lifetime of 
approximately 25 years, whereas offshore grid infrastructure may be used for 45 years or 
more. When an OWF is at the end of its lifetime, while the transmission infrastructure 
connected to it is still operational for another two decades, coastal states have to choose 
whether the OWF should be repowered, perhaps with reuse of the foundations,643 or whether 
the installation is going to be removed altogether, with a cable connection becoming 
redundant. A third option is that coastal states demand that both the wind farm itself and the 
export cables are removed. This is the case in the Netherlands.644 There is no mention on the 
removal of interconnector cables at the end of their lifetime in any of the researched national 
legal frameworks.645 
 
640 See section 2.3.1.5. 
641 See section 2.3.2. 
642 This is the case in the Netherlands, see Water Decision (Waterbesluit), art. 6.16l. 
643 This is currently not yet commonplace, but is discussed as a future possibility, in light of the 
overdimensioning of the foundations. However, this is only possible if the turbines do not increase in size, 
which is to be expected regarding the increase in turbine size over the past years. 
644 Water Decision (Waterbesluit), art. 6.16l. This can be explained by the fact that export cables used to be 
considered part of the OWF in the Netherlands. Article 6.16l mentions both OWFs and export cables in the 
same sentence, in a section of the Water Decision that is specifically about OWFs, not about an offshore grid. 
645 One could argue that it is difficult to say when an interconnector reaches the end of its lifetime. An 
interconnector can be replaced if it does not function anymore from a technical perspective. However, if 
replacement is more expensive than the economic value of the cable over its renewed lifetime, then it reaches 
the end of its economic lifetime. This could be the case if there is already a large amount of transmission 
capacity and if the price difference between the bidding zones it connects is relatively small. 
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Another issue is the financing of decommissioning costs of grid components. For OWFs, there 
are often specific provisions on the amount of money that needs to be secured for this 
purpose, and how these funds should be protected, for example through a bank guarantee.646 
However, in national law, such provisions for converter stations and other grid components 
that need to be removed are missing. This might be due to the fact that OWFs are often 
developed commercially whereas the grids are regulated, which means that states have more 
influence over the income and obligations of grid owners. Another reason might be that only 
relatively few converter stations are needed compared to the amount of offshore wind 
turbines, which makes removal less costly.   
Thus, whereas the decommissioning requirements for OWFs are often clear, the requirements 
with regard to the offshore grid are less clear. There is a need for more clarity on this issue in 
the legal framework of a MOG, in order to make sure that cost estimates regarding the MOG 
can also properly take into account decommissioning costs for offshore grid components, and 
in order to make sure that grid components are not treated differently with regard to 
decommissioning depending on the jurisdiction in which they are located. Moreover, for the 
future grid configuration, it is important that coastal states provide clarity on whether offshore 
wind turbine foundations remain in place, fulfilling a new function but blocking the 
construction of a new OWF in the same area, or whether they are to be removed. As countries’ 
experience with decommissioning grows when large-scale decommissioning of OWFs has to 
take place,647 their new insights might also spill over into more detailed decommissioning rules 
for converter stations and other offshore grid components.     
4.7 Interim Conclusion 
The coastal states around the North Sea have made many different choices in shaping their 
national policies with regard to offshore wind energy and transmission infrastructure. This is 
 
646 In France, the required funds are named specifically in law, namely EUR 50,000 per MW of installed 
capacity. Ministère de l’Ecologie, du développement durable et de l’énergie, Cahier des charges de l’appèl 
d’offres portant sur des installations éoliennes de production d’électricité en mer en France métropolitaine, p. 
38. In other countries, the sum and conditions are specified in the construction permit or the tender 
conditions. This is the case for example in Denmark and the Netherlands. For Denmark, for the older OWFs, the 
decommissioning obligation was stated directly in the letter granting a construction permit: Letter from the 
Traffic Ministry dated 20 November 1989, quoted directly in the Approval for Decommissioning, Danish Energy 
Agency (Energistyrelsen), J-2017-176, 7/8, 10 January 2017, available at 
https://ens.dk/sites/ens.dk/files/Vindenergi/tilladelse_til_nedtagning_af_vindeby_havvindmoellepark.pdf 
[accessed 9/1/2020]. The amount of funds to be reserved for decommissioning was not specified. For newer 
OWFs, this is stated in the tender conditions already: Cf. Danish Energy Agency (Energistyrelsen), Tender 
Conditions for Kriegers Flak Offshore Wind Farm (Final Draft, 8 July 2016), p. 13. In the Netherlands, this is 
stipulated in the Wind Farm Zone Decision. See for a recent example: Kavelbesluit IV windenergiegebied 
Hollandse Kust (zuid), BWBR0040532, Voorschrift 6 and 7 (in Dutch). In this decision, the OWF needs to be 
removed at latest 2 years after the end of exploitation, but within the term of the license. The required bank 
guarantee is €120.000 per installed MW, which needs to be guaranteed at latest when the OWF has received 
Guarantees of Origin for the produced electricity. 
647 E. Topham and D. McMillan, ‘Sustainable decommissioning of an offshore wind farm’ Renewable Energy 
[2017 102] p. 471; R. Fleming, H. Mas and C.T. Nieuwenhout, ‘Wind Farm Waste – Emerging Issues with 
Decommissioning and Waste Regulation in the EU, Denmark and the United Kingdom’ Oil Gas and Eenergy Law 
[2018 2]. 
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reflected in a variety of legal frameworks, each of which may be more or less successful than 
the other in stimulating offshore wind and offshore grid developments. Two main topics in 
this chapter are the diversity of the legal frameworks and the convergence of coastal states’ 
systems on some specific aspects, such as permitting and connection responsibility. 
The diversity between the rules in different states sometimes leads to large variation in how 
OWF developers or grid developers are treated. This leads to direct legal barriers to the 
development of an offshore grid, such as the complicated permitting procedures for cross-
border electricity cables. It also forms an indirect impediment to the cost-effective 
development of offshore wind energy and of the MOG itself, as there isn’t a level playing field 
between developers in different states. Convergence of the legislative and regulatory system 
for OWFs is beneficial for the cost-effective development of offshore wind energy in the North 
Sea and the MOG itself. With a level playing field, the choice of location for OWFs will then 
not be based mainly on the support scheme or connection costs of a particular coastal state, 
but rather on where the optimal wind resources exist or where optimal connection 
possibilities to the MOG exist. Issues where more coordination is needed between coastal 
states are maritime spatial planning and permitting procedures, and issues where the level 
playing field could be improved are connection responsibilities, support schemes and offshore 
grid operation, for example with regard to balancing obligations.  
Interestingly, while greater convergence is required on several topics, some ‘natural’ 
convergence of the legislative systems of certain states can already be discerned on the basis 
of learning-by-doing. Coastal states look at the successes and failures of each other’s policies 
regarding OWFs and the way they are connected to the electricity grid. They sometimes copy 
the successful elements while improving the negative elements, for example in the licensing 
and permitting procedures and the support scheme tenders of Denmark, Germany and the 
Netherlands. While natural convergence is happening on some issues, there is a need for more 
proactive convergence, as mentioned in the previous paragraph. This is because the process 
of natural convergence is rather slow and encompasses only a few states, whereas the MOG 
is supposed to connect many states around the North Sea. Therefore, the convergence 
process of learning from other states and adopting the successful parts should be actively 
pursued on more issues and in more states, for example by increasing information exchange 
between government representatives and by initiating joint (cross-border) projects.  
The issues for which more convergence is required, are the permitting procedures for cross-
border assets, rules on support schemes, rules on network charges (specifically on the issue 
of charges for generators), and decommissioning obligations. These topics will be addressed 
in the proposed future legal framework for the MOG.  
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5 The Choice of Instruments in a Multi-Level Legal Framework 
 
In the previous chapters, it has been made clear that the current legal framework for offshore 
electricity infrastructure has to be improved, in order to facilitate the development of a MOG 
and the connection of the many offshore wind farms that are to be constructed in the coming 
decades. The framework should be specifically amended to accommodate hybrid and meshed 
offshore grid developments. This requires legislative action on various levels through different 
legal instruments. In this chapter, the decision-making structure for choosing legal 
instruments to address the identified challenges is made clear.  
The legal framework for offshore electricity infrastructure can be characterised as multi-level 
and multi-actor. The different levels addressed in this chapter are national, EU and 
international law; the latter also includes regional legislative instruments. The actors 
addressed in this chapter are national governments, local governments, regulatory 
authorities, TSOs, windfarm developers, various interest groups (related to for example nature 
conservation, fisheries, tourism), the European Commission and other European institutions, 
and international organisations such as the IMO and the OSPAR secretariat.  
The structure of the chapter is as follows. To accommodate the complexity of multi-level and 
multi-actor policymaking, this chapter will first go into general decision-making theories that 
are relevant for the decision-making processes for the legal framework for the MOG. This 
serves as a basis for the second part, in which specific criteria are developed for the choice 
between multiple levels of legislation for offshore electricity infrastructure in the North Sea, 
namely the national, European and international level, the latter also including regional 
agreements governed by international law. Additionally, the choice between hard and soft 
law is elaborated in this part. The choices between different legal instruments are formulated 
in the form of questions, leading to a ‘decision tree’ which can be used to decide which legal 
instrument to adopt for which legal issue. In the third part of the chapter, the decision tree 
(and the choices and principles behind it) are applied to the legal barriers to the construction 
of an offshore grid, as identified in the previous chapters.  
The analysis shows that there is no one-size-fits-all legal instrument for all current legal 
barriers. Instead, the legal framework for a MOG in the North Sea should be based on several 
legal instruments. On the basis of this multi-level assessment based on several decision-
making theories, this chapter concludes with an overview of which legal instruments should 
form the legal framework for a meshed offshore grid in the North Sea. Its substantive rules 
will be further elaborated upon in chapter 6 and 7. 
5.1 The Choice of Legal Instruments 
5.1.1 Decision-making Models for the Choice of Legal Instruments 
Before elaborating on how the choice of legal instruments in the context of the development 
of the legal framework for a MOG needs to take place, it is important to understand how 
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decision-making processes work in the first place, and how decision-making would work for 
legislative processes with regard to a MOG in the North Sea. This is important as it shapes the 
decision criteria that are detailed in the next paragraph.  
In both economic and social sciences, several decision-making models have been developed. 
Some of these models refer specifically towards decision-making for individuals or for 
companies as market participants. Nevertheless, some decision-making theories can be 
applied to the specific context of law- and policy making, and even specifically to policy making 
for the design of a legal framework for the offshore grid in the North Sea, for which the EU 
and coastal states need to make decisions on how to address the construction and operation 
of such an offshore grid in their current legal frameworks.  
Many decision-making models have been developed over previous decades,648 and it is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation to discuss them all in detail. Therefore, a selection has 
been made based on two criteria: first, the models used in this chapter are generally known 
and established models, and second, the models are able to explain part of the decision-
making process concerning the offshore electricity grid in the North Sea which makes them 
relevant for the specific context of this dissertation. The models that meet the criteria are the 
rational actor model, the incremental policymaking model, the policy windows or ‘window of 
opportunity’ model and ‘adaptive governance’. Finally, the ‘garbage can model’ is added as an 
alternative theory, as some elements of the policy making process concerning the offshore 
grid show that the decision-making model is not always as rationally organised as is presumed. 
The rational actor model, developed by G.T. Allison in the context of an explanation of states’ 
behaviour in the Cuba crisis,649 is a model to explain states’ choices, derived from the rational 
choice model that was developed earlier by economists, and applied to administrative 
processes by Herbert Simon.650 Both models were initially derived from the utilitarian principle 
in ethics that individuals should act in such a way to maximise pleasure (good) and to minimise 
pain (bad).651 This principle was translated from ethics to (neoclassical) economics to explain 
that individuals choose the option that will deliver them most utility and that this can be 
calculated mathematically.652 However, whereas the rational choice theory takes individuals 
as subjects and models human decision-making, the rational actor model specifically takes 
states as its principal agents. The theory leans heavily on the utilitarian principles that it is 
possible for states to oversee all alternatives, to quantify social welfare for all alternatives 
(based on their costs and benefits), to have this information available to (all) parties involved 
 
648 M. Hill, The Policy Process in the Modern State (Prentice Hall/Pearson Education Ltd, 1997 3rd ed.), p. 98 ff.  
649 G.T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Little, Brown 1971, 1st ed.). 
650 H. Simon, Administrative Behaviour (The Macmillan Company, 1974). See also M. Hill 1997, p. 99-101.  
651 This principle was developed first by Jeremy Bentham in An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and 
Legislation (1789).  
652 The utility theory in economics was developed by William Stanley Jevons, see for example W.S. Jevons, The 
Theory of Political Economy (1871) p. 38/39.  
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in the decision-making process and to make decisions according to the principle that the social 
welfare should be maximised.653  
The incremental policymaking model, also called ‘muddling through’654 is based on the theory 
of Charles Lindblom who argues that in complex decision-making, it is not possible for 
policymakers to list all the possible policy outcomes and to rank them according to all 
predetermined values, as would be the case in rational decision-making.655 Instead, Lindblom 
describes that policymakers set a principal objective, with only a few immediately relevant 
secondary objectives, and then limit their evaluation to a few policy alternatives that occur to 
them.656 Then, the policymaker will discover that different alternatives are linked to various 
objectives in different ways,. As a last step, the policymaker will select a combination of the 
choice in values with the choice in instruments.657 As the policymaker’s goals will only be 
partially met, this sequence will repeat itself when conditions change and when adequacy of 
prediction improves.658 The model is therefore based on ‘successive limited comparisons’, 
which is what Lindblom calls ‘muddling through’.659  
From an economic perspective, incremental decision-making can be explained by ‘institutional 
path dependence’: the government can be considered to ‘produce’ regulation or policy, and 
the ‘production costs’ are the administrative costs of adding more regulation or policy.660 The 
additional administrative costs of a policy or regulation will reduce as the instrument is 
broadened, to encompass an extra target group (such as, in the context of this dissertation: 
adding HVDC networks to the existing rules on AC networks), or deepened, by incrementally 
adding another element to the existing rules.661 However, this may at some point lead to a 
lock-in,662 in which an instrument is not replaced when a more efficient alternative arises. In 
this case, another mode of decision-making may be necessary to make a step to another 
system. 
 
653 These assumptions are criticized by many. A notable criticism, relevant also to decision-making for an 
offshore grid, is the theory of bounded rationality, developed by Herbert Simon. H. Simon, Models of man: 
social and rational: mathematical essays on rational human behavior in a social setting (Wiley & Son, 1957). 
654 C. Lindblom, ‘The Science of "Muddling Through"’, Public Administration Review [1959 Vol. 19, No. 2] pp. 79-
88. C. Lindblom, ‘Still Muddling, Not Yet Through’, Public Administration Review [1979 Vol. 39, No. 6] pp. 517-
526. See also M. Hill 1997, p. 102 and further. 
655 This is quite similar to the conclusion of Herbert Simon concerning individual persons. With his theory on 
‘bounded rationality’, Herbert Simon remarks that individuals do not seek to evaluate all alternatives and all 
information, they are not able to process all this information. Therefore, they only seek a solution that is good 
enough, hence satisfactory. The bounded rationality model criticizes the rational choice model in the same way 
as the incremental policy making model criticizes the rational actor model. H. Simon, Models of man: social and 
rational: mathematical essays on rational human behavior in a social setting (Wiley & Son, 1957). 
656 Lindblom 1959, p. 79-80. 
657 Ibid. 
658 Ibid., p. 80. 
659 Ibid., p. 81. 
660 E. Woerdman, ‘Path-Dependent Climate Policy: the History and Future of Emissions Trading in Europe’ 
European Environment [2004 14], 261–275, p. 264. 
661 Ibid. 
662 Ibid., p. 265. 
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The ‘window of opportunity’ model is based on the policy windows theory developed by J.W. 
Kingdon.663  According to Kingdon, for each issue, in order to have policy action, three things 
must come together: a problem, a solution and political will to solve the problem. When one 
of these three is missing, there will be no change. When the three come together, a policy 
window exists. This window will only be opened for a limited time. Also, more generally, one 
can say that some issues with a large impact can only be addressed when certain windows of 
opportunity open.  
A good example of a window of opportunity is cooperation between parties after a crisis or 
disaster. An example of this is the financial crisis in 2008, after which a window of opportunity 
opened to increase banking supervision, leading for example to the Basel III accord on banking 
supervision internationally and many measures in the EU to preserve the stability of the 
Euro.664 Another example of a disaster that created a window of opportunity in policymaking 
is the large Dutch flood of 1953 (Watersnoodramp), which made it possible to create large-
scale flood protection infrastructure (Delta works).665 From a legal perspective, the floods of 
1953 made it possible to adopt a far-reaching Act on this topic, the Delta Act (Deltawet 1958). 
The urgent need for flood protection measures had been investigated and discussed since the 
1930s, so there was a problem, and a solution as well, but only after the disaster of 1953 was 
there the political will to adopt far-reaching measures;666 this formed the window of 
opportunity for definite action.667 A window of opportunity could also exist because of the 
threat of a disaster, or when major societal changes happen. The threat of a disaster provided 
a window of opportunity for example in the case of the observed ozone depletion in the 1970s, 
which led to worldwide chlorofluorocarbons (CFC) regulation and the adoption of the Vienna 
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, as well as the Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.668 Major societal changes also provide a window of 
opportunity, for example the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, 
prompted many large economic and societal reforms. 
Adaptive governance differs from the models treated above as it is less known in general 
decision-making theory. However, it is applied in the context of environmental decision-
making. Adaptive governance deals with the “the holistic management of complex 
 
663 J.W. Kingdon, Agendas, alternatives and public policies (Little, Brown & Co., 1984). 
664 J. Welch, ‘The Financial Crisis in the European Union: An Impact Assessment and Response Critique’, 
European Journal of Risk Regulation [2011 Vol 2 (4)] pp. 481-490. 
665 It must be noted that the necessity to improve the flood protection system had been recognized since 1946, 
but this first led to relatively small (incremental) changes. The large flood of 1953 made it possible to reach a 
higher state of urgency and allowed for more far-reaching measures. 
666 The political discourse on coastal protection before and after the flooding are discussed in C.C. van Baalen, 
‘Gods water over Gods akker. Het parlement en de watersnoodramp (1948-1953)’, Radboud Universiteit 
Politiek(E) Opstellen [1989 vol. 9], pp. 11-28. 
667 S. Meijerink, ‘Understanding policy stability and change. The interplay of advocacy coalition and epistemic 
communities, windows of opportunity, and Dutch coastal flooding policy 1945-2003’, Journal of European 
Public Policy [2005 12:6], 1060-1077, p. 1072. 
668 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Vienna, 22-3-1985, U.N.T.S. I-26164. Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Montreal 16-9-1989, U.N.T.S. I-26369. 
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environmental problems”,669 such as climate change or the governance of natural 
resources.670 Science has a large role in this: “adaptive governance integrates scientific and 
other types of knowledge into policies to advance the common interest in particular contexts 
through open decision-making structures.”671 Moreover, adaptive governance is based on 
adapting the policy once new insights have occurred into the effects of the existing policy. In 
that sense, adaptive governance can be considered a form of ‘trial and error’, as a pattern 
occurs wherein policy that seems to have acceptable consequences is continued, whereas 
when unacceptable consequences appear, the policy is adapted to the new reality. However, 
the picture can be more complex in reality: 
“Complex dynamics and stochastic elements can also distort the causal links (…), 
creating a pattern of ‘‘one step forward, two steps back, then maybe a couple of steps 
sideways.’’ In fact, the only certainty is that the system will always be in flux, and that 
for every action there will be a reaction— sometimes equal, sometimes amplified by 
feedbacks, and sometimes nullified by exogenous forces.”672 
The adaptive governance model thus does not treat how the initial policy decision is made, 
but rather that these decisions are revisited and adapted from time to time in order to account 
for new insights in the effects of the policy. 
Finally, the ‘garbage can model’ describes decision-making in organised anarchies, which can 
be characterised by “problematic preferences, unclear technology and fluid participation”.673 
‘Problematic preferences’ means that the organisation does not have one set of consistent 
preferences, but rather a variety of ill-defined preferences. The lack of clarity on technology 
refers to the fact that the actors do not fully understand the processes, instead, the process is 
often based on trial-and-error. The ‘fluid participation’ refers to the fact that participants vary 
in the time and involvement they commit to the policy process, and their participation may 
vary from one time to another, which means that the boundaries of the organisation are 
unclear and continually changing.674 The theory states that there are four ‘streams’, namely 
continuous streams of problems, solutions, participants and choice opportunities. These four 
streams flow together into a ‘garbage can’. The outcome of the policy process depends on the 
combination of the four streams that are combined in the garbage can. 
 
669 L. Sharma-Wallace, S. J. Velarde, A.Wreford, ‘Adaptive governance good practice: Show me the evidence!’, 
Journal of Environmental Management [2018 Vol 222] 174-184, p. 174. 
670 On adaptative governance for the governance of natural resources, see R. Brunner, T.A. Steelman, L. Coe-
Juell, C.M. Cromley, C.M. Edwards, D.W. Tucker, Adaptive Governance - Integrating Science, Policy, and 
Decision Making (Columbia University Press, 2005). 
671 Ibid., p. viii. 
672 D.G. Webster, Adaptive Governance : The Dynamics of Atlantic Fisheries Management (MIT Press, 2008), p. 
3. 
673 M.D. Cohen, J.G. March, J.P. Olsen, ‘A Garbage Can Model of Organisational Choice’, Administrative Science 
Quarterly, [1972 Vol. 17, No. 1], pp. 1-25. 
674 Ibid., p. 1. 
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In practice, multiple models can be applicable at the same time, for different types of 
legislative action. For the offshore grid as well, all four theories mentioned above explain part 
of the decision-making processes. The examples below make clear which different decision-
making processes can be employed for different parts of the legal framework for the MOG. 
Technical decisions and policy concerning the grid configuration and operational rules are 
typically based on (societal) cost-benefit analyses, sometimes directly or indirectly prescribed 
by EU law.675 If a cost-benefit analysis shows that it is more beneficial to construct the offshore 
grid in a certain way, policymaking is likely to be directed towards that way.676 This points to 
the rational actor model. Also, when choosing between different instruments, the instrument 
which costs the least to develop and to adopt, compared to the benefits it is expected to 
deliver, will probably be chosen.  
At the same time, governance and regulation of the offshore grid is not entirely ‘greenfield’, 
as many existing patterns of the onshore grid are simply translated to the offshore grid, even 
when the situations are not comparable.677 Adopting the same governance and regulations 
for the offshore grid as for the onshore grid could be seen as incremental policymaking, or as 
“muddling through”. This happens for example with the adaptation of the EU Network Codes 
to HVDC grids. 
The enormous development of offshore wind in the coming decades and the large grid 
investments associated with this could create a ‘window of opportunity’ for the adoption of 
new, potentially daring, legal instruments. If there is no political will to address a certain issue, 
the window of opportunity remains closed, even if there is a problem and a solution at hand.  
Adaptive governance could be used in the context of decision-making regarding long-term 
monitoring and decision-making on the effects of the presence of a MOG. Moreover, it could 
 
675 An example of an indirect reference is that, according to Regulation 2019/943 on the internal market of 
electricity, art. 18, only the costs that correspond with an efficient and structurally comparable network 
operator can be taken into account in the tariffs for the usage of the electricity grid. This implies that TSOs 
should only make ‘efficient’ investment decisions. This is also tested by the national regulatory authorities 
through tariff regulation which leaves out ‘inefficient’ investments. A direct reference can be found in 
Regulation 347/2013 on Trans-European Networks in Energy, art. 11 and 13(2), where energy system wide 
cost-benefit analyses are required for the development of PCI projects, and the results of this (including the 
project-wide positive externalities) should be taken into account by the national regulator. 
676 Although the general rule is that decision-making in this context is based on rational decision-making based 
on cost-benefit analysis, the following situation can be considered an exception: the investment in the ‘Celtic 
Interconnector’, which links Ireland with France, receives a large amount of funds from the Connecting Europe 
Facility (€530m out of €550m in total for electricity projects): https://ec.europa.eu/inea/en/news-
events/newsroom/eu-invests-556-million-priority-energy-infrastructure. One can wonder whether the cost-
benefit analysis of this project compared to other electricity projects is able to justify such a large investment 
from EU public funds, or whether this can rather be considered a political move to support Ireland’s position in 
light of the UK leaving the EU. 
677 For example, copying market rules from the onshore electricity network that is deemed to be a ‘copper 
plate’ to an offshore electricity network in which transmission capacity is significantly lower will lead to 
suboptimal results, as will be explained below, in section 5.2.3. See also section 1.7.1 for an explanation of the 
copper plate presumption. 
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be used to decide on the cumulative amount of OWFs to be installed in a certain area, on the 
requirements for multiple use of the space between wind turbines inside an OWF and on 
decommissioning requirements. 
Finally, when observing the North Sea Countries’ Offshore Grid Initiative (NSCOGI) and its 
successor, the North Sea Energy Cooperation (NSEC),678 it becomes clear that these 
cooperation platforms include several elements of the garbage can model. The participating 
states differ in the amount of time and effort they invest in the cooperation, depending on 
the political priorities in the states (fluid participation). The participating states have differing 
interests and preferences, for example with regard to what should be the priorities of the 
cooperation. Moreover, these preferences also change over time. Additionally, the technology 
and possible grid development scenarios were not always clear in advance – as the discussion 
often covers future grid developments in a medium or long-term time range (2030 and 
beyond). There is a stream of problems, identified by the working groups of the cooperation 
platforms, and a stream of solutions, developed by various research projects on the topic of 
offshore grids and presented at the meetings of the support groups.679 Whether the streams 
of participants, problems and solutions lead to actual policy developments, depends on 
whether, at a given moment, the combination of problem, solution and participants for a 
certain issue works. This process bears resemblance to the ‘window of opportunity model’ 
described above, as in both models, the right combination of factors at the right moment leads 
to legislative/policy action, although the fluidity of participation in the decision-making 
process is added in the ‘garbage can model’. 
As will be shown in the paragraph below, all models described above are relevant for the 
choice of legal instruments regarding the different legal barriers for the offshore grid. 
5.1.2 Criteria for the Choice of Legal Instruments 
The general policymaking theories mentioned above describe different ways in which 
policymakers come to a certain preferred policy choice. The next step is to implement the 
preferred policy choice into legislation. For the implementation into legislation, it is important 
that a certain policy choice is based on the right (level of) legal instrument.680 For example, 
the lack of certainty on the jurisdiction for hybrid assets and the MOG cannot be addressed at 
national law level, because it is a cross-border issue by nature – addressing it at national law 
 
678 These observations were made during an internship at NSCOGI (Benelux Secretariat) from October 2013 to 
March 2014 and while attending various NSEC meetings in the period 2017-2019. 
679 Projects presented and discussed at support groups of NSCOGI and NSEC include the OffshoreGrid study; 
NorthSeaGrid; PwC, Tractebel, Ecofys, ‘Study on regulatory matters concerning the development of the North 
Sea offshore energy potential’, Report for the European Commission, Jan. 2016, and the PROMOTioN project. 
680 In this section, the level of legislation entails both the geographical level, i.e. national, EU or international 
level and whether a ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ law instrument should be used. See, in parallel, Heldeweg & Wessel, who 
use a similar division for the appropriateness of enforcement in multilevel regulation: they define 
appropriateness as a combination of the ‘strength’ of the enforcement (i.e. hard or soft) and the ‘location’ (i.e. 
national, regional, international). M.A. Heldeweg, R.A. Wessel, ‘The Appropriate Level of Enforcement in 
Multilevel Regulation - Mapping Issues in Avoidance of Regulatory Overstretch’, International Law Research 
[2016, Vol. 5, No. 1], p. 17. 
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level will not solve the issue. On the other hand, an issue related to the permitting procedures 
in one coastal state can often be solved at the national level, as this is the source of the 
problem. In this section, specific criteria are developed for the choice between different levels 
of legislation and between hard and soft law.  
What is the appropriate level of legislation for a certain issue depends on different criteria: for 
the choice between national and EU law, this choice is laid out in the well-elaborated 
principles of proportionality and subsidiarity. However, for other choices between legal 
instruments, there are competing criteria and interests which need to be taken into account, 
such as the interest of including all relevant parties vs. the interest of having a binding and 
enforceable agreement.  
Since there is no offshore transmission infrastructure regulation at sub-national level in the 
coastal states researched for this dissertation, the choice of legal instruments starts with the 
question whether national law is the appropriate level or whether a larger-than-national law 
instrument needs to be sought. If the answer is the latter, the question is whether this larger 
than-national level should be EU level or international (regional/North Sea) level.681 Finally, on 
all levels of legislation, there is a choice between instruments of hard law and soft law, which 
is important to consider as well, as soft law may help to reach a goal when it is not possible to 
adopt hard law. 
It is important to note that the approach explained above is the reverse of the ‘traditional’ 
hierarchy of laws, which dictates that international law goes above EU law, and EU law goes 
above national law.682 This is justified by a focus on the principle of subsidiarity, which entails 
that the lowest level at which a measure is still effective, should be used.683 The principle of 
subsidiarity, a central principle of EU law,684 makes sure that the legal framework for the MOG 
is not based on more complex legal processes than necessary, which lowers the costs and time 
needed to adopt a legal framework for the MOG.685  
 
681 “Regional” in this sense means multiple countries within the same geographical region, not regional as a 
sublevel under “national”. 
682 EU law is bound by international law, as confirmed in CJEU case law: See for example C-111/05, Aktiebolaget 
NN. v. Skatteverket, EU:C:2007:195; C-308/06, The Queen, on the Application of International Association of 
Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko) and Others v. Secretary of State for Transport, EU:C:2008:312, para 
51; C-286/90, Anklagemyndigheden v. Peter Michael Poulsen and Diva Navigation Corp., EU:C:1992:453, paras. 
9 and 10; C-405/92, Etablissements Armand Mondiet SA v. Armement Islais SARL, EU:C:1993:906, paras. 13–15; 
C-162/96, A.Racke GmbH&Co. v. Hauptzollamt Mainz, EU:C:1998:293, para 45; C-366/10, Air Transport 
Association of America and Others v. Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change (ATAA), EU:C:2011:864, 
para 101. The primacy (precedence) of EU law over national law was first described in Case 6/64 Costa v. ENEL 
ECLI:EU:C:1964:66.  
683 Heldeweg, Wessel (2016) use a similar approach for the appropriateness of enforcement of regulation: 
smart regulation entails choosing the ‘least invasive’ option, in order to avoid regulatory overstretch. 
684 TEU, art. 5(1) and (3). 
685 It is assumed that the higher the level of law, the more different states are involved, and the larger the 
chance of differing opinions, which makes the negotiation process more complex and costly in terms of time 
and resources. 
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5.1.2.1 The Choice between ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Instruments 
In the choice between legislative instruments to address a certain issue, the first step should 
be to check whether some legislation already exists on the issue. It could be that the issue 
exists because there is no legislation yet, but it could also be that the current legislation is 
confusing to stakeholders, for example because it does not fit existing circumstances, as 
technological progress requires adaptation of the legal framework. It could also be that the 
current legislation does not deliver the desired results, for example because it gives the wrong 
incentives to stakeholders, leading to suboptimal investment decisions.686 In that case, the 
existing legislation should be amended rather than that new legislation is introduced.  
When legislation on the issue already exists, amending the existing legislation will generally 
be a more efficient solution than incurring the transaction costs of drafting new legislation on 
a higher level to overrule the old legislation. It is also usually a faster option than starting the 
drafting process of a new legal instrument. When the existing legislation actually forms the 
problem (as a regulatory failure),687 amending the existing legislation will be most efficient, as 
this will solve the issue at the source, rather than targeting only the symptoms or 
consequences. This approach fits very well with the incremental decision-making model of 
‘muddling through’ as described in section 5.1.1. However, when there is no legislation yet, 
the criteria below can be used to decide the appropriate level of legislation for a certain issue. 
5.1.2.2 The Choice between National and Larger-than-national Law 
In the choice between national and larger-than-national law, it is first important to filter out 
issues that are only a problem in one country and not in others, as these should be solved on 
a (sub-)national level rather than at EU or international level. Moreover, when an issue has no 
cross-border impact at all, even though it exists in several countries, the costs of trying to 
reach consensus among countries may be higher than the benefit of having the same solution 
for all countries, given their different preferences and circumstances. If this is the case, states 
behaving like rational actors would refrain from using a larger-than-national solution. 
However, many issues regarding the MOG do have a cross-border impact, which makes it 
important to develop criteria for the choice between addressing an issue on a national level 
or on a larger-than-national level. For the choice between national law and EU law, three 
important criteria are developed, namely the conferral of competences, subsidiarity and 
proportionality.688 These principles, anchored in the founding Treaties of the EU, aim at 
containing the EU’s power with respect to the powers of its Member States.  
 
686 This type of issues is called ‘government failure’ as opposed to ‘market failure’. The term was developed by 
Ronald Coase, in R. H. Coase, ‘The Regulated Industries: Discussion’ The American Economic Review [1964 
54(3)] p. 195. See also B. Orbach, ‘What is government failure?’ Yale Journal on Regulation Online [2013 Vol 
30:44]. In this case, the government intervention (legislation) is deemed to be imperfect, which leads to 
suboptimal results.  
687 Ibid. 
688 See above, chapter 3.2. See also TFEU, Protocol No 2 on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and 
Proportionality, OJ C 202, 7.6.2016. 
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The first principle, conferral of competences, entails that the EU can only act in so far as the 
Member-States have conferred competences for this area to the EU via the founding 
treaties.689 If the Member-States have not conferred competence to the EU on a certain issue, 
it can only be addressed through national law or through an international agreement. The 
competences are formulated in a broad way, which is why almost all issues related to the 
MOG fall within the EU competences in some way.690 Therefore, this criterion alone is not 
distinctive enough to make the choice between national and larger-than-national level.  
The second requirement relates to subsidiarity, aiming to regulate issues at the national level 
where possible. The concrete question to be asked is: ‘is it not, or not sufficiently, possible to 
achieve the objective at national level?’691 The subsidiarity principle does not only exist in the 
limitation of EU law, but it can also be more generally seen as the principle that issues should 
in general be addressed at the lowest level possible.692 The benefits of adopting a principle of 
subsidiarity can also be explained by focusing on the economic efficiency of a decentralised 
approach for those issues for which there are no explicit benefits from a centralised 
approach,693 which could be for example when (cross-border) negative externalities exist that 
can only be internalised when a centralised approach is used. Formulated in a question for the 
decision tree, the criterion for addressing an issue at a national level rather than at larger-
than-national level, is ‘Is it possible to adequately address an issue at a national level?’ 
The third requirement in this regard is proportionality, which entails that if a measure is not 
necessary to achieve the objectives mentioned in the Treaties, it should not be 
implemented.694 The aim of this rule is to make sure that the EU does not produce more rules 
than necessary to achieve its targets. The proportionality principle is applied by the CJEU as a 
‘rationality check’, to check whether the targeted measure is suitable and necessary to fulfil 
the objective it claims to serve.695  
5.1.2.3 The Choice between European and International Law 
The choice between international law and EU law696 to address a certain issue is less clear-cut 
than the choice between national and larger-than-national law. A first boundary criterion is 
 
689 TEU, art. 5(1), (2) and the topic-specific articles of the TFEU, see chapter 3.2. 
690 See section 3.2 above. 
691 Treaty on European Union (TEU), art. 5(3). 
692 See Oxford Dictionary: ‘Subsidiarity’. 
693 A. Portuese, ‘The Principle of Subsidiarity as a Principle of Economic Efficiency’ Colombia Journal of 
European Law [2011, 17-2], p. 235 ff. 
694 TEU, art. 5(4). The Treaties mention both general objectives and specific objectives, coupled to the 
competences mentioned above. 
695 T. Harbo, ‘The Function of the Proportionality Principle in EU Law’ European Law Journal, [2010 Vol. 16, No. 
2] pp. 158–185, p. 165. 
696 Some argue that EU law is a form of international law. See for example K.S. Ziegler, ‘The Relationship 
between EU Law and International Law’ in D. Patterson, A. Soderston (eds.), A Companion to EU and 
International Law (Wiley-Blackwell, 2016) pp. 42-61. However, the CJEU made clear in its landmark judgment 
‘Van Gend en Loos’ that the EEC (the predecessor of the EU) forms a new, separate, legal order. CJEU Case 
26/62 N.V. Algemene TRANSPORT— en Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse administratie 
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whether the EU has competences on the issue. If this is not the case, then only solutions under 
international law are possible. 
However, for many topics, both EU-based and international law-based solutions are possible. 
For this choice, instead of specific requirements, such as above in the choice between national 
and larger-than-national law, this choice is based on criteria that make explicit which interests 
could be taken into account and influence a decision either towards international (regional) 
law or towards EU law. 
Two criteria point towards addressing an issue at an international level, for example through 
a regional agreement between the North Sea coastal states. The first is the importance of 
having one solution for all North Sea coastal states, and the second is the relevance of the 
issue for other EU Member States that are not connected to the North Sea. 
(i) The importance of having one solution for all North Sea coastal states, including EU- and 
third states  
This criterion relates to the desired amount of involvement of the non-EU states that are 
expected to be part of the MOG, namely Norway and the UK. For Norway, EU-based solutions 
will be possible for most issues, as they are also adopted via the EEA Agreement, albeit with a 
legislative lag.697 However, for the UK, the situation is more difficult, especially in light of the 
current developments related to Brexit.698 An EU-based solution would exclude the United 
Kingdom and may not be acceptable to UK policymakers. Depending on the issue, non-
participation of the UK might lead to suboptimal grid development from a socio-economic 
perspective, as the UK has a large proportion of the installed wind capacity and the main 
societal benefits of interconnection lie in the connection of the UK electricity market to the 
continental electricity market. Therefore, for issues in which it is important to only have one 
solution and in which participation of the UK is desirable, a solution under international law is 
preferred.699  
(ii) Is it an issue that only has relevance to North Sea coastal states? 
Including 27 states in the decision-making process, while there are only a small number of 
states for whom the issue is relevant, slows down decision-making procedures under EU law, 
as the political will of the states for which the issue is not relevant is probably small. Thus, for 
 
der belastingen, ECLI:EU:C:1963:1. In this chapter, EU is treated as different from general public international 
law, in the spirit of the Van Gend en Loos judgment. Still, there are plenty of overlaps and interdependencies 
between international and EU law, see R.A. Wessel, ‘Studying International and European Law: Confronting 
Perspectives and Combining Interests’ in I. Govaere, S. Garben (Eds), The interface between EU and 
international law : contemporary reflections (Hart Publishing, 2019), p. 73-74. 
697 See section 3.3.1. 
698 See section 3.3.2. 
699 See also: B. De Witte, A. Thies, ‘Why Choose Europe? : the place of the European Union in the architecture 
of international legal cooperation’ in B. van Vooren, S. Blockmans and J. Wouters (eds), The EU’s role in global 
governance : the legal dimension (Oxford University Press 2013) p. 28 
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these issues, there might not be sufficient political willingness, and thus no ‘window of 
opportunity’ to address the issue. Instead, regional specialisation for the relevant countries is 
possible via an international agreement. This type of international agreement is called a 
‘partial agreement’.700 
Next to criteria (i) and (ii) as explained above, there are also two different criteria that point 
towards an EU-law based solution. These are, first, whether the EU already made use of its 
competence to regulate the issue, and secondly, whether it is important that the rule is 
binding and enforceable. 
(iii) Did the EU already make use of its competence to regulate the issue? 
Many issues related to the energy sector and cross-border networks fall under ‘shared 
competences’.701 In this case, Member States can only act as far as the EU has not acted yet, 
based on the principle of pre-emption.702 This blocks states from adopting their own 
legislation on the issue (internal action) but it also blocks action from Member States at an 
international level (external action).703 So, when the EU already made use of its competence 
to regulate the issue, it is not possible for states to autonomously conclude an international 
agreement on the matter without the EU participating as well. 
(iv) Is it important that the rule is binding and enforceable?  
When a binding, enforceable solution is important, for example when there is a risk of free-
riding, it is more logical to choose for a solution under EU law. Agreements under international 
law are less enforceable than EU law instruments. The European Commission supports the 
enforcement of EU law and the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) judges cases on a binding 
basis.704 In international law, enforcement is often difficult.705 In this context, the procedure 
for decision-making is also relevant, as supranational agreements in which a hierarchy of 
institutions exists are more effective than the intergovernmental agreements typically 
concluded under international law. This is because intergovernmental agreements often 
require unanimity for decision-making, whereas supranational agreements often have a form 
 
700 B. De Witte, ‘Chameleonic Member States: Differentiation by means of partial and parallel agreements’ in B. 
De Witte, D. Hanf, E. Vos (eds), The Many Faces of Differentiation in EU law, Intersentia 2001. 
701 See above, section 3.2. 
702 De Witte 2001, p. 241. 
703 Internal action refers to the adoption of laws inside the ‘own’ legal order, whereas external action refers to 
the conclusion of agreements with other states. 
704 TFEU, art. 280 and 299. 
705 Whereas countries have a police and judicial power to enforce laws, this does not exist in the same form on 
the level of international law. The UN Security Council has a role in enforcement, as has the ICJ and courts of 
arbitration, but this is not comparable to enforcement on national and European level as the power is much 
less binding. Countries can decide to bring an issue to an arbitral court, but this is also based on voluntary 
participation. 
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of majority voting. Under European law, decision-making on the competences relevant for the 
offshore grid is based on qualified majority voting.706   
5.1.2.4 The Choice between Hard and Soft Law 
In the choice of legal instruments, next to the geographical scope of the instrument, another 
possible distinction is the distinction between hard and soft law. The distinction between hard 
and soft law stems from international law, where hard law is always binding707 and soft law 
relates to all forms of non-binding law, such as guidelines, interpretation documents etc. In 
international law, soft law is defined as “a variety of non-legally binding instruments used in 
contemporary international relations”, such as declarations, interpretative guidance, codes of 
conduct, guidelines and recommendations.708 However, the concept of soft law also exists at 
lower levels, i.e. the guidelines and communications by the European Commission.709  In this 
subchapter, the concept of soft law and its advantages and disadvantages are explained. Then, 
criteria for the choice between soft and hard law are developed. 
The capacities and practical relevance of soft law are sometimes underestimated, as soft law 
is not always considered a ‘real’ type of law.710 Soft law, however, proves to be particularly 
effective for certain purposes,711 because it can help develop solutions for politically sensitive 
issues.712 First, it may be easier to reach agreement when the form is non-binding, because 
consequences of non-compliance are limited.713 For the same reason, states can use more 
detailed and precise provisions compared to vague but binding norms.714 Secondly, soft law is 
easier for states to adhere to, as no domestic ratification processes are needed.715 However, 
this does reduce the democratic legitimacy of soft law instruments, because the ratification 
process normally involves a vote in one or more democratically elected chambers. Thirdly, soft 
law is more flexible, as it is easier to amend than treaties. This is also due to the fact that no 
ratification procedure is needed for amendments. Lastly, some authors say that soft law can 
serve as more immediate evidence of international support and consensus than a treaty, as 
 
706 For these competences, according to art. 194(2) first paragraph, and art. 172, the ‘ordinary legislative 
procedure’ (OLP) is applicable. This procedure, described in TFEU art. 294, requires a decision from the Council. 
TEU art. 16(3) prescribes that this is done by qualified majority voting, which entails, according to TEU art. 16(4) 
‘at least 55 % of the members of the Council, comprising at least fifteen of them and representing Member 
States comprising at least 65 % of the population of the Union’. The threshold for a qualified majority is much 
lower than for unanimity, which makes it easier to reach a decision. 
707 A. Boyle, C. Chinkin, The Making of International Law (Oxford University Press 2007), p. 213. 
708 Ibid., p. 212/213. 
709 European Commission, Communication: ‘Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Protection and Energy 
2014-2020’, C-200/1 28-6-2014. 
710 A. Boyle ‘Soft Law in International Law-Making’ in M.D. Evans (ed) International Law, OUP 2014, 4th ed., p. 
118-119. 
711 Ibid.  
712 K.W. Abbott, D. Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’, International Organization [2000 
Vol. 54, No. 3, Legalization and World Politics], p. 423. 
713 Boyle, Chinkin 2007, p. 214. 
714 Ibid. 
715 Ibid. 
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there are no reservations,716 and no long waiting times for domestic ratification in the 
participating states.717 Soft law can also be an intermediate step in the process towards the 
creation of new hard law: when a document of soft law is afterwards combined with states’ 
practice, it will start to constitute customary international law, which is a form of hard law.718 
Although there are many different names for legal instruments (of both hard and soft law),719 
the name of the instrument does not matter so much for the legal form. What is more 
important is to distinguish between the number of countries bound by it, the extent to which 
the provisions in it are binding and the enforceability of these provisions. Abbott and Snidal 
refer to three parameters; ‘obligation’, ‘precision’ and ‘delegation’ (the possibility to delegate 
further decision-making power in the context of the contract to a lower body).720 In either 
approach, international agreements can be put on a sliding scale from hard law to soft law. 
The same goes for instruments adopted under EU law.721 
Sometimes it is not the form (i.e. covenant or treaty) which determines whether something is 
hard or soft law, it can also be the content of the text: does it contain only principles or real 
rules and obligations?722 This can mean that an instrument that is considered ‘soft law’ 
actually contains rules that function as hard law. An example of this is the Guidelines on State 
Aid for Environmental Protection and Energy.723 These guidelines, formulated by the European 
Commission, set out in detail which forms of support schemes do or do not fall under the 
prohibition of state aid in EU law according to the European Commission.724 As the European 
Commission is the body that enforces state aid law, it decides whether a support scheme for 
energy complies with the (binding) norm. As the rules are very concrete and enforced, via a 
notification and standstill procedure,725 this instrument is actually a lot less ‘soft’ than many 
other guidelines. The reverse can also happen: a hard law instrument can contain ‘soft’ norms 
that are broad and difficult to enforce. This is the case for example Regulation (EU) 2019/943 
art. 4, where Member-States are supported to adopt a national strategy for a “just transition” 
in coal and fossil fuel intensive regions.726 There are no hard requirements in this article, only 
 
716 With a reservation, a state may voice agreement with most of the treaty but disagreement with a specific 
part of it (for which a reservation is made). However, if many states have reservations, this reduces the force of 
the agreement. 
717 Boyle, Chinkin 2007, p. 214. 
718 ICJ, Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark and v. the Netherlands, The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 
ICJ rep. 1969, p. 4, para 77. See also Boyle, Chinkin 2007, p. 212. 
719 Convention, treaty, agreement, memorandum of understanding, and the declarations, interpretative 
guidances etc. 
720 Abbott, Snidal 2000, p. 424. 
721 L. Senden, S. Prechal, ‘Differentiation in and through Community Soft Law’, in B. De Witte, D. Hanf, E. Vos 
(Eds) The Many Faces of Differentiation in EU Law (Intersentia 2001), p. 187. 
722 Boyle 2014, p. 126.  
723 Communication from the Commission, ‘Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy 
2014-2020’, 28.6.2014, OJ C 200/01. 
724 See section 3.4.3 above. 
725 TFEU art. 108(3). See section 3.4.3 above. 
726 Directive (EU) 2019/944, art. 4. 
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suggestions to Member-States on financial support, exchange of good practices and 
discussions on roadmaps.727 
From the above, the criteria for the choice between hard and soft law are: 
 Is it important that the agreement is enforceable? 
 Is it (too) difficult to reach a binding agreement (hard law)? 
These criteria oppose each other somewhat. When enforceability of the agreement is 
important, this points towards hard law. However, when it is difficult to reach a binding (and 
thus enforceable) agreement, this points towards a solution under soft law. Therefore, if 
enforceability is not of crucial importance and if it is too difficult to reach a binding agreement, 
a soft law instrument may be a viable alternative.  
5.1.3 Decision Tree 
For each issue that needs to be addressed for the offshore grid, it needs to be assessed which 
legal instrument is the most suitable. ‘Suitable’ depends on which decision-making model is 
used, as with an incremental approach of ‘muddling through’, existing instruments will be 
used and expanded to address new issues, whereas a ‘window of opportunity’ approach 
would allow for new legal instruments to be adopted. In concrete terms, on the basis of the 
principles and criteria elaborated above, a decision tree can be formulated to facilitate the 
choice between different levels of legislation: 
1. Is there already legislation on the issue? 
If the issue exists because there is no legislation at the moment, the approach should be 
different than if the issue exists because currently existing legislation is outdated or does not 
lead to the desired result.  In the latter case, the transaction costs of replacing current 
legislation by entirely new legislation can be avoided by amending the existing legislation 
(incremental approach). When there is no legislation yet, the rest of the decision tree can be 
used to find the right level of legislation. 
2. Choice between national and larger-than-national law: 
 Is it possible to adequately (effectively) address an issue on national level? 
(subsidiarity) 
 Is it possible to adequately (effectively) address an issue with a less invasive 
instrument? (proportionality) 
If the first question can be answered positively, this indicates a choice of national law rather 
than EU- or international law. If the second question can be answered positively, this indicates 
that another legal instrument should be used. 
 
727 Ibid. 
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3. Choice between EU law and international law: 
 Is it important to have one solution for all states? 
 Is the issue only relevant to North Sea coastal states (not to other EU Member 
States)? 
 Did the EU already make use of its competence to legislate on the issue? 
 Is enforceability of the agreement and the rules contained therein considered 
important by the stakeholders involved (for example due to the risk of free-riding)? 
If the first two questions are answered affirmatively, this points towards a solution under 
international law. If answered negatively, this points towards a solution under EU law. If the 
third and fourth question are answered affirmatively, this points towards a solution under EU 
law. If they are answered negatively, this points towards a solution under international law. If 
there are as many criteria in favour of international law as there are in favour of EU law, the 
relative importance of the criteria needs to be weighed. 
4. Choice between different instruments at one level: 
 Is enforceability of the agreement and the rules contained therein considered 
important by the stakeholders involved (for example due to the risk of free-riding)? 
 Is it (too) difficult to reach a binding agreement? 
If enforceability is important, this points in the direction of (binding) hard law. If it is too difficult 
to reach a binding agreement, a soft law instrument may be a viable alternative. 
5.2 The Choice of Legal Instruments for the Governance of the Offshore 
Grid 
Based on the criteria for the choice between different legal instruments developed above, it 
is now possible to apply this method to the legal issues identified as barriers to the 
development of the MOG, in order to decide which legal instrument is most fitting for which 
legal issue in the context of the MOG in the North Sea. Based on the preceding chapters, the 
following issues need to be addressed in the legal framework: jurisdiction over hybrid assets 
and MOG components, the governance of the MOG, operational rules for the MOG, various 
inconsistencies in national law, support schemes for OWFs connected to a MOG and 
decommissioning of OWFs and grid assets. For every issue, the status quo is shortly stated, 
after which the decision-making model and principles are used to assess the most appropriate 
legal instrument per issue. 
5.2.1 Jurisdiction over Offshore Electricity Cables under the Law of the Sea 
Currently, the jurisdiction of coastal states and other states in different parts of the sea is 
addressed in UNCLOS. However, as explained in chapter 2, the lack of clarity in this instrument 
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with regard to hybrid assets and the MOG itself poses a barrier to the development of such 
assets.728  
Applying the decision tree described above to this issue, the first step is to analyse existing 
law. UNCLOS provides some information on the jurisdiction coastal states have with regard to 
offshore electricity cables and installations in the EEZ, but it is not specific enough to provide 
the legal certainty needed by grid developers. Whereas it is possible to amend national law 
and European law, a treaty revision process in international law takes years to complete.729 
Considering that the drafting of UNCLOS took 9 years, from 1973 to 1982, and only entered 
into force in 1994 (12 months after the 60th ratification), a long amendment drafting process 
can also be expected. The amendment procedure for UNCLOS differentiates between a 
simplified procedure and a full procedure.730 As the jurisdiction over subsea cables can be 
deemed controversial by UNCLOS’ signatories, it is unlikely that the simplified procedure can 
be used for this issue. Therefore, the incremental approach of amending the existing 
instrument directly is not a workable option.  
Secondly, this issue cannot be addressed at a national law level. The issue does not concern 
only one state but all coastal states interested in offshore electricity infrastructure. Conflicting 
jurisdiction cannot be ‘solved’ unilaterally by one of the countries involved, as this would not 
be accepted by neighbouring countries in an offshore grid and by the international 
community, as it might create a precedent of unilateral changes to the law of the sea. An 
additional argument in this specific context is that national solutions would create differences 
in the legal status of cables from one country to another, which is especially problematic for 
cross-border electricity infrastructure. 
Therefore, the choice is between international and European law. This an issue that lies 
outside the competence of the EU and therefore, only one option remains: a solution based 
on international law. Within the field of international law, it could be considered whether the 
solution should be based on soft law or hard law, and whether the issue should be addressed 
by the North Sea coastal states only, or by a wider group of states. Reaching a binding 
agreement on this issue with a large group of states might prove difficult from the point of 
view of political will, as the issue will only be relevant for a small group of states, namely the 
states for which an offshore electricity grid is of interest, which currently is only the states 
around the North Sea and the Baltic Sea. As a large-scale agreement will probably not be 
feasible, a joint statement of the coastal states interested in the MOG on the interpretation 
of UNCLOS with regard to hybrid and meshed cables will probably be the highest attainable 
agreement. 
 
728 See section 2.3.3 and 2.4 above. See also: Woolley 2012, p. 173; and Nieuwenhout 2018, p. 95-112. 
729 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 39 and 40 provide the general procedure: it requires 
agreement from the parties to amend a treaty. Specific rules may be adopted in the treaty itself. 
730 UNCLOS art. 312 (simplified procedure) and 313 (full procedure). 
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5.2.2 The Governance of an Offshore Grid 
The governance of an offshore grid is currently not addressed in any legal instrument 
specifically. In soft law, there is a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for the North Seas 
Countries Offshore Grid Initiative (NSCOGI), a regional initiative to increase cooperation 
between coastal states around the North Sea and to discuss specifically common plans and 
approaches to an offshore grid in the North Sea.731 It was terminated in 2016, but followed by 
a ‘Political Declaration on energy cooperation between the North Seas Countries’,732 with 
North Sea Energy Cooperation (NSEC) as abbreviation. Although the MoU and Political 
Declaration do facilitate meetings and cooperation between the coastal states around the 
North Sea, these agreements do not aim to address the governance of an offshore electricity 
grid. Therefore, on the first step of the assessment, it can be concluded that there is no existing 
instrument on the governance of an offshore grid.  
Following the decision tree in section 5.1.2, the governance of an offshore grid should clearly 
not be addressed on a national level, as the issue does not lend itself to national solutions by 
its nature. Therefore, a solution on a larger-than-national level should be sought. The next 
step is the choice between an instrument of EU law or of international law. Considering the 
above-mentioned four questions for this choice, it is important to have one solution for all 
North Sea coastal states, including Norway and the United Kingdom.733 Having different 
governance frameworks next to each other will lead to several difficulties, such as inefficient 
spatial planning and interoperability issues of different technologies used. There may be a lack 
of political willingness from the UK’s side to participate in an offshore grid for which the 
governance framework is based on EU law, given the recent political developments around 
Brexit. Therefore, referring back to section 5.1.1, if the coastal states aim to act as rational 
actors, they will strive for a solution under international law. However, the right ‘window of 
opportunity’ is necessary to reach an international law agreement. 
Considering the other questions for the choice between international law and EU law: it is 
preferable to not include all EU states, as this will slow down decision-making concerning the 
offshore grid by states for whom the issue is not of relevance. The EU did not yet make use of 
its competence to create a specific governance framework for the offshore grid, although 
there are already many issues related to the governance of grids which are regulated in EU 
 
731 North Seas Countries Offshore Grid Initiative (NSCOGI), Memorandum of Understanding, Brussels, signed on 
3-12-2010.  
732 Political Declaration on energy cooperation between the North Seas Countries, available at 
http://www.benelux.int/files 
/9014/6519/7677/Political_Declaration_on_Energy_Cooperation_between_the_North_Seas_Countries.pdf. 
733 The socio-economic benefits of an offshore electricity grid including the UK are much larger than that of a 
grid without the UK. PROMOTioN CBA report (forthcoming.). The added value of including Norway in the MOG 
is mainly to be able to benefit from the Norwegian hydro power. This could however also be reached by the 
construction of ‘normal’ interconnectors, as Norway does not have many concrete plans for OWF development 
in its EEZ. 
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law. The closest would be the ‘governance of the Energy Union’ programme by the EU,734 but 
the effect of the governance of the Energy Union is criticised,735 and the type of governance 
in the Energy Union is more abstract than the type of governance needed for the MOG. 
An important point is the enforceability of the agreement. An agreement on the governance 
of the offshore grid should be binding, stable and enforceable, as this gives developers 
certainty that they retain their investments. Decisions on grid extension, ownership and 
regulation of the grid, typically part of the governance framework, should be taken by the 
coastal states together. If states do not agree on these issues and decide on an individual basis, 
the offshore grid will not work as one meshed grid but rather as a collection of separate mini-
grids. The added value of a MOG becomes much smaller when the grids are not governed as 
one grid but only as separate connections. Therefore, it is important to have an agreement 
that binds all states that are willing to participate in a MOG.  
The agreement on governance should also include the EU as a signatory (making it a so-called 
mixed partial agreement), first of all because the energy sectors of the EU Member States 
around the North Sea are to a large extent based on EU law, which makes it impossible for EU 
Member-States to conclude another agreement on the same topics,736 and secondly because 
the EU can also help to support the offshore grid, for example through the Connecting Europe 
Facility (CEF) or through administrative support. The instrument that is able to incorporate 
both EU Member States and non-Member States as well as the EU itself is called the mixed 
partial agreement. As this type of agreement is relatively unknown, it will be explained further 
in the next chapter. 
5.2.3 Operational Rules for Offshore Electricity Infrastructure 
Currently, operational rules for cross-border electricity grids in Europe are laid out in the 
European network codes.737 However, as several key characteristics differ between the 
offshore grid and the onshore grid,738 there is a need for specific rules on the operation of a 
MOG. The HVDC network code that was developed specifically for HVDC connections is 
helpful, but still, several specific issues need to be addressed, especially concerning pure HVDC 
systems, rather than point-to-point HVDC interconnectors for which the rules focus mainly on 
how the HVDC asset can be integrated in the AC network. For meshed cross-border electricity 
infrastructure, it is important that there are clear rules on capacity allocation and dispatch. 
These issues need to be addressed on the same scale as the network itself. Otherwise, the grid 
cannot operate as a meshed grid but only as a collection of point-to-point lines with different 
rules per line.  
 
734 See Regulation 2018/1999 on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action, OJ L-328/1, 21-12-
2018. 
735 L. Ammannati, ‘The Governance of the Energy Union: An 'Intricate System' Unable to Achieve the European 
Union Common Goals’, Oil, Gas and Energy Law Journal (OGEL) [2019-3]. 
736 This is due to the principle of pre-emption, see section 5.1.2. 
737 See section 3.4.6. 
738 See section 1.5.1. 
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Following the decision tree of the previous paragraph, there is already legislation on the 
operational rules. Therefore, it is not necessary to go through the rest of the criteria in 
principle. However, an important point to keep in mind is that the current grid codes, even 
when amended to address the concerns mentioned above, are based on EU law and are 
amended through an EU law procedure.739 This might be difficult from a political perspective 
for the UK after Brexit. Therefore, the rest of the decision tree is followed as well. 
The operation of a cross-border network cannot be addressed at national level, as this goes 
against the nature of the issue, which is compatibility between the parts of the network in 
different states. Therefore, a solution at a larger-than-national level needs to be sought. 
The strong argument for keeping the solution at the current level (EU law) is path dependency: 
the current grid codes are all adopted under European law, and they have been developed 
over the course of the last decade. Rather than adopting new grid codes, which entails large 
administrative efforts and thus costs, the existing grid codes could be amended, in an 
incremental approach. However, when the UK leaves the EU, the EU Network Codes will not 
apply to the UK part of the offshore grid.740 The importance of having one set of operational 
rules rather than two pleads for a solution under international law, specifically an agreement 
between the countries involved in the North Sea grid. However, especially for operational 
rules, it is also important that they are binding and enforceable, as all grid operators and 
connected parties need to be able to rely on the safety of the network, which is safeguarded 
by the operational rules. The need for enforceable, binding rules points in the direction of 
keeping the network codes under EU law. Finally, the process of drafting or amending 
agreements under international law may take a very long time,741 especially given the 
generally supranational character of these agreements. The drafting procedure under EU law, 
although also lengthy at times, does allow for pushing through a decision with a qualified 
majority rather than unanimity.  
A possible solution which integrates both sides is to incorporate in an international 
agreement, such as the mixed partial agreement proposed in the paragraph above, a 
reference to the European network codes. In this way, the UK would also be bound by the 
Network codes but not by all other rules, if this is politically acceptable to the UK. An extra 
clause could also be adopted in the intergovernmental agreement mentioned above, to 
specifically adopt the most important provisions of electricity market legislation for the 
offshore grid.  
Alternatively, a similar solution as for Switzerland could be sought. Switzerland is located in 
the middle of the synchronous continental electricity network and cooperates with the EU via 
 
739 See section 3.4.6. 
740 Norway will probably adopt the Network Codes via the EEA Agreement. The current status (December 2019) 
is that they are under consideration as Draft Joint Committee Decision (JCD).  
741 The possibility of amendment of the operational rules is important as technological developments might 
require changes in the rules. Especially for operational rules, an efficient amendment procedure is important. 
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specific intergovernmental agreements. Switzerland is not bound by the network codes 
directly, but several network codes include a specific clause on Switzerland. For example, in 
the Network Code on Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management,742 specific demands 
are mentioned in article 1(4):  
The Union single day-ahead and intraday coupling may be opened to market operators 
and TSOs operating in Switzerland on the condition that the national law in that country 
implements the main provisions of Union electricity market legislation and that there is 
an intergovernmental agreement on electricity cooperation between the Union and 
Switzerland. 
However, this clause has caused several problems in practice, as it excluded Switzerland from 
the EU energy market, with a resulting loss of opportunities and loop flows (unplanned flows 
of electricity between different bidding zones).743 This should be prevented for the MOG, by 
making sure that the technical rules are politically accepted by all connected states.  
Furthermore, it must be noted that operational compatibility of the MOG is not possible 
without technological standardisation, for example on the voltage levels that will be 
commonly used in a MOG, the requirements for information exchange between converters of 
different manufacturers and the requirements with regard to faults and other unforeseen 
events. Technological standardisation helps to make electrical equipment from one 
manufacturer compatible with equipment of another manufacturer, which is of vital 
importance in a MOG that is developed by different states, owners and manufacturers and 
over the course of several years. Therefore, next to the Network Codes, which provide the 
operational rules, an important role exists for European and international standardisation 
bodies such as respectively CENELEC (the European Committee for Electrotechnical 
Standardisation) and ISO (the International Organisation for Standardisation).744 These 
standardisation bodies provide for codes and norms that ensure the interoperability of 
different parts and network elements. Unlike the norms mentioned in the sections above, 
these standardisation norms are not based on the typical ‘hierarchical’ regulation of 
(government) regulator and (private) regulatee, but rather on a different regulatory strategy: 
a design-based strategy in which different entities together describe functional requirements 
of the system that needs to be regulated.745 
5.2.4 Inconsistencies and Administrative Hurdles in National Law 
As described in section 4.7, there is a group of issues that arise at the national level of different 
coastal states. These are issues that exist because the law of the coastal states was originally 
not designed for offshore wind or for meshed offshore grids. Issues include connection 
 
742 Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/1222 of 24 July 2015 establishing a guideline on capacity allocation and 
congestion management, OJ L 197, 25.7.2015. 
743 van Baal, Finger (2019), p. 11. 
744 PROMOTioN WP11 recommendations (forthcoming). 
745 Helwegen, Wessel (2016), p. 18. 
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responsibilities, licensing regimes, different national implementation of EU law, planning and 
permitting rules and regulatory oversight.  
Following the structure of section 5.1.2, the most logical approach is to address these issues 
at a national level, via the legal instruments that already exist. This will make sure that the 
legal barriers are addressed at the source. This is an incremental approach, which can be 
considered ‘muddling through’. It will solve immediate barriers to MOG developments, such 
as adjustment of a specific rule, but without making large steps forward, such as for example 
the introduction of joint permitting procedures for cross-border projects, which would 
significantly reduce the administrative burden on MOG developers. Such joint permitting 
procedures would have to be based on EU law, as EU law provides sufficient procedural 
guarantees for project developers and third parties, such as OWF developers and NGOs. 
However, in line with the principle of subsidiarity, intense, EU-based cooperation is not 
necessary at the moment, as it is possible to reach the intended result (development of the 
MOG) with measures of national law instead.  
5.2.5 Market Access and Support Schemes 
Market access and support schemes for OWFs connected to a MOG should be part of the legal 
framework for the MOG, as the rules on market access and support schemes determine the 
willingness of OWF developers to be connected to the MOG. Moreover, stakeholders from the 
OWF industry have indicated that the conditions for market access and support schemes are 
very important for them, but currently different per country. The two topics are treated 
together, as the conditions for market access for OWFs determine the need for support 
schemes. 
Concerning market access, as mentioned in section 3.5, the current rules existing at EU level 
are a barrier to development of hybrid grid assets and eventually to the development of an 
offshore grid. Following the structure of section 5.1.2, the barrier is caused by the existing 
rules at EU level. Thus, in the future legal framework, the issue should be addressed at the 
level that is causing the problem, namely EU law. However, as also discussed in section 3.5.5, 
an alternative solution could be to change the bidding zone configuration from a zonal system 
(based on the EEZs) to a small bidding zones system. The EU Electricity Regulation would not 
have to be changed, but this would require changes to the support schemes of the coastal 
states. Furthermore, it must be noted that even with the introduction of the small bidding 
zones model, some other provisions in EU law need to be changed, for example in the EU 
Network Codes. 
Concerning the support schemes, one may wonder whether the issue of support schemes 
needs to be part of the future legal framework for the MOG as there have been several tenders 
for the construction of windfarms without (operational) aid.746 However, it may well be that 
 
746 WindEurope, ‘Wind energy in Europe in 2018 – Trends and Statistics’ (2019), p. 21. It must be noted that 
these windfarms do receive a form of support as the connection is financed through the TSO and not by the 
connected party. For offshore wind energy, the export cable is a large cost component. 
5
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support will be required again in the future, due to higher construction costs for windfarms 
that lie further away from the shore, and due to changing market conditions, such as the steel 
price and the oil price. Moreover, with the small bidding zones market system, the price at the 
bidding zone will converge towards the coastal states with the lowest market price to which 
spare capacity exists (and if there is no capacity left at all, the price will become zero). Thus, 
with the introduction of the small zones market model, the support scheme system will have 
to be changed.  
Moreover, another main issue with the current support schemes for offshore wind is that they 
are, in some countries, limited to OWFs that are connected exclusively to the coastal state of 
that EEZ. This means that if OWFs are connected to a hybrid or meshed grid that connects two 
or more countries, the OWF developer may lose its right to receive financial support.747 This 
is detrimental to the construction of an offshore meshed grid, as wind farm developers do not 
want their OWF to be connected to a grid that would lose them the right to financial support 
that they would otherwise, in the case of a radial connection, be entitled to.  
Support schemes are currently organised at national level. Following the structure of section 
5.1.2, as one of the issues with support schemes is the limitation for OWFs that are connected 
to a hybrid asset, the logical level to address the issue is national law, where the issue 
originates. However, where the small bidding zones model is introduced, it might be 
worthwhile to develop a support system that is regionally oriented rather than nationally 
oriented, as this may simplify the system for OWFs connected to hybrid or meshed grid assets 
in a small bidding zone and reduce any perverse financial incentives. Thus, which level of law 
should be used to address support schemes depends on whether the small bidding zones 
system is introduced or not.  
Going back to the decision-making theories introduced in section 5.1, the two options 
presented above also reflect two different decision-making theories. Amending EU law 
regarding market access and making small changes to national law regarding support schemes 
can be considered “muddling through” whereas the introduction of a new bidding zone 
system and market model, which also requires a thorough revision of the support schemes 
and perhaps bringing the issue of support schemes from the national level to EU level is much 
more political and bold, and requires a “window of opportunity”. 
5.2.6 Decommissioning of Offshore Wind Turbines and Offshore Grid 
Infrastructure 
As explained in section 4.6, whereas the international law on decommissioning of installations 
and structures is clear, there are some issues with regard to decommissioning of offshore wind 
turbine foundations and offshore grid components, such as converter stations and cables, at 
the end of their lifetime. Wind turbine foundations and converter station foundations in 
general have to be removed but may be left in place when they serve a legitimate purpose, 
 
747 See section 4.4.5. 
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which could also be an ecological purpose. However, this is up to the coastal states to decide. 
Moreover, although there is no removal obligation for cables based on international law, 
coastal states may adopt rules on this topic in their national legal framework. This may cause 
a diversity of rules on what happens at the end of the lifetime of offshore grid components, 
based on under which coastal state’s jurisdiction they fall. Additionally, for the future grid 
configuration, it is important that coastal states provide clarity on whether offshore wind 
turbine foundations remain in place, fulfilling a new function but blocking the construction of 
a new OWF in the same area, or whether they are to be removed. There is currently not 
sufficient clarity on this. 
Following the structure of the preceding section, the first step is to check whether legislation 
already exists. This is partially the case, in the form of the guidelines of the IMO and OSPAR 
Decision 98/3. However, they do not provide sufficient clarity at the moment, resulting in a 
variety of national rules.  
Many countries around the world have constructed or are considering constructing offshore 
wind farms and the related cable infrastructure.748 Moreover, regarding the offshore grid, the 
diversity in national rules is part of the problem. Therefore, it is more logical to use a larger-
than-national level instrument than to solve this on national level. Moreover, as the issue of 
decommissioning is not limited to EU Member-States, an international law instrument to 
which all states can participate would be preferred over an EU-based solution. Therefore, an 
instrument of international law for the specific topic of decommissioning of offshore wind 
turbines and offshore grid components is most logical. Currently, there is a hard 
decommissioning obligation in UNCLOS, which is expanded upon further via soft law 
instruments, namely the IMO and OSPAR Guidelines. For offshore wind and offshore grid 
components, a similar structure can be envisaged, which means that it is not necessary to 
create hard and binding law on this – regarding decision-making theories, a form of “muddling 
through” will suffice. The recommendations are generally observed by the companies and 
countries, if not for the willingness to protect the environment, then at least for the need to 
preserve the company’s public image.749 Therefore, it is to be expected that (soft) industry 
standards to protect the environment are sufficient for those states and companies that take 
the environment into consideration. Also, if a few countries do not adhere to the standards, 
it is not directly problematic, as long as, in general, most countries do adhere to the standards. 
 
748 Global Wind Energy Council (2017): http://gwec.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/6_Global-cumulative-
Offshore-Wind-capacity-in-2017-1.jpg. See also for other parts of the world: A.M. Gao, J. Fan, The development 
of a comprehensive legal framework for the promotion of offshore wind power: the lessons from Europe and 
Pacific Asia (Wolters Kluwer, 2017); C.T. Nieuwenhout, Chapter 56: Offshore Grids, in M.M. Roggenkamp, K.J. 
de Graaf, R. Fleming (Eds), Encyclopedia of Environmental Law: Energy Law and the Environment, (Edward Elgar 
(forthcoming)). 
749 See, in parallel, the history of the Brent Spar Incident, on the decommissioning of the Brent Spar oil 
structure off the coast of the UK. V. Bakir, ‘Policy Agenda Setting and Risk Communication - Greenpeace, Shell, 
and Issues of Trust’, Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics [2006:3] pp. 67-88. 
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Finally, the norms of UNCLOS, removal of installations that are no longer in use, form a 
minimum requirement to which all UNCLOS signatories are bound.  
5.3 Interim Conclusion 
The main legislative issues identified earlier in chapters 2, 3 and 4 are subjected to the 
analytical framework constructed in this chapter. The outcome of this analysis is that there is 
no ‘one size fits all’ solution; the legal framework should consist of different legal instruments. 
The issues treated above all require different legal instruments, depending on (a) whether the 
existing law can be expanded or whether new instruments need to be created; and on (b) the 
importance of the different principles and criteria. The following table gives an overview of 
the outcomes for the different legal issues treated above. 
Table 3: Preferred Legal Instrument per Issue 




Joint declaration on the interpretation of UNCLOS 
(international law; soft), possibly adopted as part of the mixed 
partial agreement 
Governance offshore grid Mixed partial agreement (international law; hard) 
Operational rules Network Codes (EU law; hard); adoption in mixed partial 
agreement in order to include UK part of the grid 
Inconsistencies national 
law 
Amendment of national law (national law; hard) 
Market Access and 
Support schemes OWFs 
Amendment of EU law (EU law; hard); amendment of national 




Decision under IMO or OSPAR or other appropriate venue 
(international; soft) 
 
Different decision-making approaches based on the theories set out in section 5.1 should be 
used to implement these instruments, based on the desired result (of an altogether new 
instrument or the amendment of existing law). The amendments of national law, prescribed 
for addressing support schemes and various inconsistencies in national law, will probably be 
based on an incremental approach, with a resemblance to the ‘muddling through’ style of 
decision-making. The adoption of a new agreement based on international law, on the other 
hand, can only succeed when there is a ‘window of opportunity’, or when the right 
combination of actors, problems and solutions is pulled out of the ‘garbage can’. Repeated 
decision-making with developing insights in the consequences of the existing policy (for 
example with regard to siting OWFs and offshore grid components) could be based on 
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adaptive governance. It is important to be aware of this when drafting the legal framework 
for the MOG, as the expectations of participants towards the decision-making process have to 
be clear in advance: for example, if participants expect a ‘muddling through’ decision-making 
process, they will not be open to radically new legal instruments. Vice versa, frustrations may 
arise when a muddling through approach is used whereas stakeholders expect the 
development of a new approach. 
As visible in the table above, the legal framework for the offshore grid should be based on the 
adoption of a mixed partial agreement, a new instrument based on international law in which 
both EU Member States and third states, as well as the European Union itself, participate. This 
type of agreement already exists in various contexts, although it is not widely known. As this 
instrument will form the main backbone of the legal framework for the MOG, its form and 
contents are elaborated upon further in the next chapter.  
Then, in Chapter 7, whereas this chapter has mainly focused on the form of the legal 
framework and the instruments that should be used, the substantive decisions to fill in the 
legal framework for the MOG are detailed.  
5
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6 A Framework Treaty for North Sea Energy Infrastructure 
 
The previous chapter makes clear that it is beneficial from a socio-economic perspective to 
include the United Kingdom and Norway in the offshore grid, even if this means that the 
legislative framework will need to be adapted to include non-EU Member States. This makes 
it necessary to find an overarching legal framework that binds both the coastal states that are 
part of the EU and those that are not part of the EU. An international agreement must be 
sought.  
As EU energy law plays a large role in the regulation of an offshore network, it is beneficial to 
include the EU in such an agreement as well.750 The EU could also provide expertise, assistance 
and funds (through the Connecting Europe Facility for example) for constructing and 
governing an offshore electricity grid. In order to involve the EU, it is necessary to come to a 
so-called ‘mixed’ agreement, which binds both the EU and Member States. The next step is 
that it is not necessary to bind the EU Member States that are not geographically close to the 
North Sea region in this Agreement. The regulation of a North Sea offshore grid will not be a 
priority to these states and, therefore, it is not necessary to incorporate states in a legislative 
framework that is not relevant to them. The legal instrument that incorporates these three 
requirements is the so-called ‘mixed partial agreement’. 
The instrument recommended in this part is the ‘mixed partial agreement’, an agreement 
under international law that also incorporates the EU as a member. This type of agreement 
can fulfil an essential function in the governance of an offshore grid as a backbone in which 
different rules and common goals between the states are adopted. However, the instrument 
is relatively unknown and can be designed in different ways. In this chapter, the legal basis 
behind mixed partial agreements is elaborated. Examples of this type of agreement in the 
environmental and economic context are added. Finally, the chapter zooms in on the sub-
question ‘How could a mixed partial agreement serve as a framework treaty for the North 
Sea?’ Here, the chapter elaborates on what the contents and scope of such an agreement 
could be specifically for an offshore grid. 
6.1 Legal Basis of Mixed Partial Agreements 
Mixed Partial Agreements are agreements that are ‘mixed’ and ‘partial’. These terms stem 
from EU External Relations Law. In this context, ‘mixed’ means that the agreement is between 
Member States on the one hand and the EU on the other hand.751 ‘Partial’ means that some 
of the EU Member States are signatories of the Agreement, but not all.752 Equally, other (non-
 
750 EU Membership of an agreement can also resolve issues when part of the envisaged content lies within the 
competence of the EU and part of it lies with the Member States. De Witte 2001, p. 241. 
751 P.J. Kuijper, J. Wouters, F. Hoffmeister, G. De Baere, T. Ramopoulos, The Law of EU External Relations, 
(Oxford University Press 2013) p. 405; p. 952-953. See also R.A. Wessel, J. Larik, EU External Relations Law – 
Text, Cases and Materials (Hart Publishing 2020). 
752 Partial agreements can be contrasted with ‘parallel agreements’ which are also concluded outside the EU-
law framework but which bind all Member States. See De Witte 2001, p. 241. 
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EU) states can also participate in a ‘mixed partial agreement’. One could wonder whether the 
agreement should really be mixed, as for some topics an agreement between only the EU and 
the third states would suffice, when the EU has made use of its (exclusive) competence to 
regulate a certain issue. However, in the case of the North Sea offshore grid, some issues fall 
in the sphere of competences of the EU (where the EU has made use of its shared competence, 
for example with regard to the regulation of cross-border electricity exchange) whereas other 
issues are under the competence of the individual states (such as the geographic and time-
wise planning of the construction of offshore wind farms). Thus, in order to cover all issues 
that are relevant for the construction and operation of an offshore grid, it is important to 
include both the EU and the relevant Member-States. 
Mixed partial agreements exist in various spheres, for example in the environmental 
protection of a specific geographical area (Rhine Convention; Alpine Convention), when part 
of the agreement is covered by EU-law and part of the agreement falls under national law 
(trade agreements), or when not all EU Member States are willing to cooperate in the 
agreement (Schengen agreement). These examples will be elaborated upon in the next 
paragraph, to provide context for when mixed partial agreements can be used. 
It must be nuanced that mixed partial agreements cannot solve every problem, as they are 
also limited by the system of EU law. A clear theoretical limit to the treaty-making 
competences of the Member States and the EU is that due to the primacy of EU law, there 
should be substantive compatibility between a newly drafted partial agreement and the 
already existing body of EU law.753 This is because, in general, international law on treaty 
interpretation dictates that in case of conflict between EU law and the partial agreement, the 
latter treaty prevails between states that are a member of both treaties.754  This is an 
undesirable situation as the CJEU has always stressed the importance of uniformity of EU law 
and thus defended the absolute supremacy of EU law.755 Therefore, different interpretation 
due to various partial agreements should be avoided. In the Schengen Convention (1990), this 
is solved by adding the following provisions:  
Article 134  
The provisions of this Convention shall apply only insofar as they are compatible with 
Community law. 
Article 142(1)  
(…) Provisions which are in breach of those agreed between the Member States of the 
European Communities shall in any case be adapted in any circumstances. 
 
753 De Witte 2001, p. 243. 
754 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 30. 
755 De Witte 2001, p. 244. 
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The tension between partial agreements and EU law is also shown by case law: in 2006, the 
European Court of Justice judged on the compatibility of a provision of the Schengen 
Convention with EU law, particularly free movement law.756 Another question is what happens 
when there is a legal conflict over the convention between an EU Member State and a non-
Member State. According to international law,757 EU law is not supposed to affect the rights 
of third states. As long as there is close cooperation and coordination between the states 
involved in the agreement and the EU, this can be prevented. This is also the case in the 
examples of mixed partial agreements described below. 
6.2 Examples of Mixed Partial Agreements in Practice 
Mixed partial agreements exist in many forms and for many different topics. In this section, 
several examples of mixed partial agreements are brought forward. Elements from these 
examples can be used as a blueprint for a North Sea Agreement. In order to show that mixed 
partial agreements are used in different sectors, both examples from an environmental 
context and from an economic context are presented. 
6.2.1 Mixed Partial Agreements in an Environmental Context 
6.2.1.1 Alpine Convention 
The Alpine Convention aims to protect the environment in the Alpine region.758 As the Alpine 
region stretches over different country borders and the environmental issues existing in the 
Alpine region (pollution, changes in biodiversity, preservation of the landscape) do not stop at 
the country borders, an international approach was deemed necessary. The Convention has 
prevention, polluter pays and trans-border cooperation as its main principles. All countries in 
the Alpine region; France, Germany, Italy as well as third states Switzerland, Liechtenstein and 
Monaco, and Slovenia, which was not yet an EU Member State at the moment of signing and 
ratifying this Convention but who has joined the Union since then, are represented. Moreover, 
the European Economic Community, now the EU, is also a member to the Convention. 
The legislative framework for sustainable development in the Alpine region exists of a 
framework convention (the Alpine Convention) and subsequent protocols and declarations. 
The aim of the convention is to protect and conserve the Alps, for example through pollution 
control, soil quality control, rational spatial planning, nature protection and specific policy for 
economic sectors in the Alps, such as farming, forestry, tourism and transport.759  
In terms of governance, the Convention provides for a ‘Conference of the Contracting Parties’ 
(Alpine Conference), which meets regularly (every two years) in order to discuss common 
concerns between the Contracting parties, adopt amendments and protocols to the 
 
756 CJEU C-503/03 Commission v Spain ECLI:EU:C:2006:74, particularly paras 33–35. The conclusion was that 
conduct in compliance with the Schengen agreement was only admissible in as far as this was also in 
compliance with Community law. 
757 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 34. 
758 Convention on the Protection of the Alps (Alpine Convention), Salzburg, 7 November 1991 U.N.T.S. I-32724.  
759 Alpine Convention, art. 2. 
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Convention and to approve the creation of working groups.760 Next to this, there is a standing 
committee, consisting of delegates of the contracting parties, which acts as an executive 
body.761 This body has a large role in the preparation of the meetings of the Conference and 
in collecting and assessing all relevant documents and information with regard to the 
Convention. In practice, the standing committee also appoints working groups for specific 
purposes. It also proposes measures and recommendations for the objectives mentioned in 
the Convention and its protocols.762 
6.2.1.2 Rhine Convention 
The Rhine Convention is a convention between France, Germany, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland and the European Union. It aims for sustainable development of the 
Rhine ecosystem, production of drinking water from the Rhine, improvement of sediments 
quality, flood protection and prevention, and the general restoration of the North Sea (in 
cooperation with other actions taken to protect it, such as the ‘OSPAR Convention’).763 The 
Rhine Convention is oriented towards environmental issues that need to be regulated through 
an international agreement rather than only national law, as there is a cross-border impact of 
environmental issues, especially in a shared river basin. Other transnational issues with regard 
to the Rhine are regulated either through bilateral agreements,764 or in the case of navigation 
and transportation, through another treaty.765 
This Convention is an example of a mixed partial agreement with a specific geographical scope. 
Some of the signatories to the Rhine Convention are inside the EU, but Switzerland is not. 
Equally, several Member States that are linked to the Rhine Basin are not signatories to the 
Rhine Convention.766 At the same time, the EU itself, originally its predecessor the European 
Community, is also part of the Convention.  
The governance structure of the Rhine Convention is intergovernmental. In order to 
implement the Rhine convention, the International Commission for the Protection of the 
Rhine (ICPR) is founded.767 It consists of a yearly ‘plenary assembly’ in which decisions are 
made. It is presided over by one of the Member States on a three-yearly rotating basis.768 
Technical issues are delegated to working groups. Their recommendations are passed on to 
the strategy group that prepares the Plenary Assembly. The working groups are supported 
 
760 Ibid., art. 5 and 6. 
761 Ibid., art. 8. 
762 Ibid. 
763 Convention on the Protection of the Rhine (hereinafter Rhine Convention), Bern, 12 April 1999, U.N.T.S. I-
23469, art. 3. 
764 For example, the European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Inland 
Waterways (ADN), Geneva, 26-5-2000, U.N.T.S. I-44730; Agreement on the social security of the Rhine 
boatmen (Accord rhénan), Geneva, 30-11-1979, U.N.T.S. I-25584.  
765 Convention for Rhine Navigation, Mannheim, 17 October 1868, revised on 20 November 1963.  
766 These are Austria, Belgium, Liechtenstein and Italy.  
767 Rhine Convention, art. 1(2), 6-11. 
768 https://www.iksr.org/en/international-cooperation/about-us/organisation/ 
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again by expert groups.769 Moreover, the working groups are prepared nationally by national 
committees.770 The Conference of Rhine Ministers decides on important political issues, which 
are binding on a political level. The entire organisation is supported by a secretariat.771 
There are several elements of this governance structure that are potentially interesting for 
the governance of an offshore grid. For the governance of an offshore grid, it is also important 
that there is a decision-making body in which the states can decide on specific issues regarding 
the offshore grid, such as directions for grid extension or guidelines on issues such as 
decommissioning. At the same time, there are also many technical issues, such as 
standardisation of technical requirements, which could be addressed by working groups and 
expert groups.  
6.2.2 Mixed Partial Agreements in an Economic and Social Context 
Mixed partial agreements do not only exist in the environmental context, they are also used 
for other issues, for example in the economic context, for topics on which Member States’ 
opinions vary significantly. In this paragraph, the Schengen Agreement, as a mixed partial 
agreement from the beginning, and the Energy Charter Treaty, that started as a mixed 
agreement but that became a mixed partial agreement after the withdrawal of Italy, are 
analysed more closely. 
6.2.2.1 Schengen Agreement 
Signed in 1985, the Schengen Agreement allowed for the gradual abolition of border controls 
for the citizens of its Member States. As the Member States of the EEC at the time772 could 
not agree on this issue, the agreement was designed as a separate agreement, originally 
signed between only five states.773 In 1990, the Schengen Agreement was followed by the 
Schengen Convention,774 which was aimed at implementing the Schengen Agreement. It 
proposed a common visa policy next to the abolition of internal border controls that was one 
of the original aims of the 1985 Schengen Agreement. The Agreement and Convention entered 
into force in 1995 for the five original Member States.  
With the negotiations for the Amsterdam Treaty (1999), the Member States of the EC agreed 
to adopt the Schengen Acquis (consisting of the Agreement and the implementing 




771 Rhine Convention, art. 12. 
772 Belgium, Denmark, France, Luxembourg, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, West-Germany and the 
United Kingdom. 
773 Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West-Germany. 
774 Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the 
States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the 
gradual abolition of checks at their common borders, Schengen, 19-6-1990, U.N.T.S. A-52750.  
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the other Member States and for future Member States, the Schengen Acquis has to be 
implemented in national law.775  
Several non-EU Member-States signed association agreements with the Schengen Member 
States to become part of the Schengen area, as associated states (not EU Member States): at 
the moment, this is the case for Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland.776 Moreover, 
the microstates Monaco, San Marino and Vatican City are de facto members of Schengen 
without an official agreement.777  
The Schengen Acquis started as a ‘partial agreement’ with only half of the Member States of 
the EEC participating at first. Still, as explained above, not all EU Member States are Schengen 
states. It is technically not a ‘mixed agreement’ as the agreement has become part of the EU 
Acquis, not because the EU signed and ratified the agreement, but because it is directly 
adopted in the Acquis through an amendment of the founding treaties. In a mixed agreement, 
the EU signs and ratifies an agreement and thus becomes a member to the agreement as well. 
Nevertheless, the Schengen Acquis is an interesting example of regulation that is first adopted 
in a limited geographical area and then extended to a larger scale. This is relevant for the 
regulation of an offshore grid in the North Sea as well. The capacity to be extended over time 
could, for example, allow the Baltic states to enter the agreement in order to allow for a Baltic 
offshore grid as well.778 The current Schengen construction works for non-EU Member States 
as well, although in practice, as the Schengen acquis is amended through EU legislative 
procedures, non-EU Member States officially cannot vote on changes to the legislation.  
6.2.2.2 Energy Charter Treaty 
The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) is the only sector-specific, large-scale trade and investment 
agreement, which gives it a special place in international investment law. Also, it is the 
investment treaty with the largest geographical coverage. It was originally aimed at bringing 
together the Eurasian continent after the Cold War, and it was signed and ratified by all EU 
Member States, third states (mostly former Soviet states and Balkan states) and the European 
Communities (predecessor of the EU) as a non-state member.779 This made the ECT a mixed 
agreement (not a partial agreement since all EU Member States signed and ratified it), until 
Italy withdrew from the ECT – making it a mixed partial agreement again 
The ECT is included here because it is an example of how a mixed agreement in the energy 
sector can function. In essence, it covers investments associated with economic activity in the 
 
775 For Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Cyprus, there are still concerns with regard to corruption or border 
issues. However, these states are expected to join the Schengen area as soon as these concerns have been 
adequately addressed. 
776 https://www.schengenvisainfo.com/schengen-visa-countries-list/  
777 Ibid. 
778 See below, chapter 6.3.1. 
779 A current overview of the signatories of the ECT is available at https://www.energycharter.org/ 
process/energy-charter-treaty-1994/energy-charter-treaty/signatories-contracting-parties/ 
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energy sector, including several energy materials and products.780 However, it must be noted 
that the treaty is drafted for the specific purpose of facilitating investments in the energy 
sector, which is more limited than the type of agreement necessary for the MOG. The 
structure of the ECT is interesting compared to the environmental sector mixed partial 
agreements described above. In the environmental agreements only limited substantive law 
was adopted in the agreement, with a focus rather on general principles of environmental 
protection in the respective regions and on the governance structure created by the 
agreement. This is contrary to the ECT, which has as its main body the substantive rules on 
investment stimulation and protection, and only limited provisions with regard to the 
governance structure. Still, the governance structure itself is similar to that of the 
environmental agreements, with periodic meetings between the contracting parties (“the 
Energy Charter Conference”),781 and a secretariat to support the daily governance of the 
treaty.782 The ECT lacks a committee structure, which is present in the Alpine and Rhine 
Agreements. For a North Sea Agreement, a committee structure would be a valuable addition, 
as it allows the more technical subjects to be handled by specialised committees. The dispute 
resolution part of the ECT, however, is much more detailed than in the environmental 
agreements, both in the contents of the treaty,783 and also in practice.784 For the MOG, 
considering the large and long-term investments that need to be made, it is important that 
dispute resolution is adequately addressed. However, unlike the ECT, the main topic of an 
agreement concerning the MOG is not investment protection – therefore, it should not be 
expected that a dispute resolution clause in a North Sea Agreement will be used as much as 
the dispute resolution clauses of the ECT. 
6.3 North Sea Agreement: Backbone for the Regulation of an Offshore Grid 
As concluded in chapter 5, it is important for the development of a MOG that all states around 
the North Sea that plan to participate in a MOG share the same goals and principles with 
regard to the development of the MOG and that they commit to a certain structure in order 
to facilitate cooperation and compatibility of different parts of the MOG as well as to increase 
the legal certainty of investors in a MOG. To this end, it is proposed that a mixed partial 
agreement is developed. The scope, aim and suggested contents of such an agreement are 
detailed below. 
6.3.1 Scope   
In order to be effective, the geographical scope of the agreement should at least cover the 
EEZs of the coastal states participating in the North Sea offshore grid. However, next to limiting 
 
780 Energy Charter Secretariat, ‘The Energy Charter Treaty: a Reader’s Guide’ (Energy Charter Secretariat, 2002) 
p. 20 
781 Energy Charter Treaty, Lisbon, 17-12-1994, U.N.T.S. I-36116, art. 34. 
782 Ibid., art. 35. 
783 Ibid., art. 26 and 27. 
784 Energy Charter Secretariat, ‘Conflict Prevention and Dispute Resolution: Main Provisions and Instruments’,  
(2016). See also C.G. Verburg, Modernizing the Energy Charter Treaty, dissertation 2019, chapter 5 for a large 
range of examples of disputes in the context of investment protection, Part III of the Energy Charter Treaty. 
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the scope to only the North Sea coastal states, the scope could also be designed in such a way 
that it is also possible to include other areas, such as the Baltic Sea or the Mediterranean.  
On the one hand, it takes large efforts from the Member States of such an agreement to design 
and adopt a legislative framework for an offshore electricity grid. It would not be efficient if 
these efforts are doubled to adopt a similar agreement in which the same issues are 
addressed, for another sea. Instead, it is more efficient to draft the framework in such a way 
that, in the future, other states can join the framework when they are developing a meshed 
offshore grid.  
On the other hand, it might take more time and it might make the agreement more complex 
if the possibility of future accessions to the treaty needs to be incorporated. If the extra time 
and complexity of adding extra states outweigh the benefits and the chances of these states 
actually acceding to the agreement, the scope should exclude these states.  
This is different for the Baltic Sea than for the Mediterranean Sea. In the Baltic Sea, there is 
an overlap of states between the North Sea and the Baltic Sea, namely Germany, Denmark 
and Sweden. The sea is also relatively comparable from a geographical perspective: relatively 
shallow, with sandy or muddy seabed in which it is well possible to construct offshore 
windfarms.785 In the Baltic Region, extra interconnection is also beneficial in the future.786 As 
there is potential for large-scale OWF development and as there is a demand for extra 
interconnection, the construction of a MOG is also beneficial from a socio-economic 
perspective.787 This is a strong argument for the inclusion of the Baltic Sea area in the 
envisaged agreement. Moreover, the Baltic Sea area is further advanced than the North Sea 
area in taking the first steps towards a MOG, as the only realised offshore grid project at this 
moment is the Kriegers Flak Combined Grid Solution, which is located in the Baltic Sea.788 From 
a political perspective, it is relatively easy to reach agreement with the Baltic Sea states that 
are EU states, but it is expected to be more difficult to reach agreement with the Russian 
Federation.789 In order to avoid any political sensitivity, it could also be envisaged that an 
offshore grid in the Baltic Sea is located in the Gulf of Bothnia (between Sweden and Finland) 
but not in the Gulf of Finland (leading to St. Petersburg).  
The Mediterranean sea is a different story: there is much less offshore wind energy 
development due to different geographical circumstances,790 there is less appetite for 
 
785 OSPAR Commission, ‘Region II – Greater North Sea’, available at https://www.ospar.org/convention/the-
north-east-atlantic/ii; Encyclopaedia Britannica, ‘North Sea’, https://www.britannica.com/place/North-Sea.  
786 The construction of extra interconnection capacity is necessary in order for the Baltic states to adapt to the 
synchronous continental electricity system, which was decided in the context of the BEMIP project.  
787 Bergaentzlé et al, 2019.  
788 See Nieuwenhout 2018, p. 95-112, and section 3.5.2 above.  
789 This is expected on the basis of previous negotiations with the Russian Federation on previous large energy 
infrastructure projects such as North Stream II, which led to tensions between several of the Baltic Sea states. 
790 The sea is much deeper than the North Sea, and the seabed is rocky. This makes it more difficult and more 
expensive to construct fixed offshore wind turbines. There are some developments with regard to floating wind 
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cooperation in a meshed offshore grid with unstable states on the North African coast,791 and 
the distances are much larger in the Mediterranean sea, which makes it more difficult to reach 
an economic business case.792 Thus, if the scope should be larger than the North Sea, it is most 
logical to design the framework in such a way that Baltic States can enter the agreement, as 
the extra complexity and time for adjusting the agreement in such a way that the Baltic States 
can join is relatively limited. There is no need to expand the agreement to incorporate the 
Mediterranean Sea at this moment, as the chance that provisions on an offshore grid become 
relevant in the foreseeable future is small. 
6.3.2 Aim 
‘Mixed partial agreement’ is only the form of the agreement. What is even more important, is 
the aim, scope and contents of the agreement. The aim of a mixed partial agreement is to 
agree on the issues that cannot be addressed at a lower level, following section 5.3. For the 
meshed offshore grid, this would be to create a solid legal framework for the governance of a 
future offshore grid, to adopt a common interpretation of UNCLOS with regard to hybrid 
cables and to set common principles for how the grid should be governed. Moreover, this 
agreement can also include reference to which operational rules are used. Instead of adopting 
several different agreements for each of these issues, the issues could all be addressed in the 
same, comprehensive agreement.  
The main aim of concluding an international agreement such as the agreement proposed here 
is to guarantee that it is possible for all North Sea coastal states to participate in the MOG, not 
only the EU Member-States. However, in the light of the political developments around Brexit, 
one can wonder whether the UK is willing to engage in an agreement of this kind, even if it is 
not based on EU law. This depends on many different factors, and it is impossible to give a 
definite answer to this question at the moment of writing this dissertation. However, there 
are several strong arguments that plead for participation of the UK in the agreement: from a 
cost-benefit perspective, it is favourable for the UK to participate in the offshore grid. This will 
give the UK the possibility to export large quantities of wind energy at the moments when this 
is plentily available, while also providing access to other sources of electricity, in other coastal 
states, when the amount of wind energy is low. This increases the security of supply and 
lowers the wholesale price of electricity. The chances of the UK being able to participate in 
the grid without participating in the legislative framework governing it, are slim as this would 
lead to massive legislative uncertainties. Another argument is that, although there have been 
 
farms (Hywind Scotland, and several projects in France: https://www.offshorewind.biz/2019/02/25/eu-nods-
to-four-french-floating-wind-farms/. In any case, in this region, onshore solar energy is more beneficial from a 
socio-economic perspective than offshore wind energy, as the levelized cost of energy (LCOE) are much lower 
for onshore solar energy than for offshore wind in this area. 
791 An example is the ‘Desertec’ proposal, which included large scale solar PV in North African states which 
would be transported to Europe. This proposal was initially welcomed as a promising new source of renewable 
energy, but received far less attention since various political occurrences in the North African states, notably 
since the Arab Spring. 
792 Longer distances require longer, more expensive cables, which influences the business case for meshed 
offshore grids in the Mediterranean Sea. 
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many political tensions over the past four years, the MOG is developed for a much longer time 
span, at least several decades. Therefore, decisions about cooperation should not be based 
on the political developments from month to month, but rather on what is best for society on 
a much longer time scale.793 Finally, as many issues need to be renegotiated on the basis of 
other legal instruments now, the development of a mixed partial agreement for the purpose 
of the MOG may actually provide an opportunity for the UK to negotiate on which terms they 
would like participate in an offshore grid that connects their large installed capacity of 
offshore wind, and their onshore electricity grid, to the continental and Scandinavian 
electricity grids.  
6.3.3 Contents 
As mentioned above, the aim of the North Sea Agreement is to provide a stable legal 
framework for the construction of an offshore grid and the cooperation of the North Sea 
coastal states to this end. The contents of the agreement should support this aim. Translated 
into concrete topics, its contents should aspire to: 
 Make clear what the aim and guiding principles of the MOG are 
 Clarify interpretation of UNCLOS, and thereby prevent double jurisdiction and lack of 
jurisdiction for certain cable configurations 
 Address governance of the offshore grid and create a governance structure, including 
o How should (long term) decisions regarding the grid be taken? 
o How should the grid be governed on a day-to-day basis? 
o Is there a need for a common ownership structure of the MOG? And if so, which 
party(ies) should own the offshore grid?  
o How is the grid regulated (in terms of grid access, financial (income) regulation? 
According to the same principles as codified in EU energy law, or with 
additional provisions? 
o Which entity is responsible for regulatory supervision? 
o How should operational (technical- and market-) rules concerning the grid be 
developed, adopted and enforced? 
 
793 An inspiring example in this regard is that engineers from France were already pleading for more 
cooperation and interconnection between European neighbouring countries in 1929 (Walser, Wagner (2009), 
p. 8). That, already before the second world war and before stable cooperation between neighbouring 
countries in the context of the European Union or its predecessors, it was proposed to construct a European 
400 kV grid “to exchange electricity on a seasonal basis and for emergency assistance” shows that the 
development of grids should not be based on short-term political developments but rather on the long-term 
benefits for society.   
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o Conflict resolution: how should conflicts between different entities concerning 
the MOG be addressed? 
The possible contents of a North Sea Agreement are elaborated further in chapter 7. In the 
appendices, a Model Agreement is added, based on chapters 6 and 7. 
An important issue is to what extent the acquis of EU energy law is ‘transplanted’ into the 
agreement. It is not possible for EU Member States to conclude agreements that go against 
EU law, but at the same time, the agreement needs to provide sufficient space for the UK to 
be able to keep their own principles as well. It could be solved by making the MOG only subject 
to the Agreement and no longer to EU energy law, if it is considered a greenfield development 
that is clearly separate from the existing networks which are purely AC with some point-to-
point HVDC interconnectors, but no meshed HVDC network. However, a practical problem is 
that not only EU energy law is applicable to the MOG, but also other types of law, such as 
spatial planning law and environmental law.  Another solution is to adopt provisions in the 
agreement that are fully or at least to a large extent in line with EU law, while leaving some 
room for manoeuvre for the UK and Norway. The European Commission and possibly even 
the CJEU794 will have to play a pivotal role in the negotiations if this option is chosen, by 
indicating to what extent provisions in the agreement are still in line with EU law. 
The governance structure could follow the governance structure of the agreements 
mentioned above, namely the Rhine and Alpine Conventions. In those cases, the main issues 
are addressed high-level in a conference of parties, which convenes on a regular basis (for 
example biannually). As a starting point, such an agreement would have an intergovernmental 
character, which means that voting in this conference of parties would typically be on the 
basis of unanimity. However, the signatories to the agreement can decide on a different voting 
procedure, which could make it easier to adopt decisions, specifically concerning more 
technical issues, such as harmonisation or operational rules on the grid. These issues can be 
addressed in working groups attended by national experts, similar to the Alpine and Rhine 
Conventions.  
In order to guarantee continuity of the cooperation and assistance to the committee 
structure, the founding of a secretariat through the agreement could also be considered. If 
the parties agree, it might be valuable to include a secretariat that will support the states in 
their cooperation and assist in increasing the continuity of the Agreement. This could be a 
newly founded secretariat, or alternatively, an existing body might serve as secretariat for the 
 
794 The CJEU can advise on the legality of agreements with third states regarding EU law, in a so-called 
‘Opinion’, based on TFEU art. 218(11). This can be requested by a Member State, the European Parliament, the 
Council or the Commission. This happened in many instances, famous cases are Opinion 1/17, 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:341 (on CETA), Opinion 2/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454 and 2/94 ECLI:EU:C:1996:140 (on the 
accession of the EU to the ECHR) and Opinion 1/91 ECLI:EU:C:1991:490 (on the creation of the EEA). 
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Agreement. This could be for example the Benelux Secretariat General, which has already 
served as a secretariat for the North Sea cooperation in NSCOGI and NSEC.795  
6.4 Interim Conclusion 
This chapter elaborates on the mixed partial agreement that is recommended to be used as a 
backbone of the legal framework for a MOG. The legal basis of a mixed partial agreement lies 
in the fact that for some issues EU Member States are not allowed to accede to international 
agreements – instead, this competence lies with the EU. Throughout the history of the EU and 
its predecessors, mixed partial agreements have been used for various topics. Four examples, 
both with an environmental and economic background, have been elaborated upon in this 
chapter. These examples show how mixed partial agreements can be used in practice.  
The North Sea Agreement itself should incorporate the provisions that are necessary to create 
a governance structure for the MOG, following the structure of the agreements mentioned 
above, with a regular conference of the parties for the main decisions, as well as a commission 
structure and possibly a secretariat (or a standing committee) to take care of daily 
administration, preparation of meetings and continuity of the governance structure.  
 
795 See above, chapter 5.2.2. 
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7 Qualitative Analysis of Proposals for Offshore Grid Regulation  
7.1 Introduction 
The substantive legal framework for the Meshed Offshore Grid (MOG) requires concrete, 
detailed proposals on many topics, such as the financial regulation of the assets, support for 
offshore wind connected to the MOG, regulatory supervision as well as decommissioning of 
OWFs and transmission infrastructure after their lifetime.796 In chapters 5 and 6, the legislative 
instruments of which the legal framework should be comprised were set out. The next step is 
to “fill in” the legal framework with concrete, feasible and effective legislative measures on 
the topics identified in Part I.  
The topics that are part of the legal and regulatory framework for the MOG can be addressed 
in different ways, as is made clear by the diversity of national legal and regulatory systems in 
chapter 4. The same goes for future policy choices for the MOG: there is more than one way 
to address the barriers identified in this dissertation. The way a topic is addressed may have 
significant consequences for how the MOG is developed and regulated. Specifically, there may 
be impacts on the cost-effectiveness of the MOG, the time required to implement the 
proposals in legislation, the acceptance of the MOG by different stakeholders and the risk 
assessment of the MOG made by investors. This requires a multidisciplinary approach that 
takes into account these different aspects. This chapter explores the different options to 
regulate the MOG and evaluates them against fixed criteria, which will bring together the 
economic, legal, socio-political and financial perspectives.  
The chapter starts with a short explanation of the methodology and the selection criteria that 
are used to assess which options to regulate the MOG should be recommended. Then, for 
every topic that should be included in the regulatory framework of the MOG on the basis of 
Part I of this dissertation, different options are analysed on the basis of the selection criteria. 
The options that “score the highest”797 compared to other solutions are recommended to be 
adopted in the legal framework for the MOG.  
7.2 Methodology and Selection Criteria 
7.2.1 Qualitative Informal CBA 
In order to construct the regulatory framework that leads to the most cost-effective 
implementation of the offshore grid, an analysis is made of the different options. Each of the 
options is assessed on the basis of five criteria, reflecting the economic, legal, socio-political, 
financial and environmental perspective. The type of analysis is a qualitative analysis, since 
quantification is not possible for all parameters (legal and socio-political), and since the 
quantification of the economic and financial perspective depends on many variables, some of 
 
796 The topic of decommissioning of OWFs is relevant for a dissertation on the legal framework for an offshore 
grid as the offshore grid loses a significant part of its function when the OWFs connected to it are 
decommissioned. The question then arises to what extent the grid can remain in place after the 
decommissioning of the OWFs.  
797 Having the most positive and/or the least negative impact on the different aspects assessed in this chapter. 
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which are unknown or not public at the moment.798 At this stage, a quantitative analysis of 
different legislative options would thus give a false sense of certainty.  
Listing the advantages and disadvantages of different options on different aspects can be 
considered a form of CBA. However, it is debated whether CBAs can be used for government 
regulation.799 The key seems to be that not all CBAs are the same, as a spectrum of different 
CBAs can be discerned, with on the one side ‘traditional’ formal CBAs which are highly 
technical and fully quantified, and on the other side the ‘informal’ CBA, in which advantages 
and disadvantages of different options are compared to each other.800 An early example of 
the informal CBA is described by Benjamin Franklin in 1772:  
“[M]y way is to divide half a sheet of paper by a line into two columns; writing over the 
one Pro, and over the other Con. Then, during three or four days consideration, I put 
down under the different heads short hints of the different motives, that at different 
times occur to me, for or against the measure. When I have thus got them all together 
in one view, I endeavor to estimate their respective weights… And, though the weight 
of reasons cannot be taken with the precision of algebraic quantities, yet when each is 
thus considered, separately and comparatively, and the whole lies before me, I think I 
can judge better, and am less liable to take a rash step, and in fact I have found great 
advantage from this kind of equation, in what may be called moral or prudential 
algebra.”801 
From this quote, it becomes clear that although the outcome of this type of analysis does not 
have “the precision of algebraic quantities”, it is still a valuable exercise to weigh different 
options against each other to come to a policy decision. The different types of CBA (the 
informal “Benjamin Franklin style” CBA and the more generally known formal economic CBA, 
and the spectre in between these extremes) have been explored further by Amy Sinden. She 
also assessed their use for different types of regulatory decisions. Sinden used different axis 
to assess which type of CBA fits with the available data and options. The three axis are (1) the 
availability of data and possibility to monetize the parameters, (2) the required level of 
precision and (3) the number of alternatives.802 These three axis are interrelated, as a higher 
level of precision requires more monetization of the parameters, and the more alternatives 
 
798 For example, the costs of certain technologies, such as DC circuit breakers are currently still unknown, 
whereas they are necessary for the development of a MOG. Another factor is the grid development scenario – 
the costs and benefits of different offshore grid development scenarios vary, and it is not yet known which 
scenario will be developed in the end.  
799 A. Sinden, ‘Formality and Informality in Cost Benefit Analysis’, Utah Law Review [2015 93] 95-171, p. 95. See 
also R.C. Zinke, ‘Cost-Benefit Analysis and Administrative Legitimation’, Policy Studies Journal [1987 16(1)], p. 
63-88.  
800 Sinden 2015, p. 96. 
801 Quote from a letter from Benjamin Franklin to Joseph Priestley (Sept. 19, 1772), E.M. Gramlich, A Guide to 
Benefit-Cost Analysis (Prentice Hall, 1990, 2nd Ed.). 
802 Sinden 2015, pp. 108-110. 
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are available, the more precision is needed to differentiate the alternatives from each 
other.803 The relations between the different axis are made visible in the image below. 
 
 
Image 6: Relations between the Different Axis. Source: A. Sinden. 
In this chapter, the analysis of the different alternatives tends towards the left side of this 
image. For each topic, a handful of alternatives (bottom line, second left in the table) is 
available. A rough comparison (middle line, extreme left) is made of the advantages and 
disadvantages of the different alternatives. This is done on the basis of a qualitative 
description (top line, extreme left). Thus, the type of CBA used in this chapter can be 
characterised as ‘Benjamin Franklin CBA’. Although the outcomes cannot be compared with 
algebraic precision, the alternatives can be weighed against each other with this method. A 
next step in (future) legal and regulatory research on this topic would be to perform an 
additional sensitivity analysis on the outcomes of the analysis by sending surveys to policy-
makers and stakeholders, and to ask in such surveys whether they consider the weight of 
different interests as equal or whether they weigh the different interests differently. 
7.2.2 Choice of Parameters 
Whereas CBA analyses generally focus on economic aspects, the analysis in this chapter also 
includes the legal, socio-political, financial and environmental aspect. By focusing not only on 
 
803 Ibid., p. 111 and 117. 
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the cost-effectiveness of the solutions but also on the legal and political perspective, the 
analysis incorporates the likeliness of implementation of the different options. This reflects 
the theory of efficiency in institutional economics, developed by Williamson: he describes 
efficient as ‘comparatively well-suited’,804 but he adds that a governance arrangement is only 
efficient if no superior feasible alternative can be described and implemented.805 By including 
feasibility and implementation to the assessment in this chapter, ambitious reforms are 
weighed against a ‘reality check’ which filters out unrealistic options and thus leaves the 
options on the table that have a realistic chance of being implemented.  
Thus, the legal and socio-political aspects are assessed to show whether options deviate 
significantly from the existing legal frameworks and/or whether they would lead to socio-
political difficulties, which reduces the chances of the option being implemented in practice, 
reflecting the criterion of remediableness. 
The financial aspect is added to the parameters to reflect the fact that the development of an 
offshore grid is very costly, and that without sufficient provision of capital, the MOG will not 
be developed. The financial aspect includes the ability to attract capital in different scenarios, 
which is based on the stability and predictability of a certain option compared to other 
options. Finally, the environmental aspect is added to reflect the local environmental impact 
of different grid options.  
The criteria, method of assessment and sensitivity analysis are elaborated upon in the sub-
sections below. 
7.2.2.1 Economic perspective 
The offshore grid will be costly to develop, as expensive technologies (such as HVDC cables, 
control systems and converter stations) will have to be implemented in rough conditions (the 
North Sea). However, the MOG will deliver societal benefits, as the development of offshore 
wind energy will be made possible and electricity trade between countries is facilitated.806 
Moreover, the MOG may deliver additional benefits compared to separate interconnectors, 
as it may facilitate connections between states which would not have been constructed if no 
OWFs had to be connected in that area. Vice versa, OWFs located further away from the coast 
may be connected more cost-effectively when the connection can also be used for 
interconnection. 
The absolute costs and benefits of different alternative options are difficult to assess and 
subject to many variables,807 but the relative costs and benefits of the different options can at 
 
804 O.E. Williamson, ‘Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost Economics Perspective’, Journal of 
Law, Economics, & Organization [1999, Vol. 15, No. 1] pp. 306-342. 
805 Ibid., p. 316. Italics are from the original text. Williamson calls this criterion ‘remediableness’. 
806 J. Moore (TenneT), ‘Deliverable 12.3 – Draft Deployment Plan’ PROMOTioN (2020), chapter 2. See also 3E, 
DWG, DNV GL, ECN, CEPS, NorthSeaGrid Study, Final Report, 24-3-2015, p. 18 ff. 
807 3E, DWG, DNV GL, ECN, CEPS, NorthSeaGrid Study, Final Report, 24-3-2015, p. 27 and further; and 
PROMOTioN CBA (forthcoming) have made an effort to assess the absolute costs and benefits of different grid 
configurations. It lies beyond the scope of this work to repeat this exercise.  
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least be estimated and weighed against each other. Thus, this parameter boils down to a 
relative, societal cost-benefit analysis. Options that have lower costs or higher benefits than 
the other options will score highest (++), whereas options with relatively high costs and/or low 
benefits score lowest (--), with (+), (0) and (-) as intermediate steps between these extremes. 
Costs taken into account are costs related to the grid itself (cable length, number of converters 
needed) but also transaction costs (e.g. administrative costs), and the use of scarce 
commodities (e.g. space). Benefits include the benefits from electricity trade as well as the 
increased security of supply and the reduction of CO2 emissions.808  
An important assumption regarding the economic perspective is that a coordinated grid 
development approach leads to fewer ‘stranded assets’, with cables to nowhere – which is a 
waste of resources and space. Therefore, options that lead to more coordinated grid 
development score higher than other options from an economic perspective. Options that 
entail a large administrative burden score lower than options with a light administrative 
burden. Finally, options that require more costs to implement score lower: for example, full 
removal of cable infrastructure at the end of their lifetime is more costly than partial removal, 
as it requires more dredging activity in potentially difficult circumstances.  
7.2.2.2 Legal perspective 
The proposed alternatives each have different relations to the existing legal framework. Some 
options fit very well in the existing legal framework, whereas for other options, a complete 
overhaul of the legal framework is needed. This affects the time and effort it costs to 
implement the proposal in legislation.  
As long as legal certainty is problematic for hybrid projects and innovative grid connections, 
connections will be realised as business-as-usual radial connections.809 As the offshore wind 
and grid sector keeps developing at a fast pace, there is no time to lose with regard to the 
development of a legal framework for the implementation of the offshore grid. Thus, options 
that are ready to implement within two years score higher from a legal perspective than 
options that take more than five years to implement. How long it takes exactly to implement 
a measure in the legal framework depends on two variables: first, it depends on the political 
willingness and urgency to adopt a measure. This is treated under the next parameter (socio-
political perspective). Secondly, the implementation in the legal framework depends on how 
different it is from the existing legal framework. Alternatives that can be realized with no 
changes to the legal framework score very positively (++), options that can be implemented 
with minor changes to the existing legal framework score positively (+), options that require 
some changes score neutrally (0), and that require many changes score negatively (-). Options 
for which a complete overhaul of the legal system is necessary score very negatively (--). 
 
808 J. Gorenstein Dedecca, Expansion Governance of the Integrated North Seas Offshore Grid (Dissertation, TU 
Delft 2018) p. 16-17. 
809 See above, section 1.7. 
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The legal frameworks of the coastal states currently differ significantly.810 Where a choice 
between different options that are currently being used is presented, the assessment favours 
options that are implemented in a larger number of countries above options that are 
implemented in a small number of countries, because the latter requires legislative changes 
in more countries than the former. 
7.2.2.3 Socio-Political Perspective 
If willingness to implement a certain option is missing, adoption and implementation of that 
option will take longer or might not happen at all.811 Therefore, in order to allow for smooth 
implementation of the options in the legislative framework, it is important that they are 
acceptable from a socio-political perspective. The main actors analysed here are governments, 
as they will have to implement the options. Nevertheless, other stakeholders are also taken 
into account. This is because if an option is not acceptable for certain groups in society, protest 
and litigation will also make implementation more difficult. It is difficult to test the socio-
political appetite for an option beforehand. To come as close as possible, this criterion is 
assessed based on stakeholders’ earlier public statements concerning similar topics and on an 
assessment of the controversy of the option. Moreover, input from stakeholder feedback in 
the context of the PROMOTioN project is considered in this criterion.812 The less controversy 
an option generates, the higher the option will score. 
An important assumption in the socio-political perspective is that at the moment, the transfer 
of power from the state to a higher authority (such as the EU or a regional North Sea authority) 
is deemed to be more controversial (--) than keeping the power with the state (++). This is 
based on the premise that sovereign states prefer to keep the power to themselves.813 A 
perspective supporting this assumption in the context of European (dis)integration is the post-
functionalist theory that “mass politicization and the growth of identity politics are likely to 
create ‘downward pressure on the level and scope of integration’.”814 From a more practical 
perspective, the willingness of the UK to participate in an option is an important component 
of the assessment on this theme. This means that options that rely on EU law or EU institutions 
score lower than other options. 
7.2.2.4 Financial Perspective 
Whereas the economic perspective focuses on overall costs and benefits, the financial 
perspective is narrower and only focuses on the probability of attracting (private) capital. 
 
810 The legal frameworks of the coastal states and the differences between them are described in detail in 
chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
811 See chapter 5: one of the requirements of a ‘window of opportunity’ in decision-making theory is political 
willingness. Without this willingness, it is difficult to implement a new policy, even if there is a problem and a 
solution available to it.  
812 See Menze, Wagner (forthcoming). 
813 See e.g. S. Besson, ‘Sovereignty, international law and democracy’, European Journal of International Law 
[2011, 22(2)] pp. 373–387. 
814 L. Hooghe, G. Marks, ‘A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to 
Constraining Dissensus’, British Journal of Political Science [2008 39] p. 22. 
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Currently, in the first instance, the costs for network expansion are often borne by TSOs, who 
gain their income via regulated tariffs.815 The construction of a meshed offshore grid entails 
significant costs, which are generally financed partially through debt and partially through 
equity.816 With the large investments needed, this will place a high burden on TSOs balance 
sheets, which may influence their credit rating significantly.817 The provision of private capital 
will allow TSOs to share the financial burden and risk, which makes it easier to finance the 
significant investments needed for an offshore grid. Therefore, the financial criterion is 
whether the option will facilitate the provision of private capital, or rather make it more 
difficult. This is assessed by checking how much legal and financial certainty an option 
provides: the more legal and financial certainty, the less risk for investors and therefore the 
higher an option scores. Predictability of an option also increases the score of an option 
compared to other options. Thus, options that make investments more stable and predictable 
are scored with (++) whereas options that make investments in the grid less stable or 
predictable score negatively (--). 
7.2.2.5 Environmental Perspective 
The environmental perspective can be looked at from a broad or narrow (global or local) 
perspective. In this dissertation, the focus is on local environmental impact. Large scale 
(global) impact, such as the ability of large-scale deployment of offshore wind energy to 
reduce CO2 emissions in the energy sector and thereby contribute to the fight against the 
harmful effects of climate change, is not considered in this assessment as the installed capacity 
of offshore wind energy is assumed to stay the same regardless of the chosen option. 
Analysis on the environmental perspective is thus based on the local impact, measured by the 
amount of local disturbance and the loss or creation of habitats. Where no effect is expected, 
the option scores zero (0). Increasing the local biodiversity by increasing or protecting certain 
habitats is regarded as a positive effect (+). The disturbance of the seabed and sea area for 
the construction of OWFs and submarine cables is considered a negative effect (-). Options 
that reduce the area in which the local marine life is disturbed score higher than options that 
spread the disturbance over a large area. It must be noted that the analysis on this topic should 
be substantiated through further research on the (long term and cumulative) environmental 
impact of the different options. 
 
815 An exception is that some interconnectors are so-called exempted interconnectors, that receive their 
income from congestion rents rather than from regulated tariffs. This is possible for ‘new interconnectors’ via 
Regulation (EU) 2019/943, art. 63. For an assessment of the regulatory framework for exempted 
interconnectors, see A. Rubino, M. Cuomo, ‘A regulatory assessment of the Electricity Merchant Transmission 
Investment in EU’ Energy Policy [2015 85]. 
816 In this paragraph, ‘equity’ is used in financial context (as opposed to philosophical context of equity vs. 
equality). Equity financing is financing of a certain business or activity through selling company stock or shares 
to investors. The relation between debt and equity, the debt/equity ratio, is an important metric in corporate 
financing, used to evaluate a company’s financial leverage. A. Armeni, G. Gerdes, A. Wallasch, L. Rehfeldt, 
Deliverable 7.6 Financing framework for meshed offshore grid investments, PROMOTioN 2019, p. 48. 
817 Armeni et al. 2019, p. 44. 
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7.2.3 Status Quo Bias 
In the analysis of both the legal perspective and the financial perspective, an inclination 
towards the status quo is visible. Options that deviate from the status quo will score lower in 
the legal perspective as it will take longer to implement than options that are closer to the 
status quo. From a financial perspective, changes to the status quo also score negatively. This 
is because investors favour legal certainty and changes to the status quo may decrease legal 
certainty.  
This inclination towards the status quo is also visible in other social sciences, where it is called 
‘status-quo bias’. The theoretical background for this is based on psychology, political science 
and economics. In psychology, status quo bias is described by Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 
tested by giving people the choice between keeping something the way it was or changing 
it.818 Although the term stems from psychology, it is also relevant in the context of the analysis 
for this chapter. The bias visible in this chapter could be caused by the psychological patterns 
described by Samuelson and Zeckhauser – after all, policy makers, lawyers and investors are 
not immune to psychological patterns. The status quo bias in decision-making can also be 
explained by incrementalism, as described in chapter 5,819 or path dependence, which means 
that decisions made in the past limit the scope for future decision-making.820  
7.2.4 Method of Assessment 
The options are ranked based on a qualitative assessment. Per topic, the different options are 
presented in a table with the five criteria mentioned above. Every option is scored against the 
five criteria, with a (-) or (--) for negative impact, a (0) for neutral impact and a (+) or (++) for 
positive impact. The way this is assessed is described above. 
The scores are compared and the option with the most positive scores and the fewest negative 
scores is recommended to be included in the legal framework of the MOG. The pluses and 
minuses cannot be added to each other directly, as this would depend on the relative weight 
of the different parameters. However, for many topics, it becomes clear that one option has 
significantly more positive aspects/fewer negative aspects than another. Thus, in the example 
table below, Option 3 will be recommended to be adopted in the legal framework. Option 1 
also scores relatively well, which should be reflected in a sensitivity analysis (see below). 
Table 4: Mock Topic 
 Economic Legal Socio-Political Financial Environmental 
Option 1 ++ - + + 0 
Option 2 -- + 0 + - 
Option 3 ++ ++ -- 0 + 
 
818 W. Samuelson, R. Zeckhauser, ‘Status Quo Bias in Decision Making’, Joumal of Risk and Uncertainty [1988, 
1], pp. 7-59. 
819 See chapter 5.1.1. 
820 See, e.g., P. Pierson, ‘Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics’, The American Political 
Science Review [2000, 94 (2)] pp. 251-267.  
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7.2.5 Sensitivity Analysis 
The analysis in this chapter is based on a qualitative analysis of the positive and negative 
influences on the development of an offshore grid, from an economic, legal, socio-political, 
financial and environmental perspective. However, as the (offshore) electricity sector 
develops quickly, the assessment of the different perspectives on which the analysis is based, 
may also change over time. In order to add to the robustness of the results over a longer 
period, a sensitivity analysis adds insight in to what extent the results change when the 
assessment changes. 
Therefore, throughout the chapter, for each topic a paragraph on the sensitivity of the 
recommendations is added. This is done by first assessing the difference between the 
recommended outcome and the other outcomes, and then by analysing how likely it is that 
the assumptions or analysis change. Additionally, a general analysis on the sensitivity of the 
parameters is provided below. 
7.2.5.1 Economic Perspective 
Offshore grids are in an innovative phase, with many technological developments, related for 
example to the switch from high voltage AC to HVDC, and the electrical infrastructure 
associated with this, such as converters and switchgear. The costs for HVDC technology are 
still high at the moment, but once the technology is deployed more often and the risks 
decrease, the costs are expected to go down as the risks decrease, when teething problems 
have been solved and the technology is proven in practice.821 At the same time, the costs of 
other technologies (such as HVAC technology) may also change in the timeframe analysed in 
this dissertation, or new technologies for transmitting energy may be developed. 
Next to the technology itself, the offshore grid development scenario considered most 
economically or technically advantageous may also be subject to change.822 For example, a 
hub-based grid development requires less cable length than a decentralised meshed gid 
development. However, the assumption that options with a more coordinated approach avoid 
stranded assets more than less coordinated approaches, thereby limiting the risk of 
subobtimal grid configuration, is not likely to change. 
Costs are not only influenced by the costs of the technology itself but also by risks and 
transaction costs. For the analysis in chapter 7, it is assumed that more regional cooperation 
and connections provides more benefits and leads to a lower cost per unit of electricity added, 
as the usage of the grid increases when the grid can also be used for electricity trade instead 
of only for the transmission of wind energy to the onshore electricity grid. Moreover, it is 
assumed that connections to the United Kingdom are beneficial due to the wholesale market 
 
821 The costs (and benefits) of different development scenarios for the offshore grid are listed and compared in 
J. Moore (TenneT), ‘Deliverable 12.3 – Draft Deployment Plan’ PROMOTioN (2020), chapter 2. 
822 See section 1.7.4. 
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price difference and due to the system benefits for both sides. Nevertheless, the future 
cooperation of the nations around the North Sea may be difficult,823 which may make 
cooperation costlier and transaction costs (e.g. negotiation and decision-making costs) higher. 
Thus, whether or not cooperation with the UK is beneficial depends on future relations 
between the UK and the EU, which are unclear at the moment. 
7.2.5.2 Legal Perspective 
The legal perspective reflects how radical the proposed changes are compared to the current 
legal framework. The more radical, the longer it is likely to take to implement. As the legal 
framework does not change often, this assessment is expected to stay more or less the same. 
7.2.5.3 Socio-political Perspective 
An unstable factor at the moment is the future relation between the UK and the EU. In the 
assumptions, it is expected that it is possible to reach a political agreement between the UK 
and the EU on North Sea MOG related issues. However, whether this is indeed possible 
remains uncertain. It depends on the political attitude and negotiation positions of the coastal 
states towards each other. 
Another factor that is (inherently) difficult to assess, and that fluctuates over time, is political 
willingness of states to act together, in a regional context. The sentiments towards the EU 
provide a good example thereof: the development of the internal market with free movement 
of goods, services, persons and capital is deemed to have brought significant wealth to the 
Member-States of the EU.824 Nevertheless, the case of Brexit, and the rise of anti-EU 
sentiments in the political discourse of many states in Europe,825 show a decreasing 
willingness to cooperate on a regional level. This shows that the political willingness of states 
to act together is not only dependent on expected or material economic benefits, but also on 
other factors, that are difficult to predict.  
7.2.5.4 Financial Perspective 
The financial perspective reflects the amount of financial certainty and predictability an option 
provides to investors compared to other options. This is not expected to change within the 
coming years. Investors will appreciate certainty and predictability now and in the future. It is 
unlikely that this preference changes. The total amount of funding available for offshore grid 
investments may fluctuate, but the relative comparison of the options will remain the same. 
The assessment itself, as performed in chapter 7, is also not expected to change much, as it is 
a relatively clear-cut assessment as to whether the options deliver more or less financial 
certainty than other options. 
 
823 Due to the downwards pressure on integration, see Hooghe, Marks 2008. 
824 “The main idea is that such an internal market allows all the factors of production, labour, capital and 
enterprise, to move freely, generating maximum allocative efficiency and hence increasing overall wealth.” A. 
Cuyvers, ‘The EU Common Market’, in E. Ugirashebuja, J.E. Ruhangisa, T. Ottervanger, A. Cuyvers (Eds.) East 
African Community Law: Institutional, Substantive and Comparative EU Aspects (Brill Nijhoff 2017), p. 294. 
825 Hooghe, Marks 2008. 
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7.2.5.5 Environmental Perspective 
More research is needed on long term development of marine ecology with regard to the 
construction, operation and decommissioning of OWFs and offshore grid components. 
Further research would help to substantiate policy choices on the permitting requirements for 
OWFs and offshore grid assets, on maritime spatial planning considerations, and on the 
choices regarding the decommissioning of OWFs and grid infrastructure. The assessment on 
this issue may change when more insights in the long-term impact of the presence of 
submarine cables and of wind turbines and their foundations are available. As mentioned 
briefly already in section 5.1.1, the uncertainty concerning the long-term environmental 
impact and the complexity of the maritime ecology calls for ‘adaptive governance’, with which 
policy choices are regularly reiterated if new information becomes available.  
7.3 Analysis of Substantive Proposals 
In Part I of this dissertation, barriers to the construction of the offshore grid have been 
mentioned. They cover a variety of topics, which should be included in the legislative 
framework. This chapter, rather than only mentioning which topics should be covered, 
investigates what the possible options are to address the topics mentioned, and which options 
score highest from an economic, legal, socio-political, financial and environmental 
perspective. The topics addressed here follow the lifetime of the offshore grid, starting with 
governance and planning and continuing with project development issues, such as connection 
responsibilities, support schemes and regulatory supervision. After this, more practical issues 
are treated: offshore grid operation, dispute settlement and, finally, decommissioning. 
7.3.1 Governance of the MOG 
Governance can be defined as “the activity of governing a country or controlling a company 
or an organisation; the way in which a country is governed or a company or institution is 
controlled”.826 For the offshore grid, one possible definition, that can also be used for 
governance of the offshore grid is “the combination of heterarchical (non-hierarchical) and 
possibly hierarchical institutions (formal and informal) that guide decision-making in a 
networked multi-level, multi-actor system.”827 In this dissertation, the same definition of 
governance will be used, as the states around the North Sea can be considered heterarchical 
institutions (there is no hierarchy among states), while there is a hierarchy between the EU, 
coastal states and actors such as NRAs, TSOs and OWF developers. 
Governance of the offshore grid encompasses how decisions concerning the grid and its 
utilisation are made, for example relating to grid expansion and investment, technology 
choices, strategic decisions on whether other coastal states can join, and any other 
unforeseen events that require decisions to be taken. 
 
826 Oxford Dictionary online, “governance”. 
827 J. Gorenstein Dedecca derives this definition from M. Bevir, Governance as Theory, Practice, and Dilemma, 
in M.Bevir (ed.) SAGE Handbook of Governance (SAGE 2011). Gorenstein Dedecca 2018, p 23. 
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7.3.1.1 Decentral or central governance 
Governance of the grid can be organized in different ways; either decentralised, i.e. bilaterally 
between bordering states, or centrally, by all connected states together. For the continental 
synchronised onshore electricity grid, there is no longer a choice: since the interconnected AC 
network reacts to any change in any part of the network,828 a coordinated planning is strictly 
necessary. However, for the MOG, the electricity flows can be isolated from the onshore 
electricity flows and steered into a particular direction, which means that it is possible to 
develop a MOG in a decentralised manner, at least when certain standards (such as a 
standardised voltage level) are set. 
In a decentralised governance system, there will be less unity, as states may have a different 
negotiation strategy with one neighbour than with another neighbour, leading to different 
agreements across the North Sea.829 However, it may be more difficult to reach agreement 
when all states need to agree in a form of centralised governance.  
From an economic perspective, the decentralised option leads to higher transaction costs, as 
more negotiations need to take place and project developers need to adjust to different sets 
of rules in the different countries. Moreover, it is more likely that economies of scale exist 
when governance is organised at a central level. Therefore, decentralised governance scores 
(--) and centralised governance scores (+). From a legal perspective, decentralised governance 
is the status quo.830 Only minor changes to the legal framework will thus be needed (+). For a 
centralised governance system, a legal framework for this governance needs to be adopted, 
for example through the North Sea Agreement. This will take several years to develop and to 
adopt (-). From a socio-political perspective, centralised governance entails transferring some 
decision-making power from the national level to the regional (North Sea) level. In the current 
political climate, states seem to prefer keeping the decision-making power at national level 
rather than transferring it to a higher level (-).831 A decentralised system will keep more of the 
decision-making power at national level (+). From a financial perspective, centralised 
governance will deliver less diversity of how offshore grid investments are handled and how 
investors are treated within the system, which is positive (+) as investors know better what to 
expect. For the decentralised system, the opposite is true (-). From an environmental 
perspective, the decentralised governance is not expected to alter the environmental impact 
compared to current practice. The centralised governance system scores positively (+) as a 
 
828 A good example of the sensitivity of the synchronized continental electricity network is the effect of a 
conflict over electricity balancing between Kosovo and Serbia, which disturbed microwave clocks and alarm 
clocks throughout continental Europe, from Portugal to Poland. See BBC, ‘Kosovo-Serbia row makes Europe 
clocks go slow’, 7 March 2018. 
829 This is the practice for gas pipeline treaties in the North Sea, see section 2.4.4. 
830 States have bilateral negotiations and, if need be, bilateral agreements in case of joint or conflicting 
interests with regard to maritime affairs. There is a centralized framework that allows states, regulators and 
TSOs to discuss common developments via NSCOGI and NSEC, but this framework does not provide for any 
binding commitments. See section 5.2.2. 
831 As elaborated in section 7.2.2.3. 
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coherent centralised policy towards environmental protection in and between OWF zones is 
expected to have benefits for the protection of species and habitats. 
Table 5: Decentralised or Centralised Governance 
 Economic Legal Socio-Political Financial Environmental 
Decentralised -- + + - 0 
Centralised + - - + + 
 
From the analysis above, there is a slight preference for centralised governance. This is mainly 
due to the economic perspective. When there is more political will for a centralised solution, 
the legal perspective will also score higher, as the time needed to reach agreement and to 
implement international agreements depends on the willingness to engage in these 
agreements, which depends more on socio-political factors than on legal factors. 
The two options, ‘decentralised’ or ‘centralised’ lie very close to each other. If one parameter 
changes, this may change the recommendation – which makes this choice sensitive to any 
development in the assessment. The economic and socio-political perspectives are the 
parameters most prone to change: from an economic perspective, the more states participate 
in the grid, the more transaction costs can be expected in a decentralised system and the 
higher the benefits of centralised governance can be. With only a few states participating in 
the grid, the assessment will change. The socio-political perspective is prone to change due to 
the considerations elaborated upon in section 7.2.7.3: the willingness of states to act together 
or to act alone fluctuates, and the assessment on centralised decision-making may change 
depending on the political inclinations of the moment. 
 
7.3.1.2 Proactive or retroactive decision-making 
Another choice is whether to organise the governance of the MOG proactively or retroactively. 
This relates to the moment when decisions are made: should decisions be  made only when 
problems arise and when project developers file a request for a new connection or project (a 
retroactive and passive approach), or should a governing body, to be created by the North Sea 
Agreement, be developing plans and actively steering for a certain direction, which is a 
proactive approach. Both approaches are currently used,832 depending on the country and on 
the situation.  
From an economic perspective, a proactive approach scores higher than a retroactive 
approach. This is because a proactive approach to governance will ensure early adaptation to 
changing economic or technological conditions, leading to fewer stranded assets, avoiding 
unnecessary costs, and facilitating a faster development of the grid. From a legal perspective, 
 
832 For example, Norway and Sweden have an approach that can be called reactive: their policy and permit 
granting process depends on OWF developers’ initiatives. On the other hand, in the Netherlands, Germany and 
Denmark, proactive approaches to maritime spatial planning, permitting procedures and connection of 
offshore wind farms are used. See chapter 4 for more details. 
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both options score neutrally as for both, no laws will have to be adopted – it is rather a matter 
of implementation. From a socio-political perspective, it is generally preferred to govern 
proactively rather than waiting for problems to arise before solving them. From a financial 
perspective, a proactive approach gives more certainty to investors about future policy. This 
scores more positively than a reactive approach. No differences in environmental impact are 
expected from this choice. 
Table 6: Proactive or Retroactive Decision-making 
 Economic Legal Socio-Political Financial Environmental 
Proactive + 0 + + 0 
Retroactive - 0 - - 0 
 
The assessment above shows a clear preference for a proactive approach, which fits well with 
the approach already used by ENTSO-E and the TSOs in the governance of the onshore grid. 
Still, some countries, such as Norway and Sweden, currently have a rather reactive approach 
to offshore wind and offshore grid developments. These are also the countries that barely 
have any offshore wind activities.833 In further research, it could be analysed whether there is 
a causal relationship between the lack of activities and the reactive decision-making strategy, 
or vice versa, with the reactive decision-making causing a lack of interest of offshore wind 
energy developers. A negative spiral, with both affecting each other, is also possible.  
On almost all aspects, proactive decision-making scores higher than reactive decision-making. 
Even if the scoring changes on several aspects, the outcome will remain the same. Therefore, 
this recommendation is considered to be robust and not sensitive to developments in the 
parameters. 
 
7.3.1.3 Decision-Making Process 
Part of governance is the decision-making process itself. In a multi-level (EU, regional, Member 
States) and multi-stakeholder (TSOs, OWF developers, grid and OWF supply chain industry, 
other sea users) cooperation, it is important that decision-making processes are designed well, 
in order to run smoothly and to keep transaction costs for those participating in the MOG low. 
Otherwise, decision-making for the MOG may be paralysed by the number of different 
interests and difficulties with regard to political priorities that could change every few years.  
In order to give the organisation around the MOG sufficient decision-making power, coastal 
states should agree on how they want to establish the decision-making process. There are 
many parameters for this topic, such as who prepares the agenda, how topics are prepared 
 
833 Norway and Sweden respectively have 2 and 192 MW of installed capacity. The other North Sea coastal 
states all have more than 1 GW installed capacity. WindEurope, ‘Key Trends and Statistics 2018’, (2019), p. 12. 
The other states generally have far more installed capacity, although France can be considered an outlier in this 
trend. The installed capacity of offshore wind in France is only 2 MW (trial project), although there is a 
proactive policy towards offshore wind. This can be explained by delays in implementation of the offshore wind 
projects that are in the pipeline.  
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for decision-making, which voting procedure is used, the level of the persons involved in 
decision-making, whether unanimity, qualified majority or simple majority is needed, and the 
frequency of meetings. Different decision-making processes could be used for different types 
of decisions, depending on whether they have a more technical or a more political character. 
This makes it difficult to compare the options in a table. Thus, rather than evaluating all 
options, only general suggestions are made here. 
The decision-making process could be codified in the North Sea agreement that is proposed 
as a backbone for MOG governance.834 Similar to other regional agreements with joint 
decision-making and with both EU Member States and third states (the Rhine Convention and 
the Alpine Convention),835 a (bi)annual conference could serve to decide on important broad 
themes, such as the principles governing the grid,  the general direction of the MOG 
development (centralised or decentralised) and final decisions on standardisation of 
technology. Technical (standardisation), economic (regulation) and environmental 
(decommissioning) topics can be addressed at lower levels through a committee or working 
group structure. The latter reflects the decision-making structure of the Rhine and Alpine 
Conventions.836 
7.3.2  Spatial Planning of OWFs and Transmission Infrastructure 
The MOG will be constructed in order to connect OWFs. The location and extension of the grid 
will thus depend on where the OWFs are located, which depends on many factors, such as 
wind resources, seabed structure and other uses of the sea. Industry stakeholders have 
indicated that they appreciate a coordinated plan for OWF rollout, with a steady stream of 
projects.837 They have also described this as a ‘backbone structure’ providing them with 
information on what is going to be constructed, when and by whom.838  
In this subchapter, coordinated planning, location and grid extension are treated together, as 
the location and timing of OWF projects will determine where and when the grid needs to be 
extended and with what capacity, and, vice versa, cable trajectories and grid extension in a 
certain area will also facilitate OWF construction in that area, as a connection is closer and the 
connection costs, whether borne by society or by the OWF developer, will be lower if the OWF 
is located where there is capacity on the grid to evacuate the offshore generated electricity. 
At the moment, each state has a different system for deciding on the location of the OWFs 
and on the cable trajectory for the grid connection.839 For the governance of the MOG, it is 
relevant to make clear who decides where the OWFs and the cables are going to be located 
and how the grid is extended, and how these decisions are reached.  
 
834 See section 6.3. 
835 See section 6.2. 
836 Ibid. 
837 WindEurope, ‘Offshore Wind Energy in the North Sea, Industry Recommendations for the North Seas Energy 
Forum’, 2017, p. 4. 
838 Armeni et al. 2019, chapter 2, based on stakeholder interviews. 
839 Nieuwenhout (2017), chapter 5. See also, P. Bhagwat (2019), p. 63 ff. 
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7.3.2.1 Country-specific or regional (North-Sea) approach 
At the moment, coastal states have spatial planning laws for their own EEZ.840 Some also have 
a specific development plan which indicates which OWF zones will be connected in which 
year.841 Rather than nationally-oriented grid development plans, it is also possible to draft 
regional grid development plans that encompasses the entire North Sea MOG area. There is a 
relation between this topic and the topic of centralised or decentralised governance, but 
governance is much broader in scope than spatial planning. Therefore, regardless of whether 
governance in general is organised centrally or is decentralised, a decision should be made on 
the extent to which spatial planning and grid extension are coordinated. 
There is already an example of regional planning of electricity infrastructure, namely the ‘Ten 
Year Network Development Plan’ (TYNDP) process.842 For the planning of the meshed offshore 
grid, the TYNDP process will probably form an integral part of the grid planning process. To 
this end, the time horizon of the TYNDP, which is originally ten years but is in practice already 
longer (to 2040 in the 2018 version),843 should be kept sufficiently long term. Moreover, the 
forecasts on when and where OWFs will be constructed could be elaborated further by 
coordinating the location- and time-wise planning of OWFs between different states, in order 
to keep a steady pipeline of projects for the offshore wind manufacturing and installation 
industry. The question is, however, whether the United Kingdom would participate in the 
TYNDP process when they are no longer part of the EU (and possibly also no longer part of 
ENTSO-E) and when there is no technical necessity to cooperate as they are not in a 
synchronous AC grid with other European states. 
From the economic perspective, the major difference between the two options is the way the 
scarce space available at the North Sea is most efficiently used. By grouping OWFs in certain 
wind-resource rich areas, the MOG can also be developed in the most cost-effective way as 
less cable length is needed when OWFs are located close to each other. In several countries, 
this is currently done at a national level, but it could be more efficient if coordinated at 
European level (++), as that allows for placing the OWFs in the areas with the most 
advantageous wind resources and the lowest interference with the environment.844 When 
spatial planning is organised solely at national level, OWFs may be located much further from 
 
840 See section 4.1. 
841 This is the case for example in Germany (BSH, ‘Flächenentwicklungsplan 2019 für die deutsche Nord- und 
Ostsee’), and the Netherlands (Ministerie van Economische Zaken en Klimaat, 
Directoraat-generaal Klimaat en Energie, ‘Ontwikkelkader windenergie op zee’, actualisatie sept. 2018.  
842 The TYNDP is a pan-European network development plan updated every two years. It is drafted by ENTSO-E 
on the basis of the submissions of the TSOs. It analyses the planned projects and matches this with the 
scenarios on the development of electricity demand and supply, and makes visible where network congestion 
exists or may arise. The TYNDP and its drafting process is based on Directive (EU) 2019/944 on common rules 
for the internal market for electricity, OJ L 158, 14.6.2019, art. 51. Although it is based on EU legislation, its 
impact is larger than only the EU, as it also incorporates all non-EU Member States that are part of the 
synchronous continental grid in Europe. 
843 ENTSO-E, ‘Connecting Europe: Electricity 2025 - 2030 – 2040, Executive Summary’, (2019 Final version after 
consultation and ACER opinion), p. 40. 
844 This works best in combination with a joint support scheme, as described in section 4.4.4. 
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each other and less optimally organised, i.e. not in the areas with the highest amount of wind 
energy or the most favorable location criteria. This scores negatively (--) as it entails much 
higher costs for the MOG, since more cable length is required and more space is used. 
From a legal perspective, the speed of implementation will be lower if regional decision-
making is used (-), as this is more complex and further away from the status quo than country-
specific decision-making, meaning that it will need more time to be implemented. From a 
socio-political perspective, if multiple actors are involved in a bottom-up process of planning 
the usage of the sea, the socio-political acceptability will be higher but the more actors 
involved, the longer it may take to reach consensus. Governments as a central authority is 
neutral (0) – it is the status quo in many countries, so it does not need much implementation, 
but on the other hand, every tender needs to be prepared, which requires organisational 
capacity from governments. Regional decision-making scores slightly negatively (-) as it entails 
a transfer of authority from national states to a higher level, which some states do not deem 
acceptable. From a financial perspective, there are no differences when a different scope is 
used, as long as there is a predictable pipeline of projects and sufficient OWFs to connect. 
From an environmental perspective, a regional (North Sea) perspective would allow states to 
cooperate together to avoid sensitive areas (+), which is not always happening with a country-
specific approach (0). An example of this is the Dogger Bank: whereas the German authorities 
regard the Dogger Bank area as a no-go zone for OWFs (as a Special Area of Conservation),845 
the UK Crown Estate has licensed several gigawatts of OWF capacity in the UK part of the 
Dogger Bank area.846 Meanwhile, the Dutch and Danish TSOs are contemplating constructing 
an artificial island in this area.847 This example shows that the same sensitive area can be 
treated very differently with regard to offshore wind and offshore grid developments. In a 
coherent environmental policy, the same ecologically valuable area should be treated similarly 
on different sides of a maritime border, regardless of these borders.  
Table 7: Spatial Planning: Scope 
 Economic Legal Socio-Political Financial Environmental 
Country-specific -- + 0 0 0 
Regional (North Sea) ++ - - 0 + 
 
From the analysis above, the regional (North Sea) approach seems to deliver the most 
economic benefits, which compensates for the longer time needed to implement regional 
spatial planning. Also, the economic benefits may convince those who have political 
 
845 Bundesamt für Naturschutz: https://www.bfn.de/en/activities/marine-nature-conservation/national-
marine-protected-areas/north-sea-eez/dogger-bank-sac.html. 
846 The consortium behind the licenses is Forewind: http://forewind.co.uk/dogger-bank/overview.html. 
Recently, contracts for difference have been allocated to these OWFs: Contracts for Difference Allocation 
Round 3 Results – Published by BEIS on 20 September 2019, Revised on 11 October 2019.  
847 North Sea Wind Power Hub, https://northseawindpowerhub.eu/project/. See also: Renée Postma, 
‘Stroomfabriek Doggersbank’, NRC (Dutch newspaper), 11-6-2016. 
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difficulties with giving power to a higher authority, in order to organise regional spatial 
planning for OWFs and for the MOG.  
The difference between national and regional planning is small. It depends mainly on the 
estimate of the economic perspective; if this is changed, country-specific planning may be 
preferable above regional planning, as country-specific planning is faster and has lower 
transaction costs. Whether national or regional planning is recommendable also depends on 
the preferred grid development scenario as well: if the grid is based on a few large hubs that 
are connected to each other, country-specific planning will be more feasible, whereas if a 
decentralised meshed approach is chosen, regional planning is more important. Thus, this 
recommendation is sensitive to changes in the assessment, which might happen specifically 
in the economic perspective. 
 
7.3.2.2 Permitting System: Centralised, Zonal or Open-door 
There is a strong link between spatial planning considerations and the choice for organising 
the permitting system for offshore wind farms as a centralised system, with predetermined 
locations, or as an open-door system in which the developer decides freely on the location 
(within the boundaries of the law). A middle way, with predetermined wind farm zones in 
which developers can then choose their preferred location also exists. An open-door regime 
exists in Norway and Sweden.848 Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark have a centralised 
approach and the UK seeks the middle way with a zonal approach.849 The centralised approach 
allows preparation of tenders for OWFs and anticipatory investments in the MOG, as it is 
known at an early stage where OWF development will take place. On the other hand, open-
door and zonal approaches give more liberty to the project developers, to decide where they 
want to construct an OWF. This allows them to optimise the location of their OWF. 
From an economic perspective, advantageous areas in the North Sea, with good wind 
resources and not reserved for other, overriding interests, are scarce. Therefore, the most 
efficient spatial planning scores the highest. A centralised approach in which specific areas are 
dedicated to OWFs gives most certainty that the available space is used in the most efficient 
way. An additional benefit for the centralised approach is that authorities can prepare the 
OWF area in terms of seabed surveys and EIA, as is happening in the Netherlands (+).850 A 
zonal approach is in the middle (0) and for an open-door regime, efficient use of the available 
space is not guaranteed (-). 
From a legal perspective, there is no large difference between the options (0). The countries 
are currently divided over the three options, which means that for each option, some 
countries will have to change their legal system.  
 
848 See section 4.2.1. 
849 Ibid. 
850 See section 4.2.3. 
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The socio-political acceptability is high (+) when governments are in charge, at least, if they 
also involve stakeholders in their decision-making processes. Letting OWF developers decide, 
in an open-door regime, scores negatively (-), as it will be more difficult to find a compromise 
with the other users of the sea if the scarce space is not used in the most efficient way. The 
zonal approach also allows for efficient spatial planning, although slightly less than with the 
centralized approach (+). On the other hand, the zonal approach does allow for a little leeway 
for developers in choosing their location. 
From a financial perspective, it is important for investors that there are sufficient users of the 
MOG, which means that investors in the grid have the opportunity to recoup their 
investments.  If developers decide the location of the OWFs, in an open-door regime, it is less 
certain that there are sufficient users of the connecting grid infrastructure (-) than if this is 
decided through a centralised approach (+), which is more likely to ensure a steady roll-out of 
OWF projects to be connected to the MOG, in locations that are strategically close to each 
other, making the grid connection costs lower. Having a coordinated regional plan creates 
more certainty and long-term foresight into the project pipeline, for both developers and 
financiers.  
From an environmental perspective, a centralised or zonal approach gives power to the 
authorities to decide where OWFs will be located. If the planning authorities take into account 
environmentally sensitive areas, which they are required to do under EU environmental law 
and international law,851 this scores positively (+). Vice versa, when developers are free to 
decide where to locate their OWFs, it is less certain that environmental impact is taken into 
account in the location choice. 
Table 8: Permitting Approach for OWFs 
 Economic Legal Socio-Political Financial Environmental 
Centralised approach + 0 + + + 
Zonal approach 0 0 + + + 
Open-door regime - 0 - - - 
 
On the basis of the analysis above, the centralised option is the recommend option. This 
option leads to the largest economic benefits as it leads to the most efficient utilisation of the 
space available in the North Sea. This is under the condition that maritime spatial planning is 
well developed, that other stakeholders are also consulted and that states choose OWF 
locations on the basis of an evaluation of relevant criteria such as water depth, seabed surveys 
 
851 See sections 3.4.4.2 and 3.4.4.3 on EU environmental law, the obligations under international law are based 
on the OSPAR Convention, see section 2.2.3. It must be noted that the coastal states have a different 
interpretation of this in practice. 
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and wind resources. The experiences in the Netherlands and Denmark prove that states are 
able to do this.852 
The zonal approach received only a slightly lower score than the centralised approach. Thus, 
choosing an approach in which the potential locations are more or less clear (zonal and central 
approach) compared to the open-door approach is insensitive to future developments in the 
economic or socio-political perspective. The choice between centralised and zonal is sensitive 
to any changes in assessment of the parameters. In fact, the difference between centralised 
and zonal can be seen as a sliding scale, from larger to smaller areas in which OWFs are 
planned.  
 
7.3.2.3 Multiple-use of OWF areas 
At the moment, the status quo is that many coastal states have a 500 metre safety zone 
around OWFs (and cable trajectories),853 which means that it is not permitted to sail through 
an OWF area, or to fish in that area. This is the case for example in Belgium, the Netherlands 
and Germany, although exceptions may occur, for example with regard to small vessels 
(shorter than 24 metres).854 An exception is the United Kingdom, where OWF safety zones are 
much more limited and where, consequentially, fishing is allowed inside OWFs.855 Another 
exception is Denmark, where no mandatory safety zones exist during the operational phase 
of OWFs. Although the rules are less stringent in Denmark and the UK, the rules in the other 
coastal states imply a loss of fishing grounds for commercial fisheries,856 an important group 
of stakeholders regarding the development of different activities at sea.857 With a scarcity of 
space at sea, it is important to assess to what extent multiple use of OWF areas can be allowed. 
OWF areas could be used for example for aquaculture, fishing with certain technologies and 
shipping for smaller vessels, especially if the turbines are sufficiently far away from each other. 
 
852 See section 4.2.3. 
853 For cable trajectories, the safety zone entails that sailing across the cable is allowed but that anchoring and 
fishing with gear that disturbs the sea bottom is not allowed. 
854 See for Belgium: F. Maes, ‘Hernieuwbare Energie en Scheepvaart’ in A. Cliquet, F. Maes (Eds.), Recht door 
Zee, Hedendaags Internationaal Maritiem en Zeerecht (Maklu, 2015) p. 70-71. For the Netherlands, an 
experiment allowing small vessels (until 24 metres) to sail through certain OWFs, at day time and while 
respecting a number of safety rules, is currently running: https://www.noordzeeloket.nl/functies-
gebruik/windenergie-zee/doorvaart-medegebruik/. Fishing (except with a fishing rod) is still not allowed. In 
Germany, the rules differ per OWF, but in some OWFs, sailing through an OWF safety zone is permitted under 
certain circumstances. The exceptions are listed in documents called Allgemeinverfügung, published by Wasser 
und Schifffahrtsverwaltung des Bundes (WSV). See for example: WSV, Allgemeinverfügung 7 June 2016 
concerning the OWF ‘Dan Tysk’, available at: https://www.elwis.de/DE/Seeschifffahrt/Offshore-
Windparks/Dan-Tysk.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3. Here, also, except for rods, usage of fishing gear is not 
allowed. 
855 See D. Davies, ‘FLOWW Best Practice Guidance for Offshore Renewables Developments: Recommendations 
for Fisheries Liaison’, p. 34 for an overview of when and where safety zones are allowed. 
856 V. Stelzenmüller et al.,‘Co-location of passive gear fisheries in offshore wind farms in the German EEZ of the 
North Sea: A first socio-economic scoping’, Journal of Environmental Management, [2016 183], 794-805, p. 
797-798. See also K. Bolongaro, ‘Fishermen and wind farms struggle to share the sea’, Politico 29-12-2017. 
857 T. Gray, C. Haggett, D. Bell, ‘Offshore wind farms and commercial fisheries in the UK: A study in Stakeholder 
Consultation’, Ethics Place and Environment [2005 8:2] 127-140, p. 129. 
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It is also possible to dedicate the space between wind turbines for nature protection.858 In the 
future, more usage possibilities could be envisaged and developed. 
Whether or not a certain activity is compatible with the OWF and offshore grid development 
in a certain region depends on many factors, such as the space requirements of the activity, 
support for innovation, business case, whether or not there is a chance of damage of the 
turbines or the grid components and the willingness to use the space between turbines. 
Rather than assessing all possible usages for the space between wind turbines there are at the 
moment, it is sufficient to generally assess whether multiple use in general should be allowed 
or not. Whether a specific project should be allowed can then be assessed on a case-by-case 
basis. 
From an economic perspective, space is a scarce commodity. When many OWFs are installed 
in the North Sea, a significant amount of space is lost to other activities, such as fisheries, 
aquaculture, tourism and shipping. From an economic perspective, using the space between 
OWFs for other activities increases the economic profit of that area compared to the status 
quo, where no other vessels (except maintenance vessels) are allowed inside an OWF. 
Although there may be extra costs to make the area ready for multiple use, for example by 
placing extra markings (buoys) inside an OWF rather than only around the OWF, these costs 
are relatively small compared to the benefits which may be gained from other activities, such 
as aquaculture (+). However, it must be noted that the balance between the costs and the 
benefits differs per activity. From a legal perspective, some laws will have to be amended in 
order to allow multiple use, which will take some time.859 From a socio-political perspective, 
more groups of stakeholders can be served if the space between wind turbines is used for 
other purposes. Therefore, making it possible for other stakeholders to access this space for 
other activities scores positively. Retaining current restrictions scores neutrally. From a 
financial perspective, multiple use of the area adds complexity and entails more risks, for 
example risks to damage cables and installations, which may increase the cost of capital as the 
perceived risks are greater. Therefore, allowing other activities in OWF areas scores negatively 
(-).  
From an environmental perspective, not allowing any other activity inside an OWF creates 
‘safe havens’ for maritime ecology with positive effects partially from the absence of fisheries 
or other human activities in the area.860 The absence of fisheries is not only expected to have 
a positive effect on the targeted fish species, but also on other parts of the ecosystem, such 
as harbour porpoises and grey seals. Therefore, allowing fisheries inside OWF areas has a 
 
858 The project “De Rijke Noordzee” is currently experimenting with nature conservation between wind turbine 
foundations in OWF Luchterduinen. Information is available at www.derijkenoordzee.nl. 
859 The Dutch Noordzeeoverleg (North Sea Dialogue) is an example of a holistic spatial planning approach for 
the entire Dutch part of the North Sea. In the process, many stakeholders are included. This is supposed to lead 
to a Dutch North Sea Agreement in which the government and different stakeholders state their commitments 
and agreements with regard to developments in the North Sea. 
860 H.J. Lindeboom et al., ‘Short-term ecological effects of an offshore wind farm in the Dutch coastal zone; a 
compilation’ Environmental Research Letters [2011 6] 035101, p. 8. 
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strongly negative environmental impact (--), whereas keeping OWFs free from fisheries has a 
strongly positive impact (++). It must be noted that other human activities, such as sailing 
through a specified corridor inside an OWF or exemptions for small vessels that are not fishing 
vessels will have less environmental impact. This could be taken into account in policy on this 
topic, for example through case-by-case exceptions for activities with relatively small 
environmental impact. 
Table 9: Multiple Use of OWF Areas 
 Economic Legal Socio-Political Financial Environmental 
Allowed + - + - -- 
Not allowed - + 0 0 ++ 
 
The difference between the two options is small, in favour of not allowing multiple use. 
However, it can be adapted by only allowing activities from which no negative environmental 
impact is expected (such as the exception for small, non-fishing vessels described above).  
 
7.3.3 Connection Responsibility 
At the moment, in different countries, different parties have the responsibility for connecting 
OWFs to the onshore grid. These can be the onshore TSO, the OWF developer or a third party, 
such as an OFTO. For the MOG, the first question is whether the same party across the region 
is responsible for connecting OWFs. The second question, if the first question is answered 
affirmatively, is which entity should connect the OWFs. In some coastal states, the connection 
responsibility is coupled to the discussion of grid ownership: the entity responsible for 
connecting the OWFs is also the grid owner and operator (as explained in section 4.3, this is 
the case for example in the Netherlands and Germany). However, it is not necessary that the 
connection responsibility, the ownership of the grid and the operation of the grid are in the 
same hands. For example, after construction of an OWF connection, the asset can be 
transferred to another party. Moreover, it is also possible to split ownership of the grid and 
operation of the grid. In this section,  
Regarding the first question, whether grid ownership and connection responsibilities need to 
be harmonised across the region, having the same (type of) entity responsible for the grid and 
the connection of OWFs facilitates cooperation. When a regulated entity, such as a TSO, and 
a commercial entity, such as the OWF developer, have to agree on investments, they may 
have very different interests: maximising their revenues on a relatively short timeframe vs. 
cost-effective development of a reliable electricity network over a much longer timeframe. 
Also, the coherence of grid operation and planning becomes more difficult when more 
(different) entities with different interests have to be involved. This becomes clear for example 
when anticipatory investments have to be made in a first connection in order to facilitate the 
connection of a second OWF several years later. The willingness to make this type of 
investment may be different for different entities. 
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From an operational perspective, there is no need to harmonise the grid connection 
responsibility of all OWFs. Instead, it suffices to harmonise the technical standards, in order 
to ensure operational safety and compatibility between different parts of the grid.   
Regarding the second question, which entity should be responsible for the connection of 
OWFs, is subject to debate. At the moment, three systems exist in parallel. In most countries, 
the (onshore) TSO has the responsibility to connect OWFs to the onshore grid or to an offshore 
grid.861 In others, the OWF itself is responsible for the connection to the onshore grid – in 
other words, the grid connection takes place on land and the infrastructure upstream of this 
connection is owned and operated by the OWF owner. A third option is the OFTO-model, in 
which private investors own and operate the cable between the OWF and the onshore grid 
(although the cable connection is usually first constructed by the OWF developer and only 
transferred to the OFTO before commissioning of the OWF).862 
From an economic perspective, the first option, connection by TSOs, has the advantage that 
TSOs have a long-term perspective on grid development.863 This makes it easier to facilitate 
anticipatory investments and to facilitate a cost-effective development of the MOG on the 
long term (++). Also, research has shown that TSO-based OWF connections are currently more 
cost-effective than the alternatives.864 On the other hand, earlier research has shown the 
third-party (OFTO) system to be most cost-effective for the connection of OWFs, even when 
one accounts for the higher transaction costs needed for the tender process to decide which 
party receives the right to own and operate the connection.865 However, the latter does not 
take into account the possibility of clustering OWFs and connecting them to an offshore grid, 
which requires long-term coordination of investments. The developer-based system does not 
support anticipatory investments unless the OWF developer is also the developer of the OWFs 
further away or the entire hybrid asset. With a more complex grid, this is more difficult, as it 
may not yet be known who will be the developer of the OWFs further away, or the connection 
may be to another part of an existing grid with existing OWFs owned by other companies. This 
leads to suboptimal development of the MOG. Therefore, the TSO-based system will lead to 
more benefits in the long term than the third party-based system (+). Moreover, from the 
viewpoint of market power, especially taking into account the essential facilities doctrine,866 
it is not advantageous to let the OWF owners, which have specific interests in production 
facilities, operate the connection (--). 
From the legal perspective, the TSO-based and developer-based systems are the least difficult 
to implement. With a third party based system, a more complex legal system needs to be in 
 
861 See section 4.3.1. 
862 Ibid. 
863 Directive 2019/944 on common rules for the internal market for electricity, art. 2(35): Definition TSO:, (…) 
ensuring the long-term ability of the system to meet reasonable demands for the transmission of electricity. 
864 https://www.tennet.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/Company/News/Dutch/2019/20190624_DNV_GL_ 
Comparison_Offshore_Transmission_update_French_projects.pdf.  
865 CEPA, ‘Evaluation of OFTO Tender round 2 and 3 Benefits’ (Ofgem, 2016) p. 43. 
866 See footnote 440 above for an explanation of the essential facilities doctrine. 
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place – as there are more interfaces where the parties need to cooperate (OWF – third party; 
third party – TSO; third party – another third party), which means that the legal framework 
should provide for these interactions and describe what norms the different parties have to 
abide to.  
From the socio-political perspective, the TSO-based system has a slight preference in many 
coastal states. In part, this is because the TSO is in public hands in several coastal states, which 
is sometimes even a legislative norm in these countries.867 This gives states the possibility to 
influence the way the grid is constructed and governed. If the TSO is not in public hands, the 
influence in the way the grid is constructed and governed has to take place via the regulatory 
authority, but this influence is less strong than the direct influence of the state as stakeholder. 
As the reliance of the onshore grid on the offshore grid becomes larger, this preference will 
also become larger. Both the developer-based system and the third party-based system entail 
a departure from publicly owned and governed grids, which is the status quo in, for example, 
Denmark and the Netherlands. In the UK, the system is the reverse. There, a strong preference 
for having OWF grid connections in private hands is visible. The onshore TSO (national grid) is 
also not in public hands in the UK as shares in the company are available on the stock 
exchange.868 Germany has opted for a middle way: out of the four TSOs, two are owned by 
the parent companies of the Dutch and Belgian TSOs (respectively TenneT and 50Hertz (80%, 
the other 20% being owned by German development bank KfW). TransNetBW is owned by the 
state of Baden-Württemberg and Amprion is in private hands, with its shares divided between 
institutional investors (74.9%) and RWE AG (25.1%). 
From a financial perspective, the third party-based system has as an advantage in that it 
facilitates financing from the private sector (++). This is important as the construction of a 
MOG creates a large financial burden that will probably be difficult to bear by TSOs (-).869 The 
developer-based system also allows for access of private capital to grid investments, more 
than the TSO-based system. However, this is limited to the OWF developers, which makes the 
score lower than the third party-based system (+), in which any investor with a long-term 
perspective could participate. No differences in environmental impact between these 
approaches are expected. 
Table 10: Connection of OWFs 
 Economic Legal Socio-Political Financial Environmental 
TSO-based ++ + + - 0 
Developer-based -- + - + 0 
Third party-based + -- - ++ 0 
 
 
867 Armeni et al. 2019, p. 29. 
868 https://investors.nationalgrid.com/debt-investors/group-structure.  
869 Armeni et al. 2019, p. 85. 
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Based on the analysis above, the recommended option is to make the TSO responsible for the 
connection of OWFs and for the construction of a meshed offshore grid. The long-term 
perspective helps them make investments that are valuable from a socio-economic 
perspective. An important point of attention is that methods need to be developed to attract 
sufficient funds for the large investments needed for the MOG.870 
Within the TSO-based system, one possibility could be to establish a common North Sea TSO. 
Such an entity could organise grid planning and ownership on behalf of the coastal states,871 
and secure the operational security of the grid. Especially when a substantial share of 
electricity used in coastal states is (offshore) wind, it becomes attractive to be able to control 
the output of single OWFs with the aim of reducing the total cost of the combined 
infrastructure of offshore grid and wind farms. When such a North Sea TSO requires certain 
OWFs to limit their output (curtailment) to the benefit of all users of the offshore electricity 
grid, it is logical that the ‘costs’ are also shared by all participants, regardless of the country 
they are in. However, this would be a large step away from the current situation, with many 
regulatory implications. A ‘light’ version of this would be to have a North Sea system operator, 
which allows for different ownership models (depending on the differing preferences of the 
coastal states) but which makes sure that the system is operated in a coordinated way. 
In the assessment table, the difference between TSO-based, developer-based and third party-
based grid connections is not large, which means that the analysis can change when the 
assessment changes. The difference depends on the interplay between the economic 
perspective and the financial perspective, specifically the possibility of attracting sufficient 
investment to finance the offshore grid. If the economic assessment of third-party based 
solutions becomes more positive than TSO-based, or if the legal implementation becomes less 
difficult, the third-party based solution may be recommended rather than the TSO-based 
model. This recommendation is sensitive (but not highly so) to changes in the assessment of 
the parameters. 
7.3.4  Support Schemes 
Support schemes facilitate the development of OWFs. Although this dissertation is more 
about the offshore grid than about the OWFs connected to it, the rules on support schemes 
greatly influence the willingness of OWF developers to develop OWFs that are to be connected 
to the MOG (rather than investment in radially connected OWFs). After all, without OWFs to 
connect, there is also less need for a MOG. Therefore, the topic of support schemes for OWFs 
is relevant to include in a legal framework that facilitates the development of a MOG. 
At several competitive tenders for the construction and operation of offshore wind farms, it 
may seem that no support is needed anymore.872 However, it is important to examine this 
 
870 Ibid. 
871 Armeni et al. 2019, p. 66 discusses the different varieties of ownership models and their advantages and 
disadvantages. 
872 See the introduction of section 4.4 above. 
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claim in more detail. First, the zero-subsidy auctions have so far only occurred in states where 
the export cable is financed and constructed by the TSO, thus, developers do not have to pay 
these costs. The export cable costs are either subsidised separately or socialised through the 
general grid tariffs all electricity consumers pay.873 Secondly, zero-subsidy bids are only 
possible in countries with a stable and mature offshore wind energy supporting regulatory 
regime. In less stable regimes or regimes with less favourable conditions, zero-subsidy bids 
will probably not occur. Third, the costs of offshore wind are also influenced by the steel price, 
the fuel price and the (lack of) investment in the offshore oil and gas industry. Thus, even 
though currently very low or zero subsidy tenders occur for offshore wind,874 it is still relevant 
for the regulatory framework for the MOG to include provisions on how support schemes 
should be treated when OWFs are connected to multiple coastal states.  
There is a strong link between the way the OWFs are connected, the market rules applicable 
to the OWFs, and the level of financial support needed for OWF developers. Some states only 
provide support when the electricity generated at an OWF is fed into the national grid of that 
state.875 For OWFs connected to a MOG, this cannot be guaranteed. Therefore, in order for a 
MOG to develop, a separation between physical electricity flows and market flows should be 
considered as an alternative to the current system (section 7.3.4.1). The next choice is 
whether a national or regional support scheme should be preferred (section 7.3.4.2) and how 
this support scheme should be financed (section 7.3.4.3). 
7.3.4.1 Separation market flows – physical flows 
Some North Sea coastal states used to have a clause in the legislative framework for their 
renewable energy support schemes that the electricity must be fed into the national 
transmission (or distribution) grid of the state that gives the financial support. This clause is 
harmless for renewable energy installations located onshore. However, for offshore wind 
energy, this proves to be a barrier to the development of the MOG,876 as one of the 
fundamental characteristics of the MOG is that it allows electricity to flow to different 
countries, depending on where the demand is the highest. In a MOG, it is no longer possible 
to say beforehand to which country the electricity physically flows. An alternative to this 
approach is to decouple physical flows from market flows. This is done for example in the case 
of the Kriegers Flak Combined Grid Solution.877 In this way, OWF developers still have one 
market to take into account, similar to if they were connected radially, and states can be 
reassured that the economic benefits of the OWF, namely a reduced electricity price,878 flow 
 
873 See section 4.3. 
874 WindEurope, ‘Wind energy in Europe in 2018 – Trends and Statistics’ (2019), p. 21. 
875 See section 5.2.5. 
876 Ibid. 
877 See section 3.5.2 above. 
878 As OWFs have low marginal costs, they pull down the electricity price by pushing more expensive plants out 
of the market. 
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to the state in whose EEZ the OWF is located. At the same time, cross-border electricity flows 
are facilitated by marketing the remaining capacity on a connection. 
Other countries have overcome this problem by changing the definition of where electricity 
must be exported to, for example by adding ‘or offshore grid’ to the requirement that the 
electricity should be fed into the national electricity grid, as happened in the Netherlands. In 
Germany, the Renewable Energy Act was amended to include the possibility of a joint support 
scheme.879 The conditions mentioned in the Act are that the other states should be EU 
Member States, that they have a similar scheme or open up their national support scheme for 
German participation (reciprocity), and that the electricity has to physically be imported into 
Germany or has a similar effect on the German wholesale electricity market. This last condition 
is interesting in the context of the analysis in this paragraph: with the last phrase, Germany 
allows for electricity that does not physically flow to Germany to still receive support, provided 
it has a similar effect on the German electricity market. 
For the development of a MOG, it is a necessity that the support schemes for OWFs connected 
to the MOG are not limited only to electricity that is physically fed exclusively into the 
(onshore) national transmission grid. 
7.3.4.2 Support Scheme Design: national or regional 
When the market flows are decoupled from the physical flows, there are still many choices to 
be made. There are various options for the design of support schemes, namely the design of 
the competitive tender to determine which party will receive the permission to construct and 
operate a wind farm and to receive support,880  and to what extent bidders have to make costs 
before the tender.881 However, in this paragraph, the main question is whether support 
schemes should be designed for only one state or for the entire region.  
Support schemes for offshore wind are currently organised nationally, with OWFs receiving 
support from the one coastal state they are connected to, which is the coastal state of the EEZ 
in which the wind farm is located. In future grid designs, this may differ when OWFs are no 
longer only connected to one country but rather to a meshed grid, in which it is impossible to 
discern to which country the electricity flows. In order to make this more acceptable from a 
socio-political point of view, the support scheme design and financing of the support scheme 
should be reconsidered. 
Support could be organised on a national basis, but with decoupled physical flows and market 
flows. This is the practice for Baltic 1 and 2 and Kriegers Flak, all connected to the Kriegers Flak 
combined grid solution.882 In this way, even though the electricity may physically flow to 
 
879 German Renewable Energy Act (Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz), art. 5(3). 
880 See L. Kitzing et al., ‘Auctions for Renewable Energy Support: Lessons Learned in the AURES Project’, IAEE 
Energy Forum [2019 3]. 
881 This depends on whether the state prepares the tender, for example by providing sea-bed surveys, wind and 
water data, an environmental impact assessment etc. See section 4.2.3. 
882 Nieuwenhout 2018. 
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another country, the market flow is towards the coastal state. In this way, the coastal state 
still has the benefits (lower wholesale electricity price; more liquidity), whereas the 
connection to the MOG is not blocked. It must be noted that the benefits for the coastal state 
also depend on the interconnector capacity. The downwards pressure on the electricity prices 
of OWF developers selling their electricity on the wholesale electricity market of the coastal 
state is diminished again by using the same offshore grid connection in the reverse direction, 
as an interconnector, to export electricity, as this increases the prices on the wholesale 
electricity market again (as this reduces the supply side of the market, albeit to a limited 
extent). 
Another option is to organise support schemes in a joint, regional, way. This could be for 
example through a joint fund in which the countries connected to the MOG participate. The 
legal basis of such a fund could be a specific agreement such as the agreement between 
Norway and Sweden on their joint support scheme.883 This type of support scheme is also 
supported by the cooperation mechanisms of the Renewable Energy Directive.884 
From an economic perspective, the option to be recommended for the cost-effective 
development of the MOG is the option that places OWFs relatively close to each other, in 
order to allow for clustering and for strategic connections, such as ‘stepping stone 
connections’.885 Regionally organised support schemes score slightly positive, as countries 
may decide to fund OWFs in the location with the most beneficial circumstances, whatever 
country that may be.886 This leads to a more efficient use of the funds for offshore wind 
energy, as less financial support is needed when OWFs are constructed there where the yield 
is the highest. Also, it leads to a more cost-effective development of the MOG if the OWF 
tenders are organised in such a way that OWFs close to each other are developed within the 
same time period, as this allows joint grid connections. Nationally oriented support schemes 
lead to a suboptimal division of OWFs and grid development (-), as the location and size of the 
OWFs is then mainly determined by the national support system rather than by what the 
optimal location would be based on yield and grid development perspective. 
From a legal perspective, national support schemes are the status quo, no changes need to be 
made (+). For regional support schemes, some changes will need to be made (-), but it must 
be noted that these changes all fit within the system of cooperation mechanisms as available 
in EU law since 2009.887 With this system, cooperation in support schemes between EU states 
 
883 See section 4.4.4. 
884 See section 3.4.2. 
885 Ministerie van Economische Zaken en Klimaat, Directoraat-generaal Klimaat en Energie, ‘Ontwikkelkader 
Windenergie op Zee’, geactualiseerd september 2018, p. 14 (in Dutch, the stepping stone approach is referred 
to as ‘stapsteen naar verder gelegen gebieden’). 
886 The experience from a joint solar photovoltaic tender between Germany and Denmark teaches us that this 
may depend rather on the regulatory regime in place (local rules and conditions, tax conditions), than on 
geographical conditions. 
887 See section 3.4.2. 
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and third states is also possible, which would allow the UK to participate as well – if the UK is 
willing to engage in this. Whether this is the case, is treated in the next paragraph. 
The largest differences occur in the socio-political perspective. When, inside a MOG, national 
support schemes are used, most countries are funding electricity that will then flow to another 
country. This means that the costs, paid by public funds, lie in one country, whereas the 
benefits, namely a lower wholesale electricity market price, lie in another country. Except for 
the country on the receiving side, this will be difficult to accept from a socio-political 
perspective. In a regionally organised support scheme, it is possible to prevent this by 
calculating the support scheme based on which country benefitted from the OWF, based on 
the actual electricity flows.888 It is estimated that this option is more acceptable from a socio-
political perspective, as the costs lie with the country where the benefits are. On the other 
side, states like to keep control over their support schemes, which is easier with nationally 
oriented support schemes than with regional support schemes. Nevertheless, the system is 
limited to only offshore wind energy, which means that for all other sources, states still keep 
control over the support schemes and sources of electricity. Therefore, this negative aspect 
does not weigh up to the benefits of a fairer division of support, based on the ‘beneficiary 
pays’ principle. Thus, for the North Sea at large, regional orientation scores positively (+). One 
notable exception to this is the United Kingdom, as it may be politically difficult for the UK and 
the EU coastal states to work together on a common support scheme for offshore wind 
energy, especially if this common support scheme is mainly based on EU law. This does not 
necessarily have to be the case, as for example the common support scheme between Norway 
and Sweden is based on an international agreement and on national laws in the two countries. 
Nevertheless, with the current political situation, it is unlikely that the UK would participate in 
a common support scheme for the North Sea. However, a regional support scheme will also 
work if not all North Sea coastal states participate. 
No differences in environmental impact are expected from this choice. Also, from a financial 
perspective, there is no difference between the options for the financing of the MOG.  
Table 11: Support Scheme Design 
 Economic Legal Socio-
Political 
Financial Environmental 
National support schemes - + - 0 0 
Regional support scheme + - + 0 0 
 
From the analysis above, it appears that for OWFs connected to the MOG, it is recommend to 
pursue a regionally organised support scheme rather than a nationally oriented support 
scheme. This is because with a nationally oriented scheme, one country may be subsidising 
 
888 With HVDC networks, it is possible to steer electricity flows and to discern where they originate. With AC 
networks, this is hardly possible. 
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electricity that then flows directly to another country, which is politically less acceptable than 
a system in which the receiving country pays for the support (beneficiary pays principle). 
The difference between a regional and national support scheme is small. This is because the 
legal and socio-political perspective oppose each other and keep each other in balance. The 
balance is on the regional support scheme now, because the economic assessment scores 
more positively there. However, both the economic and the socio-political assessment may 
change. Therefore, this recommendation is sensitive to changes in the assessment. 
 
7.3.4.3 Financing of Support Schemes 
Alongside the way the support is organised, it is important for the socio-political acceptability 
of the MOG to elaborate on how a regionally organised support scheme should be financed, 
as this allows states to agree on a fair division of the costs and benefits, rather than the status 
quo in which states risk financing OWFs that produce electricity that predominantly flows to 
other countries. Three types of financing are possible. The first possibility is that each country 
participating in the fund contributes equally. This is the case in the joint support scheme 
between Norway and Sweden.889 The upside of this division is that it is easy to understand and 
to foresee the costs. The downside is that it can be deemed unfair if there are large differences 
in installed capacity between the coastal states and if the benefits of the scheme are unevenly 
distributed, which may make states less willing to participate in a joint support scheme. Thus, 
as a second option, in order to come to a fair contribution of each country, the country that 
benefits from the electricity at a given moment should finance the support for that moment. 
It could be calculated ex-post which country benefited from the electricity. This could be 
calculated on a monthly or yearly basis. In order for this option to be a success, decoupling 
between physical flows and market flows is still necessary, but the obligation that electricity 
produced by OWFs should be marketed in the coastal state needs to be removed. A third 
option is to fund the scheme through EU funding, for example via a specific part of the financial 
instruments of the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), which is currently used for financial 
support of projects that contribute to the trans-European network for electricity.890 In order 
for the CEF to be able to fund this type of projects, an amendment procedure is needed. 
Moreover, the UK will not be able to benefit from CEF funding. However, as mentioned above, 
it can be doubted anyway whether the UK would want to participate in a common support 
scheme for the North Sea offshore grid in the current political situation.  
From an economic perspective, there is in principle no difference in the costs and benefits (0) 
between these options, as it only determines where the support comes from, not how much 
the support should be. The three options are all oriented towards a regional form of support, 
which means that the benefits will be more or less the same. The costs may vary slightly 
 
889 See section 4.4.4.  
890 See section 3.4.5. 
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depending on the transaction costs, but this depends rather on the implementation than on 
the form of the fund.  
From a legal point of view, it will be less complex to introduce a fund in which all states 
participate equally (+), than it is to design a fund in which states participate on the basis of 
actual electricity flows (-). Support for OWFs on the basis of the CEF fund will have a longer 
implementation time (-), as such an instrument would need to go through the entire legislative 
procedure of the EU.891  
The most important parameter for this table is socio-political acceptability. A solution in which 
the states contribute equally will not be acceptable for the smaller states and for states with 
low electricity prices compared to the other coastal states, meaning that the offshore 
generated electricity will on average flow away from their EEZ towards other coastal states. 
Thus, the option ‘every state pays equally’ scores very low (--). Moreover, the issue flagged in 
the preceding paragraph, that some countries will mostly contribute but not receive the 
benefits, is not solved with this option. A fund based on the actual electricity flows (and thus 
coupled to which state receives the benefits of the installed OWF capacity) is much fairer – 
the state that benefits will pay for the fund. As this is difficult to predict in advance, it can be 
divided on the basis of ex post calculation, on for example a monthly or yearly basis. In order 
to limit the risks for states, the total amount of support or the maximum contribution per 
country could be capped. This would make the scheme more complicated but it could relieve 
political hesitance due to the large sums of money needed for such a fund. Support on the 
basis of EU instruments will probably score high on socio-political acceptability for the North 
Sea states, but the states not connected to the North Sea will be less willing to agree to such 
a scheme, resulting in an average (0).  
Another complexity linked to the socio-political perspective as well as to the economic 
perspective, is that the final benefits of the generated electricity may not lie within one of the 
North Sea states but rather with states connected to the North Sea states via the 
interconnected AC networks.892 This means that states will either have to add a layer of 
complexity to the funding scheme in order to account for this, which implies additional 
transaction costs, or they will have to accept that this is inherent to participating in cross-
border synchronous electricity grids. This is no novelty that occurs specifically due to the MOG. 
It already happens today, with renewable electricity produced from onshore and offshore 
sources that are also funded from national support schemes.893 The reason why it should still 
be mentioned here are twofold: the MOG may make it more visible that electricity flows from 
an OWF do not reach the coastal state but go directly to another country. In onshore electricity 
 
891 CEF is created through the CEF Regulation, see section 3.4.5.  
892 See www.electricitymap.org for a real-time overview of primary sources of electricity as well as electricity 
flows between states. This map shows the complexity of electricity flows. 
893 When there is a large supply of (onshore and offshore) wind energy in Northern Germany, it is transported 
as much as possible to adjacent states, due to market dynamics and due to the fact that there is congestion 
inside the German electricity transmission network. 
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systems, this is covered by the complexity of the electricity market, but with offshore cables, 
the flows can be made visible much more easily. The second reason is that the MOG connects 
large capacities of renewable energy, which means that the effect is larger and therefore more 
visible. 
It is not expected that the source of the OWF support will have a significant impact on the 
provision of private capital for the MOG, as long as it is clear that there is a stable support 
system for the main parties connected to the MOG, namely OWFs. Also, no differences in 
environmental impact are expected from this choice. 
Table 12: Funding of Support Schemes 
 Economic Legal Socio-
Political 
Financial Environm’l 
Equal funding per country 0 + -- 0 0 
Based on electricity flows 0 - ++ 0 0 
EU funding 0 - 0 0 0 
 
Following the analysis above, the recommended way of funding a support scheme is 
calculation on the basis of electricity flows. The specifics of the funding arrangements should 
be developed in further (economic) research. It must be noted that for this topic, the options 
do not always exclude each other. For example, co-financing of the scheme via EU funding 
could be envisaged alongside funding from the participating member states. Nevertheless, on 
the basis of the analysis above, there are no specific benefits to funding from the EU rather 
than funding from the member states. 
The results only differ in their assessment of the legal and socio-political parameters. As the 
socio-political assessment is not likely to change, the sensitivity of the recommendation to 
changes in the assessment is low. The socio-political assessment is not likely to change 
because the underlying ideas, that the division of the costs should be fair, for example based 
on the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle,894 are widespread among different countries, societal 
groups and political ideologies. They are not likely to change within the coming years. 
7.3.5 Regulatory Supervision 
Due to the large upfront investments needed to construct offshore transmission 
infrastructure and the small marginal costs of extra users on the grid, the MOG is considered 
a natural monopoly.895 A form of regulation is needed in order to compensate for the lack of 
competitive pressure due to the monopolistic character of the grid.896 A sector cannot be 
regulated without implementation of the rules, and supervision of whether the rules are 
adhered to. In practice, the tariffs and conditions for access need to be assessed and the 
 
894 P. Bhagwat 2019, p. 128 and further. 
895 See chapter 3.5.2. The transmission of electricity in general is deemed to be a natural monopoly: J. Perloff, 
Microeconomics (Pearson 2009, 5th ed) p. 369/70 
896 Ibid. 
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performance of the grid owner in terms of efficiency and reliability of the grid need to be 
evaluated. For the onshore electricity grid, these tasks are fulfilled by NRAs, either as an 
independent entity for the energy sector (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, UK) or as part of a 
larger antitrust and competition agency (the Netherlands).897 For the MOG, it can be discussed 
whether the same system should be used as for onshore grid regulation, or whether the 
special character of the MOG requires a different kind of regulation and/or a different 
regulatory authority.  
The MOG requires regulatory decisions on a regular basis, and these decisions will be cross-
border by nature. There is a risk of disorganised or slow decision-making processes when 
many regulatory authorities are in charge, when it is not clear which authorities are in charge 
of cross-border assets or when unanimity is required for any decision. Therefore, the legal 
framework for the MOG should include provisions on how the offshore grid should be 
regulated and who should regulate the grid. 
Various options for the regulatory supervision of the MOG are available. However, before 
analysing the options in detail, it is important to be aware of the interdependencies between 
these choices and earlier choices about ownership and operation of the offshore grid. If the 
grid is owned by one entity, it should be regulated as one grid, in order to make sure that the 
grid is operated and developed in an optimal way from a regional perspective. With regional 
ownership of the grid in combination with nationally oriented regulation, there may be 
perverse incentives to develop the grid in a nationally oriented way, even though this is 
suboptimal from a regional (North Sea) socio-economic perspective. Moreover, if the grid is 
owned by multiple entities, there should be regulatory decisions for each entity individually, 
due to the principles of (national) administrative law. This implies that the choice for one MOG 
owner and operator or for multiple owners and operators influences the choice for the 
regulatory governance. 
There are various possible options for the regulation of the MOG. The options could be divided 
into whether there should be one regulatory authority for the entire MOG or whether there 
should be multiple regulatory authorities, for example a separate regulator for each EEZ. ‘One 
regulator for the MOG’ could be a new entity, a special purpose ‘North Sea Grid regulator’, in 
which national experts of the participating countries take place, or ACER as an existing entity 
that could get a new role (although this would require an amendment of the legislative 
framework for ACER).898 Both of these options entail the transfer of regulatory and supervisory 
 
897 Respectively BundesNetzAgentur (Germany, National Network Agency), Commission for Electricity and Gas 
Regulation (Belgium, CREG), Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (UK, Ofgem) and Authority for Consumers 
and Markets (Netherlands, ACM). 
898 To make ACER responsible for the regulation of the MOG means that ACER will have to take up new tasks 
and responsibilities. Currently, it is an EU body responsible for promoting regulatory cooperation and for 
coordinating NRAs’ activities in the EU. It plays a central role in the institutional framework introduced by the 
Third Energy Package, with tasks relating to facilitating cross-border connections and the development of the 
internal market in energy, and facilitating the adoption of EU Network Codes. ACER could to take over a 
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powers from the national level to the regional level. The other two options are based on 
having multiple regulators that retain their own powers. This is possible in the current system, 
in which NRAs all regulate activities in their ‘own’ EEZ, with ad-hoc cooperation for cross-
border connections. Alternatively, formal cooperation between multiple NRAs for the entire 
MOG could be adopted. The difference between the cooperation of multiple NRAs and 
founding a new North Sea Regulator is that in the former, the NRAs cooperate as institutions 
but keep their own authority, whereas in a new North Sea Regulator, the authority is shifted 
to this new entity. In practice, the same persons may decide on the regulatory governance on 
the North Sea, but either they do this as representative of their own NRA, or they are seconded 
or employed by the new entity and decide on behalf of the new entity. In a schematic way, 
the structure looks as follows: 
 
Image 7: Overview of Options for Regulatory Supervision. Source: author’s own production 
From an economic perspective, the creation of a new regulatory body on top of the existing 
national regulatory bodies will entail extra costs in the short term, compared to other options. 
However, the possibilities for specialisation and learning (both leading to cost savings) in a 
dedicated offshore regulatory agency may offset the upfront investment in the long term, 
leading to a slightly positive score (+) for the North Sea Regulator. Cooperation of national 
NRAs will not lead to large upfront investments, as there is no need for the establishment of 
a new entity. One may fear larger transaction costs in the long term, but NRAs have indicated 
that they experience a learning curve with regard to cross-border cooperation, which means 
that transaction costs may decrease over time.899 As the infrastructure for NRA cooperation 
already exists, this is the option with the least costs and with similar benefits potential on the 
long term, thus scoring very high (++). Making ACER responsible for the regulation of the MOG 
on the North Sea will lead to extra costs to construct capacity at ACER for fulfilling this new 
function, as ACER currently does not fulfil the role of regulator. At the moment, it only fulfils 
specific roles related to facilitating the regulatory cooperation of states. On the other hand, 
 
broader set of responsibilities regarding the MOG, acquiring the same competences as an NRA has for the 
onshore grid. After all, ACER already has a clear operational responsibility on the EU market monitoring 
process. 
899 This was confirmed in stakeholder meetings with TSOs, governments and regulators. The findings are based 
on experiences in the field of interconnector development over the past decade. 
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with ACER as a regulatory body, it will be possible to have a team specialising in MOG 
regulation, which is beneficial. This mitigates some of the negative impact of the extra costs, 
leading to a (-) as score for making ACER responsible. Finally, NRAs regulating ‘their’ EEZ leads 
to ‘islands’ of regulation, i.e. every regulator only with the interests of the own state in mind, 
rather than what is in the best interest for the region as a whole. This may also lead to double 
regulation of cables that cross EEZ borders and to complex situations if the regulatory 
requirements are different in different EEZs, leading to a very negative score (--). 
From a legal perspective, maintaining the status quo that NRAs regulate their EEZ will be the 
fastest option in the short term, for relatively simple hybrid assets, as nothing will have to be 
changed from the current system. However, it may be that this causes longer discussions at a 
later stage, especially if more complex connections are developed, linking three or more 
countries. Moreover, for the MOG, repeated negotiations are needed for each connection. 
Therefore, it may not be the fastest approach in the long term. Using ACER as a regulator 
requires adjustment of the ACER Regulation in order to allow ACER to take up more tasks, 
which will take a few years (-). Creating a North Sea Regulator will take more time on the short 
term, as a new institution will have to be created (-). However, in the long term, increased 
speed of decision-making can be achieved compared to the previous two options. Cooperation 
of the NRAs will build on existing structures, leading to a fast speed of implementation in the 
short term. In the long term, a method needs to be found to allow for standardised decision-
making between the NRAs, especially if repeated decision-making is needed for the MOG. To 
what extent this is necessary depends on the offshore grid development scenario that is used, 
i.e. for decentralised grids with many connections, this is more important than if a few large 
hubs are created with relatively fewer connections. 
From a socio-political perspective, the most important factor is that it is unclear what the 
relationship between third states around the North Sea with ACER would be, making ACER 
score negatively in this regard (-). An EU briefing paper in the context of Brexit indicates that 
the UK could re-join ACER as an associate member with the agreement of the EU27 (although 
this has never happened before).900 It is unclear whether this position would be acceptable to 
the UK Government as it would require adhering to the decisions of a body which is controlled 
by the EU Court of Justice.  Creating a new North Sea Regulator scores slightly negatively (-), 
as it entails a transfer of authority to an international body, which is more difficult to control 
for the coastal states, and the assumption is that states prefer to keep the control over 
regulatory bodies. Letting NRAs regulate ‘their’ EEZ will be acceptable from a socio-political 
perspective, as it is the status quo (+). Cooperation between national NRAs scores positively 
(+), as this is also a current practice which is generally evaluated positively by NRAs and 
national governments. Such cooperation can evolve over time, if coastal states are willing to 
increase the amount of cooperation, eventually creating a de-facto North Sea Regulator. 
 
900 G. Frederiksson, A. Roth, S. Tagliapietra, G. Zachmann (Bruegel), Briefing: The Impact of Brexit On the EU 
Energy System, European Parliament (ITRE), November 2017. 
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From a financial perspective, it is important that investors know well in advance what they 
can expect in terms of financial (income) regulation, and that it is clear what duties the grid 
owner and operator have in terms of providing access and delivering a high security of supply. 
This influences the level of the costs for a MOG as well as the income of the grid owner, which 
is relevant for investors. Building on an existing legal framework gives certainty to investors, 
so the options ‘cooperation of national NRAs’ and ‘NRAs regulate their own EEZ’ both score 
positively (+), whilst the other two options score negatively (-). No differences in 
environmental impact are expected from this choice. 
Table 13: Regulatory Governance 
 Economic Legal Socio-
political  
Financial Environmental 
New North Sea Regulator + - - - 0 
Cooperation of national NRAs ++ + + + 0 
ACER - - - - 0 
Each NRA regulates ‘own’ EEZ -- ++ + + 0 
 
From the analysis above, cooperation of the national NRAs is the recommended option to 
incorporate into the legal framework for the governance of the MOG. The NRAs should decide 
together on the regulatory context, such as tariffs, access regime and safety standards. Such 
cooperation can evolve over time, if coastal states are willing to increase the amount of 
cooperation, eventually creating a de-facto North Sea Regulator. However, it is important for 
socio-political acceptance that this is a bottom-up process rather than a decision imposed on 
the NRAs. 
There are large differences in the scores for this topic. This means that the recommendation 
is stable and not sensitive to any changes in the assessment of the individual options.  
 
7.3.6 Offshore Grid Operation and Market Rules 
In order to have a reliable and safe offshore grid, it is important to have technical and 
operational rules that secure certain standards. At the moment, these rules are adopted in 
the European Grid Codes as well as in national codes.901 The rules can be subdivided in 
technical rules, setting for example a common voltage level and protection system, and 
market rules, which guarantee a level playing field between different entities connected to 
the MOG.902  
7.3.6.1 Technical Rules 
The technical rules need to be adjusted, as the current Network Codes do not take into 
account meshed HVDC grids. There is a Network Code specifically on HVDC, but this code aims 
 
901 See sections 3.4.6 and 4.5. 
902 See section 3.4.6. 
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to regulate the transition between AC and DC. Operational rules for pure DC networks have 
yet to be developed.903 It is important that the operational rules, for example on the voltage 
level, are clear well in advance. As the MOG is expected to develop gradually, compatibility 
with earlier and later grid developments is essential.  
Assessing which technical rules should be adopted in the legislative framework for a MOG 
cannot be done using the tables of parameters used in earlier sections.904 This is because the 
rules should be primarily based on technological possibilities and calculations, rather than on 
the parameters used earlier in this chapter. The rules should be established in the same way 
as the other Grid Codes are developed. Enabling technological standardisation and 
interoperability of different grid components should be one of the aims of the Grid Codes and 
of the wider HVDC industry. 
A source of inspiration for how a simple provision regarding technical standardisation and 
operability can be adopted in a general legal framework can be found in the Model 
Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) for pipeline systems, as developed by the Energy Charter 
Secretariat: The States shall endeavour to harmonise their respective technical standards 
applicable to Project Activities.905 With such a clause, the parties agree to harmonise technical 
standards. How this is done specifically can be decided in technical working groups on the 
specific issues to be addressed. A similar clause can also be included in the proposed North 
Sea agreement. 
7.3.6.2 Market Rules 
An important question for the network operators and for OWFs connected to the offshore 
grid alike is whether the market rules for the offshore grid remain the same or whether they 
are adjusted to the specific characteristics of offshore grids. As explained in section 3.5, the 
current EU-rules for interconnectors will lead to a suboptimal development of the offshore 
grid. There are two ways to address this, namely by amending the EU Regulation in which 
these rules are currently laid down or by introducing a new type of market model, based on 
small bidding zones (a ‘nodal’ model) rather than the current bidding zones that are based on 
the EEZs of the different coastal states. This latter option would bring several benefits, such 
as that it gives more efficient market signals (related to the location of the OWFs and the 
transmission capacity around that OWF), and that it will be easier to fit in the current EU legal 
framework regarding the obligation to bring at least 70% of the available capacity to the 
market.906 However, it also brings several difficulties, such as that in a small zones pricing 
model, high congestion rents and low revenues for OWF owners may be expected  - which 
 
903 P. Sørensen, ‘Deliverable 11.1 - Harmonisation Catalogue’, PROMOTioN, 2019. 
904 Instead, proposals for technical standardization and operational rules are described in PROMOTioN 
Deliverable 11.1, P. Sørensen 2019. 
905 Energy Charter Secretariat, Model Intergovernmental and Host Government Agreements For Cross-Border 
Pipelines, Second Edition, 2007, art. 11. The Model IGA is available at 
https://energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/Legal/ma2-en.pdf.  
906 See section 3.5.5. 
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needs to be corrected in order to allow a fair division of benefits between the OWF owners 
and the grid owners.907  
When a different market model, such as a ‘nodal’ or a ‘small bidding zones’ market model, is 
introduced, some market rules may need to be adjusted.908 This relates for example to the 
division of income between grid owners and OWFs, which needs to be fair for all parties: 
without any change to the current rules, the income for the grid owners would be much higher 
than the status quo, due to extra congestion income, whereas the OWF owners  would have 
a much lower income.909 This effect can be mitigated by granting so-called financial 
transmission rights (FTRs) to the OWFs connected to a small bidding zone, via a tender 
process, such as the tender process that currently already exists to determine which developer 
may construct the OWF in a certain location. These FTRs would allow OWFs access to a certain 
capacity of the grid in a certain direction, coupled to the capacity of the OWF. If such a system 
is introduced, some of the existing market rules may have to be altered. This relates for 
example to the provisions on electricity balancing,910 and the rules on forward capacity 
allocation.911  
7.3.7 Dispute Settlement 
Within the context of the MOG, different types of disputes may arise. Disputes may arise 
between different states participating in the network, between commercial parties, such as 
between the grid owner and a subcontractor responsible for a certain project, and between 
the grid owners and a higher authority, such as a regulatory authority. Conflicts of this kind 
could be about regulatory decisions regarding the tariff levels for grid use, the level of grid 
safety and security or the conditions for access for certain (groups of) connections. 
Conflicts between two commercial parties are generally organised according to the relevant 
dispute settlement clauses in the commercial contracts that they conclude. Therefore, these 
types of disputes do not have to be addressed in the legal framework for the MOG. However, 
the other two types of disputes are addressed below. 
7.3.7.1 Disputes between States 
For disputes between states, different options are available, namely ‘all disputes are 
addressed through arbitral procedures’ (such as the procedures as described in the ECT), a 
mix: ‘procedures at the CJEU for disputes between EU states and arbitral procedures for 
disputes between EU states and third states’, or ‘all disputes are addressed through 
procedures at the CJEU’.  
 
907 J. Moore (TenneT), ‘Deliverable 12.3 – Draft Deployment Plan’ PROMOTioN (2020), Appendix V. 
908 Ibid. 
909 Ibid. 
910 Suggestions to this end are analysed in P. Bhagwat 2019, p. 185-200. 
911 Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/1719 of 26 September 2016 establishing a guideline on forward capacity 
allocation, art. 39 and further (regarding the operational rules of forward capacity allocation). 
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Whereas for other topics in this chapter, the different options are evaluated on the basis of 
economic, legal, political and financial perspective, such an evaluation is not possible for this 
topic. Costs and benefits depend on the length of the procedures, and this varies significantly 
between cases. Moreover, the costs depend on the rules of procedure that are adopted, for 
example on the number of experts each party is allowed to bring forward; the length of the 
procedure and the possibilities for appeal. On the other hand, the legal and political 
perspective overrule other considerations, as some options may not be possible from a legal 
doctrinal point of view. Therefore, another method of evaluation is necessary here.  
There are some fundamental legal rules that influence the choice between the options 
mentioned above. The evaluation of these options is done on the basis of legal doctrine. A 
definite preference cannot be given at this stage as this depends on the future relation 
between the UK and the EU, which is unclear at the moment. 
The first option, ‘all disputes are addressed through arbitral procedures’, requires attention 
from a doctrinal perspective. In a long line of case law, the CJEU has made clear that legal 
disputes between two EU Member-States for which the CJEU has jurisdiction, that raise 
potential issues for EU law should be judged only by the CJEU, and not by other bodies such 
as international courts or other dispute settlement oganisations. This doctrine derives from 
the Mox Plant Case,912 and relates to the exclusive jurisdiction of the CJEU and the autonomy 
of the EU legal order.  
More recently, in the Achmea Case,913 the CJEU judged that the arbitration clause in the 
Bilateral Investment Treaty between the Netherlands and Slovakia was deemed to be against 
the autonomy of the EU legal order.914 The reasoning of this case provides a two-step test of 
whether a dispute settlement body of a treaty is compatible with EU law. The first step is a 
test whether the dispute settlement body proposed by a treaty could be placed in a position 
where it would need to interpret parts of EU law. This was the case with the tribunal proposed 
in the Bilateral Investment Treaty between the Netherlands and Slovakia, the subject of the 
Achmea case. The second step is to test whether the dispute settlement body could be 
considered as a national court in the context of art. 267 TFEU. This would entail that the 
dispute settlement body takes part in the system of internal legal order of EU Law with the 
preliminary reference procedure between national courts and the CJEU, which guards the 
uniformity of EU law.915 In the Achmea case, the tribunal could not be considered a national 
court in the context of art. 267 TFEU. The combination of these two steps made the tribunal 
 
912 C-459/03 Commission v. Ireland (Mox Plant Case), ECLI:EU:C:2006:345. 
913 C-284/16 Slovak Republic v. Achmea B.V., ECLI:EU:C:2018:158. 
914 Ibid., para 58/59. 
915 P. Merkouris, C. Verburg, ‘The autonomy of the European legal order and its internal and external 
implications for treaty based investor-state arbitration' (forthcoming). This is not the case for all dispute 
settlement bodies, see for example N. Lavranos, C. Verburg, ‘Recent Awards in Spanish Renewable Energy 
Cases and the Potential Consequences of the Achmea case for intra-EU ECT Arbitrations’ European Investment 
Law and Arbitration Review [2018 vol 3], p. 210 and further. 
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in the Bilateral Investment Treaty between the Netherlands and Slovakia incompatible with 
EU law. 
Dispute settlement clauses in treaties can be compatible with EU law under a number of 
conditions. Recently, the CJEU set out these conditions when it gave an opinion on the dispute 
settlement procedures of CETA (Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement), the trade 
agreement between the EU and Canada. This agreement is also a mixed partial agreement to 
which the EU Member States, the EU itself and Canada as a third state are member. In this 
opinion, the CJEU again started with the consideration that the EU protects its legal order 
through a judicial system intended to ensure consistency and uniformity in the interpretation 
of EU law.916 As in the Achmea case, the tribunal installed in the context of CETA would not be 
part of the legal orders of either the EU or Canada or any of the EU states.917 Nevertheless, 
the tribunal does not have the power to amend any EU law, except for CETA itself, which 
becomes part of the EU legal order as soon as it is signed and ratified by the Member-States 
and the EU itself. Moreover, the tribunal proposed by CETA cannot make arbitral awards that 
might have the effect of preventing the EU institutions from operating in accordance with the 
constitutional framework of the EU.918 Moreover, CETA provides sufficient leeway for the host 
states to adopt their own rules, as CETA does not allow the tribunal to judge on the legality of 
national rules. Instead, the tribunal may only consider national law as a matter of fact.919 
In the light of the Achmea and CETA judgments, the criteria for a dispute settlement 
mechanism such as an arbitral tribunal are that the tribunal does not judge on the application 
of EU law, except for the treaty itself. A mixed partial agreement on the North Sea should also 
consider this in the provisions adopted on the topic of dispute settlement.  
Another way to guarantee compatibility of a mixed partial agreement with EU law is the 
‘disconnection clause’.920 This type of clause makes EU member states solve disputes between 
themselves via the EU legal system, whereas disputes with third states are settled according 
to the arbitration rules of the treaty in question. Two examples of this clause in international 
agreements, of the Council of Europe and of the OECD are: 
“Parties which are members of the European Union shall, in their mutual relations, 
apply Community and European Union rules in so far as there are Community or 
European Union rules governing the particular subject concerned and applicable to the 
 
916 CJEU Opinion 1/17, ECLI:EU:C:2019:341, para 111. 
917 Ibid., para 113/114. 
918 Ibid., para 118. 
919 CETA (EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement), Preliminary Consolidated text, available 








specific case, without prejudice to the object and purpose of the present Convention 
and without prejudice to its full application with other Parties.”921  
“Those Parties which are member States of the European Union can apply, in their 
mutual relations, the possibilities of assistance provided for by the Convention in so far 
as they allow a wider co-operation than the possibilities offered by the applicable 
European Union rules.”922 
The adoption of a ‘disconnection clause’ (such as the examples above) in the North Sea 
Agreement brings us to the second option, namely two parallel ways of dispute resolution - 
CJEU for disputes between EU Member States and arbitration for disputes between EU states 
and third states. This may lead to multiple interpretations of the same text, which creates 
undesirable legal difficulties and uncertainty for stakeholders over the interpretation of 
clauses. However, this option does provide certainty that the Agreement, even with an 
arbitration clause in it, is in line with EU law, which may increase the political acceptability of 
the agreement for EU Member States. 
The third option, all disputes are addressed by the CJEU, is probably not acceptable from a 
political point of view to third states. Third states will not allow jurisdiction of a foreign court 
over disputes that they are involved in. Therefore, currently, the option of two parallel 
systems with a disconnection clause is the option with the least difficulties and is thus the 
recommended option. 
7.3.7.2 Regulatory Disputes923 
Disputes may also arise between grid owners and the responsible regulatory agencies. In the 
current regulatory system, decisions by the national regulator can be appealed at national 
level and tested through national legal procedures. Often, the judge will not engage in a full 
reconsideration of the case, but rather apply a marginal test, in which it is only verified 
whether the regulatory authority could reasonably have arrived at its decision and whether 
no procedural mistakes were made. The judgment by the national court follows the 
procedures that exist in national administrative law. For projects that are located fully within 
one coastal state’s EEZ, the NRA of that state would be the competent authority and the 
national administrative procedures would be applicable.  
For cross-border projects, this procedure is currently replaced with procedures that stem from 
EU law. For decisions concerning cross-border interconnector projects, the procedure is that 
 
921 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime 
and on the Financing of Terrorism, Warsaw 2005, CoE Treaty Series 198, art. 52(4). 
922 OECD and Council of Europe, Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters,  
Strasbourg, 25 January 1988, U.N.T.S. I-33610, art. 27(2). 
923 There is an important link between this topic and Regulatory Supervision (7.3.5). When the option ‘One 
North Sea Regulator’ is chosen, the topic of regulatory disputes also becomes much more important compared 
to when the option ‘Cooperation of national NRAs’ is chosen. In the latter case, most disputes will be addressed 
by the competent national judge and only issues that have a clear cross-border context need to be addressed 
separately. 
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the NRAs should first reach a decision together. If they cannot reach a decision together, they 
refer the case to ACER.  ACER provides for a Board of Appeal for internal review of its decisions.  
If the developer does not agree with the decision of the ACER Board of Appeal, the project 
developer can appeal the decision at the General Court (previously known as the Court of First 
Instance), part of the Court of Justice of the EU.  This happened in practice in the case of 
Aquind, which shows the necessity of having procedures if NRAs cannot agree on a decision 
for cross-border projects: 
Case study Aquind 
Aquind is an interconnector to be constructed between the UK and France.924 The project 
developers applied for an exemption under art. 17 of Regulation 714/2009.925 A partial 
exemption from EU law is sought, namely with regard to the use of revenue 
requirements; third party access and unbundling rules.  
There has been a dialogue between Ofgem and CRE, the relevant NRAs, since 2015. After 
the official exemption application in September 2017, both NRAs indicated they could 
not reach a joint decision on the case.926  As the NRAs could not reach a decision, the 
case was referred to ACER, which decided on the case in June 2018. ACER decided that 
the exemption would not be permitted. The Aquind consortium appealed this decision at 
the ACER Board of Appeal, which upheld ACER’s decision to refrain from granting an 
exemption.927  Aquind started proceedings at the General Court (part of the Court of 
Justice of the EU, CJEU). So far, the General Court has not yet judged on the case (as of 
31-12-2019). 
The Aquind case makes clear how project developers currently rely on appeal mechanisms 
and procedures that are developed in EU law, providing legal certainty and uniform 
application of the law. However, as mentioned above, it is questionable whether third states 
will accept the CJEU as the highest court to judge on cases about interconnectors, network 
codes, tariffs and access regimes. At the same time, as the decisions concern cross-border 
projects, the national courts would also not be competent to review decisions.  
Decisions on regulatory matters are slightly different than the other investor-state or state-
state disputes treated above. This is because, with the swift development of offshore wind 
and offshore grid connections, it is important that appeals procedures for regulatory decisions 
should not take too long. If they do, this may cause uncertainty about the regulation of other 
parts of the grid that are in the same situation. In the example above, for as long as it is not 
 
924 For general information, see (last visited 11-2-2019): http://aquind.co.uk/. 
925 Regulation 714/2009 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity, art. 
17. 
926 Internal minutes by Aquind, available at (last visited 11-2-2019): http://aquind.co.uk/wp-








clear whether an exemption will be granted, the project cannot be constructed. If this 
procedure lasts several years, the economic conditions may be very different, i.e. because 
other cable connections are constructed in the meantime, or because markets may have 
changed. The longer the appeals procedure lasts, the longer the uncertainty lasts. If multiple 
projects depend on the same decision or on the same methodology that is appealed, the 
consequences could be even larger if the procedures last too long. Therefore, an appeals 
procedure for regulatory decisions concerning cross-border grid elements should be adopted 
in the North Sea Agreement.  
Such an appeals procedure could be organised through an appeals committee in which 
representatives of the different coastal states take place, similar to the ACER board of 
appeals.928 
7.3.8 Decommissioning 
The notion of decommissioning929 has been established for decades in the offshore oil and gas 
sector, where decommissioning entails ending the operations, closing the wells securely, 
removal of the installation and waste management of the removed parts.930  A main difference 
between the offshore oil and gas sector and the offshore wind sector is that decommissioning 
of oil and gas infrastructure comes naturally when the field is depleted and the infrastructure 
loses its function, or when it is technically or economically not feasible to extract the remaining 
resources.931 For OWFs, this is a different story. The wind will continue to blow, so 
decommissioning will not start when the source is depleted, but when the OWF is technically 
or economically932 at the end of its lifetime.933 Individual turbines or other parts that are 
technically at the end of their lifetime could be replaced by new turbines, especially if the 
foundations are still solid and reliable. However, there comes a time when the entire OWF is 
at the end of its lifetime or when the permit that allows its operation expires permanently. At 
that moment, it should be decided whether the grid should also be removed when the OWF 
 
928 The ACER Board of Appeal is created by Regulation 2019/942 of 5 June 2019 establishing a European Union 
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators. In art. 25 of this Regulation, its tasks and procedures are 
explained. 
929 Decommissioning is not officially defined in legal terminology, nor does the term appear in any major legal 
docment on this issue. See B.A. Hamzah ‘International rules on decommissioning of offshore installations: some 
observations’ Marine Policy [2003 27 4] p. 33. However, for the purposes of this dissertation, decommissioning 
entails what happens to an asset at the end of its lifetime. 
930 Exemptions may apply in cases where the structure has no potential effects on navigation and environment 
or costs are too high or non-proportional risks to personnel are involved, Resolution A.672(16), 2.1. 
931 There is research on the re-use of offshore oil and gas platforms for the purpose of CO2 storage in depleted 
fields. In that case, platforms could be re-used after their operational lifetime. There is only a removal 
obligation for installations that are not in use any more. Therefore, as long as the platform is used, it can 
remain at its place. 
932 When maintenance costs exceed the proceeds from the generated electricity, a windfarm is economically at 
the end of its lifetime. 
933 Another reason for decommissioning is that the OWF license expires. These licenses are time-bound, 
generally 15-20 years. Some licenses can be renewed/extended. In this subchapter, it is assumed that when the 
OWF is not yet at the end of its technical and economic lifetime and there are no dangers to maritime safety, 
authorities are willing to extend the license rather than decommissioning the OWF before the end of its 
technical and economic lifetime. 
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is removed, or whether the same grid connection should be used again for a new OWF in the 
same area. These options are compared in this section.  
Alongside the decommissioning of OWFs, the lifespan of parts of the meshed offshore grid 
should also be discussed.934 Cables may keep their function as an interconnector, even when 
individual OWFs are removed. Nevertheless, when a certain connection loses its function as 
interconnector, or when it is technically at the end of its lifetime and replacement is no longer 
economically feasible, it should be clarified what should happen to the assets, should they 
remain in place or should they be removed? Based on current international law, there is no 
removal obligation for cables, but it might be discussed as part of a new legal framework for 
a MOG, whether such an obligation should be introduced in specific cases, for example to 
avoid the ‘spaghetti scenario’ in areas with many different subsea cables, and/or to recycle 
the valuable or toxic materials inside the cables.935  
7.3.8.1 Relevance of Decommissioning 
The norms around decommissioning of parts of the grid and of OWFs connected to it are 
relevant for the legal framework for the MOG for several reasons. First, it is important for the 
offshore grid design to know what happens after decommissioning of OWFs: will the same 
sites be used for new OWFs, leaving the connection point in place? This entails that the grid 
should not be removed as it will keep serving its purpose. Or will the OWF foundations be left 
in place in the context of a new function, such as a function as ‘artificial reef’? This may 
influence the opportunities for the construction of new OWFs in the same area, and thus 
influences whether the grid connections in that area will keep their use or become redundant. 
This may make a difference for grid design and development. This is especially relevant as the 
estimated lifetime of an OWF is currently around 25 years, whereas the cable infrastructure 
may last even 40+ years.  
Secondly, it is relevant for the CBA (cost benefit analysis) of the MOG to have a cost estimate 
for decommissioning of offshore transmission assets, including converter stations and possibly 
for cables, if states agree to introduce a removal obligation for subsea cables. This needs to 
be taken into account in the CBAs for offshore grid projects.  
Thirdly, the rules on decommissioning transmission infrastructure in a MOG which are 
adopted in the legal framework for a MOG, will affect the environmental impact of the 
infrastructure. 
 
934 For this chapter, inter-array cables are considered to be part of the OWF. In most countries, the inter-array 
cables are included in the removal obligation of the OWF. Thus, there is a difference in submarine cables that 
are part of the offshore grid and cables that are part of the OWF. 
935 Next to the metals used as conductor of the electricity (often copper or aluminium), subsea electricity cables 
generally contain lead for insulation purposes. However, alternative materials are being investigated. See B. 
Sonerud, F. Eggertsen, S. Nilsson, K. M. Furuheim, G. Evenset, ‘Material considerations for submarine high 
voltage XLPE cables for dynamic applications’, Conference Paper (Conference on Electrical Insulation and Solid 
Dielectrics (CEIDP, 2012). 
7




As a consequence, it is important to establish rules on decommissioning for the OWFs 
connected to a MOG and for parts of the MOG itself. These rules need to be part of the legal 
framework for a MOG in order to provide certainty on the costs of future grid development. 
Decommissioning for OWFs and the offshore grid entails many new choices that cannot 
directly be copied from the oil and gas sector. This section explores the issue and the policy 
choices that could be made. More technical, environmental and economic research is needed 
in order to come to a well-developed decommissioning policy for the MOG and the OWFs 
connected to it.  
7.3.8.2 Grid Removal at the End-of-lifetime of OWFs 
When OWFs are at the end of their technical or economic lifetime or when licenses can no 
longer be extended, the cable from the OWF to the nearest converter station of the offshore 
grid is often not yet at the end of its lifetime. Thus, it should be decided what to do with the 
grid components when the OWF reaches the end of its lifetime. There are various options: 
either the grid connection is removed up to the nearest MOG hub that still has a function for 
the connection of other OWFs,936 or the cable is reused, either because the OWF is fully or 
partially repowered by the same developer (in a way, extending this developer’s license to 
operate an OWF on the same location), or to connect a new OWF based on a new tender. 
From an economic perspective, the costs and benefits of the different options depend on the 
grid development scenario that is constructed.937 For example, for centralised hubs, the 
lifetime of the OWFs connected to it is much shorter than for the hub itself. It would be a 
waste of resources not to use the capacity of the converter station. This makes it more logical 
to reuse the connection. For the areas in which it is not cost-effective to create a new wind 
farm, for example because the area is too small to construct the (probably much larger)938 
wind turbines, removal of the converter station (and, if coastal states decide to introduce this, 
the cables between the OWF and the converter station) is more logical. A relevant point here 
is the division of the costs of removal between different coastal states, where it concerns hubs 
to which multiple states are connected and from which multiple states profit. The simplest 
solution is to take decommissioning costs well into account in the total CBA and possibly also 
in the Cross Border Cost Allocation (CBCA).  
From an economic perspective, creating a new OWF in the same area is more positive than 
repowering the old OWF, as it will allow for increased turbine size, leading to higher yield, as 
well as more competition and innovation, which may translate into economic benefits. From 
the legal perspective, all options are possible with only minor changes to the legal framework. 
Therefore, all options score positively (+). 
 
936 In case offshore grid components are removed, the removed materials will need to be brought ashore and 
handled according to the applicable legal framework for waste management, including electronic waste 
management. See Fleming, Mas, Nieuwenhout 2018, p. 22. 
937 J. Moore (TenneT), ‘Deliverable 12.3 – Draft Deployment Plan’ PROMOTioN (2020), chapter 2. 
938 Over the last decades, both wind turbines individually and OWFs have significantly increased in size and 
capacity. WindEurope, Offshore Wind - Key Trends and Statistics 2018, p. 20-21.  
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From the environmental perspective, it is not clear whether a time difference between grid 
removal and OWF removal influences the environmental impact. Therefore, the option 
‘remove grid when OWF is removed’ is scored neutral (0). Repowering of the old OWF or 
constructing a new OWF in the same area will score negatively, as there is more construction 
activity, which has a local environmental impact. 
From the socio-political perspective, removing the grid when the OWF is removed leads to an 
inefficient use of (public) resources, which is slightly negative in terms of socio-political 
acceptability (-). Using the grid is more positive, as it increases the usage of the resources (+). 
Between repowering the old OWF and creating a new OWF in the same area, the latter is more 
positive than the former, as it will allow new developers a fair chance to enter the industry.  
From the financial perspective of the MOG, it is most advantageous to maximise grid usage, 
which means repowering OWFs or creating a new OWF on the same connection as a previous 
OWF (both score positively (+)). Removing the grid when the OWF is removed, not taking into 
account the much longer lifetime of the cables, will score negatively (-), as investors in the grid 
will have less time to make a return on their investment. 
Table 14: End-of-lifetime of OWFs 
 Economic  Legal Socio-
Political  
Financial Environm’l  
Remove grid when OWF is 
removed 
-- + - - 0 
Repower OWFs + + + + -- 
New tender for same area ++ + ++ + -- 
 
Following the analysis, the option to be recommended concerning what should happen to the 
grid connection at the end of the lifetime of the OWF connected to it, is a new tender for the 
same area, if this is technically possible. Together with repowering the OWFs, this is the most 
economically efficient option. However, between these options, a new tender for the same 
area is a chance for new entrants, which opens the market, whereas repowering OWFs is done 
by the former owners of the OWF. A new tender for the same area thus brings more 
competition than repowering by the existing wind farm owner.  
The analysis of the options for the course of action when an OWF reaches the end of its 
lifetime shows only a small difference between ‘new tender for the same area’ and ‘repower 
OWFs’, and a large difference between the former and ‘remove grid when OWF is removed’. 
Thus, the sensitivity of this outcome to changes in the assessment is average. The parameters 
most likely to change, and most likely to influence the outcome are the economic and socio-
political assessment. Regarding the economic assessment, what is most advantageous also 
depends on the grid development scenario – which may be different than originally envisaged. 
This can change the analysis. 
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7.3.8.3 Removal of Cables 
Currently, there is no removal obligation for subsea cables under international law.939 In 
national law, some states have specific rules on the removal of cables, but most states stay 
silent on the matter.940 However, with the large amount of subsea cables that need to be 
installed in the context of the MOG, it might be discussed whether a removal obligation for 
subsea cables should be introduced in international law. 
It must be noted that a differentiation between cables in the MOG can be made: main 
connections and connections to hubs with multiple OWFs will remain functional for much 
longer than cables that lead to isolated OWFs. Thus, they will probably be replaced when they 
reach the end of their technical lifetime. However, cables that lead to isolated OWFs may lose 
their function if the OWF is decommissioned and the connection is not re-used. This part is 
about the removal of cables that lose their function. 
There is a knowledge gap about the environmental and spatial impact of leaving submarine 
cables in place and about the environmental impact of removal of these cables from the 
seabed. Concerning the spatial impact, the ‘spaghetti scenario’ with many cables that cross 
each other and that are not removed after use, leaving less place for new cables, is mentioned 
as an undesirable situation that should be avoided.941 Concerning the environmental impact, 
submarine electricity cables consist of several materials, some of which should not leak or 
remain into the marine environment, such as lead.942 However, the disturbance of the seabed 
with removal of the cable may be larger than the negative effects of leaving the cables in place. 
This topic requires more research to be done. 
Different options regarding the removal of cables in the MOG are:  
 No common rules 
 Removal of the cables 
 Leave cables in place 
 Leave cables except in specific sensitive areas, such as the landing to the beach or 
important waterways 
From an economic perspective, there is a cost involved in removing the cables that are buried 
in the seabed. It is more expensive to remove the cables than to leave the cables in place and 
solve problems such as cables crossing each other (in a ‘spaghetti scenario’) locally. Therefore, 
the option full removal scores lowest in terms of costs (--), and the option to leave all cables 
 
939 See section 2.3.2. 
940 See section 4.6. 
941 The “spaghetti scenario” is a term coined in several studies to depict a large uncoordinated amount of 
cables in the seabed. The term has been coined already in 2013 and possibly already before. See for example: 
http://www.elia.be/~/media/files/Elia/PressReleases/2013/EN/20131112_BOG-permits_ENG.pdf. 
942 B. Sonerud, F. Eggertsen, S. Nilsson, K. M. Furuheim, G. Evenset, ‘Material considerations for submarine 
high voltage XLPE cables for dynamic applications’, Conference Paper (Conference on Electrical Insulation and 
Solid Dielectrics (CEIDP, 2012). 
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in place, scores highest (+). With no common rules, it is up to the countries and will depend 
on the local rules. This is slightly negative as it hinders standardisation. The option ‘No 
common rules’ will lead to a fragmented regulatory landscape, which scores negatively as it 
entails administrative costs for project developers to take into account the different rules per 
country (-). 
From a legal perspective, all options except removing all cables are currently possible with 
only minor changes to the legal framework (+). The full removal of all cables is currently not 
required in international environmental law, and also in national legal requirements, full 
removal of the cables is not required.943 
From a socio-political perspective, having no common rules will lead to a fragmented 
landscape and environmental policy with regard to the seabed, which is slightly negative (-). 
Removal of the cables follows the general principle of ‘polluter pays’ and will therefore be 
more acceptable (+) than leaving the cables in place, which may lead to a public image of 
creating a ‘spaghetti scenario’ in the North Sea (-). Leaving the cables in place except in specific 
sensitive areas will take away the concerns of those who fear adverse consequences in specific 
areas (including the ‘spaghetti scenario’) in areas close to the coast, whilst also not causing 
excessive costs. 
From a financial perspective, first of all, the rules need to be consistent, so that investors can 
take the costs and risks for the prescribed decommissioning standard into account. ‘No 
common rules’ will lead to a fragmented landscape, which results in administrative costs and 
risks for investors in the MOG (-). Leaving the cables in place requires the least action, and 
thus the least risk, which scores positively (+). The other two options score neutral as there is 
no specific influence. 
The environmental impact of leaving the cables in place will probably be lower than that of 
removing the cables dug into the seabed, as this disturbs the seabed locally.944 However, this 
depends on which type of materials used in the cable and whether it is buried deep into the 
seabed or not. Leaving the cables in place where this does not do harm to the environment, 
and removing them in specific areas, such as shipping routes or landing points on the beach 
scores the highest from the environmental perspective, under the condition that the 
insulation material of the cables cannot leak into the water. The option ‘no common rules’ will 
probably lead to cable owners choosing the option that costs the least, with removal bringing 
high costs and leaving the cables in place bringing lower costs.  
 
 
943 See section 4.6. 
944 Disturbance of the seabed has an impact on the local maritime environment. NIRAS, ‘Subsea Cable 
Interactions with the Marine Environment’ (2015), p. 22. 
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Table 15: End-of-lifetime of the Cable Infrastructure 
 Economic Legal Socio-
Political  
Financial Environmental 
No common rules - + - - + 
Removal of cables -- - + 0 - 
Leave cables in place + + - + + 
Leave cables in place 
except in sensitive areas 
+ + + 0 ++ 
 
From the analysis above, the recommended option to be adopted in the future legal 
framework for a MOG is to leave the cables in place except in specific sensitive areas. Under 
this approach, most cables will stay in place, but in specific sensitive areas, for example with 
high shipping or fishing activity, or at environmentally sensitive areas like the beach, the cables 
will be removed. It should be weighed per area whether removal causes more or less 
disturbance than leaving the cables in place. The area-specific approach costs less than full 
removal, and scores higher from the environmental perspective and the socio-political 
perspective than leaving all cables in place. Guidelines on this topic should be introduced. 
The difference between the options varies from small to large, depending on which options 
are compared. On the whole, the sensitivity to changes in the analysis is average. The least 
certain option in this assessment is the environmental assessment, as the impact of the 
environment of different removal scenarios still needs to be researched further and new 
discoveries may change this assessment. 
7.4 Interim Conclusion 
The measures that need to be adopted in the legal framework for the MOG have been 
weighed against each other in this chapter. There is often more than one way to address a 
topic, but the way a topic is addressed may have significant impact on how the MOG is 
developed and regulated. Specifically, there may be impacts on the cost-effectiveness of the 
MOG, the time it costs to implement the proposals and to construct the MOG, the acceptance 
of the MOG by different stakeholders and the risk assessment of the MOG made by investors. 
This chapter lists the different options and analyses them in terms of their economic, legal, 
socio-political and financial impact for the offshore grid. This is done on the basis of a 
qualitative, informal CBA.  
 
The outcomes of this assessment per topic are presented below. It must be stressed that the 
nuances of the analysis are not displayed in the outcomes. Therefore, recommendations 
should not be based solely on the list of outcomes below but rather on the analysis behind it, 
which can be found in the text of the chapter itself. The outcomes have been incorporated in 
a Model North Sea Agreement, which is added in the appendix to this dissertation. 
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Decision-making (section 7.3.1) 
Decision-making should be based on a centralised rather than a decentralised 
approach – in order to take into account regional (North Sea-wide) effects. Moreover, 
rather than waiting until issues arise, proactive decision-making should be used. In this 
way, both grid developers and the parties connected to the grid have more certainty. 
 
Planning (section 7.3.2) 
Grid planning can be organised per country or on a regional scale. It is recommended 
to use a regional perspective in grid planning. Specifically, the locations of OWFs should 
be based on a centralised or zonal approach and there should be limits on the use of 
OWF areas for other economic purposes in order to preserve the maritime 
environment and ecology. 
 
Connection Responsibility (section 7.3.3) 
The different options are connection by the developer, by an OFTO or by a TSO. The 
latter option, connection by a TSO, is recommended as this option assures the long-
term perspective necessary for offshore grid development. However, this choice is 
highly political. Therefore, rather than prescribing one harmonised connection 
responsibility (and ownership) model for the MOG in a North Sea Agreement (which is 
probably not feasible), states should rather aim to make sure that the models they 
have are compatible with each other. 
 
Support Schemes (section 7.3.4) 
First, it is important that physical flows are not hindered by market restrictions around 
support schemes – this enables OWFs to be connected to an offshore grid with multiple 
coastal states. EU law offers various possibilities for organising support schemes for 
cross-border objects. These possibilities should be utilised, as a regional support 
scheme rather than a national support scheme for MOG-connected OWFs is 
recommended. The financing of such a support scheme should be based on the 
‘beneficiary pays’ principle, which means that a calculation of the contributions of 
states is based on the flow of the electricity towards the different coastal states. Th 
 
Regulatory Supervision (section 7.3.5) 
As the MOG will be a natural monopoly, regulatory supervision is necessary. Different 
options are that NRAs regulate ‘their’ part of the MOG, that ACER takes this task, that 
a North Sea regulator is created or that NRAs from the coastal states increase their 
cooperation. The latter option is recommended. 
 
Offshore Grid Operation and Market Rules (section 7.3.6) 
Both technical rules and market rules need to adapt to the specific characteristics of 
DC grids and the large infeed of offshore wind energy. This needs to be adopted in the 
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EU Network Codes. Moreover, compatibility between the UK and continental part of 
the MOG need to be ensured and standardisation of technical norms needs to be 
encouraged. 
 
Dispute Resolution (section 7.3.7) 
It is recommended to adopt dispute resolution clauses in the legal framework for the 
MOG. In order to make sure that conflicts regarding the legal framework for OWFs will 
not lead to changes in the interpretation of EU law, a disconnection clause is needed. 
Moreover, it is important to provide for dispute resolution for regulatory disputes as 
well in a North Sea Agreement. 
 
Decommissioning (section 7.3.8) 
The differing lifetimes of OWFs and the MOG are a point of attention that needs to be 
addressed in the legal framework for the MOG. At the end of an OWF’s lifetime it is 
recommended that new tenders are organised for the same area, in order to be able 
to use the same MOG connection. Considering the large amount of cables to installed 
in the context of the MOG, it could be discussed whether a removal obligation for 
cables should be introduced. More research into this topic is necessary, but a 
preliminary analysis shows that cables can be left in place except in sensitive areas.  
 
These recommendations should be adopted in the legal framework for the MOG. Based on 
the analysis in chapter 5, the recommendations on decision-making should be adopted in the 
proposed North Sea Agreement. Guiding principles on grid planning and the compatibility of 
connection responsibilities (without requiring full harmonisation thereof) can also be included 
here. The recommendations on support schemes should not be included in such an 
Agreement but rather implemented at national level. Regulatory supervision, when organised 
through cooperation of NRAs, needs to be implemented in policy, but adding this to the North 
Sea Agreement will give the cooperation a formal basis. Dispute settlement needs to be part 
of the North Sea Agreement, whereas the standards of decommissioning should be adopted 
in international standards instead. 
 
In order to complete the analysis on the substantive legislative framework for the MOG, the 
last question to be answered is whether this approach solves all legal barriers for the 
development of a MOG. This is not (and cannot be) the case, as new legal questions will arise 
when technology develops further or when political priorities change. This should not be 
problematic, as the methodology presented in this chapter can be copied and re-used when 
there are further topics to be addressed, or when the possible options for a certain issue 
change. Thus, the methodology presented can be used as part of an iterative and dynamic 
legislative process in which the regulatory framework for the MOG is refined and developed 
as the MOG itself develops. Nevertheless, the recommendations for the substantive legislative 
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framework above are meant to provide legal certainty for the cost-effective development of 
the MOG over the coming decades. 
  
7
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8 Conclusion and Recommendations 
This dissertation provides an analysis of how the legal framework for the MOG should develop 
in order to facilitate the cost-effective development of an offshore electricity grid in the North 
Sea. In this chapter, the answers to the research sub-questions are (re)stated based on the 
analysis in the preceding chapters (section 8.1). Then, the main recommendations for the legal 
framework for the development of a MOG are given (section 8.2). The first main 
recommendation is that a North Sea Agreement should be developed to serve as a stable 
backbone for the legal framework for the MOG. What makes this dissertation unique 
compared to previous literature on this matter is that a ‘Model North Sea Agreement’ is added 
in the appendix to this dissertation. Then, to round off this dissertation, it is checked whether 
the design principles that were stated in the introduction are indeed incorporated in the legal 
framework (section 8.3). Finally, this chapter closes with an outlook towards future 
developments and further research topics (section 8.4). 
8.1 Answering the Research Questions 
This dissertation answers the seven research questions formulated in the introduction. In this 
paragraph, the main conclusions on the research questions are stated, divided over the three 
parts of the dissertation.  
Part I:  
Current Legal Framework for Offshore Electricity Infrastructure in the North Sea 
The first part of the dissertation provides an answer to the questions: what is the current legal 
framework for offshore electricity transmission infrastructure under international, European 
and national law, and which parts of the current legal framework are holding back the 
development of an offshore grid? The latter question is especially important, as it forms the 
basis of the rest of the dissertation.  
At international law level, a main issue in this regard is the extent of jurisdiction of coastal 
states over different parts of an offshore electricity grid. This dissertation concludes that 
whereas the extent of jurisdiction over wind farms and over interconnector cables is clear, it 
is not clear to what extent coastal states have jurisdiction over hybrid assets, the building 
blocks of a MOG, as well as over a MOG itself. Another finding is that some questions remain 
with regard to decommissioning: the guidelines on the decommissioning of installations and 
structures at sea are clear in general, but exceptions may differ per state, based on the 
applicable IMO Guidelines. Moreover, there is currently no removal obligation for cables, but 
it could be discussed whether such a removal obligation should be introduced in light of the 
increase in the amount of cables necessary to connect the planned amount of offshore wind 
capacity over the coming decades. These two issues (jurisdiction over hybrid/MOG assets and 
decommissioning) need to be addressed in a legal framework for the development of a MOG. 
At EU law level, there are many instruments that are relevant for the legal framework for an 
offshore grid. The majority of North Sea coastal states are members of the EU, and for these 
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states, EU law strongly influences the general organisation of the energy sector. Moreover, 
the legal instruments on (maritime) spatial planning, environmental protection, the 
construction of trans-European electricity networks and the network codes are highly relevant 
for the offshore grid. However, not all states around the North Sea are EU member states. 
Most EU law related to the internal electricity market is applicable to Norway via the EEA 
Agreement. Regarding the United Kingdom, this is much more difficult in the light of recent 
political developments around Brexit, which means that a solution to ‘bridge the gap’ between 
EU law and future UK law needs to be sought.  
In substantive EU law, the main barrier for the development of a MOG is the regulation of 
‘hybrid’ assets, electricity cables that have the dual functionality of connecting offshore wind 
energy and providing interconnection between different states. This needs to be addressed 
specifically. Furthermore, some other questions remain, for example with regard to whether 
it is desirable to expand the EIA obligation for overhead power lines to also include submarine 
high voltage cables, of which many will have to be constructed over the coming decades. 
In the national legal frameworks of the North Sea coastal states, large diversity in the 
approaches towards offshore wind and offshore electricity grids is visible. To a large extent, it 
is not problematic that different states have different approaches. However, for some issues 
it is more efficient to converge the legal systems, for instance by streamlining the planning 
and permitting approaches of the coastal states. This should be a point of attention for the 
North Sea coastal states both when legislation on OWFs and offshore electricity cables is 
amended, and when specific cross-border projects are envisaged. In the latter case, these 
cross-border projects could serve as trial projects for increased cooperation between the 
permitting authorities of the coastal states involved, which should lead to streamlining of the 
permitting process between these states. 
Part II:  
A New Legal Framework for Offshore Electricity Infrastructure in the North Sea 
In the second part of the dissertation, the different instruments that could be used for the 
legal framework for the MOG were investigated. Chapter 5 provided an answer to the 
question “Which different levels of legislation are there and how to decide which level is most 
suitable to address a certain issue?” The different levels of legislation are national, EU-based 
and international legislation. Within these three levels, both ‘hard law’ and ‘soft law’ 
instruments can be considered. In this chapter, a decision tree for deciding which topic should 
be addressed at which level is developed. Then, this decision tree was used to define which 
legal instruments should be used for the legal framework for the offshore grid. The outcomes 
of this analysis are that concerns about the jurisdiction over parts of the MOG should be 
addressed by an agreement under international law. The same agreement can be used to 
address the governance of the offshore grid. This agreement could serve as a framework 
agreement for the North Sea offshore grid, or (wider) for North Sea energy activities that need 
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to be coordinated. In this dissertation, the agreement is referred to as the North Sea 
Agreement. 
Some issues should be addressed in the existing legal framework. Operational issues, for 
example, should be addressed through the existing European Network Codes (albeit with an 
extra clause to ensure compatibility with the UK part of the grid). Inconsistencies and 
incompatibilities in national legal frameworks for offshore developments, for example related 
to permitting and licensing procedures, should be addressed at the national level. The same 
goes for incompatibilities in support scheme frameworks. Finally, questions on 
decommissioning of offshore grid components should be addressed by developing guidelines 
at international level, through IMO or OSPAR, building on the existing international law on the 
topic of decommissioning. 
In chapter 6, the North Sea Agreement as a framework treaty for the legal framework of the 
MOG was explored. The North Sea Agreement should be designed as a mixed partial 
agreement, to which the relevant North Sea coastal states and the European Union are 
signatories. The European Union needs to be member of the agreement, because EU member 
states have transferred their competence to the EU for many issues, which means that they 
can no longer autonomously conclude treaties on the topics for which they have conferred 
their competence (pre-emption). There are some examples of earlier mixed partial 
agreements that are used for the governance of a specific geographical region, such as the 
Alpine and Rhine Conventions, or for a specific economic activity, such as the Schengen 
Agreement and the Energy Charter Treaty. These examples could be used as a blueprint for a 
North Sea Agreement, as is visible in the Model North Sea Agreement that is added in the 
appendix to this dissertation.  
Part III:  
Substantiating the Rules: Concrete Proposals for the Development of a MOG 
In the third part of this dissertation, substantive proposals for the legal framework are 
assessed, based on a qualitative analysis of different alternative ways to address an issue, on 
the basis of their economic, legal, socio-political, financial and environmental impact. This 
assessment is performed on the basis of an ‘informal’ cost-benefit approach, as mathematical 
precision cannot be reached at this stage and with these parameters.  
The result of this approach is a list of recommendations that says which options will deliver a 
cost-effective development of the offshore grid in the North Sea. These recommendations 
have been incorporated in the Model North Sea Agreement that is added in the appendix to 
this dissertation.  
The central research question, “What legal framework should be implemented in order to 
facilitate the cost-effective development of a MOG in the North Sea?”, can be answered based 
on the outcomes of all previous questions. The legal framework that should be implemented 
in order to facilitate the cost-effective development of an offshore electricity grid in the North 
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Sea is a combination of various measures, as there is no one-size-fits-all legal instrument to 
address all barriers. Therefore, the legal framework should consist of the combination of 
instruments described in chapter 5, with the North Sea Agreement, described in chapter 6, as 
the backbone for the governance of the offshore grid. The concrete measures described in 
chapter 7 complete the legal framework for now. The findings from this dissertation have been 
brought together in a Model North Sea Agreement in the appendix to this dissertation. 
Finally, it must be noted that with the offshore wind and offshore grid sectors changing 
constantly due to new economic and technological developments, the legal framework for a 
MOG should not be static, but dynamic. It should be adapted to new developments when they 
occur. New developments and new legal barriers can be addressed using the structure 
provided in this dissertation, namely the method for determining with which type of legal 
instrument an issue needs to be addressed (chapter 5), and the assessment framework which 
combines the economic, legal, socio-political, financial and environmental perspective, in 
order to compare alternative ways to address a topic (chapter 7). 
8.2 Recommendations for the Legal Framework for the MOG 
Based on this dissertation, a number of recommendations on the legal framework for the 
MOG can be made. First and foremost, the North Sea coastal states should initiate 
negotiations on a North Sea Agreement as a legal framework for the MOG. As the negotiations 
for such an international agreement are expected to take several years, it is important that 
this process is started without delay. Secondly, the legal barriers for hybrid assets in EU law 
should be removed. Hybrid assets are considered to be the first building blocks of the MOG, 
so their development over the coming years is an important step towards development of a 
MOG. Thirdly, the existing national legal frameworks need to be adapted to each other and to 
the future development of a MOG.  
8.2.1 Adopt a North Sea Agreement 
The first recommendation is that the North Sea coastal states that wish to develop a MOG 
together should start negotiations on a North Sea Agreement, an agreement under 
international law signed both by the coastal states and by the EU (a mixed partial agreement). 
There are various reasons why such an agreement is necessary. First, such an agreement is 
necessary to provide the structure and legal stability for intensive and long-term collaboration 
between the coastal states. The North Sea Agreement can provide for the common aim and 
principles of the MOG and provide a decision-making structure. Secondly, as the United 
Kingdom is leaving the EU, the MOG cannot be based solely on EU energy law. Thus, there is 
a need to specify which principles and rules will be applicable to offshore electricity 
infrastructure between the EU and the UK. Thirdly, there needs to be legal certainty on various 
concrete issues, such as how the offshore grid is governed, how regulatory supervision of the 
MOG is organised, how technical decisions are reached and how dispute resolution inside the 
MOG works.  
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As the negotiation of an agreement under international law may take several years, it is 
important that this process is started well ahead of when it is required. Suggestions on the 
contents of the agreement are added in the Model North Sea Agreement in the appendix to 
this dissertation. 
8.2.2 Facilitate Development of Hybrid Assets 
A second important recommendation is to facilitate the development of hybrid assets on the 
short term. At the moment, the substantive provisions of the Electricity Regulation, especially 
the so-called “70% rule”, hold back the development of hybrid assets. It needs to be made 
clear by the European Commission how the “70% rule” needs to be interpreted with regard 
to offshore hybrid assets, and whether recital 66 of the Electricity Regulation can have any 
substantive effect, for example by providing exceptions for hybrid assets.  
Furthermore, it needs to be verified whether the alternative of introducing several small 
bidding zones is indeed in line with current EU law. The small bidding zones model seems 
attractive, as it circumvents the difficulties with regard to the 70% rule. However, it 
significantly (negatively) influences OWF developers’ revenues, whereas the grid owners may 
receive a disproportionately high congestion income. The difference in revenues between 
OWFs and grid owners needs to be balanced, in order to give OWF owners the possibility to 
recoup their investments on the electricity market rather than resorting to a continuous 
redistribution via higher subsidies. This could be done by providing financial transmission 
rights combined with contracts for differences to the different markets an OWF is connected 
to.  
There are three requirements regarding the legal framework in order to make this possible: 
first, the national support schemes for OWFs need to be adjusted in order to make it possible 
to grant OWFs financial transmission rights coupled to contracts for difference in different 
coastal states. Secondly, there needs to be sufficient time before this is introduced, in order 
to provide legal certainty: this change requires OWFs and grid owners to change their market 
models and algorithms, which may take some time. Thirdly, some provisions from the EU 
Network Codes, such as the rules on Forward Capacity Allocation, may need to be amended.945 
The exact rules of changing the market model to a small zones model need to be developed 
in further legal and economic research.  
8.2.3 Adapt the National Legal Frameworks to Each Other 
Stakeholders have indicated that the permitting procedures for electricity transmission 
projects are perceived as a large hurdle to project development. This is already the case for 
projects within one state, but even more so for cross-border projects with permitting 
 
945 Specifically Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/1719 of 26 September 2016 establishing a guideline on 
forward capacity allocation, art. 39 and further; which describe the rules for forward capacity allocation. For 
example, it might be discussed whether OWFs should be able to transfer their financial transmission rights to 
other parties (art. 44), or whether the rights should be returned to the TSO if they are not used – after which 
the TSO can market them again. The OWFs in principle only received the rights in order to transport their 
offshore generated electricity to shore, not to trade and speculate on these rights. 
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procedures in two or more jurisdictions. For the MOG, many connections will have to be 
constructed, which means that many permitting procedures will need to be completed. The 
administrative costs related to the MOG will decline when the national permitting procedures 
for cross-border (electricity transmission) projects are streamlined. The same goes for national 
support scheme rules, as mentioned above: they need to be adjusted to the possibility that 
OWFs are not connected only to one coastal states, but to multiple states. This requires 
amendments of national law. 
8.2.4 Provide Clarity on End-of-Lifetime of OWFs and MOG Assets 
In international law, the general rule is that installations should be removed at the end of their 
lifetime. However, if they obtain another function (including an ecological function as artificial 
reef), they can remain in place if the coastal state so decides. This can also be applicable to 
offshore wind turbine foundations, which are known to function as artificial reefs in certain 
circumstances. Whether foundations are removed at the end of the lifetime of the OWF, or 
whether they stay in place in a new function matters for the configuration of the offshore grid, 
as it determines whether new OWFs can be constructed in the same area, and thus whether 
certain grid connections or hubs can be re-used or not. The coastal states should provide more 
clarity on what happens at the end-of-lifetime of OWFs.  
Moreover, there is currently no obligation to remove subsea cables when they lose their 
function. It could be discussed whether such an obligation should be introduced. There are 
two reasons for this, namely because states may want to avoid the ‘spaghetti scenario’ with 
an uncoordinated amount of subsea cables, especially close to landing points, and because 
subsea electricity cables may contain materials that should not leak into the marine 
environment. However, the environmental impact of removing the cables should be weighed 
against the environmental impact of leaving the cables in place – a case-by-case approach can 
reflect the different impact in different situations (i.e. removal of cables when they are located 
in specific, heavily used, areas, but leaving the cables in place in other cases). International 
guidelines on this topic could be developed. 
8.2.5 Time is Crucial 
A final recommendation, which is applicable to all other recommendations, is that 
governments need to start to implement the aforementioned changes, because time is of the 
essence. Legislative changes generally take a long time to prepare, adopt and implement. 
Therefore, governments need to start in time in order to make sure that barriers in the current 
legislative framework are amended before they hold back offshore grid developments in the 
coming decades. If time is wasted, development costs are likely to be higher and societal 
benefits may be delayed.  
8.3 Design Principles for the MOG 
As described in the introduction to this dissertation, the future legal framework for the MOG 
should adhere to two design principles: first, the legal framework should be able to cope with 
the uncertainty around technological developments, the grid development scenario that is 
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chosen and other unknown developments, and secondly, the legal framework should take into 
account the complexity of the multiple layers of legislation and the many actors and interests 
involved. 
The uncertainty about future developments is addressed through designing a legal framework 
that is independent of the technologies used and of the preferred grid development scenario. 
In this way, it does not matter how the grid develops exactly or which technologies are 
employed – the legal framework will be ready for any type of offshore grid development.  
The complexity of the multi-layer legal framework is addressed through the mixed partial 
agreement that provides for a governance framework in which both the EU and the coastal 
states (both EU members and non-EU members, regardless of their legal relation with the EU) 
are able to participate. Moreover, specific attention is paid to specific groups such as the NRAs 
(in section 7.3.5 on Regulatory Supervision), the TSOs (in 7.3.3 on Grid Ownership) and the 
OWF developers (in section 7.3.4 on Support Schemes and section 7.3.6 on Market Rules). 
8.4 Future Outlook and Further Research 
A future outlook to the development of offshore electricity grid is difficult to give, as this 
depends on technological development which is difficult to predict. However, some broad 
forecasts can be given.  
A first development is that as the installed capacity of offshore wind is expected to rise 
considerably, and as the volatility of electricity supply increases as a consequence, a main 
point will be sector integration between electricity and other energy carriers, such as methane 
and hydrogen, which may take place onshore, offshore or both. This requires not only 
technological research and development, but also a legal framework that allows for sector 
integration to take place. This includes the regulatory framework as well as a clear division of 
roles and responsibilities. An example of a regulatory question that should be addressed is 
whether the TSO has the obligation to construct an electrical connection from an OWF to the 
offshore (or onshore) grid if there is a more cost-effective alternative, for example via 
conversion of the electrical energy into chemical energy (through power-to-gas), and to 
transport the gas to the onshore (gas) network via existing gas infrastructure. This could be 
the case for OWFs that are located relatively close to existing gas infrastructure and relatively 
far from existing offshore electricity grid infrastructure.  
Another development, indirectly related to the development of a MOG, is the possible 
construction of artificial islands in the North Sea. These artificial islands could serve as 
locations for the large converter stations that are needed for the MOG and as hubs for OWF 
logistics, for example for spare parts and maintenance. There are many legal questions with 
regard to the development of artificial islands, such as which entity would be responsible for 
the construction of such islands, what (national and EU) law is applicable to artificial islands 
and to what extent artificial islands can be developed in environmentally sensitive areas. 
These questions can be addressed in future legal research. 
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Several other issues that have been analysed in this dissertation need more research. First, it 
would be valuable to substantiate the findings of chapter 7 through stakeholder surveys. For 
example, it would be helpful to perform a sensitivity analysis on the outcomes of the analysis 
through surveys to policy makers, representatives from NRAs, grid developers (TSOs and 
OFTOs), OWF developers, NGOs and (potential) investors. In such surveys, the policy makers 
and stakeholders should indicate whether they would estimate the economic, legal, socio-
political, financial and environmental impact of a certain alternative as positive or negative, 
and whether they consider the weight of the different parameters equal or whether they think 
the different interests should be weighted differently.  This would provide insight into the 
robustness of the analysis with regard to the opinions of different (types of) stakeholders. 
Secondly, the shift from the current market model to a ‘small bidding zones’ model requires a 
solution on the changed income pattern for OWFs versus grid owners. Rather than continuous 
redistribution via subsidies to the OWFs, this can be based on market solutions, such as 
financial transmission rights. The exact rules for such financial transmission rights require 
further legal and economic research. 
Finally, more research is required on the (cumulative) environmental impact of different 
decommissioning options over the short and long term. In such an analysis, it is important that 
the differences between the oil and gas sector and the offshore wind and offshore electricity 
transmission sector are recognised. Then, legislation on this topic should be based on a 
comparison of environmental impacts of removal, and leaving (part of) the installations and 
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A Model North Sea Agreement 
A North Sea Agreement should be developed by the legislative authorities of its contracting 
parties. However, on the basis of the research in this dissertation, some suggestions on the 
contents of such a North Sea Agreement can be made. These suggestions are listed below, in 
the form of a Model North Sea Agreement. 
Model North Sea Agreement 
Article 1: Aim and Principles of the MOG 
All contracting parties should agree on the common aim and principles of the cooperation. 
This could be either narrow, i.e. the cost-effective connection of offshore wind energy to the 
onshore electricity grids of the contracting states, or broad, i.e. to facilitate the energy 
transition in a wider sense, including the use of depleted oil and gas fields and the possibility 
of offshore power-to-gas.  
Article 2: Scope and Definitions 
As the legal situation of different types of assets needs to be clarified, a definition of the assets 
is necessary. This article could also be used to clarify a common interpretation of relevant 
UNCLOS provisions on jurisdiction over different types of cables. 
Article 3: Decision-making Structure 
An important goal of the North Sea Agreement is to provide a stable structure for the coastal 
states to cooperate with each other on a long term. A clear decision-making structure is 
indispensable for this. This article could introduce different levels of decision-making, as some 
decisions are rather political whereas others are of a technical nature. Centralised decision-
making for the entire North Sea region, rather than individual decision-making by all the 
coastal states separately, should be pursued. Moreover, proactive decision-making is to be 
preferred over reactive decision-making. 
Article 4: (Bi)annual Conference of the Parties 
Based on other mixed partial agreements for the governance of a certain geographic area 
(chapter 6), it seems beneficial to split decision-making into different levels. A (bi)annual 
conference of the parties would then be the highest level of decision-making, reserved for 
political decisions. This article should specify when such a conference is organised, who sets 
the agenda and what voting procedure is used. 
Article 5: Committee Structure 
A second layer of decision-making could then be reserved for decisions of a more technical 
nature, such as decisions on long-term grid planning, on operational rules, on regulatory 
governance etc. This article should sketch the committee structure, the composition of the 
committees, agenda setting in the committees and operation of the committees. 
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Article 6: Secretariat 
Again following the example of other mixed partial agreements, a secretariat provides for the 
continuity of an agreement and organises day-to-day management. This could be valuable for 
the governance of a MOG as well. This article should describe the tasks and responsibilities of 
the secretariat. 
Article 7: Long-term Grid Planning 
One of the most important issues related to the MOG is long-term planning of OWFs and grid 
development, both geographically and temporally. This long-term planning of both OWFs and 
the grid itself is necessary in order to come to the most cost-effective connection of OWFs, to 
avoid stranded investments (i.e. cables to nowhere) and to make sure that the project pipeline 
is evenly distributed in time, which is important for the supply chain of offshore grid 
components.  
Long-term grid planning should be organised in a similar way as the TYNDP process or even as 
a part of the TYNDP process (if the UK agrees). Otherwise, a regional infrastructure plan, such 
as suggested by Müller,946 could be used. The grid planning should have a sufficiently long 
scope in time, in order to allow for anticipatory investments in future connections. Moreover, 
the planning should be updated regularly (i.e. biannually, in parallel to the TYNDP), in order to 
allow for new developments to be taken into account. 
Article 8: Regulatory Supervision 
Currently, all national regulatory authorities decide on the income and tariffs of grids in ‘their’ 
part of the North Sea. However, with a complex cross-border grid, it becomes difficult to do 
this, and grid owners will be confronted with a variety of different income and tariff decisions. 
These national differences may lead to perverse incentives and not necessarily to the most 
cost-effective grid development. Therefore coordination of regulatory supervision is 
necessary. After weighing different options, including the founding of a new ‘North Sea 
Regulator’ and giving this task to ACER, the most beneficial option is not creating a new entity 
but rather fortifying the existing cooperation between national regulatory authorities around 
the North Sea. How this should be done specifically, should be included in this article as well. 
Article 9: Regulatory Framework for the MOG 
At the moment, the electricity grids of the EU Member States are regulated on the basis of EU 
law. However, when the UK leaves the EU, the UK part of a MOG will no longer be bound by 
EU law, which means that the regulatory framework of electricity grids on both sides will start 
to diverge from each other. This can be problematic for cross-border MOG connections 
between EU states and the UK. A provision bridging the legislative gap might be needed – 
unless this topic is already addressed in a possible future general cooperation agreement 
 
946 Müller (2016), p. 328 and further. 
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between the EU and UK. If necessary, this article would then need to specify how MOG assets 
are regulated, as a lex specialis to general (EU) energy law. 
Article 10: Operational Rules 
A similar issue exists with regard to the EU Network Codes, which currently specify all 
operational rules for electricity grids, but to which the UK will no longer be bound after the 
UK leaves the EU. This means that even though the rules and procedures may be similar at the 
moment, they will diverge from each other when the rules are updated and the UK is not 
required to follow this update. This article should specify how this issue is handled. It is not 
necessary to provide a solution for the very specific operational rules for interconnected AC 
grids, as the MOG (or at least the cross-border connections to the UK inside the MOG) will be 
based on HVDC technology. Therefore, it suffices to specify the rules for DC networks. 
Article 11: Technical Standardisation 
Next to operational rules, some technical standardisation is needed in order to make sure that 
grid assets from different manufacturers can be used without causing disruptions to the MOG. 
A source of inspiration for how a simple provision regarding technical standardisation and 
operability can be adopted in a general legal framework can be found in the Model 
Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) for pipeline systems, as developed by the Energy Charter 
Secretariat: “The States shall endeavour to harmonise their respective technical standards 
applicable to Project Activities.”947 With such a clause, the parties agree to harmonise 
technical standards.  
Article 12: Appeals Procedures and Dispute Resolution 
With any long-term cooperation, disputes can arise, either between contracting parties or 
between a contracting party and a grid owner (a regulatory dispute). In order to make sure 
that conflicts regarding the legal framework for OWFs will not lead to changes in the 
interpretation of EU law, a so-called disconnection clause is needed. Moreover, it is important 
to provide for an appeals procedure for regulatory disputes as well in a North Sea Agreement, 
since the currently existing course of legal action (ACER Board of Appeal, CJEU) will not be 




947 Energy Charter Secretariat, Model Intergovernmental and Host Government Agreements For Cross-Border 
Pipelines, Second Edition, 2007, art. 11. The Model IGA is available at 
https://energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/Legal/ma2-en.pdf.  














With the fast-growing capacity of offshore wind energy in the North Sea and an increasing 
demand for interconnection between its coastal states, there is a trend towards developing 
offshore electricity infrastructure in the North Sea. Such infrastructure would facilitate the 
cost-effective connection of offshore wind farms as well as increase the possibilities for 
electricity trade between the different coastal states. This is true especially when, rather than 
using separate connections for the offshore wind farms and for the connections between 
countries, a Meshed Offshore Grid (MOG) is developed in which both functions are combined. 
However, the current legal framework on offshore electricity cables was not developed with 
a MOG in mind. As a result, there are several barriers in the current legal framework which 
need to be addressed in order to facilitate the development of a MOG in the North Sea. This 
dissertation answers the central research question “What legal framework should be 
implemented in order to facilitate the cost-effective development of a MOG in the North Sea?”  
This question is answered in three parts. In the first part, the current legal framework for 
offshore electricity infrastructure on international, European and national level is examined. 
In the second part, the various options for legal instruments to address the barriers identified 
in the first part are discussed. In the third part, the concrete measures to substantiate the 
legal instruments recommended in the second part are discussed.  
This dissertation concludes that the legal framework for the MOG should be formed on the 
basis of a mixed partial agreement, a North Sea Agreement. The contents of such an 
agreement are discussed in the dissertation, and an overview of these suggestions is added in 
the Appendix. 
Part I: The Current Legal Framework 
Regarding the current legal framework at international law level, two topics are relevant for 
the MOG: to what extent do states have jurisdiction over a certain asset, and what 
responsibilities do states have under international law, for example with regard to 
environmental protection. Concerning the former, an important finding is that the extent of 
coastal states’ jurisdiction is clear with regard to existing types of electricity cables (namely, 
the cables needed to transport electricity from offshore windfarms (OWFs) to the onshore 
grid and regular interconnector cables between two states) when they are viewed separately. 
However, when these two functions are mixed, forming an offshore grid, the jurisdiction over 
the assets is not clear. This should be addressed in the future legal framework for a MOG. This 
can be done by amending UNCLOS or by concluding a new treaty. Alternatively, the states 
around the North Sea could create legal certainty by agreeing on a common interpretation of 
the existing formulations in UNCLOS and in national legal texts. 
Concerning EU law, it is important to note that EU law can only be applicable as far as the 
coastal states have jurisdiction over the assets. Assuming that the states have resolved the 
issue around jurisdiction described above, EU law will have a large influence on various aspects 
of activities related to the MOG. First, the general principles of the energy market, such as 
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unbundling and third party access, will also apply to the MOG. Moreover, there are several EU 
Directives in the context of maritime spatial planning and environmental law that are relevant 
to the development of offshore electricity infrastructure. Finally, the more technical EU 
Network Codes, that are currently applicable to electricity grids and the internal electricity 
market, should be slightly amended in order to incorporate HVDC technology, which is 
necessary for the operation of a MOG.  
The most important legal barrier at EU law level is that, without any changes, the currently 
applicable rules for interconnectors will also be applicable to the MOG. This would lead to 
various difficulties, such as that the operator of a cable that is used both for interconnection 
and for the connection of OWFs (a ‘hybrid’ cable) cannot give preferential access to the OWFs 
connected to the cable. This is no longer possible under the legislative changes of the ‘Clean 
Energy Package’, but without such access, it is difficult for the OWF owners to market the 
offshore generated electricity under the same circumstances as other sources of electricity. 
Thus, OWFs connected to a MOG will have a significantly worse position than OWFs connected 
to the onshore grid via a radial connection (the status quo) and compared to other types of 
(onshore) renewable energy. This can be addressed in the legal framework for the MOG by 
changing the EU Regulation at this point, by introducing separate rules for ‘hybrid’ cables and 
cables that are part of the MOG, or by introducing a new system of bidding zones, namely 
small bidding zones rather than bidding zones based on the EEZs of the coastal states. 
For the analysis of national legal frameworks of the North Sea coastal states, a comparative 
method is used. It appears that there is a large diversity in the national legal frameworks that 
are relevant for a cross-border offshore grid, such as maritime spatial planning, financial 
support for OWFs and the rules on decommissioning at the end of the lifetime of OWFs. In 
principle, a diversity of rules is not problematic for the MOG, but some degree of compatibility 
between the different systems is required, for example with regard to the permits needed for 
cross-border infrastructure. Interestingly, a natural convergence between the legal 
frameworks of several coastal states is already noticeable. Coastal states seem to copy 
successful features from other states’ legal frameworks in their own legal frameworks, and 
appear to remove or improve unsuccessful features when they copy from other states’ legal 
frameworks. This brings the legal frameworks closer to each other. However, in the new legal 
framework, attention still needs to be paid to the compatibility of the permitting procedures 
for cross-border assets, rules on support schemes, rules on network charges (specifically on 
the issue of charges for generators), and decommissioning obligations.  
In Part I, it thus becomes clear that legal barriers to the development of a MOG exist on 
international, EU and national level that need to be addressed in the new legal framework. 
Part II: A New Legal Framework for Offshore Electricity Infrastructure in the 
North Sea 
In Part II, the different instruments that could be used for the legal framework that applies to 
the MOG are analysed. Within the three levels (international, EU and national), both ‘hard 
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law’ and ‘soft law’ instruments have been considered. However, which legal barrier should be 
addressed with what instrument is not always clear. Therefore, in this dissertation, a decision 
tree has been developed to decide which topic should be addressed at which level. 
Subsequently, this decision tree is used to define which legal instruments should be used for 
the legal framework that applies to the offshore grid. The outcomes of this analysis are the 
following:  
● Concerns about the jurisdiction over parts of the MOG should be addressed by an 
agreement under international law. The same agreement can be used to address the 
governance of the offshore grid. This agreement could serve as a framework 
agreement for the North Sea offshore grid, or for (wider) North Sea energy activities 
that need to be coordinated.  
● Operational issues should be addressed through the existing regime of European 
Network Codes.  
● Inconsistencies and incompatibilities in national legal frameworks for offshore 
developments should be addressed at the national level.  
● Incompatibilities in support scheme frameworks should be addressed by amending 
national law.  
● Finally, the decommissioning of offshore grid components should be addressed by 
developing guidelines at the international level, through IMO or OSPAR, building on 
the existing international law related to decommissioning. 
The agreement mentioned above (referred to as the North Sea Agreement) should function 
as a framework treaty for the legal framework of the MOG. Since EU Member States cannot 
autonomously conclude treaties on topics for which they have conferred competence to the 
EU, the North Sea Agreement should be designed as a mixed partial agreement. This is an 
agreement to which both the coastal states and the EU are signatories – both for their 
respective competences – and which non-EU member states can also join. There are some 
examples of existing mixed partial treaties that are used for the governance of a specific 
geographical region, such as the Alpine and Rhine Conventions, or for a specific topic, such as 
the Schengen Agreement and the Energy Charter Treaty. These examples could be used as a 
blueprint for a North Sea Agreement.  
Part III: Concrete Proposals for the Development of an Offshore Grid 
The third part of this dissertation assesses substantive proposals for the legal framework  
based on a qualitative analysis of different alternatives to address an issue, whilst taking into 
account their economic, legal, socio-political, financial and environmental impact. This 
assessment is performed on the basis of an ‘informal’ cost-benefit approach (CBA), as 
mathematical precision cannot be reached due to the qualitative nature of various parameters 
and/or due to a lack of quantitative data.  
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The result of this analysis is a list of recommendations showing which options will deliver a 
cost-effective development of the offshore grid in the North Sea. The main outcomes of this 
analysis are: 
● Centralised and proactive decision-making are preferred over decentralized and 
reactive decision-making. 
● Regional planning is recommended above country-specific planning. 
● A centralized or zonal permitting system is more likely to lead to a cost-effective 
development of a MOG rather than open-door approaches: in the latter, OWFs may 
be constructed far away from existing grid developments and require the bridging of 
much longer distances for grid connection.  
● Multiple-use of the area between turbines inside an OWF should not be allowed, or 
only allowed for activities which have no or very little negative environmental impact. 
● The responsibility for grid connection of the OWFs should lie with transmission system 
operators (TSOs), who have a long-term perspective on (offshore) grid development.  
● In order to take away legal barriers regarding support schemes, it is recommended to 
decouple the market flows from physical flows. In other words: national legislation 
should not require electricity flows to physically reach the coastal state, as this goes 
against the central principles of the offshore grid, namely that the electricity flows to 
the area where it gives the highest socio-economic benefits. In order to reap the 
benefits of the offshore generated electricity, it is possible to require the electricity to 
be marketed in the coastal state. In the long term, a regionally organised support 
scheme is recommended, in which the states that benefit from the generated 
electricity pay for the support.  
● For the regulatory supervision of the offshore grid, no new entity should be created. 
Rather, the cooperation between national regulatory authorities (NRAs) should be 
enhanced.  
● The differing lifetimes of OWFs and the MOG are a point of attention that needs to be 
addressed in the legal framework for the MOG. At the end of an OWF’s lifetime it is 
recommended that new tenders are organised for the same area, in order to be able 
to use the same MOG connection. Considering the large amount of cables to be 
installed in the context of the MOG, it could be discussed whether a removal obligation 
for cables should be introduced. More research into this topic is necessary, but a 
preliminary analysis shows that cables can be left in place except in ecologically 
sensitive areas.  
The central research question, “What legal framework should be implemented in order to 
facilitate the cost-effective development of a MOG in the North Sea?”, can be answered as 
follows. The legal framework that should be implemented in order to facilitate the cost-
effective development of an offshore electricity grid in the North Sea is a combination of 
various measures. However, as a backbone for the legal framework, a ‘North Sea Agreement’ 
should be adopted. The concrete measures as described in chapter 7 complete the legal 
PP-IDTK-PDF-TEMPLATE-24032020-1601471070490_NEW.indd   302 06-10-2020   09:43
 
278 
framework for now, and are in fact suggestions for the contents of a North Sea Agreement (a 
full list of suggestions can be found in the Appendix).  
Nevertheless, with the offshore wind and offshore grid sectors changing constantly due to 
new economic and technological developments, the legal framework for a MOG should not 
be static but dynamic. It should be adapted to new developments when they occur. New 
developments and new legal barriers can be addressed using the structure provided in this 
dissertation, namely the method for determining which type of legal instrument should 
address a particular issue (chapter 5), and the qualitative assessment framework which 
combines the economic, legal, socio-political, financial and environmental perspective, in 













Met de groei van windenergie op zee in de Noordzee en met een steeds groter wordende 
behoefte aan interconnectie tussen de Noordzeelanden, neemt de interesse toe in het 
ontwikkelen van een offshore elektriciteitsnet. Dergelijke infrastructuur zorgt ervoor dat 
offshore windparken op een kosteneffectieve manier kunnen worden aangesloten op de 
bestaande elektriciteitsnetten en vergroot tegelijkertijd de interconnectiecapaciteit tussen de 
kuststaten, zeker wanneer de twee hierboven genoemde functies (aansluiting van offshore 
windparken en verbinding van kustlanden met elkaar) worden gecombineerd in een 
zogenoemd ‘vermaasd’ elektriciteitsnet (hierna ‘net op zee’). Het huidige juridische kader is 
echter ontwikkeld vóórdat er sprake was van zo’n net op zee, waardoor er nu verschillende 
(juridische) barrières voor het ontwikkelen van een net op zee zijn. Deze barrières moeten 
worden beslecht om te zorgen dat het net op zee kan worden ontwikkeld. De centrale vraag 
van dit proefschrift is dan ook “Wat voor juridisch kader is nodig voor de kosteneffectieve 
ontwikkeling van een elektriciteitsnet in de Noordzee?” 
Deze vraag wordt beantwoord in drie delen. In het eerste deel wordt het huidige juridische 
kader voor offshore elektriciteitsinfrastructuur op internationaal, Europees en nationaal 
niveau besproken. In het tweede deel worden de verschillende juridische instrumenten 
geanalyseerd die aangewend kunnen worden om de (in Deel I) geïdentificeerde barrières weg 
te nemen. In het derde deel worden de concrete maatregelen besproken die kunnen worden 
opgenomen in het juridisch kader voor een offshore elektriciteitsnetwerk. 
Een hoofdbevinding van dit proefschrift is dat er een Noordzeeverdrag zou moeten worden 
gesloten, als ruggengraat voor het juridisch kader voor het net op zee. De inhoud van zo’n 
verdrag wordt besproken in het proefschrift, waarbij in de Appendix een overzicht van de 
mogelijke inhoud van het verdrag wordt gegeven. 
Deel I: Het huidige juridische kader 
In het huidige juridische kader op internationaalrechtelijk niveau zijn twee onderwerpen 
relevant voor het net op zee, namelijk in hoeverre kuststaten jurisdictie hebben over bepaalde 
kabels en installaties, en wat voor verantwoordelijkheden staten hebben onder internationaal 
recht met betrekking tot de bescherming van het maritieme milieu. Met betrekking tot de 
jurisdictie van kuststaten over kabels en installaties is een belangrijke constatering dat de 
juridische situatie van kabels verschilt afhankelijk van hun gebruik, namelijk om windenergie 
naar land te brengen, dan wel om een handelsverbinding tussen twee landen te scheppen. 
Zodra deze functies worden gecombineerd, in het kader van een net op zee, is de rechtspositie 
van kuststaten met betrekking tot deze infrastructuur niet meer duidelijk. Dit heeft dringend 
opheldering nodig. Dit kan gebeuren door UNCLOS te amenderen of door een nieuw verdrag 
te sluiten. Een alternatieve oplossing is dat de Noordzeestaten meer juridische zekerheid 
kunnen creëren door samen een gemeenschappelijke interpretatie van UNCLOS af te spreken.  
Met betrekking tot Europees recht is het ten eerste belangrijk dat Europees recht alleen van 
toepassing is voor zover de kuststaten jurisdictie hebben over de kabels en installaties. 
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Aangenomen dat de kuststaten de (in de vorige alinea genoemde) onduidelijkheid rond 
jurisdictie hebben opgelost, heeft Europees recht een grote invloed op verschillende aspecten 
van het net op zee. Ten eerste zijn de algemene principes van de interne energiemarkt, zoals 
ontvlechting van netbeheer en commerciële activiteiten alsmede derdentoegang tot het 
elektriciteitsnetwerk, ook van toepassing op het net op zee. Daarnaast zijn er meerdere EU 
Richtlijnen in de context van maritieme ruimtelijke ordening en milieurecht van toepassing. 
Vervolgens gelden ook de meer technische EU Netcodes voor elektriciteitsnetwerken en voor 
de elektriciteitsmarkt. Deze Netcodes moeten wel enigszins aangepast worden om te zorgen 
dat de regels ook aansluiten bij de techniek van hoogspanningsgelijkstroom (HVDC), 
aangezien deze techniek de basis vormt van een offshore elektriciteitsnetwerk. De 
belangrijkste juridische barrière op EU niveau is dat de huidige regels voor interconnectoren 
ook van toepassing zullen zijn op het net op zee. Dat leidt tot verschillende problemen. Een 
voorbeeld daarvan is dat de beheerder van een kabel die zowel gebruikt wordt om wind op 
zee aan te sluiten op het landelijke net  en om handel te drijven tussen twee kuststaten (een 
‘hybride’ kabel) geen voorrang mag geven aan de windparken die aangesloten zijn op die 
kabel. Die kabel heeft echter wel een beperkte transmissiecapaciteit, die soms al vergeven 
kan zijn aan handelsstromen in plaats van aan de windenergie. Daardoor hebben deze 
windparken een significant slechtere positie, zowel in vergelijking met offshore windparken 
die met een directe kabel aan het onshore netwerk worden aangesloten (de status quo), als 
in vergelijking met andere hernieuwbare energiebronnen (op land). Dit kan worden opgelost 
door de Europese verordening op dit punt te veranderen door aparte regels op te stellen voor 
‘hybride’ kabels en offshore elektriciteitsnetwerken, of door een nieuw systeem van 
biedzones te introduceren, namelijk kleine lokale biedzones in plaats van biedzones gebaseerd 
op de zeegrenzen van de kuststaten.  
Voor de analyse van de nationale juridische kaders van de Noordzeestaten wordt een 
rechtsvergelijkende methode gebruikt. Er blijkt een grote diversiteit te bestaan tussen de 
juridische kaders van de verschillende kuststaten op het gebied van maritieme ruimtelijke 
ordening, financiële steun voor offshore windparken en de regels rond het verwijderen van 
de windparken aan het eind van hun levensduur. In principe is een diversiteit aan regels tussen 
de verschillende staten niet problematisch voor een net op zee, maar op onderdelen moet er 
wel enige afstemming zijn tussen de verschillende regels, bijvoorbeeld met betrekking tot de 
nu variërende vergunningseisen voor grensoverschrijdende infrastructuur. Een interessante 
ontwikkeling is dat er reeds een natuurlijke convergentie tussen de juridische kaders van de 
kuststaten zichtbaar is. Kuststaten lijken de succesvolle onderdelen van elkaars juridische 
kader over te nemen, terwijl de onsuccesvolle elementen worden aangepast of verwijderd. 
Hierdoor komen de nationale juridische kaders dichter bij elkaar. Toch moet er in het 
voorgestelde nieuwe juridische kader voor een net op zee meer aandacht besteed worden 
aan de afstemming van de regels in verschillende kuststaten met betrekking tot de 
vergunningverlening voor grensoverschrijdende projecten, financiële steun voor de 
windparken, regels rond de netwerktarieven voor elektriciteitsproducenten en regels rond het 
weghalen van kabels aan het eind van hun levensduur.  
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In Deel I zijn kortom verschillende juridische barrières geïdentificeerd, zowel op 
internationaal, EU- als nationaal niveau. Om deze barrières te beslechten is een nieuw 
juridisch kader voor het net op zee vereist. 
Deel II: Een nieuw juridisch kader voor een elektriciteitsnet in de Noordzee 
In Deel II worden de verschillende juridische instrumenten geanalyseerd, waarmee de eerder 
geïdentificeerde barrières kunnen worden opgelost. Binnen de drie rechtsniveaus 
(internationaal, EU en nationaal recht) worden zowel harde als zachte (niet juridisch-
dwingende) instrumenten beoordeeld. Welk instrument gebruikt moet worden om welke 
barrière op te lossen is niet altijd duidelijk. Daarom is in dit proefschrift een beslisboom 
ontwikkeld waarmee besloten kan worden welk onderwerp door welk juridisch instrument 
aangepakt kan worden. Deze beslisboom wordt daarna toegepast op de barrières voor het 
offshore elektriciteitsnetwerk. Daar komt het volgende uit: 
● Onzekerheden inzake de jurisdictie over delen van het offshore elektriciteitsnet 
moeten worden verholpen door middel van een verdrag onder internationaal recht. 
Hetzelfde verdrag kan gebruikt worden om het beheer van het elektriciteitsnetwerk te 
regelen (bijvoorbeeld omtrent de verantwoordelijkheden en de 
besluitvormingsprocedures). Dit verdrag kan ofwel specifiek gelden voor het 
Noordzeenet  ofwel gebruikt worden om een breder palet aan energie-gerelateerde 
onderwerpen voor de Noordzee te regelen. 
● Operationele problemen zouden binnen het bestaande kader van Europese netcodes 
moeten worden opgelost. 
● Inconsistenties en slechte afstemming in nationale juridische kaders zouden moeten 
worden aangepakt in de nationale juridische kaders zelf. 
● De nationale  subsidieregimes voor offshore windparken zouden op elkaar moeten 
worden afgestemd door de nationale juridische kaders op dit punt aan te passen. 
● Het weghalen van onderdelen van het offshore elektriciteitsnet aan het einde van de 
levensduur zou moeten worden gecoördineerd door richtlijnen op internationaal 
niveau, bijvoorbeeld via de IMO of OSPAR, voortbordurend op bestaand recht ten 
aanzien van dit onderwerp. 
 
Het hierboven genoemde verdrag (in dit proefschrift: the North Sea Agreement) zou een 
raamwerkverdrag moeten zijn dat  het juridische kader biedt voor het net op zee. Omdat EU-
lidstaten niet meer autonoom verdragen kunnen sluiten over onderwerpen waarvoor zij de 
competentie aan de EU hebben overgedragen, moet het verdrag vormgegeven worden als 
een zogenaamde mixed partial agreement: een verdrag waar zowel de lidstaten zelf, als de 
EU, als derde landen (niet-EU lidstaten) aan mee kunnen doen. Er zijn enkele voorbeelden van 
dergelijke verdragen die gebruikt werden voor een bepaald geografisch vastomlijnd gebied, 
zoals het Alpenverdrag en het Rijnverdrag, en verdragen die worden gebruikt voor het regelen 
van één specifiek thema, zoals het Schengenverdrag en het Energiehandvestverdrag. Deze 
bestaande voorbeelden kunnen dienen als blauwdruk voor een Noordzeeverdrag. 
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Deel III: Concrete voorstellen voor de ontwikkeling van een net op zee 
In het derde deel van het proefschrift worden concrete voorstellen ten aanzien van het 
juridisch kader voor een net op zee getoetst aan hun economische, juridische, sociaal-
politieke, financiële en milieu-impact. De analyse is gebaseerd op een ‘informele’ kosten-
baten analyse (KBA), aangezien wiskundige precisie op veel van de thema’s niet mogelijk is, 
door de aard van de thema’s en/of omdat er simpelweg niet genoeg data beschikbaar zijn.  
Het resultaat van deze kwalitatieve analyse is een lijst met aanbevelingen die zorgen voor een 
kosteneffectieve ontwikkeling van een Noordzee-elektriciteitsnetwerk. De belangrijkste 
uitkomsten van de analyse zijn: 
● Gecentraliseerde en proactieve besluitvorming hebben de voorkeur boven 
gedecentraliseerde en reactieve besluitvorming; 
● Regionale planning wordt geprefereerd boven landenspecifieke planning; 
● Een gecentraliseerd of op zones gebaseerd vergunningensysteem draagt eerder bij aan 
een kosteneffectieve ontwikkeling van het Noordzee-net dan open-door procedures 
(waarin de ontwikkelaars zelf de plaats kiezen waar zij een windmolenpark willen 
bouwen), omdat in het laatste geval de windparken ver weg kunnen komen te liggen 
van de bestaande netwerkinfrastructuur; 
● Dubbel gebruik van de ruimte in een offshore windpark (bijvoorbeeld voor aquacultuur 
of visserij) zou niet moeten worden toegestaan of alleen als er geen of weinig 
negatieve milieu-impact te verwachten valt (wat per individueel geval beoordeeld 
moet worden); 
● De verantwoordelijkheid voor het aansluiten van de windparken zou moeten liggen bij 
de netbeheerders, die immers een langetermijnperspectief hebben op de ontwikkeling 
van een offshore elektriciteitsnetwerk; 
● Wat betreft de subsidie voor offshore windparken wordt  aanbevolen om niet langer 
het vereiste te hanteren dat de opgewekte elektriciteit fysiek het netwerk van de 
kuststaat bereikt in wiens gebied het windpark ligt. Dat is nu soms nog wel het geval, 
maar dit gaat in tegen het principe van een vermaasd elektriciteitsnetwerk, namelijk 
dat de elektriciteit vloeit naar de plaats waar er de meeste behoefte aan is, dus waar 
het sociaal-economische voordeel het grootst is. Op de lange termijn wordt 
aanbevolen om een regionaal subsidiemechanisme te maken, waarin de landen die 
profiteren van de opgewekte elektriciteit ook betalen voor de subsidie op dat moment. 
Dat kan via een nacalculatie gebeuren. 
● Voor het regulatoire toezicht op het offshore elektriciteitsnetwerk is het niet nodig om 
een nieuwe toezichthouder te creëren. In plaats daarvan zou de samenwerking tussen 
de verschillende nationale toezichthouders van de elektriciteitsnetwerken verder 
versterkt moeten worden. 
● Er is meer onderzoek nodig naar de milieu-impact rond het verwijderen van 
netwerkonderdelen aan het eind van hun levensduur (de levensduur van het 
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elektriciteitsnetwerk is veel langer dan die van de windparken zelf). Op basis van de 
huidige informatie wordt aanbevolen dat een windpark tegen het einde van zijn 
levensduur wordt vervangen door een nieuw windpark in hetzelfde gebied, waardoor 
dezelfde netwerkinfrastructuur hergebruikt kan worden. Verder zou het, gezien de 
grote hoeveelheid kabels die de komende jaren in de zee zal worden neergelegd, 
besproken kunnen worden of een verwijderingsplicht voor onderzeese kabels moet 
worden ingevoerd. Er is meer onderzoek nodig naar dit onderwerp, maar het zou 
bijvoorbeeld kunnen worden voorgesteld dat kabels in principe kunnen blijven liggen 
behalve in ecologisch gevoelige gebieden. 
 
De centrale onderzoeksvraag, “Wat voor juridisch kader is nodig voor de kosteneffectieve 
ontwikkeling van een elektriciteitsnet in de Noordzee?” kan als volgt beantwoord worden. Het 
juridische kader dat nodig is om de kosteneffectieve ontwikkeling van het Noordzeenet te 
faciliteren is een combinatie van verschillende maatregelen. Het Noordzeeverdrag dat in dit 
proefschrift geïntroduceerd wordt zou moeten dienen als raamwerk voor het juridisch kader. 
De concrete maatregelen die vervolgens genomen moeten worden, uitgewerkt in hoofdstuk 
7, completeren het juridisch kader voorlopig. Deze maatregelen zijn suggesties om op te 
nemen in het Noordzeeverdrag (waarbij een volledige lijst van suggesties in de Appendix te 
vinden is).  
 
Aangezien de offshore windsector en offshore elektriciteitssector zich constant ontwikkelen, 
moet het juridisch kader niet statisch maar juist dynamisch zijn. Het moet derhalve aangepast 
kunnen worden aan nieuwe ontwikkelingen. Nieuwe ontwikkelingen alsmede nieuwe 
barrières die opkomen kunnen vervolgens met dezelfde, in dit proefschrift gebruikte, 
structuur geanalyseerd worden. Ten eerste gaat het er dan om welk juridisch instrument 
gebruikt kan worden voor welk probleem. Ten tweede kan dan hetzelfde vergelijkingskader 
gebruikt worden als in hoofdstuk 7, waarbij voor de oplossing van een probleem verschillende 
alternatieven worden vergeleken op basis van hun economische, juridische, sociaal-politieke, 
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